Geirus in our time

Introduction

The laws of geirus do not comprise a particularly long or complicated part of halacha.[1] Despite this, there seems to be a great deal of confusion and argument in this field, and I will attempt to explain the sources of this and how I believe they should be applied.

In doing this it is important to differentiate between three questions:

1) What are the essential requirements for geirus without which the conversion would be invalid?

2) What are the standard requirements for geirus which a beis din must check before completion of conversion, even if they would not invalidate the conversion?

3) Which special circumstances may be taken into account to alter the answer to question 2?

Inherent and formal requirements

Question 1 has two parts to it. In the same way that the technical part of marriage can be accomplished by a man giving a woman anything with a minimal value in front of witnesses, conversion also has a technical side. Clearly, in both cases the formal act is meaningless if there is no understanding or acceptance of what one is undertaking.[2]

The formal part of geirus involves milah (obviously only for men), tevila in a mikveh and when possible the offering of a korban. The gemara derives this from the way Bnei Yisrael entered into the covenant when they accepted the Torah.[3]

It is also explicit (in a different place in the gemara) that before this we must inform a potential convert of some of the mitzvos that he is undertaking, and that he must accept them.[4] However, there seems to be a dispute amongst the Rishonim whether this acceptance is part of the formal conversion process or not.

The gemara tells us that conversion must be done in front of three people.[5] Tosfos suggest that if the acceptance of mitzvos is done in front of three, even if the tevila is done privately the conversion is not invalidated.[6] The Rosh testifies that this was the view of the Maharam MiRotenburg.[7] However the Rif and the Rambam maintain that in all circumstances the tevila is invalid if it is not done in front of three people, and seem not to require the presence of three people for the acceptance of mitzvos.[8]

According to the first view, it is clear that the acceptance of mitzvos is a formal part of the conversion. However the Rambam seems to disagree, and understands that the acceptance of mitzvos is not something technical.[9] According to him, as the acceptance of mitzvos is the very essence of geirus, it is not a step in the process

The boundaries of acceptance

The debate about geirus today focuses almost entirely on the definition of acceptance of mitzvos.[10] I will therefore try to answer the three questions above in relation to this part of the geirus.

From what we have written already, it should be clear that geirus without any acceptance of mitzvos is meaningless. This point is confirmed by the Shulchan Aruch[11] and generally agreed upon,[12] although there is much discussion over what exactly must be accepted.

Two details are explicit in the gemara. We only need to tell the potential convert about some of the ‘lighter’ mitzvos and some of the more severe ones, as well as about the punishment for not adhering to them and the reward for keeping them.[13] However, if he excludes even one mitzvah from his acceptance, we cannot accept him.[14] The question is what it means to ‘accept’ the mitzvos.

As the laws of geirus are derived from the giving of the Torah, it would be logical to assume that the acceptance required is also parallel to the acceptance then. In other words, an undertaking to keep to all the mitzvos of the Torah is required (albeit with the understanding that it is virtually impossible never to make mistakes). This was in fact the traditional understanding of the concept of acceptance.

R’ Chaim Ozer Grodzinski (1863-1940), a leader of European Jewry, had a novel approach. He ruled that concerning most of the mitzvos, an acceptance of their binding status and the consequences of violation is sufficient. In other words, one can convert to Judaism without any intention of keeping the laws of family purity (for example), as long as he accepts the fact that this will be a violation.[15]

A contemporary, R’ Avraham Dov Kahana-Shapira (1870-1943), disputes this explicitly. He maintains that an ‘acceptance’ with intention to violate is a contradiction in terms.[16] To my knowledge, these are the only two major responsa that deal with this question. For this reason the issue is often looked at as fifty-fifty, without any attempt to decide which view is the more natural one.

Intentions and motivations

It is explicit in the gemara that it is not sufficient to ascertain that the prospective convert accepts the mitzvos, we must also check his motivations for doing so. If, for example, he (or she) wants to convert in order to marry a Jewish woman (or man), even if we believe that he is prepared to keep the mitzvos, we are not supposed to accept him.[17] However, if such a person nevertheless goes through conversion, it is valid b’dieved.[18]

Historically batei din throughout the world have been willing to forgo this requirement. The knowledge that the conversion will be valid and that upholding the strict letter of the law will likely cause many who were born Jewish to intermarry, have been a key factor. To compensate for this leniency, standard practice is to seek some kind of indication that the couple will be observant of Halacha.

The situation in Israel today

In summary of the above, the answers to the first two questions asked are:

1) The genuine undertaking to keep all the mitzvos to the best of ones abilities is a crucial requirement of conversion, without which the conversion is invalid.[19]

2) Ideally we are also supposed to check that the motivations of the prospective convert are pure, and if he is not being influenced by external factors we should not accept him.

