Obligations of the mind

Introduction

The fact that we are obligated to subscribe to certain beliefs is explicit in Chazal. One who declares that there is no resurrection of the dead in the Torah, or that the Torah did not come from Heaven, has no portion in Olam Haba.[1] Who is defined as an heretic also has halachic relevance for others when it comes to returning lost objects and other issues.[2]

What exactly we are obligated to believe is not completely clear, and subject to much dispute between the rishonim. Here I want to deal with a different question- what constitutes belief? In Judaism the obligation to know that G-d exists and that multiple gods do not exist is undisputed.[3] But what is far less clear is how well we have to know this. There are several levels (this list is not exhaustive and the order is not necessarily definitive):

1) One who has studied the issue thoroughly, and understands intellectually the proofs of the issue beyond dispute.

2) One who has studied exhaustively and has come to the conclusion that there is no absolute proof. However, his research has led him to believe that the probability of this tenet of Judaism being untrue is small enough to discount.

3) One who has not done any intellectual study (or failed to come to any conclusion from it), but senses the existence of G-d emotionally to the extent that he is left with no doubt.

4) One who has studied to an extent and in his mind no doubt remains. However, if questioned he may not be able to successfully defend his arguments (even in his own mind).

5) One who has no proof either intellectual or emotional, but based on habit, social norms or fear of punishment declares that he has no doubt based on blind faith.

The question is which of these levels are acceptable? I will start with number 5 and try to work up the list. At the moment I am not discussing those who lack the mental capacity to get to the highest levels, rather those who have used their abilities to different extents.

Blind faith

With number 5 we have to ask whether we are commanded to know or just to believe. The answer should be obvious, but also can be found explicitly in the Torah:

וְיָדַעְתָּ הַיּוֹם וַהֲשֵׁבֹתָ אֶל לְבָבֶךָ כִּי ה' הוּא הָאֱלֹקִים בַּשָּׁמַיִם מִמַּעַל וְעַל הָאָרֶץ מִתָּחַת אֵין עוֹד.

(דברים ד, לט)

You should know and set in your heart that Hashem is G-d in heaven above and on the Earth below- there is no other.

(Devarim 4:39)

The Rambam also states that the mitzvah is knowledge (ידיעה) of G-d’s existence rather than belief.[4] Although many of the other compilations listing the 613 mitzvos do use the root אמונה, the truth is that even this term does not refer to blind faith.[5] The Torah uses this root to tell us that Avraham Avinu trusted in Hashem when he was promised that his descendants will be as numerous as the stars.[6] The term describes a relationship usually based on experience, although with Hashem an intellectual understanding of His ways may be sufficient to create this trust.

I will concede that although those with blind faith do not fulfil the mental obligations the Torah expects of us, they are not defined by anyone as heretics (and as such we must still return their lost items and may drink their wine).[7] However, this is far from complimentary to such people.[8] The Rambam writes explicitly that those who don’t have positive belief in his thirteen principles do not have a share in Olam Haba.[9]

Level 4 (those who claim to have intellectual proof of G-d but in fact have flawed arguments) differs from level 5 only quantitatively. Although I know of no source that deals with such a level, logically it makes sense to say that those who have done part of the intellectual work they are supposed to can receive part of the share in Olam Haba set aside for them.

Emotional proof

In Tanach we find various examples of those who did not need to contemplate too much to know that G-d existed. Are ancestors who witnessed the miracles in Egypt, the splitting of the sea and Matan Torah are the clearest example. Not only is such experiential evidence an acceptable means of knowing, the Torah in several places encourages faith based on these experiences.[10]

Furthermore, even for those who were not alive then, our belief in the truth of the Torah stems from acceptance of the tradition passed down from those who were. For this reason the mitzvah of remembering the Exodus from Egypt is so crucial.[11]

Clearly then, the philosophical arguments used by Avraham Avinu and the Rambam to prove the existence of G-d are not a must for those who have enough proof from their experiences. However, these proofs are not merely emotional. In the same way Avraham Avinu and the Rambam deduced the existence of G-d from what they observed in the natural world, others used their observations of the supernatural.

We can conclude that those who genuinely experience G-d without much mental effort (Level 3 above) have fulfilled the mitzvah incumbent upon them. The only question is whether such people actually exist nowadays, or if what they are actually experiencing is a product of their imagination, driven by emotion alone.

For someone who has never had this kind of experience, it is impossible to know the answer to this question. All I can do is to urge those who feel this way to carefully scrutinise the source of their emotions. The dangers of following ones instinct alone are severe.[12]

Can we really know?

