Shabbos and Shevus

The concept of shevus 

It is only natural that a blog for all Torah topics should have a post about something that plays such an integral part of our spiritual lives. But on the other hand, it would be virtually impossible to write an overview of the concept or laws of Shabbos limited to the length I allow for my articles.[1] Consequently, I have chosen a small but critical sub-topic, with many ramifications. 

As has become normal, I will start with the words of the Rambam (this time in Yad Hachazaka):[2]

נאמר בתורה )שמות כ"ג( "תשבות"- אפילו מדברים שאינן מלאכה חייב לשבות מהן. ודברים הרבה הן שאסרו חכמים משום שבות, מהן דברים אסורים מפני שהן דומים למלאכות ומהן דברים אסורים גזרה שמא יבוא מהן איסור סקילה. 

(שבת כא, א)

“The Torah says (in Shemos ch. 23) "You shall desist," implying that one is obligated to desist even from things that are not melacha. The Sages forbade many things because of shevus (desisting), some because they are similar to melachos, and some are forbidden due to an edict, lest a prohibition subject to the punishment of stoning be violated."[3] 

The commentaries discuss whether the Rambam really means to give a Biblical status to the rabbinic prohibitions related to melacha.[4] The truth is that this question seems trivial, as elsewhere the Rambam writes that all rabbinic enactments fall under the Biblical obligation to follow the Sanhedrin.[5] In my mind it is more critical to clarify in what way Shabbos is different from other laws, as rabbinic prohibitions are certainly not limited to the laws of Shabbos.

In fact the additional obligation to ‘desist’ on Shabbos is explained at length by the Ramban in his commentary on Chumash.[6] He argues strongly that this concept is Biblical, and tells us that we must rest on Shabbos even from things like business, moving things from place to place and measuring. Although these things are not melacha, one who continues doing them all day has not obeyed the command to rest on Shabbos.[7]

The Rambam broadly agrees with the Ramban about this obligation, although there seems to be a difference in the way he defines it. According to the Rambam the activities one must desist from are those similar to melachos or which may result in melacha being done. The Ramban does not mention such a requirement, and says that the Torah wants us to rest on Shabbos irrespective of the technical definition of melacha.

Extensions

The Rambam also agrees that there is an obligation to rest on Shabbos from non-melacha related activities, from a different source. He writes: 

יש דברים שהן אסורין בשבת אף על פי שאינם דומין למלאכה, ואינם מביאין לידי מלאכה. ומפני מה נאסרו? משום שנאמר (ישעיה נ"ח) "אם תשיב משבת רגלך עשות חפציך ביום קדשי" ונאמר "וכבדתו מעשות דרכיך ממצוא חפצך ודבר דבר." לפיכך אסור לאדם להלך בחפציו בשבת, ואפילו לדבר בהן, כגון שידבר עם שותפו מה ימכור למחר או מה יקנה או היאך יבנה בית זה ובאי זה סחורה ילך למקום פלוני. כל זה וכיוצא בו אסור, שנאמר "ודבר דבר"- דבור אסור, הרהור מותר.

(שבת כד, א)

“Some activities are forbidden on Shabbos even though they are neither similar to melacha nor do they lead to doing melacha. For what reason were they forbidden? Because it says (in Yeshaya 58) “If you rest your feet on Shabbos, from carrying out your affairs on My holy day ….. and you respect it (Shabbos) by refraining from making your journeys, pursuing your affairs and speaking about them.” Therefore it is forbidden for a person to pursue his (business) affairs or even to speak about them. For example, he may not speak with his partner about what he will sell or buy tomorrow, how he will build a house, or for which merchandise he will travel to a particular place. All this and similar to it is prohibited, as it says “And speaking about them”- speech is forbidden, although thought (about these matters) is permitted.”[8]

It is clear from this that although the original concept of shevus only includes melacha-related activities, in the times of the nevi’im this was expanded. Presumably those who made this institution felt that Shabbos could be enhanced by this, and that it would go further to achieving the same purpose that shevus was supposed to achieve.

Later on, this was later extended further. The Rambam writes that the rabbinic prohibition of moving muktzeh items on Shabbos is a natural extension of the above institution of the nevi’im. Another reason was to ensure that even those who don’t work during the week will have a Shabbos different to weekdays.[9]

Modern applications

The questions asked about the laws of Shabbos today tend to be very different even from those asked fifty years ago. The constantly changing technology that we use during the week forces poskim to think carefully about the fundamental principles of the melachos, as there is often no precedent or established minhag.

