Saturday 26 January 2019

You shall pursue justice - but where?


Any kind of court is not a place most of us should want to end up in (at least not as a litigant). However, the reality is that humans tend to get into arguments and are not always able to settle their differences independently. Furthermore, those who are victims of (or witnesses to) criminal activity will sometimes need to report this to the relevant authorities if justice is to be carried out.

The Torah has much to say about these situations, although sadly there is a great deal of ignorance about this even among observant Jews. This ignorance has two extremes- some are not aware of any prohibition of litigating in non-Jewish courts, whereas some think that this is forbidden under almost any circumstances. As always, in order to achieve clarity it is necessary to understand the source of the laws involved, together with their rationale.

The prohibition

The gemara quotes a statement of R' Tarfon: "Wherever one finds courts of non-Jews, even if their laws are identical to Jewish law, you are not permitted to make use of them. As it says, "These are the laws that you shall place in front of them (the dayanim)"[1]- in front of them and not in front of non-Jews."[2]

The underlined phrase indicates that the main problem with non-Jewish courts is not the worry that justice will not be carried out (although depending on the circumstances this may well also be an issue). The reason for this injunction is explained by the Rambam:

"Anyone who litigates under non-Jewish laws or in their courts, even if their laws are identical to Jewish law, is a rasha. It is as if he has blasphemed, insulted and raised his hand against the Torah of Moshe Rabeinu."[3]

This strong language drives home a point. One who prefers a non-Jewish court over a Beis Din indicates that he prefers (sometimes subconsciously) an alternative legal system over that of the Torah. He thus rejects the laws of the Torah, at least when it comes to monetary issues. Even if the person involved davens regularly and keeps other mitzvos, he shows that he does not believe in the authority of the Torah over the more 'mundane' parts of our lives.[4]

I will go on to demonstrate that there are circumstances where going to non-Jewish courts does not indicate a rejection of this part of the Torah and thus is not prohibited. However, first I would like to point out one potential excuse given which is not acceptable.

A claim which is often heard implicitly is that while the Torah is perfect and a person would want to follow Torah law, rabbinical system has become antiquated and Batei Din nowadays are not worldly or experienced enough to deal with modern disputes. While in many cases this claim is not baseless, it does not suffice. From personal knowledge, there certainly are Batei Din around whose dayanim are well versed in the intricacies of modern business.[5] [6]

Clear exceptions

The most explicit dispensation given for going to a secular court is when the defendant refuses to come to Beis Din (if he is not Jewish this refusal can usually be taken as a given). In an ideal situation this refusal would not be possible, as the Sanhedrin and its delegates would have the power to force the issue. Nowadays, there is no country in the world where this is the case.

Clearly, the Torah does not expect a person to forgo his claim just because it is impossible to enforce Torah law. The accuser must put forward his claim to Beis Din, who will advise him that under these circumstances it is permissible to sue in a secular court.[7] Since he has clearly indicated his preference for Torah law, using an alternative out of lack of choice does not constitute an attack on the Torah.

Criminal cases and mesirah

Based on all of this, it should be obvious that whenever it is clear that there is no practical way to have a case heard by Beis Din, the prohibition of going to a non-Jewish court does not apply. Thus currently it is permitted to report any crime to the civil authorities, unless there is a possibility that the offender will be punished in a way that is forbidden by the Torah.

For most of our history, this last concern was a very real one. One who handed over his fellow Jew to the non-Jewish authorities (a moser), even if he was a criminal, was liable to the death penalty as a rodef (literally a pursuer, but including anyone causing a danger to someone else's life).[8] Even if he only gave information aiding non-Jews to take someone's possessions, this could eventually lead to the person being put to death in attempt to extract more from him.[9]

In more civilised societies where this fear does not exist, a moser is clearly not equivalent to a rodef. However, if damages caused are beyond what the Torah allows for, it is still forbidden to aid the authorities in any way. One example is testifying in a court that will rely on just one witness to enforce payment, contrary to Torah law. One who provides such testimony may be excommunicated.[10]

R' Moshe Feinstein extrapolates from here that since according to the Torah the only punishment that a thief gets is returning what he stole and in some cases paying double, one may not report his actions to the police if this may lead to imprisonment.

