Thursday 30 May 2019

New Chagim


A couple of years ago, in Zionism and Yom Ha'atzmaut, I wrote about the philosophical side of what we have to celebrate regarding the events of recent times. I intentionally left out the halachic aspects of the ways in which we can or should celebrate, as this often clouds the main issue.

Now, enough time has passed and I feel free to write about the unrelated issues of the nature of new festivals, who has the right to institute them and which parts of our tefilos (if any) can be changed in their honour. At least on a theoretical level, these questions are important even for those who may feel that they have nothing to celebrate.

Megilas Ta'anis

In the times of the second Beis HaMikdash (and slightly beforehand), the Chachamim forbade fasting (and in some instances also eulogising) on various days when there was something to celebrate. A list of these days was compiled and named Megilas Ta'anis, as the main institution was the prohibition of fasting.

On most of these days, there was no obligation to do anything positive to celebrate. The Tana'im and Amora'im disputed whether or not the laws of Megilas Ta'anis apply even after the Beis HaMikdash was destroyed, and the final halacha is that it is obsolete with the two exceptions of Chanuka and Purim. As we know, these two festivals do have positive mitzvos, and they were retained because of the fame of the miracles that happened.[1]

The gemara also tells us that according to the accepted view that Megilas Ta'anis no longer applies, certainly we do not add new celebrations. Thus the institution of a festival on the day that the writing of Hashem's name on business documents ceased must have been while the Beis HaMikdash still stood. Similarly, those who declared a festival on the day of the rescinding a decree against Torah learning, bris milah and Shabbos, must have subscribed to the view that Megilas Ta'anis is still in force.[2]

It would appear from here that as long until the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, we should not institute new festivals. Even if there is a theoretically legitimate reason to celebrate, it does not justify further distraction from the mourning we are supposed to feel for what we are missing.

However, the Tana R' Yossi says that Megilas Ta'anis became obsolete for a different reason. After the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash, these former celebrations of events connected to it have themselves become a source of mourning.[3] This would seem to imply that celebration of happenings unrelated to the Beis HaMikdash is indeed appropriate. How can we reconcile this contradiction?

The Aroch La'ner[4] explains that as most of the festivals in Megilas Ta'anis were in celebration of events connected to the Beis HaMikdash, it became obsolete when the Beis HaMikdash was destroyed. Although a few of these festivals were not connected, as they were part of Megilas Ta'anis they were also discontinued. The corollary of this is that nowadays there is no problem in adding new festivals – although obviously it would not make any sense to add them to Megilas Ta'anis.[5]

Voluntary Chagim

The Pri Chadash[6] discusses those in his time who instituted festivals celebrating various miracles that happened to them and does invoke the rule that "if the original festivals were ceased, how can we add new ones?!" He therefore concludes that these festivals and celebratory meals cannot be obligatory, even if one observed them for many years.[7] However, it should be noted that even according to the Pri Chadash, we are perfectly entitled to celebrate days like this on a voluntary basis.

Furthermore, it is hard to understand the rationale behind the view of the Pri Chadash. If the leaders of the generation feel that it is appropriate to institute a festival, what limits their authority to do so?[8] I believe that he learned from the gemara that the revoking of Megilas Ta'anis contained an implicit decree that no new chagim could be made until the rebuilding of the Beis HaMikdash.[9] As with other rabbinic decrees, this can only be rescinded by a court of higher wisdom and numbers.[10]

This understanding of the gemara is certainly not obvious. The language used, that Megilas Ta'anis ceased (בטלה), doesn't sound like a beis din issued an active decree to revoke it. It also seems improbable that the Tana'im and Amora'im disputed whether such a historical event occurred. Neither is there any indication that an explicit decree was made to prevent the institution of new festivals.

Therefore I believe that even if we reject the explanation of the Aroch La'ner and find some other resolution to the contradiction in the gemara, the principle of not adding new festivals could only have been a policy and not a strict rule. If the leaders of the generation feel that this policy needs to be changed because of the needs of the times, they have every right to do so.

