Growing up
through various stages of a religious Jewish education, something fairly
ingrained in me was that there is no such thing as coincidence. I do remember
one teacher mentioning that there are views that G-d does not intervene with
unimportant matters, but this was certainly not considered mainstream.
It is perhaps
shocking that despite spending most of the last 15 years learning Torah, it is
only within the last two or three that I have investigated this seriously, but
better late than never. The first thing that needs to be decided here is the
method used to tackle philosophical questions, which texts are binding and how
much is left to one’s own intellect.
The
difference between halacha and philosophy
In “How
does halacha work?” I explained the model of the Sanhedrin and the later
equivalent of the Talmud. In the first
footnote I mentioned that whether the same rules apply to philosophical issues
requires further discussion, and this is the place. The natural question to
start with is whether the Sanhedrin have the same power when it comes to
philosophy, essentially can they dictate what we are supposed to think.
The Torah
seemingly tells us clearly which matters are within the remit of the Sanhedrin:
כִּי יִפָּלֵא מִמְּךָ דָבָר לַמִּשְׁפָּט בֵּין דָּם לְדָם
בֵּין דִּין לְדִין וּבֵין נֶגַע לָנֶגַע דִּבְרֵי רִיבֹת בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ וְקַמְתָּ
וְעָלִיתָ אֶל הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְקֹוָק אֱלֹקֶיךָ בּוֹ:
(דברים יז, ח)
“When a matter
of justice will be hidden from you, whether between types of blood, din
or negaim, matters of dispute in your gateways, you must arise and
ascend to the place that Hashem your G-d will choose.”[1]
The Talmud Bavli
explains that the question between types of blood refers to the blood of a
niddah, as certain types of menstrual blood are in fact pure halachically. ‘Din’
refers to capital, monetary and corporal judgements, and negaim are the
different types of tzara’as afflictions, some of which are pure and some
impure. The seemingly superfluous phrase ‘matters of dispute’ adds also various
cases of consecration, and the processes of the sotah, egla arufa (the calf
whose neck must be broken when a murder has taken place and the culprit is
unknown) and purification of the metzora.[2]
Clearly these
examples are not exhaustive, but are meant to illustrate the different
categories over which the Sanhedrin has jurisdiction. How to define these
categories precisely is not so obvious, but there certainly is no mention of
philosophical issues here.
In contrast, the
Yerushalmi includes also aggadic matters, based on the word דבר
at the beginning of the pasuk.[3]
Based on this, some indeed understand that our question as to whether Sanhedrin
dictates to us philosophical issues is itself subject to a dispute between the
Bavli and the Yerushalmi.[4]
If this is the case, the generally accepted rule is that the halacha follows
the Bavli.[5]
It is possible
to suggest that in fact there is no dispute here. Often seeming differences
between the Bavli and Yerushalmi can be due to different styles. The Bavli
tends to be clear and precise, whereas the Yerushalmi is more cryptic and
poetic.
Bearing this in
mind, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Yerushalmi also agrees that the
absolute authority of Sanhedrin is limited to halacha. However, sometimes
halacha itself can depend on philosophy. One who has heretical beliefs is not
granted many of the special privileges halacha gives to the Chosen People.[6]
But not every mistaken belief is heretical.[7]
The Yerushalmi clarifies that the Sanhedrin has authority to fix which beliefs
are heretical, but if heresy is not in question they do not dictate to us how
to think.
Returning to our
original discussion, I have yet to see any view about the way G-d oversees the
world classed as heresy (as long as there is general acceptance that G-d does
indeed oversee the world and has
not forsaken it[8]). It follows then that the only authority that is binding here is
that of G-d himself in Tanach. But the Tanach is far from clear-cut on this
issue, and the same is true of Chazal. It therefore makes sense to start by
quoting some of the Rishonim who did discuss this extensively.[9]
Rambam
The Rambam lists
five ancient views that existed in the world about hashgacha (Divine Providence):[10]
1) There is none
(the worthless belief of Apikores).
2) G-d cares
only about the higher spheres of the universe, from the moon upwards (Aristotle).
3) Nothing in
the entire universe is coincidental, all is decreed by G-d and there is no free
will (the view of one group of Muslims).
4) There is free
will, but all of G-d’s actions are with an intelligent purpose including what
happens to animals, plants and the non-living. This also includes people being
born with defects (the view of another group of Muslims).
5) All actions
of man and animal are based on free will. All G-d’s actions are with justice,
i.e. there is fair reward and punishment for everything. However this concept
of reward and punishment applies only to man and not to animals[11]
(the view of the Torah[12]).
The Rambam goes
on to explain that his understanding of the Torah view is that G-d’s care for
the world is dependent on seichel
(intelligence or wisdom). The nevi’im have the highest
level of protection, and others follow on a sliding scale. There is such thing
as coincidence, but this is fair as those more deserving are less exposed to
it. True, animals were born
without individual Divine Providence, but this is no more difficult than the
fact that they were born without intelligence.[13]
Who argues?
