Introduction
Part 1 of When Rabbis Make Mistakes was written over two years ago. The post discussed serious mistakes caused by negligence of a rabbi, and the implications for the offender. This post will deal with a completely different aspect of rabbinic mistakes – the question of if and when individuals are halachically bound to follow rulings that turn out to be mistaken.
The main overlap between these posts is the fact that rabbis do make mistakes and that following their rulings blindly does not absolve all personal responsibility (as illustrated in part 1 by the words of R' Zerachia HaLevi, aka the Ba'al Hama'or). However, there certainly are also times when we are bound by rulings that we may not agree with, and here we will try to clarify when this applies.
If they tell you that right is left
Probably the most famous comment of Chazal related to this issue is a derivation from the command "not to veer to the right or the left" from the words of the Sanhedrin.[1] The Sifri, quoted by Rashi, explains that the phrase 'right or left' hints to us that one must listen to the Sanhedrin even if they tell us that right is left or left is right.
However, this is not the complete picture. The Mishna says that an individual who followed a lenient ruling of the Sanhedrin that he knew was erroneous, must bring a sin-offering (where applicable), as he did not genuinely rely on the Sanhedrin.[2] The gemara explains further that as deliberate transgressors do not bring sin-offerings, the Mishna must be discussing a person who knew that the Sanhedrin were wrong but mistakenly believed that he was obligated to follow them even when they were wrong.[3]
The clear premise of the gemara is that the truth is that one who knows that the Sanhedrin are mistaken, must not follow their lenient ruling. The Yerushalmi quotes a Beraisa that derives this principle from the very same verse quoted above, but in an opposite manner to the Sifri - 'right or left' limits the obligation to follow the Sanhedrin to cases where they tell us that 'right is right or left is left.'[4]
A precise reading of the Sifri and the Yerushalmi will show that as far as practical halacha is concerned, there is no contradiction between them. The Sifri explicitly refers to a person to whom it appears that the Sanhedrin's ruling mistakes 'right and left,' whereas the Yerushalmi is discussing the Mishna which deals with a person who knows that Sanhedrin have erred. This reconciliation was already suggested in the sefer Be'er Sheva (R' Yissachar Ber Eilenburg, Eastern Europe 1550-1623) in his commentary on the gemara.[5]
The line between 'knowing' of an error and 'appearing' to a person as an error is not always easy to draw. The human mind can never be 100% sure about anything, and 'knowledge' may really represent over-confidence whereas uncertainty may be a function of a lack of self-assuredness.[6] Part of a person's avoda is introspection in order to ascertain whether one really is, or should be, sure about any convictions.
Due to this difficulty, the Ramban does not accept the distinction between knowledge and 'appearance.' Instead, he writes that although one who thinks/knows that the Sanhedrin have made a mistake must not follow their ruling blindly, he must raise his objection for their consideration. They will discuss with him and potentially retract their position; however, if they are not convinced and decide that he is the mistaken one, he is obligated to follow the rule of the majority and forgo his own beliefs.[7]
Support for the position of the Ramban may be found from the law of the Zaken Mamrei ('rebellious elder', who does not accept the majority rule of the Sanhedrin). The process can start with a dispute in a local beis din, which is subsequently taken to the Sanhedrin for adjudication. A judge who returns home and continues to rule in accordance with his own minority opinion is liable to the death penalty;[8] the same applies if he acts personally in accordance with his own opinion.[9]
The Rambam writes that this applies even if the rebellious ruling is a stringency.[10] The clear implication is that the minority dayan must accept the lenient ruling and act accordingly, with no distinction being made if he 'knows' that the majority are wrong. However, the Chidushei HaRan[11] questions this, as lenient rulings do not obligate a person to action.[12]
Proven Mistakes (Ta'us bidvar Mishna)
The Ramban's solution of discussing any reservations with the Sanhedrin, but accepting their final ruling, is workable under ideal conditions. Even if those responsible for the original ruling are no longer alive, one who disagrees can raise his concerns with the judges of his time, who have the right to overturn earlier rulings based on their own understanding of halacha.[13]
The problem comes when, as in our times, there is no Sanhedrin and no authority to overturn earlier rulings. One who thinks that the Sanhedrin have erred has no-one to turn to, or at least no-one with the authority to uphold the concerns.[14]
There is potentially one exception. Chazal discuss the laws of mistakes made by Jewish courts – in some cases the ruling stands, but the judges may be held personally accountable and charged with paying compensation to the party found guilty in error. However, one category of mistake, called a ta'us bidvar Mishna (lit. error regarding a Mishna), can never stand.[15] This is usually when the mistake can be proven from an explicit, halachically binding text.