That being said, obligating people to celebrate a new festival is much less straightforward. As I have pointed out many times before, the only ones who have the power to make binding institutions on the entire Jewish people are the Sanhedrin or its equivalent (all or virtually all the Rabbis of the generation).[11] In the absence of such an authority, although we are all obligated to thank Hashem for the good he has given us, the manner in which we do so remains a matter of personal choice.[12]

Hallel

Based on the above, any festivals instituted by lesser authorities than the Sanhedrin or its equivalent must not contain any form of observance that requires a formal institution. For example, celebratory meals are clearly appropriate as they do not require any formal institution. By contrast, adding a new 'mitzvah' with its own beracha would not be possible.[13]

The 'grey area' is when we have an existing mitzvah which we want to extend; one example of this being the reciting of Hallel. While adding days on which we say Hallel poses no halachic questions if done for a good reason,[14] we cannot just say extra brachos without establishing the halachic basis for this. Saying a beracha where none is required is a severe transgression.[15]

In Brachos on Mitzvos, I already explained at length that this situation exists regarding Hallel on Rosh Chodesh, a custom started by the people as an extension of the Rabbinic institution of saying Hallel on Yom Tov. The rishonim dispute whether or not the beracha is also extended to Rosh Chodesh.

For those who say it, should the status of Hallel on Yom Ha'atzmaut and Yom Yerushalayim be different to that of Hallel on Rosh Chodesh? One possible reason to distinguish is due to the fact that in contrast to Rosh Chodesh, the custom of saying Hallel on Yom Ha'atzmaut and Yom Yerushalayim has not spread to the entire Orthodox Jewish world. One could argue that only such a widespread custom could justify a beracha being recited, as only such customs may become compulsory.[16]

However, taking a closer look at the history of Hallel on Rosh Chodesh reveals that in the times of the gemara, this custom was not universal. The gemara relates that Rav, who lived in Eretz Yisrael, was not aware of the custom until he visited Bavel.[17] Rabeinu Tam, one of the main proponents of saying a beracha on Hallel on Rosh Chodesh, assumes that even then a beracha was recited.[18]

To summarise, those who don't say a beracha on Hallel on Rosh Chodesh should certainly also not do so on Yom Ha'atzmaut and Yom Yerushalayim. Those who do say a beracha on Hallel on Rosh Chodesh certainly have some justification for doing the same on Yom Ha'atzmaut and Yom Yerushalayim.

My personal practice is to say a beracha on Hallel on Rosh Chodesh, although as I hinted in the above post, I am not 100% convinced that this is correct. Due to this uncertainty, added to the possible distinction between Rosh Chodesh and the newer festivals, I do not say a beracha on Hallel on these days. However, here too I am far from convinced of the correctness of this position and I am open to reconsidering in the future.

Yom Yerushalayim Same'ach!


[1] Rosh HaShana 18b-19b.
[2] Ibid. This festival was a later addition to Megilas Ta'anis, after the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash.
[3] Ibid. 19b.
[4] R' Yaakov Etlinger, Germany 1798-1871.
[5] I have found only one other commentator who deals with this contradiction in the gemara – the Chasam Sofer writes that in fact the conclusion of the gemara rejects the earlier premise that we don't institute any new festivals after the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash. He argues that on the contrary, there is a Biblical obligation to celebrate and praise Hashem on a day that we were saved from danger (Shu"t Chasam Sofer 1:191). I find this explanation more difficult, but either way the halachic conclusion is the same.
[6] R' Chizkiyah di Silo, 1656 (Livorno) – 1695 (Yerushalayim).
[7] The Chasam Sofer quoted above rejects this ruling at length.
[8] Obviously, if those who attempt to impose a festival are not the legitimate authorities, there decision carries no weight. Such people have no right to institute anything. The Pri Chadash clearly means that even those who do have the authority to make other institutions cannot declare a new chag.
[9] Although see B'ikvei HaTzon siman 32, where R' Hershel Shachter explains that adding any festivals not related to the building of the Beis HaMikdash is a violation of the prohibition of Ba'al Tosif (adding new mitzvos. Despite this, he justifies the celebration of Yom Ha'atzmaut as it appears to be the start of the process leading to the rebuilding of the Beis HaMikdash). Without getting into a lengthy discussion of the parameters of this prohibition, I find this argument hard to defend. Adding a new festival should be no worse than the addition of the fourth beracha in Birkat HaMazon.
[10] Mishna, Eduyos 1:5.
[12] Nevertheless, based on the principle of ברוב עם הדרת מלך, finding a way that as many people can identify with as possible is far superior to each person doing his own thing.
[13] We can only make a beracha on a compulsory mitzvah, due to the appearance of the word וצונו (= He commanded us).
[14] Chazal compare saying Hallel to blasphemy (Shabbos 118b), as the mitzvah is belittled and made into a mere song (Rashi). Some have claimed that any reciting of Hallel when halacha does not require it falls under this category of blasphemy (see Nefesh HaRav, page 97), although this position is hard to justify when there is a specific reason for saying Hallel on that day (see Yabia Omer 6, Orach Chaim siman 41).
[15] See Rambam, Hilchos Brachos 1:15.
[16] As explained in Brachos on Mitzvos, some take the position that even these minhagim are never really compulsory unless endorsed by the Sanhedrin, although these rishonim also maintain that a beracha is not said on Hallel on Rosh Chodesh.
[17] Ta'anis 28b.
[18] Sefer HaYashar, Chidushim siman 537. Also quoted by Tosfos in Sukkah 44b and by many other Rishonim.