The view of the Rambam is endorsed by Ralbag[14] and
R’ Yosef Elbo.[15] The Ran
also says something similar, that G-d only changes nature in case of great
need. It follows from this that some suffer despite their innocence.[16]
I have found no strong evidence that any of the early commentaries
disagree with the Rambam in a major way. It seems that the first to do so was
the Ohr HaChaim (1696-1743), who says that a person will never die by
exposure to the elements or animals if he does not deserve it. However, even he
agrees that human beings could kill one undeserving of death, as they have the
ability to decide between good and bad.[17]
Not long after this, the Ba’al Shem Tov (c.
1700-1760) and the Chasidim stated
that everything that happens is due to Divine Providence (although seemingly
paradoxically they also accept the concept of free will). As already mentioned,
the fact that they expressed a novel opinion is not to be held against them.
However, the portrayal of this view as the mainstream is wrong and misleading.
Fallout
I believe that with an issue like this that can affect much of our
decision making, everyone should figure out for themselves where they stand.
Personally, as I have not seen any indication in Tanach or even in Chazal that
Providence is all-encompassing, my assumption is that it isn’t. Crucially
though, whatever a person thinks he must take responsibility for the consequences,
both philosophical and practical.
One who takes the Chasidic approach must know how to explain how free
will is not compromised.[18] He
must also figure out how to understand suffering of the innocent, unless he is
prepared to take the bold step of denying it entirely. Rationalists like me also have questions
to answer, albeit in areas less directly connected.[19]
Practically, the way of the Rishonim is generally more conducive to
taking responsibility for our actions. The assumption that in most cases G-d
will not intervene, and our actions will achieve their natural results, is
usually something very positive. Although the Ba’al Shem Tov certainly did not
intend us to be passive and rely on Hashem alone, those following his path need
to be aware of this possible danger.[20]
One reason many give for preferring the way of the Chasidim is the
encouragement they can give to those who are suffering. They claim that it
helps these people to understand that there is a reason for the pain they are
experiencing.[21] Clearly
this depends on the person, but in my view ultimately the opposite is true. Too
often we have lost Jewish souls who simply could not comprehend what they or
others had done to deserve the punishment they thought had been imposed upon
them.[22]
In the short term it may also be hard for people to accept that they
have been left by G-d to the mercy of the free will of others, and even to
random occurrences. But once the importance of both
free will and a naturally-functioning world are understood, it should become
clear that even these events are in a broad sense part of G-d’s master plan.
[1] Devarim 17:8
[2] Sanhedrin 87a
[3] Sanhedrin 11:3
[4] See Igros Har’iya, Igeres 103
[5] As it was written later, and those who compiled it knew the views
expressed by the Yerushalmi and decided whether to accept them or not. There is
some discussion about the position of the Rambam on this issue, but the truth
is that he states clearly in his introduction to Mishne Torah (quoted in “How
does halacha work?”) that only the Talmud Bavli is absolutely
authoritative.
[7] See for example Ra’avad, Hilchos Teshuva 3:7 who argues this about
the view that G-d has a physical form. Even though the Rambam strongly
disagrees there, he also agrees that some mistaken views are not heretical. See
Moreh Nevuchim 1:71 concerning the view that the world was not created.
[9] I have only quoted
those who are clear in their views. Some others merely hint to the issue, and
the view of the Ramban is hard to determine due to apparent contradictions.
[10] Moreh Nevuchim 3:17-18
[11] The Rambam mentions
that one of the Geonim accepted the Muslim view that there is reward for
animals, see the commentary of R’ Kapach for a discussion of who he may be
referring to.
[12] Elsewhere (3:10) the Rambam explains that the existence of defects
is inherent to physical beings, and other than this fact there is no reason why
people are born with them. As the only alternative would have been not to
create the physical world at all, even the creation of these people is a good
thing.
[13] There is much more to
be discussed here, but my purpose in this post is just to provide a starting
point for independent thought.
[17] Bereishis 37:21
[18] Here it is not enough to claim lack of mental capacity and leave
the understanding up to G-d, as if so one should also not assume that
Providence is all-encompassing with certainty.
[19] I have a difficulty explaining the role of the simpleton who is
entirely devoted to Hashem but understands little about Him. There also seem to
be contradictions in Moreh Nevuchim about this.
[20] I described an example of this danger in 'Building the
Beis Hamikdash'.
[21] I once even heard that a certain Rosh Yeshiva felt this way so
strongly that he removed all sefarim with references to coincidence from the
shelves of the yeshiva.
[22] The claim that it could be for sins in a previous life is rarely
convincing or encouraging.