At the end of the teshuva, R' Moshe mentions the case of R' Elazar bar R' Shimon and R' Yishmael bar R' Yosi who caught thieves on behalf of the authorities and punished them by death.[11] Although they were criticised for this, it appears that according to the letter of the law their actions were not forbidden (and they certainly were not considered murderers). Quoting the Beis Yosef in the name of the Rashba, R' Moshe answers that as they were appointed by the authorities to do this job, their situation was different.[12]

This answer is difficult to understand. If it is forbidden to report a thief to the non-Jewish authorities because their punishments are illegitimate, how can it be permitted to be the one carrying out the same illegitimate punishments?[13] The conclusion must be that such retribution is in fact permitted by the Torah, as we will explain.[14]

Law and order

The Torah sets out standard punishments for different transgressions, which fall into three categories. The severest crimes are punishable by death (for technical reasons this very rarely happened), most non-monetary sinners receive lashes and those who damage others usually have to pay. However, these standards are not sufficient. Every generation and every community has its own areas that require strengthening. In order to preserve law and order, there must be a person or body with the power to impose extra punishments.

In general, the person that the Torah gives this authority to is the king.[15] He has the right (and obligation) to punish and make institutions according to the needs of the time.[16] When there is no king but there is Jewish autonomy, the Ran explains that this authority is given to the Sanhedrin.[17] Thus the gemara tells us that Beis Din also have the right to administer special punishments at times of need.[18]

It goes without saying that non-Jewish sovereign powers also have this authority.[19] For much of Jewish history, these two systems acted concurrently. The Jewish community had some degree of independent autonomy, although the non-Jewish authorities stepped in when they decided to. In such a situation, reporting crimes to the non-Jewish authorities or in any way aiding this process was a severe transgression for someone acting in private capacity, although it was not strictly forbidden for a Jew employed by them to act as an agent of a legitimate law-enforcing body.[20]

When there is only one body with any power to punish and 'make institutions according to the needs of the time,' as long as they act within reason[21] it is absolutely in order to report crimes to them. While we yearn for the time that Hashem will 'restore our judges like in former times,'[22] until this happens we cannot allow a situation where 'each man swallows up his fellow.'[23]


[1] Shemos 21:1
[2] Gitin 88b
[3] Hilchos Sanhedrin 26:7
[4] It should be clear that this holds even if the judges are Jewish, if the laws they are following are not the laws of the Torah.
[5] One only needs to look at some of the publications of institutions like Machon Keter and Mishpetei Eretz to see this.
[6] Sometimes a claimant may be concerned about the accepted practice of the defendant having the right to choose which Beis Din to go to. As there is very little control over who has the authority to start a Beis Din, a dishonest defendant may choose a place whose credentials are less than impressive. However, the truth is that even this concern should not deter a person from going to the Beis Din of his choice and registering his complaint about the defendant's choice. If this Beis Din feels that the complaint is valid, they can decide to authorise taking the case to a secular court.
[7] The details of this can be found in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 26:2. It may be necessary to demonstrate to Beis Din that at least according to his version of events, he has a financial claim according to Torah law.
[8] See Bava Kama 117a
[9] Rosh, Bava Kama 10:27
[10] Bava Kama 113b
[11] Bava Metsia 83b
[12] Igros Moseh, Orach Chaim 5:9. Although part of his reasoning is the administering of physical punishment by the authorities, I believe that all he is referring to is standard prison conditions in a Western country. The teshuva was written in 5740 (1980) long after R' Moshe left Russia, to a dayan in Manchester.
[13] See also Chashukei Chemed (R' Yitzchak Zilberstein shlita) Bava Kama 27b, who says that R' Moshe could only have been talking about a case where there is no concern that the thief will re-offend. He quotes a teshuva of R' Avraham Rappaport (Levov, 1584-1651) who writes that efforts made to redeem thieves imprisoned by the non-Jews are a chilul Hashem (Shu"t Eitan HaEzrachi, siman 18). It also should be noted that the Rashba that R' Moshe is quoting does not make any distinction between those representing the authorities and those reporting to them (see Beis Yosef, Choshen Mishpat siman 388).
[14] I have already covered some of this in Capital Punishment.
[15] The Rishonim debate whether or not the monarchy is an ideal or only a response to an improper request of the people, but either way it is the default position.
[16] Rambam Hilchos Melachim 3:10
[17] Drashos HaRan, Drush 11.
[18] Sanhedrin 46a
[19] The Torah describes the appointment of a Jewish king as being 'like all the other nations' (Devarim 17:14).
[20] Civil courts in Israel do not have this legitimacy, as these cases should come to Beis Din. Thus at first sight, it is hard to justify acting as a judge in these courts. However, the power held by the justice system in this country is such that judges who are loyal to the Torah can greatly influence national issues in a positive way (and conversely, if there were no religious judges this would severely limit the Torah's influence on the country). Thus the interest to find a leniency for this is considerable (see Minchas Osher, Devarim siman 3 who does allow it. See also this article by Professor Eliav Shochetman at length). In my mind, the question that needs to be examined is whether or not it is permissible to act as an agent for an illegitimate legal system when carrying out damage limitation (it is often possible to cite Torah law as a source in legal rulings). My inclination is that this is indeed the case, although this needs to be sourced.
[21] See The right to resist abuse of power about the limits of this.
[22] Yeshaya 1:26
[23] Avos 3:2

