Objections to
the Rambam's View
In the last post, we mentioned briefly that the Rambam was accused of denying that there would ever be a physical Resurrection of the Dead. We also explained how his view of a temporary physical resurrection might fit with pesukim in Daniel. We now need to deal with some of the other objections raised by the Rambam's opponents, and make some analysis of this opposing view.
We first must quote the comment of the Ra'avad, referring to his perception of the Rambam's position: "In my eyes, the words of this man are close to (those of) one who says that the Resurrection of the Dead is not for bodies but for souls alone. By my life, this was not the intention of Chazal!" He continues to refute the possibility that Chazal's words regarding the Resurrection were meant as a parable.[1]
Either the Ra'avad did not understand the position of the Rambam accurately, or he was worried that others may misunderstand it in such a way. Either way, there is no real dispute here and therefore no analysis is required.[2]
For representatives of the opposing view who write clearly and at length, I will take the Ramban[3] and the Rama[4] (R' Meir HaLevi Abulafia, 1170-1244, Spain). They both show that Chazal use the terms 'Techiyas HaMeisim' and 'Olam HaBa' interchangeably in many places,[5] clearly indicating that the terms are synonymous or at least that the events will happen concurrently.
Furthermore, the Rambam's assertion that those who will rise physically from their graves will eventually die a second death is in explicit contradiction to the words of Chazal. Quoting Tana d'bei Eliyahu, we are told that the dead who will be resurrected in the future will not revert 'to their dust'.[6]
Presumably, the Rambam would contend that this statement of Tana d'bei Eliyahu is just one view within Chazal. As mentioned in part 1, Chazal also tell us explicitly that in the World to Come there is no eating or drinking. This implies that our eventual destiny is a non-physical world, and that any physical resurrection can only be temporary.
Faced with this dispute within Chazal, the Rambam naturally sided with the view that seemed most rational to him.[7] A physical existence is not necessary in order to receive the ultimate good that Hashem has to give us; in order to come closer to the non-physical it is surely more logical for us to shed our own physical impediments.
Can there be eternal physical life?
The opponents of the Rambam maintain that the words of Tana d'bei Eliyahu, that the physical Resurrection of the Dead is forever, represents the unanimous position of Chazal. In the physical World to Come, although there will be no eating and drinking, we will still have mouths and the rest of our bodies.[8] When a righteous person dies, they go to an interim 'world of souls' called Gan Eden until the time for the World to Come, the place for ultimate reward.
This position raises several philosophical conundrums:
1) What would we need a physical body for if the basic physical functions will not be required?
2) An eternal physical existence would appear to be a contradiction in terms - all physical bodies we know of have an 'expiry date.'
3) If it is possible for a physical body to last forever, it is presumably also possible for a physical body to have always existed (at least theoretically). If this is the case, how do we know that our own world had a beginning?
I hate to disappoint, but I don't really have answers to any of these questions.
The Ramban addresses the first question in a way so cryptic that I am not able to even to begin to reproduce it here.
The Rama could be construed as answering the second question by saying that nothing is beyond Hashem's capability. If this is what he means, he would appear to be missing the point. Even Hashem cannot create something paradoxical (e.g. a triangle with four corners), and this is no contradiction to His Omnipotence.[9] If an eternal physical body is a paradoxical concept, it is no different.[10]
The third question would be less problematic for the Rambam, as he contends that there is in fact no philosophical proof that our world had a beginning and we know this only from the Torah.[11] However, despite having no proof for this, I have a feeling that the Ramban would not agree with the Rambam in this regard. It seems more probable that he would have sided with the Chovos Halvavos[12] or with R' Chisdai Kreskas[13] who do offer philosophical proofs.[14]
In summary
The position of the Rambam may be less well grounded in Chazal, but to me at least it is far easier to understand philosophically. The greatest difficulty I have with the alternative is that there seems to be no need for a physical existence in the place of ultimate spiritual reward.[15]
Does it matter?
