Mashiach, Resurrection & The World to Come (part 2)

Objections to the Rambam's View

In the last post, we mentioned briefly that the Rambam was accused of denying that there would ever be a physical Resurrection of the Dead. We also explained how his view of a temporary physical resurrection might fit with pesukim in Daniel. We now need to deal with some of the other objections raised by the Rambam's opponents, and make some analysis of this opposing view.

We first must quote the comment of the Ra'avad, referring to his perception of the Rambam's position: "In my eyes, the words of this man are close to (those of) one who says that the Resurrection of the Dead is not for bodies but for souls alone. By my life, this was not the intention of Chazal!" He continues to refute the possibility that Chazal's words regarding the Resurrection were meant as a parable.[1]

Either the Ra'avad did not understand the position of the Rambam accurately, or he was worried that others may misunderstand it in such a way. Either way, there is no real dispute here and therefore no analysis is required.[2]

For representatives of the opposing view who write clearly and at length, I will take the Ramban[3] and the Rama[4] (R' Meir HaLevi Abulafia, 1170-1244, Spain). They both show that Chazal use the terms 'Techiyas HaMeisim' and 'Olam HaBa' interchangeably in many places,[5] clearly indicating that the terms are synonymous or at least that the events will happen concurrently.

Furthermore, the Rambam's assertion that those who will rise physically from their graves will eventually die a second death is in explicit contradiction to the words of Chazal. Quoting Tana d'bei Eliyahu, we are told that the dead who will be resurrected in the future will not revert 'to their dust'.[6]

Presumably, the Rambam would contend that this statement of Tana d'bei Eliyahu is just one view within Chazal. As mentioned in part 1, Chazal also tell us explicitly that in the World to Come there is no eating or drinking. This implies that our eventual destiny is a non-physical world, and that any physical resurrection can only be temporary.

Faced with this dispute within Chazal, the Rambam naturally sided with the view that seemed most rational to him.[7] A physical existence is not necessary in order to receive the ultimate good that Hashem has to give us; in order to come closer to the non-physical it is surely more logical for us to shed our own physical impediments.

Can there be eternal physical life?

The opponents of the Rambam maintain that the words of Tana d'bei Eliyahu, that the physical Resurrection of the Dead is forever, represents the unanimous position of Chazal. In the physical World to Come, although there will be no eating and drinking, we will still have mouths and the rest of our bodies.[8] When a righteous person dies, they go to an interim 'world of souls' called Gan Eden until the time for the World to Come, the place for ultimate reward.

This position raises several philosophical conundrums:

1) What would we need a physical body for if the basic physical functions will not be required?

2) An eternal physical existence would appear to be a contradiction in terms - all physical bodies we know of have an 'expiry date.'

3) If it is possible for a physical body to last forever, it is presumably also possible for a physical body to have always existed (at least theoretically). If this is the case, how do we know that our own world had a beginning?

I hate to disappoint, but I don't really have answers to any of these questions.

The Ramban addresses the first question in a way so cryptic that I am not able to even to begin to reproduce it here.

The Rama could be construed as answering the second question by saying that nothing is beyond Hashem's capability. If this is what he means, he would appear to be missing the point. Even Hashem cannot create something paradoxical (e.g. a triangle with four corners), and this is no contradiction to His Omnipotence.[9] If an eternal physical body is a paradoxical concept, it is no different.[10]

The third question would be less problematic for the Rambam, as he contends that there is in fact no philosophical proof that our world had a beginning and we know this only from the Torah.[11] However, despite having no proof for this, I have a feeling that the Ramban would not agree with the Rambam in this regard. It seems more probable that he would have sided with the Chovos Halvavos[12] or with R' Chisdai Kreskas[13] who do offer philosophical proofs.[14]

In summary

The position of the Rambam may be less well grounded in Chazal, but to me at least it is far easier to understand philosophically. The greatest difficulty I have with the alternative is that there seems to be no need for a physical existence in the place of ultimate spiritual reward.[15]

Does it matter?

It is clear that although belief in the Resurrection is a basic tenet of our religion, inaccurate perceptions of the nature of the Resurrection are not considered heretical. The final consensus even within the camp opposed to the Rambam's view was that the Rambam remained within the limits of acceptable Jewish belief. However, from what we have seen above, this camp did attach significant importance to the attempt to verify the truth about the Resurrection. The attack on the Rambam's position was at least as strong as the halachic disputes that exist between the Rambam and other rishonim.

