Divine Providence, Free Will and Coincidence

Growing up through various stages of a religious Jewish education, something fairly ingrained in me was that there is no such thing as coincidence. I do remember one teacher mentioning that there are views that G-d does not intervene with unimportant matters, but this was certainly not considered mainstream.

It is perhaps shocking that despite spending most of the last 15 years learning Torah, it is only within the last two or three that I have investigated this seriously, but better late than never. The first thing that needs to be decided here is the method used to tackle philosophical questions, which texts are binding and how much is left to one’s own intellect.

The difference between halacha and philosophy

In “How does halacha work?” I explained the model of the Sanhedrin and the later equivalent of the Talmud.  In the first footnote I mentioned that whether the same rules apply to philosophical issues requires further discussion, and this is the place. The natural question to start with is whether the Sanhedrin have the same power when it comes to philosophy, essentially can they dictate what we are supposed to think.

The Torah seemingly tells us clearly which matters are within the remit of the Sanhedrin:

כִּי יִפָּלֵא מִמְּךָ דָבָר לַמִּשְׁפָּט בֵּין דָּם לְדָם בֵּין דִּין לְדִין וּבֵין נֶגַע לָנֶגַע דִּבְרֵי רִיבֹת בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ וְקַמְתָּ וְעָלִיתָ אֶל הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְקֹוָק אֱלֹקֶיךָ בּוֹ:

(דברים יז, ח)

“When a matter of justice will be hidden from you, whether between types of blood, din or negaim, matters of dispute in your gateways, you must arise and ascend to the place that Hashem your G-d will choose.”[1]

The Talmud Bavli explains that the question between types of blood refers to the blood of a niddah, as certain types of menstrual blood are in fact pure halachically. ‘Din’ refers to capital, monetary and corporal judgements, and negaim are the different types of tzara’as afflictions, some of which are pure and some impure. The seemingly superfluous phrase ‘matters of dispute’ adds also various cases of consecration, and the processes of the sotah, egla arufa (the calf whose neck must be broken when a murder has taken place and the culprit is unknown) and purification of the metzora.[2]

Clearly these examples are not exhaustive, but are meant to illustrate the different categories over which the Sanhedrin has jurisdiction. How to define these categories precisely is not so obvious, but there certainly is no mention of philosophical issues here.

In contrast, the Yerushalmi includes also aggadic matters, based on the word דבר at the beginning of the pasuk.[3] Based on this, some indeed understand that our question as to whether Sanhedrin dictates to us philosophical issues is itself subject to a dispute between the Bavli and the Yerushalmi.[4] If this is the case, the generally accepted rule is that the halacha follows the Bavli.[5]

It is possible to suggest that in fact there is no dispute here. Often seeming differences between the Bavli and Yerushalmi can be due to different styles. The Bavli tends to be clear and precise, whereas the Yerushalmi is more cryptic and poetic.

Bearing this in mind, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Yerushalmi also agrees that the absolute authority of Sanhedrin is limited to halacha. However, sometimes halacha itself can depend on philosophy. One who has heretical beliefs is not granted many of the special privileges halacha gives to the Chosen People.[6] But not every mistaken belief is heretical.[7] The Yerushalmi clarifies that the Sanhedrin has authority to fix which beliefs are heretical, but if heresy is not in question they do not dictate to us how to think.

Returning to our original discussion, I have yet to see any view about the way G-d oversees the world classed as heresy (as long as there is general acceptance that G-d does indeed oversee the world and has not forsaken it[8]). It follows then that the only authority that is binding here is that of G-d himself in Tanach. But the Tanach is far from clear-cut on this issue, and the same is true of Chazal. It therefore makes sense to start by quoting some of the Rishonim who did discuss this extensively.[9]

Rambam

The Rambam lists five ancient views that existed in the world about hashgacha (Divine Providence):[10]

1) There is none (the worthless belief of Apikores).

2) G-d cares only about the higher spheres of the universe, from the moon upwards (Aristotle).

3) Nothing in the entire universe is coincidental, all is decreed by G-d and there is no free will (the view of one group of Muslims).

4) There is free will, but all of G-d’s actions are with an intelligent purpose including what happens to animals, plants and the non-living. This also includes people being born with defects (the view of another group of Muslims).

5) All actions of man and animal are based on free will. All G-d’s actions are with justice, i.e. there is fair reward and punishment for everything. However this concept of reward and punishment applies only to man and not to animals[11] (the view of the Torah[12]).

The Rambam goes on to explain that his understanding of the Torah view is that G-d’s care for the world is dependent on seichel (intelligence or wisdom). The nevi’im have the highest level of protection, and others follow on a sliding scale. There is such thing as coincidence, but this is fair as those more deserving are less exposed to it. True, animals were born without individual Divine Providence, but this is no more difficult than the fact that they were born without intelligence.[13]

Who argues?

