Sunday, 2 October 2016

Lashon Hara- Is it that hard?



At the time of the year most appropriate for introspection, it may seem that 98% of genuine Torah-adhering Jews can be split into two groups. There are those who have given up on keeping the laws of lashon hara, instead looking for other area to improve in. And there are those who kid themselves that this year will be different.

My aim in this post is to make this picture slightly more accurate, and to examine what can be done to improve the situation. I will start by giving some historical background.

Responding to the needs of the time

The gemara quotes a statement that all Jews are guilty of lashon hara, and immediately objects that it is not possible to say such a thing. Rather, the meaning must be that all Jews are guilty of avak lashon hara (literally the dust of lashon hara).[1] In the same vein, the gemara also lists this as one of the aveiros that people do not manage to avoid on a daily basis.[2]

To summarise, the gemara tells us that the main prohibition of lashon hara is something that people can and do adhere to, but all fall in to the trap of speaking in a way that is incorrectly perceived as being ok. Clearly one of the first things that needs to be done to help this situation is to learn the rules in detail.

With this in mind it seems very surprising that the Shulchan Aruch does not discuss these laws.[3] It is quite likely that this omission further added to the ignorance in this matter, compounding the problem.

The Chafetz Chaim was atune to all of this, and decided that the sefer that Am Yisrael needed the most was a compendium of the laws of lashon hara. The other sefarim that he went on to write also dealt with issues he felt that the generation needed, in contrast to most of the sefarim that we have where the topic was chosen primarily based on the interests of the author.

Very few sefarim have as big an impact as the sefer Chafetz Chaim. For many years there has not been a child with a Jewish education who is not aware of the prohibition of lashon hara, and even many of the detailed laws that appear in the sefer are well known. Without detailed knowledge of the situation before the sefer was published it is hard to gauge what improvement was caused, but it is safe to assume that it was significant.

The situation today

As stated before, despite the best efforts of the Chafetz Chaim there is much more that needs to be done. One thing is clear to me- simply teaching the code of the Chafetz Chaim is not enough. This method has already been implemented for years, and all we can hope to achieve by it is preservation of the status quo.

In my view, today’s challenge is very different to that of the generation of the Chafetz Chaim. At a time when ignorance of the basic concepts of lashon hara was prevalent, the most important thing was to publicise the extent of the prohibition as much as possible, which the Chafetz Chaim did by writing a relatively long and stringent sefer. Nowadays, what is needed is a deeper understanding of the same basic concepts.

How can we achieve this better understanding? The more learned can go through the words of the Chafetz Chaim together with his explanations and derivations in the Be’er Mayim Chayim. His sources can be learned in detail, and this way the laws can be understood better. On occasion it may also be possible to understand these sources differently to the  Chafetz Chaim.

For those who are not yet comfortable enough at their ability to do this, there is another option. There is another compilation that includes the laws of lashon hara, in a clear, precise and concise language. The Mishne Torah of the Rambam is the only known complete compilation of all the halachos of Chazal, with no exceptions[4] (at least in his view).

The Rambam sums up all the rules of lashon hara in six paragraphs, at the beginning of the seventh perek of Hilchos De’os. Many years ago I heard an idea from R’ Zevi Friedlander (thank you wherever you are) that for those who find the Chafetz Chaim too much to take on, studying and trying to adhere to the Rambam’s laws is something more realistic. I believe that in addition to this it also helps to add clarity.

Some examples

The gemara tells us that after lashon hara has been said in the presence of three people (‘Apei Tlasa’) there is no prohibition.[5] The Rambam quotes this leniency, clarifies and adds a condition:

אחד המספר בלשון הרע בפני חברו או שלא בפניו, והמספר דברים שגורמים אם נשמעו איש מפי איש להזיק חבירו בגופו או בממונו ואפילו להצר לו או להפחידו, הרי זה לשון הרע. ואם נאמרו דברים אלו בפני שלשה כבר נשמע הדבר ונודע, ואם סיפר הדבר אחד מן השלשה פעם אחרת אין בו משום לשון הרע. והוא שלא יתכוין להעביר הקול ולגלותו יותר.

(דעות ז, ה)

Whether one tells lashon hara in the presence of his friend or not, or if he relates things that could cause physical or property damage or even to cause him distress or to scare him if it is passed on by word of mouth, this is considered lashon hara. But if these words were already said in the presence of three, the matter has already been heard and become known. Accordingly, if one of these three related the matter on another occasion, there is no issue of lashon hara provided that he does not intend to spread the rumour and reveal it further.