By contrast, the Rambam writes that he originally saw no point giving any explanation of what the Resurrection involves, as one only has to believe in it (without any of its details). Only once accused of unbelief in the Resurrection was it necessary for him to clarify his views, and even then, he added a section to Igeres Techiyas Hameisim (Treatise on Resurrection) in order not to leave it "devoid of useful new material." The Rambam does not appear at all concerned if others wish to believe in a different format of resurrection.

This difference may stem from the fact that while for his opponents, the Resurrection is our end purpose, for the Rambam it is merely a stepping-stone. After all, the Rambam did provide a description of the World to Come in Mishne Torah.

However, I believe that it goes deeper than this. The Rambam did not consider the details of what will happen in the Messianic age to be a fundamental part of our religion,[16] and the same would seem to hold for the Resurrection. It is far more important for us to concentrate on the here and now, perfecting ourselves in the world that we have currently. It was important to stress that the World to Come will not be physical, but only so that we should realise that even in this world, our main focus should not be the physical.

On the other hand, the Rambam's opponents seem to attach far greater importance to the physical aspects of this world. This difference has far-reaching consequences in the world today,[17] perhaps explaining the strong feeling expressed.

---

[1] Hilchos Teshuva 8:2

[2] Further on (8:8), the Ra'avad accuses the Rambam of disputing Chazal's statement that the world will be destroyed and then rebuilt (see Sanhedrin 97a). Based on this statement, the Ra'avad disputes the Rambam's contention that The World to Come already exists now. Thus there is in fact a clear point of dispute between the Rambam and the Ra'avad, although perhaps not one with fundamental repercussions.

[3] Toras HaAdam, Sha'ar HaG'mul

[4] Igros HaRama, simanim 10 and 33-46.

[5] Perhaps the clearest is in Sanhedrin 90a.

[6] Sanhedrin 92a

[7] Even had there not been any view of Chazal supporting him, it is far from obvious that the Rambam would have seen himself obligated to the words of Tana d'bei Eliyahu. See “Divine providence, free will and Coincidence”.

[8] They even claim that the statement of Chazal regarding eating and drinking is further support to their view; had Chazal meant that there will be no physical existence at all they would have said so explicitly.

[9] See Moreh Nevuchim 3:15, Shu"t HaRashba 1:418 (in case anyone needed a 'kosher' source for the obvious).

[10] One might want to argue that just because we have never seen anything physical that is everlasting, this does not mean that it is inherently impossible. This is clearly not an argument that can be tested using human capabilities (i.e. it is not falsifiable, and we should therefore be sceptical about its truth). However, even if this were true, these kind of 'physical entities' would be in a completely new category and incomparable to the ones we know of. Thus the Rambam would still be right to say that the World to Come is not physical, if we define 'physical' as having the physical properties known to us.

[11] Moreh Nevuchim 1:71

[12] Sha’ar Hayichud, ch. 5-6

[13] Or Hashem, Klal 1 at length.

[14] The Rambam was at least in part influenced by Aristotle in this regard – while dismissing Aristotle's proofs for an eternal universe he could not believe that Aristotle would have believed something that was philosophically impossible. The Ramban certainly did not share this degree of respect for Aristotle, or any of the Greek philosophers.

[15] If the ultimate reward in store for us was physical (as would appear from statements of some other religions), this would not be difficult. However, to the best of my knowledge, this is not the view of any of the Jewish theologians and philosophers.

[16] Hilchos Melachim 12:2

[17] See for example Lust - permitted and forbidden, where I present a philosophical explanation of the Torah's view of homosexuality, based on the Rambam's position. I am unable to provide an alternative understanding based on the opposing view, in the same way that I have been unable to defend this view philosophically here.

Mashiach, Resurrection & The World to Come

We all know the Rambam's famous twelfth 'Principle of Faith,' the belief in the Messianic period on Earth. Some also know that the concept of the World to Come is part of the Rambam's eleventh Principle (reward and punishment) and that the thirteenth Principle is belief in the Resurrection of the Dead.

While there were views in Chazal that questioned the certainty of the coming of Mashiach, and even a rejected view that denied it altogether, the Rambam's position represents the final consensus of Chazal and those who followed.[1] A similar consensus exists regarding the Resurrection of the Dead and the World to Come (although many dispute the Rambam's contention that these are two completely distinct concepts). Here I will examine the sources for these concepts and the reasons why they are necessary.