The third question was how we should apply the answer to question 2 based on the circumstances. I already mentioned that practice was to forgo the requirement of pure motivation when we have a strong indication that the convert will remain observant. Many argue that nowadays in Israel, this practice should be relaxed further, accepting converts even without the assurance that they will be able to live up to their intentions. If we want to be honest, statistics show that all batei din seem to accept this to some extent.[20]

One of the reasons given for this leniency is that due to the large numbers of non-Jewish Russians that have immigrated over the last thirty years, if we don’t do something drastic there will soon be a huge surge in intermarriage. However, in my humble opinion easing conversion will not lead to any significant gain in this field. Even if the conversion will technically be valid, we are still supposed to keep our distance from insincere converts. As the Rambam writes:

“Because Shlomo (HaMelech) and Shimshon converted women and married them, and it is known that they only converted for ulterior motives, without the approval of Beis Din (the Sanhedrin), the Tanach considers it as if they were non-Jews and remained forbidden. …… For this reason Chazal said that geirim are as difficult as tzara’as, as most of them convert with ulterior motives and lead Israel astray, and it is hard to separate from them after they converted.”[21]

A better reason I have heard for these leniencies is the concern that large numbers of non-Jews could lead to a fifth column rising against the State. This is something that needs to be investigated by experts in the causes of political uprisings, although one thing seems clear to me- there is no reason to expect a further increase in the percentage of non-Jews. Children of a Jewish mother will be Jewish regardless.

Beyond these practical issues, there is something more fundamental at stake here. A third reason given by some to be lenient is the belief that we cannot close the doors to someone who serves in the army and is strongly loyal to the State. After all, for many of those born Jewish this is the only expression of their Judaism.

In my view, this attitude is extremely misguided. I do not for a second underestimate the value of the contribution of these people to the country, or the reward they deserve for being ‘The Righteous of the Nations’. However, as we have shown above, being Jewish means more than this. A Jew is obligated by every one of the 613 mitzvos, and the only way to become Jewish is to undertake the fulfilment of this obligation.

With this in mind, I would like to suggest the possibility that in fact nowadays we should be much more stringent about who we accept as a convert. In Europe, and throughout the majority of our history, ulterior motives for conversion were limited. The hate most of the world had for the Jews meant that for the insincere there was usually little to gain from being Jewish.

The situation in Israel now couldn’t be more different. Although many non-Jews have full citizens’ rights, they are severely restricted when it comes to basic things like marriage and education for their children. In fact, the relatively small numbers of those who want to convert is hard to understand.

Chazal tell us that geirim were not accepted by the Sanhedrin in the times of David and Shlomo, and they should not be accepted in the times of the Moshiach.[22] As far as this issue is concerned, we may well have already reached the Messianic era.

---

[1] An indication of this is the relatively small amount of space allocated by the Rambam (Isurei Biah 13-4) and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 268) for these laws.

[2] An exception to this is the case of a minor converting, which is another major issue beyond the scope of this post.

[3] Kereisus 9a

[4] Yevamos 47b

[5] Ibid. 46b

[6] Ibid. 45b

[7] Ibid. 4:31

[8] Rif Yevamos 15b, Rambam Isurei Biah 13:7. See also Even Haezel, Avadim 8:20 who points this out. However, some explanation is required as to why the Rambam says that the conversion is invalid if the prospective convert immersed privately and converted privately.

[9] The fact that there is no need for three does not prove this, as according to him milah also need not be done in front of three people. However, throughout chapter 13 of Isurei Biah this distinction is apparent. Especially in halacha 4, the Rambam writes that when a non-Jew wants to become Jewish and accept the Torah, he needs milah (for a man), tevila and the offering of a korban.

[10] There is broad consensus on all the laws of milah and tevilah, with just slight differences of opinion over how a woman should preserve modesty while immersing in the presence of men (I have never heard of the validity of an Orthodox conversion being questioned due to such a difference).

[11] Yoreh Deah 268:3

[12] Although there are acharonim who claim that according to many rishonim, conversion is valid b’dieved (ipso facto) even without acceptance of mitzvos. However, the truth is that all these rishonim said is that the conversion is valid even if Beis Din did not inform the convert about mitzvos. To me it is clear that all they meant to say was that telling the convert about mitzvos is only a means to ascertaining that he knows about them, and that b’dieved even if he was not told formally we can assume that he knows. All attempts to refute this distinction (see Zera Yisrael part 1, page 16) are seriously flawed.

[13] Yevamos 47b. The Rambam writes that if the convert was not taught even some of the mitzvos, his conversion is nevertheless valid b’dieved (Isurei Biah 13:17). This position is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 268:12) and almost unanimously, although see Darkei Moshe 3 and Shut Divrei Yatziv, Even Haezer 102.

[14] Bechoros 30b. My assumption here (based on what I have already written above) is that even b’dieved a conversion on this basis is invalid. This is also the understanding of R’ Moshe Feinstein in two teshuvos (Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:194 and 2:124), although he seems to contradict this in a third teshuva (Ibid. 3:106).

[15] Shut Achiezer 3:26. He does stipulate that if it is clear that he won’t keep basic mitzvos and does not genuinely mean to accept anything, his ‘acceptance’ is meaningless.

[16] Shut Dvar Avraham 3:28

[17] Rambam Isurei Biah 13:14

[18] Ibid. 17

[19] Whether or not we can retroactively rule that this requirement was not met is an issue I have decided not to write about here, in interests of brevity.

[20] The most stringent beis din for conversion in the country is that of R’ Nissim Karelitz in B’nei Brak. I have been told by someone with knowledge in the field that just 40-50% of their converts remain observant.

[21] Isurei Biah 13:16-18

[22] Yevamos 24b