Saturday 5 January 2019

Debt Collection


Introduction

The issue of unpaid debts and how to enforce payments has been around for as long as money has. Finding a system that is both moral and efficient can be elusive, and deciding what is considered moral can be complex.

Before we discuss what the Torah has to say about this, let's take a look at what happened historically when Torah laws were not implemented. We have a classic example in Tanach:

וְאִשָּׁה אַחַת מִנְּשֵׁי בְנֵי הַנְּבִיאִים צָעֲקָה אֶל אֱלִישָׁע לֵאמֹר עַבְדְּךָ אִישִׁי מֵת וְאַתָּה יָדַעְתָּ כִּי עַבְדְּךָ הָיָה יָרֵא אֶת יְיָ וְהַנֹּשֶׁה בָּא לָקַחַת אֶת שְׁנֵי יְלָדַי לוֹ לַעֲבָדִים.

(מלכים ב, ד, א)

One of the wives of the sons of the prophets cried to Elisha: "Your servant, my husband has died, you knew that your servant feared G-d. Now the creditor is coming to take my two children as slaves!"

)Melachim II, 4:1(

The continuation is the famous miracle that Elisha oversees, with the small amount of oil that the woman has increasing until she is able to use it to pay off the debt and live off the remainder. However, what would have happened without this miracle is appalling.[1]

I do not know how often this kind of thing happened under Jewish rule in the times of the Tanach, but I do know that in the world as a whole similar practice was common until not so long ago. In the UK, until 1869 debtors could be imprisoned indefinitely if they could not pay up (usually impossible after being imprisoned). While most countries abolished this around the same time, in Greece it was still possible to jail debt defaulters until 2008![2]

The other extreme would be to give free reign to borrowers without the means to pay up, allowing them the freedom to raise the funds in their own time. As far as I am aware this has never been tried, for obvious reasons. In such a situation, no-one in their right mind would lend money to anyone. The poor and those in need of cashflow would be major losers and the global economy would also crash (a 'credit crunch').

'Do not act as a creditor'

The Torah has rules to prevent both extremes, as well as less extreme behaviour. The Rambam summarises:

Anyone who pressurises a poor person (to repay a debt) in the knowledge that he doesn't have anything to pay back with violates a negative commandment, as it says, "Do not act as a creditor."[3] …. It is forbidden for a person to display himself to his debtor at a time that he knows that he doesn't have funds, even to pass in front of him without claiming his debt (and certainly not to claim it), so that he should not get scared or humiliated.

Just as it is forbidden for the lender to claim (knowing that the borrower cannot pay), it is also forbidden for the borrower to hold back someone else's money, telling him to come back another time, if he has the money. As it says, "Do not say to your fellow 'Go and return.'"[4] Similarly, it is forbidden to take a loan and spend it unnecessarily, leaving nothing for the creditor to collect from, even if the lender is a very wealthy man. One who does this is a wicked man, as it says, "A wicked man borrows and doesn't pay back."[5] The Chachamim instructed that your fellow's money should be as dear to you as your own.

Hilchos Malveh v'Loveh, 1:2-3

All of this relates to the obligations of an individual, although obviously if it is forbidden for the lender to put any amount of pressure on a borrower who doesn't have the funds, certainly no punishment will be administered to such a borrower by Beis Din. The questions start in cases where the ability of the borrower to pay is disputed, or the debt itself is disputed.

'Not to lock the door'

It is well known that the guiding rule of the Torah in all monetary disputes is that המוציא מחברו עליו הראיה, the onus of proof is on the claimant. In order to make sure that he has such proof, a lender is advised to keep written evidence. This is the only way to ensure that the borrower will not be able to deny the loan itself or claim that he repaid without supporting evidence.