Mashiach

The simplest of these principles is Mashiach. The basic idea does not require anything unnatural (although some do believe that changes in nature will occur even at this stage) and is a matter of broad consensus. A physical redeemer will lead the Jewish People to Eretz Yisrael, reign there and rebuild the Beis HaMikdash. While the details of how this will happen are unclear, they are also not critical to our belief – as the Rambam writes, we will only really know when they actually happen.[2]

It is also not difficult to find sources or to explain why such a period is necessary. The Tanach is full of prophecies about the Messianic era, including that of Bilam in the Torah.[3] The ability to be able to serve Hashem without disturbance and to convey this message to the rest of the world is our primary calling in this world.

The harder question is one that I have already raised before on this blog, without offering an answer.[4] Why are we required to believe that this will definitely happen at some point? We have free will, and if we choose not to take the steps necessary for self-determination and dedication to Hashem, it is far from obvious that this will be forced upon us.[5]

I am now able to offer a suggested solution to this problem. Although no one can force us to repent,[6] it was critical for Hashem to promise us redemption and for us to believe in it. Without this belief, there would have been a danger of loss of motivation or even total despair. Our lives may have appeared meaningless to us.[7]

The World to Come

In contrast to the Messianic period, the nature of the World to Come is shrouded in mystery. It is not mentioned explicitly in Tanach even once, although there are a handful of strong indications that the human soul remains extant after death.[8]

Chazal do speak about the World to Come many times, but they offer very little in terms of description of what this 'World' entails. The most crucial pieces of information they offer are statements about what the World to Come is not:

• The visions received by our prophecies only told of the times of Mashiach; only Hashem has seen anything of the World to Come.[9]
• The World to Come does not include eating, drinking, reproduction, business deals, jealousy, hatred or competition.[10]

Many of the early commentaries discuss why the Torah does not mention the World to Come.[11] In my mind, the answer that is best backed up by the information we have[12] is given by Ibn Ezra[13] and Rabbeinu Bachaye[14] – the Torah omitted any description of the World to Come simply because it is not comprehensible to most humans.

All of this forms a solid basis for the contention of the Rambam that the World to Come is void of any physicality. A world for souls alone is indeed not something that we can fathom. Furthermore, the Rambam argues, what would be the point of a physical body and its organs if they would not be necessary for eating, drinking and reproduction? He claims that those who disagree do so only because of the inability to recognise any value to non-physical entities, similar to those who believe that Hashem has a physical form.[15]

Pre-empting one obvious question, the Rambam explains further that although Chazal use the language 'World to Come,' they are not referring to a world that is yet to be created. It already exists now for those who have completed life in this world, and is only 'to come' for mortals like us.[16]

This argument of the Rambam was one of his most controversial. However, before I discuss the various counter-arguments, I believe it is important to point out that all agree about one thing. However one understands what exactly the World to Come is, it is our final destiny and ultimate purpose.[17] Thus for those who disagree with the Rambam and maintain that the World to Come is an improved version of our current physical world, this must involve resurrection of the dead.

In fact, this connection between the World to Come and the Resurrection made by the Rambam's numerous opponents led to some of them questioning whether the Rambam believed in a physical resurrection at all.[18] If the ultimate reward in the World to Come does not involve the physical body, why would there need to be any physical afterlife?

These accusations forced the Rambam to write a treatise dedicated to the topic of the Resurrection. There the Rambam starts by bemoaning the fact that his accusers ignored his explicit statements in a number of places that belief in the Resurrection is indeed a basic tenet of our faith. His consolation is that even the Torah's monotheistic declaration in Shema was as badly misinterpreted by the Christians.

However, it would be wrong to say that the accusations against the Rambam were completely unfounded. While he certainly did believe in the Resurrection of the Dead, he did not believe in his opponents' (perhaps more conventional) understanding of it. To analyse this further, we will need to examine some of the sources for the Resurrection.

Resurrection

The Mishna tells us that one who says that the Resurrection is not part of the Torah has no portion in the World to Come.[19] The gemara finds various hints in the Torah that the dead will live again, but nothing explicit.[20] However, something more direct is found in the vision of Daniel about 'the time of the end.'[21] Daniel is told:

ורבים מישני אדמת עפר יקיצו אלה לחיי עולם ואלה לחרפות לדראון עולם. ... ואתה לך לקץ ותנוח ותעמד לגרלך לקץ הימין.

דניאל יב, ב; יב, יג

"Many of those who sleep in dusty earth will awaken – these for eternal life and those for shame, for eternal disgrace. … As for you, go to the end – rest and arise for your portion at the End of Days."