The Rambam explains that lashon hara is any passing on of information that could cause any kind of distress to someone else that he would not have experienced otherwise. It follows that if the matter is already public knowledge, the prohibition does not exist. However, as inevitably there are exceptions to the rule that what is known by three is known by all, the leniency given by the gemara cannot be followed blindly or used as an excuse for trying to get at someone.

In contrast, the Chafetz Chaim devotes an entire chapter of thirteen paragraphs to explaining the rules of the leniency of ‘Apei Tlasa’.[6] Without meaning any criticism whatsoever, for varying reasons much of this chapter is hard for people to relate to.

The first major point that the Chafetz Chaim makes is that only one who heard the lashon hara personally in the presence of three can use this leniency, otherwise he has no right to believe someone who told him that it is in fact public knowledge.[7] I have no argument with this, but in our generation it is (albeit sadly) rarely relevant. In the age of the internet and social media, most things are public knowledge virtually instantaneously.[8]

The second restriction added is that if the three people are God-fearing individuals who keep to the laws of lashon hara, the leniency does not apply.[9] The proof to this is from a Mishna which states that a dayan who was in the minority must not tell the losing litigant that he ruled in his favour,[10] even if many dayanim were present at the time the verdict was given.

This proof is by no means inarguable, as it would be logical to demand higher standards from dayanim. Nevertheless, the logic behind this restriction seems compelling.

However, the Chafetz Chaim adds that even if one of those present is God-fearing there is no leniency, and possibly even if he is not God-fearing but is a friend of the person the lashon hara was said about. This limitation is a stretch, and it seems more probable that the requirement of three people compensates for the possibility that some of them will keep the matter to themselves. Certainly, taking on the basic requirements codified by the Rambam is a better alternative than giving up entirely because of the stringencies of the Chafetz Chaim.[11]

Where we can really make a difference

The benefits achieved by taking on a limited undertaking in this area can be far-reaching. Although I have argued that nowadays some of the restrictions made by the Chafetz Chaim are irrelevant, for the same reason the severity of speaking lashon hara that is genuinely prohibited is often greatly increased. I will bring two examples to illustrate this.

When it was revealed that a Knesset member had made inappropriate comments to a woman a long time previously, there was rightly widespread agreement that he had to resign. Those entrusted with running the country should be of high moral calibre, and if he had continued to serve as if there was no problem it would have given off a bad message.

Less discussed was the issue of whether it was right for the matter to be revealed in the first place. The halacha is very clear here- as long as there is no-one in any danger of suffering further damage it is forbidden to say anything. While it is not for us to judge the recipient of the inappropriate comments who had to see this person achieving respect and power, we also cannot excuse what she did. The public gained nothing significant from the termination of this man’s political career.

The second case is that of a high-ranked soldier accused of rape. Here we cannot know whether there is truth behind the accusations, and therefore we cannot blame the accuser. If it is true she certainly had the obligation to report the matter to the police in order to protect others.[12]

However, we must object strongly to the court allowing the name of the accused to be made public. Whether or not he is guilty, his career has been destroyed. Just as the court recognised that the accuser needed protection and has remained nameless, the same protection should have been given to the accused.

Conclusion

Lashon Hara remains one of the major destroyers of society. If we can follow the example of the Chafetz Chaim and stay in tune with the needs of the times, we can go a long way to building a world that can flourish.


[1] Although it is quite clear that the gemara is referring to something prohibited, and not merely a stringency.
[2] Bava Basra 164b-165a
[3] See Magen Avraham 156:2 who mentions lashon hara in his list of the omissions of the Shulchan Aruch. I do not know how the Shulchan Aruch decided what to include and what not.
[4] See his introduction to the Mishne Torah.
[5] Arachin 16a. Although Tosfos explain this gemara in an entirely different way, they surely agree that when there is no doubt that the damage already has been done and nothing is being added, there can be no prohibition.
[6] Hilchos Lashon Hara, Klal 2
[7] Ibid. halacha 4
[8] Similarly, the stipulation made in halacha 6 that the leniency applies only within the same city that the lashon hara was heard, is irrelevant in our generation. The same is true for many other examples.
[9] Halacha 5
[10] Sanhedrin 29a
[11] Although it is certainly better to refrain from speaking in a derogatory manner for no positive purpose. See the Rambam’s commentary to Pirkei Avos (1:16) where he divides speech into five categories, and includes any purposeless speech in the ‘repulsive’ category.
[12] See Klal 10 of the Chafetz Chaim for details of this. Admittedly this section is not clear in the Rambam, although generally one can derive the rules from basic common sense.

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