It is clear that although belief in the Resurrection is a basic tenet of our religion, inaccurate perceptions of the nature of the Resurrection are not considered heretical. The final consensus even within the camp opposed to the Rambam's view was that the Rambam remained within the limits of acceptable Jewish belief. However, from what we have seen above, this camp did attach significant importance to the attempt to verify the truth about the Resurrection. The attack on the Rambam's position was at least as strong as the halachic disputes that exist between the Rambam and other rishonim.
By contrast, the Rambam writes that he originally saw no point giving any explanation of what the Resurrection involves, as one only has to believe in it (without any of its details). Only once accused of unbelief in the Resurrection was it necessary for him to clarify his views, and even then, he added a section to Igeres Techiyas Hameisim (Treatise on Resurrection) in order not to leave it "devoid of useful new material." The Rambam does not appear at all concerned if others wish to believe in a different format of resurrection.
This difference may stem from the fact that while for his opponents, the Resurrection is our end purpose, for the Rambam it is merely a stepping-stone. After all, the Rambam did provide a description of the World to Come in Mishne Torah.
However, I believe that it goes deeper than this. The Rambam did not consider the details of what will happen in the Messianic age to be a fundamental part of our religion,[16] and the same would seem to hold for the Resurrection. It is far more important for us to concentrate on the here and now, perfecting ourselves in the world that we have currently. It was important to stress that the World to Come will not be physical, but only so that we should realise that even in this world, our main focus should not be the physical.
On the other hand, the Rambam's opponents seem to attach far greater importance to the physical aspects of this world. This difference has far-reaching consequences in the world today,[17] perhaps explaining the strong feeling expressed.
[1] Hilchos Teshuva 8:2
[2] Further on (8:8), the Ra'avad accuses the Rambam of disputing
Chazal's statement that the world will be destroyed and then rebuilt (see
Sanhedrin 97a). Based on this statement, the Ra'avad disputes the Rambam's
contention that The World to Come already exists now. Thus there is in fact a
clear point of dispute between the Rambam and the Ra'avad, although perhaps not
one with fundamental repercussions.
[3] Toras HaAdam, Sha'ar HaG'mul
[4] Igros HaRama, simanim 10 and 33-46.
[5] Perhaps the clearest is in Sanhedrin 90a.
[6] Sanhedrin 92a
[7] Even had there not been any view of Chazal supporting him, it is
far from obvious that the Rambam would have seen himself obligated to the words
of Tana d'bei Eliyahu. See “Divine providence, free will and Coincidence”.
[8] They even claim that the statement of Chazal regarding eating and
drinking is further support to their view; had Chazal meant that there will be
no physical existence at all they would have said so explicitly.
[9] See Moreh Nevuchim 3:15, Shu"t HaRashba 1:418 (in case anyone
needed a 'kosher' source for the obvious).
[10] One might want to argue that just because we have never seen
anything physical that is everlasting, this does not mean that it is inherently
impossible. This is clearly not an argument that can be tested using human
capabilities (i.e. it is not falsifiable, and we should therefore be sceptical
about its truth). However, even if this were true, these kind of 'physical
entities' would be in a completely new category and incomparable to the ones we
know of. Thus the Rambam would still be right to say that the World to Come is
not physical, if we define 'physical' as having the physical properties known
to us.
[11] Moreh Nevuchim 1:71
[12] Sha’ar Hayichud, ch. 5-6
[13] Or Hashem, Klal 1 at length.
[14] The Rambam was at least in part influenced by Aristotle in this
regard – while dismissing Aristotle's proofs for an eternal universe he could
not believe that Aristotle would have believed something that was
philosophically impossible. The Ramban certainly did not share this degree of
respect for Aristotle, or any of the Greek philosophers.
[15] If the ultimate reward in store for us was physical (as would
appear from statements of some other religions), this would not be difficult.
However, to the best of my knowledge, this is not the view of any of the Jewish
theologians and philosophers.
[16] Hilchos Melachim 12:2
[17] See for example Lust
- permitted and forbidden, where I present a philosophical explanation
of the Torah's view of homosexuality, based on the Rambam's position. I am unable
to provide an alternative understanding based on the opposing view, in the same
way that I have been unable to defend this view philosophically here.