Notwithstanding this option for the lender to keep written evidence, in no fewer than five places we find institutions of Chazal to make it easier for the lender to collect his debt.[6] It can be expensive to keep documentation (years ago because of the cost of writing materials, now because of various legal nuances), and even if the lender has a proof it can be hard to track the borrower down. All these institutions were made explicitly for the benefit of the (general) borrower, so that 'the door will not be locked in front of him' (by lenders afraid of losing their money).

None of these institutions help in a case where the borrower claims that he has no funds at all to pay from. In such a case Beis Din can investigate, and if they suspect that there is some hidden property to collect from there may be ways to uncover it. If they do not manage to prove it, the gemara provides no solution and the lender will have to wait.

However, in the times of the Geonim (between the seventh and tenth centuries) this issue caused frequent problems and a new institution was necessary. Practical limitations meant that the only thing that could be done was to make the borrower take an oath that he has nothing, did not hide anything in someone else's property and did not give a gift with a stipulation that it must be returned. Furthermore, anything that he will acquire will not be used to feed or provide for his family,[7] nor will he give it away to anyone.[8]

Nowadays, enforcing such an oath would rarely be effective. Not many dishonest people would be deterred by the severity of swearing falsely, and the result would mainly be an increase of transgression. Moreover, there is usually no necessity for such a solution. It is impossible for a debt defaulter to hide from everyone how much he has in his bank account, and by necessity there will always be some funds coming in. The bigger problem is organising and enforcing a practical payment schedule.

Bankruptcy

The Torah never absolves someone from debt due to bankruptcy. As the Rambam writes, "When the lender claims his debt, even if he is wealthy and the borrower is under pressure and preoccupied with sustenance, we do not take mercy in judgement. Rather, we collect the debt up until the last penny."[9]

This does not mean that we leave the borrower penniless. The Torah tells us that if one pledges a certain value to sacred funds but cannot afford it, he must be assessed and pays in accordance with what he has.[10] There is a dispute in the gemara about whether the same rules apply to a loan,[11] and the majority of poskim rule that they do.[12] Practically this means that we leave the borrower with basic needs, as well as the tools that he needs to continue to earn a living.[13] Whenever he obtains more funds, he must use them to continue paying off the debt.

Nowadays it is usually not necessary for Beis Din to make an assessment. When a debtor admits to his obligations but claims that he cannot pay up immediately, he is asked to suggest an amount to pay per month until the debt is paid in full. If the creditor is unhappy with this, usually a compromise can be arbitrated.

The problem comes with stubborn litigants, usually the ones who deny their obligation to pay fully or partially. If Beis Din rule against them they may be unwilling to discuss any payment schedule, feeling wronged. In this case, the only way Beis Din can enforce payment is by using debt enforcement agencies, empowered by the arbitration agreement signed by the litigants.

This brings up a potential halachic problem. The rules debt enforcement agencies follow (i.e. the law of the land) may not be as strict as the Torah's regulations, and they might violate the laws of what the borrower must be left with. Usually even a stubborn borrower will realise that it is not worth it for him to get into such a situation, but as enforcement ultimately relies on this route it is something that needs to be though out well.

One solution to this problem is dependent on the right that we have to 'change' the monetary laws of the Torah (see Nezikin- the part of the Torah that we can change). The Shulchan Aruch rules that a lender can stipulate with a borrower at the time of the loan that the usual rules will not apply,[14] and depending on the section of society this stipulation may be implicit based on the law of the land. However, we still need to question whether acting in such a way is appropriate on a moral level.


[1] This episode happened during the reign of Yehoram ben Achav, one of the immoral kings of Israel. According to Rashi, Yehoram himself was the creditor and the debt was interest that had accrued on a loan taken out by Ovadya in order to sustain the prophets that he hid in the cave from Yehoram's murderous father.
[3] Shemos 22:24
[4] Mishlei 3:28
[5] Tehilim 37:21
[6] See Kesuvos 88a (collection from the property of an absentee borrower), Gittin 49b (collection from average quality land as opposed to poor quality), Bava Basra 175b (collection from property already sold by the borrower), Sanhedrin 3a (relaxation of the need for ordained judges to enforce payment) and 32b (relaxation of the need to cross-examine witnesses to the loan).
[7] Although one is responsible to provide for his family, this responsibility cannot be carried out using funds that he is obligated to pay to others. If it is necessary, his family should be provided for by public tzedaka funds.
[8] See Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 99 for details.
[9] Malveh v'Loveh 1:4
[10] Vayikra 27:8.
[11] See Bava Metsia 114a.
[12] See Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 97:23.
[13] The details of this were set out by Chazal in Arachin 23b-24a.
[14] Choshen Mishpat 97:28