Friday 10 May 2019

Wet Wipes on Shabbos


I'm not sure why, but probably the halachic question that I have been asked the most often over the years is what my position is on baby wipes on Shabbos. I believe that the answer is relatively straightforward, and most of what I have to say has already been written by others. However, as it involves clarification of some basic concepts which I have not seen elsewhere in English, I thought it would be worthwhile to devote a post to the topic.

Dash, Melaben and Sechita

This first section will be well known to those who have studied the relevant topics, so those who don't need a reminder please feel free to skip to the next sub-heading or the one after it.

Probably most people know that sechita ('squeezing out') can be forbidden on Shabbos, although many will not be able to identify which of the 39 categories of melachos it fits into. In fact, there are two potential candidates, either of which may be relevant in different circumstances.

The first is the melacha of dash (threshing). As the purpose of this melacha is extracting food from its unwanted parts, one derivative (with the same severity as the primary melacha) is the squeezing of olives and grapes to extract the oil/juice.[1] The melacha is only relevant when there is a desired product which is categorically different from the source – with real threshing the food product is extracted from within the waste; when squeezing fruit a liquid is obtained from within a solid. Squeezing fruit juice into a solid (e.g. lemon juice into a salad) is permitted.[2]

The other relevant melacha is melaben (lit. whitening). One of the first stages of making clothes is cleaning the wool (or other fabric); in the mishkan this was necessary for the various coverings and curtains. Wringing out clothes or fabric from the water used to wash them was an essential part of this process, thus this kind of sechita is Biblically forbidden on Shabbos as a derivative of melaben.[3]

Chazal were very stringent regarding this type of sechita, Rabbinically prohibiting various ways of getting clothes wet out of concern that people would forget that it was Shabbos and inadvertently squeeze out the liquid.[4] It seems that this concern stems from the fact that leaving clothes with this liquid in them would be damaging, or possibly because historically the effort of having to repeat a wash was something that was avoided whenever possible.

Barrel Sealing

Before we get on to analysing the case of the baby wipes, we must deal with a potentially related case from the gemara. We are told that tightening the sealing of a wine barrel is forbidden on Shabbos, as it is a psik reisha (lit. cutting off of a head), meaning that a melacha will be an inevitable result of this action.[5] Rashi explains that the melacha involved is sechita, but doesn't elaborate further. The Rishonim give various different explanations:

1) Wine is inevitably squeezed out of the seal back into the barrel. Thus a useful liquid is obtained, a violation of the melacha of dash (Aruch).

2) Even if no useful liquid is obtained, squeezing out the wine from the seal is a violation of melaben. Although with liquids other than water no Rabbinic injunctions were made out of this concern, as people are not so eager to squeeze them, if one does squeeze these liquids out of clothes the melacha is still performed (Ri).[6]

3) Neither dash nor melaben are relevant here (negating Rashi), rather tightening the seal is forbidden for an entirely different reason. We are concerned that one may decide to leave the sealing in permanently, thus creating a new vessel (the melacha of boneh or makeh b'patish. Rabbeinu Tam).[7]

4) Although neither melacha is relevant here, squeezing out liquids that are normally squeezed is Rabbinically prohibited (Ramban).[8]

It is difficult to adjudicate between these possibilities in this case. The important observation for our discussion is that according to all views, dash is only violated when a useful liquid is obtained.[9] If the liquid produced is not useful or goes to waste, provided that melaben is not relevant, squeezing it is out is prohibited Rabbinically only if this is the liquid's 'normal way,' and only according to the Ramban.

Squeezing into Solids

Moving closer to the case in question, let's first ask if it would be permitted to do something extreme and intentionally squeeze out the liquid from a wipe on to a baby's dirty behind in order to clean the baby with this liquid. With these wipes there is no question of melaben, as they are thrown out immediately after use and no-one ever has any interest in cleaning them.[10] Would this be a transgression of the melacha of dash?[11]

As we have seen, dash is only relevant when a useful liquid is obtained. In our case, the liquid is useful in order to clean the baby. However, we have also seen that when the liquid is immediately absorbed into a solid, as nothing significantly new has been created the melacha of dash has not been violated. Squeezing the water into solid excrement should be no different to squeezing a lemon into a salad.