The two categories we have yet to explain seem to be in direct conflict. Clearly the philosophy that G-d’s existence cannot be proved outright (level 2) implies that level 1 (those who know how to prove G-d’s existence) does not exist. Those who feel that they are at level 1 may argue that level 2 doesn’t really exist, as the intellectually honest are capable of getting to level 1 (unless their intelligence is limited to the extent that may exempt them from mitzvos).

The Rambam, quoting the philosophy of Aristotle, clearly expects us to reach level 1. In short, his proof of the existence of an infinite G-d is that if there was none and everything had an end, this end should have already come.[13] A way of thinking we are not used to, added to the language barrier caused by the Arabic used,[14] make the understanding of this proof inaccessible to most of us.

The main other rishon who writes about this issue preceded the Rambam.[15] The Chovas Halvavos (11^th century, Spain) also expects us to reach level 1, and writes in a much clearer and more understandable way.[16] However, there seem to be holes in his logic, and the Rambam explicitly negates the arguments he makes.[17] Thus according to the Rambam, the Chovos Halvavos himself was only on level 4.

As far as I am aware, the view of those on level 2 does not have a source in classic Jewish philosophy. It seems also not to have a source in any non-Jewish medieval philosophy, stemming from those who more generally rejected the Aristotelian methodology used by both the Chovos Halvavos and the Rambam. They maintain that we cannot prove anything about the transcendental from the world we live in.

What is a proof?

My claim is that the difference between levels 1 and 2 is merely in semantics. Those who say they have absolute proof also realise that with a finite human brain, there exists a possibility of mistake. One who says he is not 100% sure but does not consider the doubt significant is also legitimate, and essentially means the same thing.

Are we 100% sure about who our father is, or that the food we are about to eat isn’t poisonous? Whether or not we think we have proof for such things is not really relevant.

The existence of atheism means that most do not treat their belief in G-d in the same unquestioning way, and as I wrote above this is a good thing. However, when judging what level of proof is satisfactory, we should not set an aim higher than we do with more mundane matters.

To prove anything we will always need to make certain assumptions. For example, proving something from what we see assumes that our eyesight is accurate to some degree, and the same is true for all the senses. My rule here (the axiom of axioms) is that any assumption agreed upon by the overwhelming majority of people without expecting proof is valid.

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[1] Mishna Sanhedrin 90a. As all the ways of G-d are just (see Devarim 32:4), we can discount the possibility that this individual has no part in the World to Come through no fault of his own.

[2] See Avoda Zara 26b-27b. Here is not the place to discuss the intricacies of these halachos or how and when they should be applied. But the existence of an halachic side here is crucial, because when it comes to halacha we are absolutely obligated by Chazal. See “Divine providence, free will and Coincidence”.

[3] Although the Behag does not count this as one of the 613 mitzvos, the Ramban (Mitzas Asei 1) explains that this is because this principle is the basis of all the mitzvos.

[4] Yesodei Hatorah 1:1-6. This is also the accurate translation in Sefer Hamitzvos, Mitzvas Aseh 1 as attested by R’ Kapach (Sefer Hamitzvos was written by the Rambam in Arabic).

[5] To my knowledge there is no word in Biblical Hebrew signifying blind faith, perhaps because such a concept was and should be completely foreign to us.

[6] Bereishis 15:4

[7] See for example the Rambam’s definitions in Hilchos Teshuva 3:7-8.

[8] In all probability, the failure to categorise them stems from the worthlessness of those who do not use the brain that separates them from animals.

[9] Commentary to the Mishna, introduction to Perek Chelek. See also Chovos Halvavos, Sha’ar Hayichud ch. 3 who confirms that all are obligated to understand the Oneness of G-d according to their ability.

[10] See for example Shemos 19:9

[11] See Ramban Shemos 13:16

[12] If the experience is not genuine, it is just as easy for someone to ‘instinctively know’ that they need to do things prohibited by the Torah. Sadly, there is no shortage of case studies showing this.

[13] Moreh Nevuchim part 2, introduction and ch. 1-2

[14] Without any claims of expertise in this field, from the little I have seen it appears that no translation out preserves both accuracy and coherency.

[15] It seems that for those who wrote after the time of the Rambam until the modern day, the main arguments that needed to be made were within monotheism.

[16] Sha’ar Hayichud, ch. 5-6

[17] The Chovos Halvavos first proves that the world was created and is not eternal, and uses this to prove the existence of G-d. The Rambam )M.N. part 1 ch. 71) writes that there is no philosophical proof that the world was created (the only proof is from the existence of miracles in the Torah), and strongly criticises using this method to prove G-d. Nowadays this debate is anachronistic, as the scientific world agrees to the fact that the world had a beginning. Thus we can use the method of the Chovos Halvavos without any hesitation.