The view of the Rambam is endorsed by Ralbag[14] and R’ Yosef Elbo.[15] The Ran also says something similar, that G-d only changes nature in case of great need. It follows from this that some suffer despite their innocence.[16]

I have found no strong evidence that any of the early commentaries disagree with the Rambam in a major way. It seems that the first to do so was the Ohr HaChaim (1696-1743), who says that a person will never die by exposure to the elements or animals if he does not deserve it. However, even he agrees that human beings could kill one undeserving of death, as they have the ability to decide between good and bad.[17]

Not long after this, the Ba’al Shem Tov (c. 1700-1760) and the Chasidim stated that everything that happens is due to Divine Providence (although seemingly paradoxically they also accept the concept of free will). As already mentioned, the fact that they expressed a novel opinion is not to be held against them. However, the portrayal of this view as the mainstream is wrong and misleading.

Fallout

I believe that with an issue like this that can affect much of our decision making, everyone should figure out for themselves where they stand. Personally, as I have not seen any indication in Tanach or even in Chazal that Providence is all-encompassing, my assumption is that it isn’t. Crucially though, whatever a person thinks he must take responsibility for the consequences, both philosophical and practical.

One who takes the Chasidic approach must know how to explain how free will is not compromised.[18] He must also figure out how to understand suffering of the innocent, unless he is prepared to take the bold step of denying it entirely. Rationalists like me also have questions to answer, albeit in areas less directly connected.[19]

Practically, the way of the Rishonim is generally more conducive to taking responsibility for our actions. The assumption that in most cases G-d will not intervene, and our actions will achieve their natural results, is usually something very positive. Although the Ba’al Shem Tov certainly did not intend us to be passive and rely on Hashem alone, those following his path need to be aware of this possible danger.[20]

One reason many give for preferring the way of the Chasidim is the encouragement they can give to those who are suffering. They claim that it helps these people to understand that there is a reason for the pain they are experiencing.[21] Clearly this depends on the person, but in my view ultimately the opposite is true. Too often we have lost Jewish souls who simply could not comprehend what they or others had done to deserve the punishment they thought had been imposed upon them.[22]

In the short term it may also be hard for people to accept that they have been left by G-d to the mercy of the free will of others, and even to random occurrences. But once the importance of both free will and a naturally-functioning world are understood, it should become clear that even these events are in a broad sense part of G-d’s master plan.

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[1] Devarim 17:8

[2] Sanhedrin 87a

[3] Sanhedrin 11:3

[4] See Igros Har’iya, Igeres 103

[5] As it was written later, and those who compiled it knew the views expressed by the Yerushalmi and decided whether to accept them or not. There is some discussion about the position of the Rambam on this issue, but the truth is that he states clearly in his introduction to Mishne Torah (quoted in “How does halacha work?”) that only the Talmud Bavli is absolutely authoritative.

[6] See for example Menachos 42b that if he writes tefilin they are invalid.

[7] See for example Ra’avad, Hilchos Teshuva 3:7 who argues this about the view that G-d has a physical form. Even though the Rambam strongly disagrees there, he also agrees that some mistaken views are not heretical. See Moreh Nevuchim 1:71 concerning the view that the world was not created.

[8] Such a view is criticized strongly by prophecies of Yechezkel, 8:12 and 9:9

[9] I have only quoted those who are clear in their views. Some others merely hint to the issue, and the view of the Ramban is hard to determine due to apparent contradictions.

[10] Moreh Nevuchim 3:17-18

[11] The Rambam mentions that one of the Geonim accepted the Muslim view that there is reward for animals, see the commentary of R’ Kapach for a discussion of who he may be referring to.

[12] Elsewhere (3:10) the Rambam explains that the existence of defects is inherent to physical beings, and other than this fact there is no reason why people are born with them. As the only alternative would have been not to create the physical world at all, even the creation of these people is a good thing.

[13] There is much more to be discussed here, but my purpose in this post is just to provide a starting point for independent thought.

[14] Milchamos Hashem, Ma’amar 4 chapter 7

[15] Sefer Haikarim 4:10

[16] Drush 3

[17] Bereishis 37:21

[18] Here it is not enough to claim lack of mental capacity and leave the understanding up to G-d, as if so one should also not assume that Providence is all-encompassing with certainty.

[19] I have a difficulty explaining the role of the simpleton who is entirely devoted to Hashem but understands little about Him. There also seem to be contradictions in Moreh Nevuchim about this.

[20] I described an example of this danger in 'Building the Beis Hamikdash'.

[21] I once even heard that a certain Rosh Yeshiva felt this way so strongly that he removed all sefarim with references to coincidence from the shelves of the yeshiva.

[22] The claim that it could be for sins in a previous life is rarely convincing or encouraging.