Daniel 12:2, 12:13

The Rambam affirms that these verses are indeed an explicit source for the Resurrection, with no reason to be explained allegorically.[22] This would, however, seem to raise a significant difficulty for the Rambam. He understands that the ultimate end is the World to Come, and the Resurrection is only temporary – those who are resurrected will die again.²¹ Why then is Daniel told that the righteous will arise for eternal life? Why is Daniel's own 'portion' being resurrected, and why is this described as happening at 'the End of Days'?[23] The strongest Biblical source for the Resurrection would also appear to be the strongest source for the view of the Rambam's opponents.[24]

The only suggested answer I have found to this problem is given by a certain R' Yeshayahu Levi (about whom I know very little). The Rambam must explain that the righteous are granted resurrection in order to acquire additional understanding, which in turn allows them to live eternally in the World to Come.[25]

This answer, if a little strained, also helps us to understand a more philosophical question according to the Rambam. If the Resurrection is not the ultimate purpose, it is not clear why it is a fundamental principle of our faith or even why it is necessary at all. If we accept R' Levi's explanation, we can now answer that the Resurrection is necessary as a stepping-stone from our world to the next.

To be continued?

I have not yet analysed the opposing view, that our ultimate purpose is indeed a revamped form of physical life after the Resurrection. This will involve looking at the objections raised against the Rambam, understanding why Hashem would want us to retain some kind of physical existence and answering some other questions that this view raises (such as what happens to the dead until the Resurrection).

This may be the topic of the next post, if I manage to address these questions satisfactorily and if nothing more pressing comes up.

---

[1] There is considerable discussion among the Tana'im and Amora'im regarding whether the Redemption is contingent on teshuva; R' Hillel maintained that the promise of Mashiach was already fulfilled in the days of Chizkiyahu and will never be repeated. However, both of these views were ultimately rejected (Sanhedrin 97b-99a).

[2] Hilchos Melachim 12:1-2. Of course, this does not exempt us from our obligations to take real steps to bring about the redemption and it is not sufficient just to fulfil the remaining mitzvos hoping that Hashem will do the work for us (see Building the Beis Hamikdash).

[3] Bamidbar 24:14-24. Moshe Rabbeinu also prophesises about redemption in the closing sections of the Torah, although here it is not 100% clear that the redemption being referred to is the final one.

[4] At the end of How are Jews Unique?

[5] Although one could argue that denial of this principle is also denial of the truth of the prophecies mentioned above (and although we have free will, Hashem knows that we will eventually repent), this would not justify the concept of Mashiach being an independent Principle of Faith. Furthermore, as mentioned above, some of our Sages disputed this interpretation of the prophecies.

[6] While the view of R' Yehoshua (and Chazal's conclusion) is that should we not repent alone, this will be 'forced upon us' by decrees of an uncompromising king, this coercion cannot be total. Repentance may be incentivised, but it would be meaningless without an element of human choice.

[7] This also explains the necessity for a natural redemption, which we bring about ourselves without any overt Divine intervention.

[8] For example Bereishis 5:22, Shmuel 1 25:29 and Koheles 12:7. See also Kuzari 1:115. By contrast, the Rambam implies that the source for the World to Come is only from the Oral Tradition (Hilchos Teshuva 8:1).

[9] Berachos 34b

[10] Berachos 17a. Although the continuation does describe the World to Come, it is in cryptic terms: "Rather, the righteous sit with crowns on their heads, enjoying the splendour of the Divine Presence."

[11] See for example Emunos v'Deos chapter 9; Chovas Halevavos, Sha'ar HaBitachon chapter 4; Abarbanel Vayikra 26:3.

[12] Based on the above and the Occam's razor principle.

[13] Devarim 32:39

[14] Vayikra 26:9. See also Maharal, first introduction to Gevuros Hashem & Tiferes Yisrael chapter 58.

[15] Hilchos Teshuva 8:2-3, 6; Igeres Techiyas HaMeisim

[16] Hilchos Teshuva 8:8

[17] Even the Kuzari, who criticises those who concentrate on the World to Come (1:109), explains that in order to attain the World to Come one must come as close as possible to that level in this world.

[18] See for example Ra'avad, Hilchos Teshuva 8:2.

[19] Sanhedrin 90a

[20] See Rashi who claims that it is not sufficient to believe that there will be a Resurrection; one must also accept the truth of the inferences to it from the Torah. However, even Rashi did not expect us to believe that this is the simple interpretation of these verses. Furthermore, the Rambam would seem to dispute Rashi's claim – in his list of those who have no portion in the World to Come he includes only one who denies the entire concept of the Resurrection (Hilchos Teshuva 3:6). This is also supported by the Rambam's version of the text of the Mishna (available here).