This rule also applies when the mistake is proven not from a halachic source, but from secular knowledge. The Mishna tells us of the case of a cow whose uterus was removed. R' Tarfon ruled that this rendered the cow a tereifa and thus ordered it to be fed to dogs; the other sages reversed this ruling based on the testimony of a doctor, that in Egypt it was commonplace to remove uteruses of cows (and this did not cause any fatal injury).[16] The gemara describes R' Tarfon's original ruling as a ta'us bidvar Mishna, and this is one reason why R' Tarfon was exempt from paying compensation.[17]
We have already quoted the explanation of the Ba'al Hama'or, that the exemption from payment is due to the personal responsibility of the one following the ruling. Although the Ramban disagrees with this reasoning, all agree that a ruling based on such a mistake is null and void.[18]
It would therefore make sense to say that as long as there is no longer any dispute regarding the facts, the original ruling may be disregarded without any need for a formal statement from the beis din. This was famously the position of R' Yitzchak Lampronti (1679-1756, Ferrara), who wrote that although the accepted halacha allows the killing of lice on Shabbos because lice 'do not reproduce through a male and a female,' this is now known not to be true and therefore one must be stringent.[19]
While there are many who disagree with R' Lampronti's ruling, this is predominantly based on claims that we should rely on Chazal's understanding of science rather than scientists,[20] or that Chazal themselves did not mean literally that lice do not reproduce.[21] The implication is that were there to have been a clear mistake, all would agree that this could be overturned.
However, R' Moshe Shmuel Glasner (Hungary, 1856 – 1924, Yerushalayim) writes that this is not the case. Affirming that Chazal indeed issued rulings such as permitting the killing of lice on Shabbos based on the imperfect scientific knowledge of their time, he claims that we are nevertheless bound by these rulings.[22] This was also the position of R' Yitzchak Herzog (first Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of the State of Israel).[23]
Rather disappointingly, neither R' Glasner nor R' Herzog explain how their statements square with the principle of ta'us bidvar Mishna.[24] Presumably, they must hold that even a clear mistake must be confirmed by a halachic authority. Although this appears to be a mere technicality, R' Glasner argues that this is necessary in order to prevent a loss of faith in the entire system.
I would counter that at least in a generation where information is readily accessible to all, this attitude is counter-productive. People know when a clear mistake has been made, and we are better off knowing that the system itself incorporates a method for fixing these mistakes in an efficient manner.
[1] Devarim 17:11. This command has already been discussed extensively
here in How
does halacha work? and less directly in several other posts.
[2] Horayos 2a. This Mishna follows the view of R' Yehuda that one who
does genuinely rely on the Sanhedrin is exempt from bringing an offering. The
halacha does not follow this view, but the principle that R' Yehuda's distinction
is based on is undisputed.
[3] Ibid. 2b
[4] Yerushalmi Horayos 1:1
[5] A clear contradiction remains regarding the explanation the verse,
as it does not seem reasonable to derive opposite meanings from the same word
(even on the level of drash). However, the truth is that no more than one of
these derivations is necessary. For example, we can read like the Yerushalmi
that the verse only speaks of rulings that do not contradict known reality, and
we automatically know that one who is not sure of an error is bound by the
ruling. It is also quite possible that neither derivation is the real source
for the halacha, as neither is explicit or clearly implied from the verse.
Rather, the halacha is derived from logic and the words 'right or left' are a
mere asmachta (hint or even a form of mnemonic - see Halachic
Exegesis).
[6] See Obligations
of the mind where we discussed what level of knowledge is required
regarding the beliefs the Torah requires us to hold.
[7] Sefer HaMitzvos, Shoresh 1.
[8] Sanhedrin 86b
[9] Ibid. 88b
[10] Hilchos Mamrim 4:1
[11] Written by an unknown author, not Rabbeinu Nissim of Gerona.
[12] Sanhedrin 86b. He concludes that even the Rambam only spoke in a
case where the stringency contains a corresponding leniency, but this is
difficult to accept.
[13] See Rambam, Hilchos Mamrim 2:1.
[14] In How
does halacha work? we explained that the binding nature of the gemara is
based on the same principle that obligates following the Sanhedrin, and that
until the consensus attained in relation to the gemara is replicated, we must
not deviate from its rulings. This situation, being unable to alter laws dating
from thousands of years ago in order to fit the needs of the time, is clearly
not an ideal, and one of the reasons why the restoration of the Sanhedrin is so
critical (see Ubitul
Sanhedreya).
In part 6
of Mehalchim bein Ha'Omdim, R' Michael Avraham raises potential ways
of mitigating this problem even without a Sanhedrin. However, were it possible
to achieve any kind of consensus regarding these controversial ideas, it would
likely also be possible to restore the Sanhedrin and thus render these methods
unnecessary.
[15] Sanhedrin 33a and other places.
[16] Bechoros 28b
[17] Sanhedrin 33a. See also Shach, Choshen Mishpat 25:9
[18] Rashi writes אין דינו דין לגמרי (the ruling is completely
invalid).
[19] Pachad Yitzchak, volume 10, צידה.
[20] The position of R' Yehuda Bril of Mantua, quoted by R' Lampronti
there.
[21] See Michtav Me'Eliyahu, volume 4, page 355 footnote 4.
[22] Introduction to Sefer Dor Revi'i on Chulin.
[23] Shu"t Heichal Yitzchak, Orach Chaim siman 29.
[24] Similarly, R' Lampronti does not cite this principle in his
support.