In practice, this consideration alone may not be sufficient to allow the use of baby wipes on Shabbos. Sometimes the substance being cleaned is not particularly solid; even if it is, if it is small enough it will simply dissolve into the liquid rather than absorbing it. Even in these cases, as the liquid is used up immediately it is not clear that a melacha is involved,[12] but there certainly would be grounds for ruling stringently here.[13]

Is there any squeezing?

Now we can examine what happens when wipes are used normally. It is quite clear that there is some liquid on the surface of the wipes that does not need to be squeezed out in order to use; likewise it is clear that some amount of liquid is absorbed within the fibres of the material and could theoretically be extracted. Is the case similar to the barrel sealing, where liquid is inevitably squeezed out?

To my naked eye this would certainly not appear to be the case. I would doubt anyone who claimed to be able to discern absorbed liquid being forced out. It should therefore be obvious that using wipes in the normal way should not be a problem on Shabbos, just like dragging a chair over earth which is permitted as long as one does not intend to make a groove.[14]

Some of those who forbid the use of wipes on Shabbos claim to have verified with experts that liquid is in fact squeezed out from between the fibres of the material.[15] However, for at least two reasons this is insufficient to support their halachic conclusion:[16]

1) Laboratory observations are not relevant when it comes to defining melacha; rather we follow the observations of the naked eye.[17]

2) Even the words of the expert that they quote only attest to the fact that some liquid is absorbed within the fibres and that if one squeezes hard enough this will come out (which we knew already). There is absolutely no claim that this is inevitable.[18]

Furthermore, I contend that even if it were true that some water is inevitably extracted from the fibres, this would not constitute forbidden sechita. The truth is that some of the liquid will eventually drip out of the material even without any pressure being applied. Although any pressure will speed up this process, I do not accept that the small amount of pressure normal during wiping constitutes sechita.

It is true that it is forbidden to clean with a wet sponge without a handle on Shabbos,[19] and some of the Rishonim explain that this is because squeezing is inevitable.[20] However, this is because with a sponge the concern is the melacha of melaben.[21] When the potential problem is only dash, I believe that minimal pressure cannot constitute the extraction necessary for the melacha and this is no different to holding a dripping wipe over the baby.

Finally, if any readers share the common misconception that the lenient ruling of R' Asher Weiss on this matter is a lone view, let me point out that R' Moshe Feinstein and R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach both ruled the same way.[22]


[1] See Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 8:7, 10. According to most poskim, this prohibition applies even to liquid absorbed in something other than its original source.
[2] Shabbos 144b. This is true even though there will inevitably be some liquid which is not absorbed into the solid food.
[3] Rambam, ibid. 9:11. The prohibition applies even to water that was not used for washing the clothes, as long as it is not done in a way that makes them more dirty (דרך לכלוך). For some of the details of this, see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 302.
[4] See Orach Chaim 320:15-17.
[5] Shabbos 111
[6] These first two opinions appear in Tosfos, Kesuvos 6b.
[7] Ibid., see Sefer HaYashar, Chidushim siman 283.
[8] Shabbos 111a. Also Ran, Rif Shabbos 41a.
[9] It would also appear that this violation is only Biblical if the object being squeezed from grows from the ground, see Shabbos 75a and Ritva Shabbos 111a.
[10] As far as I am aware, this point is undisputed.
[11] If not, there would be no Rabbinic prohibition even according to the Ramban, as squeezing is not the normal way to obtain water.
[12] See Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasa (new version) 14:37, footnote 99. See also Shu"t Minchas Asher, volume 1, 14:3.
[13] Although as the squeezing is not being done from something that grows from the ground and the whole question is of a Rabbinic violation, I would probably tend to leniency.
[14] Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 337:1 (based on Shabbos 22a).
[15] Orchos Shabbos volume 1, Birurei Halacha siman 7.
[16] These points are made by R' Asher Weiss (Minchas Asher volume 2, siman 33), but in fact should be easy for anyone to realise.
[17] In our case specifically, R' Asher proves this point from the commentaries to Orach Chaim 302:9, who allow cleaning gently using a damp cloth as squeezing out is not inevitable (despite the fact that laboratory observations will certainly show that some liquid is in fact extracted).
[18] Astonishingly, the full text of the expert opinion that the authors of Orchos Shabbos showed R' Asher says the opposite, that "it is reasonable to assume that normal use will only cause the exit of the water that rests above the fibres."
[19] Mishna Shabbos 143a.
[20] Rashi ibid., Rambam Shabbos 22:15 (although from the context it is clear that the Rambam's view is that this is only a Rabbinic transgression).
[21] This is explicit in the words of the Rambam there.
[22] Shemiras Shabbos ibid., Igros Moshe Orach Chaim 2:70