Sometimes there is almost total consensus that a particular activity is prohibited on Shabbos, but very little agreement about the reason. Two examples that stand out in my mind are the use of bicycles and of electricity. Both of these were disputed originally, and in both cases the poskim seem to bend over backwards to explain themselves.[10]

One of the reasons given to forbid these things is the issue of uvdin d’chol, literally ‘weekday activities’. This is in fact the general term used for the categories of activities decreed forbidden on Shabbos during the period of the nevi’im and later extensions), as described by the Rambam above.

I believe that this consideration is a crucial one, and possibly the real motivation the poskim had in their determination to stop the use of bicycles and electricity on Shabbos.[11] Without this determination, Shabbos today would certainly have looked very different. But more importantly, the distinction between Shabbos and weekday would become increasingly blurred and would eventually disappear entirely.[12]

It is also important to know where to draw the line. Imposing too many restrictions may lead to Shabbos becoming a burden, which can eventually cause rebellion and the opposite of what these restrictions were supposed to achieve.[13] Even if this doesn’t happen, sometimes the attempt to forbid something may simply be disregarded by the community.[14]

When a new technological development arrives, it can lead to long discussions as to whether its use on Shabbos constitutes a melacha or not. If it does not, we must not forget to think about the issue of shvus/uvdin d’chol, and what the repercussions of allowing or not allowing its use will be for future generations. This task is not straightforward, and requires much foresight. It also requires communication between poskim, as making this kind of decision without unity will inevitably lead to failure.[15]

This task is especially complicated when it comes to tools designed specifically to avoid halachic problems. Sometimes these appliances resemble their regular equivalents identically, with small operational differences inside them. Even if this negates the technical melacha (and this is often far from straightforward), the decision to make use of this must not be taken lightly.[16]

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[1] My judgement is that the best contribution I can make here is in pieces short enough to be read in a few minutes, but long enough to get across meaningful ideas in a comprehensive way.

[2] There is a source for this in the Sifra (Acharei Mos Parsha 5), but the Rambam presents it in a clearer way.

[3] Hilchos Shabbos 21:1

[4] See Magid Mishne and Lechem Mishne

[5] Sefer Hamitzvos, Shoresh 2. See also “How does halacha work?”.

[6] Vayikra 23:24

[7] Chazal decreed that many of these actions are forbidden to do even once on Shabbos, but this is a rabbinic prohibition.

[8] Shabbos 24:1

[9] Ibid. 24:12

[10] See for example Tzitz Eliezer 1:21 and Yechave Da’as 2:52 about bicycles, and Minchas Shlomo 1:11 and Tzitz Eliezer 1:20 about electricity. Obviously when a real melacha (like lighting a fire) is achieved by means of electricity, there was never any question.

[11] Although activities in the category of uvdin d’chol are usually permitted where there is even a relatively small need, I believe that it is fair to differentiate between different cases of uvdin d’chol. It makes sense to be stricter with activities that may take up a large part of the day, and significantly dilute our Shabbos experience.

[12] Already now, most electric lights work without anything getting hot. Even the writing on a computer screen may halachically not be a melacha, as nothing is tangibly changed (black is created by the absence of light and not by colouring any material).

[13] This may be one of the reasons for many leniencies the poskim have to allow people to walk freely in the street on Shabbos, irrespective of various motion sensors. At some point it may simply not be possible to leave the house on Shabbos without triggering various electric circuits, and it is not practical to tell people that they must stay at home all day.

[14] An example of this is the ruling of R’ Moshe Feinstein forbidding the use of time-switches for electricity on Shabbos (Igros Moshe Orach Chaim 4:60). His main claim is that this degrades Shabbos, which in his time was probably very understandable. Even he allowed the use of time-switches for lights, as anyway in many places the practice was (rightly or wrongly) to have them turned on and off by non-Jews on Shabbos.

[15] This point goes beyond practicality. When there is no precedent outlawing a particular action, even if it is clear that Chazal would have done so if it was relevant, the only mechanism we have to forbid it is making a new edict. This is only possible if it is agreed to by the overwhelming majority of poskim, as well as being accepted by the community. See “How does halacha work?”

[16] Many of these contraptions are developed for the use of those in great need, such as the elderly or the sick. It may be appropriate to stipulate that the device is only permitted for certain people, although this is not always practical. Sometimes it might be better simply to utilise existing leniencies for those in need, waiving rabbinic prohibitions or even biblical ones when there is danger to life.