[21] Daniel 11:40. Yechezkel's prophecy following the vision of the 'dry bones,' (Yechezkel 37:12-16) is not cited as a clear source for the Resurrection – see Radak there who accepts the possibility of the 'graves' referred to in this prophecy being a metaphor for the exile.

[22] Igeres Techiyas HaMeisim

[23] This second verse about arising at the End of Days could actually have been explained figuratively, referring to the Rambam's idea of the World to Come. But the Rambam did not explain in this manner.

[24] See Rosh Hashana 16b, where the gemara understands this verse as referring to 'Judgement Day.' See also Rashi and Tosfos there and Ibn Ezra's commentary on the verse.

[25] Yeshurun, volume 11, page 790

Early Shabbos

Introduction

For centuries, communities all over the world have started Shabbos (and Yom Tov) before nightfall when convenient to do so, usually in the summer in order to avoid waiting until late to eat. The practice is rarely questioned in Europe, but in Israel there are those who refrain from doing so on halachic grounds. Furthermore, the whole idea sometimes seems strange to those new to Judaism. How can we daven ma'ariv (the 'evening service') in broad daylight?

Here I will attempt to explain what the issues are, provide some historical perspective and present my own halachic conclusions.[1]

Mincha and Ma'ariv

The primary issue is not directly related to Shabbos. There is a dispute in the Mishna regarding the latest time one may daven the Mincha Shemoneh Esrei. The Tana Kama says that one has until the evening,[2] whereas R' Yehuda requires one to daven before Plag Hamincha, 1  halachic hours beforehand.[3]

The gemara attempts to determine the halacha from the practices of some of the amora'im, but concludes that here too there is no consensus. While Rav would daven the Friday night ma'ariv shemoneh esrei before Shabbos, Rav Huna and other amora'im would not daven until night. The conclusion therefore is that as the halacha has not been decided either way, one who follows either opinion is ok.[4]

This gemara clearly implies that the latest time for mincha is also the earliest time for ma'ariv on Friday night.[5] Thus one may choose to follow the opinion of R' Yehuda, and to daven early as some of the amora'im did. The gemara later says that one may also say Friday night Kiddush early.[6] Why then should anyone object?

Living a contradiction?

The Rosh writes that although one may choose which view to follow, consistency is required. One who davens mincha after Plag Hamincha must wait until night to daven ma'ariv; one who davens ma'ariv early must daven mincha before Plag Hamincha.[7] This stringency is not agreed to unanimously,[8] but it is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch.[9]

Nowadays, davening mincha just before sunset is a common practice of most religious Jews. Even those who daven mincha at lunchtime during the week will usually daven before sunset on Fridays (during the winter) and on Shabbos. Thus according to the Shulchan Aruch, we may have expected that also davening ma'ariv early on Friday nights may be a problem.

The reality is that this is not the case. The Shulchan Aruch himself writes explicitly that on Friday night, we should daven earlier than we do during the week.[10] Although the Vilna Gaon is quoted as being opposed to this practice,[11] it is unlikely that this was because of the contradiction. In Europe, especially before there was electricity, it would presumably have been easier to achieve consistency by davening mincha before plag. Even during the week, it was not practical for shuls to daven ma'ariv after dark during the summer.[12]

The time for Shema and its berachos

It is more likely that something else bothered the Vilna Gaon about davening early. The time for the mitzvah of reciting Shema at night is only from nightfall.[13] Although shuls say Shema before Shemoneh Esrei even when davening early, the Yerushalmi explains that this is only in order to daven following words of Torah.[14]

It should therefore be no surprise that Rav Hai Gaon and the Ra'avad both take it for granted that when davening early, one cannot say the berachos that usually accompany Shema.[15] While Shema itself can be said simply as pesukim in the Torah, berachos cannot be said voluntarily. Thus Shema must be said later, together with its berachos.

The common practice today, to say even the berachos early, appears to be based on the view of Rashi. Rashi writes that when davening early, the mitzvah of Shema is fulfilled when we say Shema in bed.[16] As the other rishonim point out, the berachos are not generally said at this time. The Rashba explains that although Shema must be said at night, the berachos are not intrinsically linked to Shema and may therefore be said earlier.[17]

Potential support for the assertion of the Rashba can be found from the halachos of the berachos of the morning Shema. The gemara says explicitly that these berachos may be said even after it is too late to fulfil the mitzvah.[18]

However, this comparison is inaccurate. Although the time restriction on the berachos of Shema is looser than that of Shema itself, it does not follow that the night-time berachos can be said during the day. On the contrary, it is clear elsewhere that one cannot say the berachos of Shema in the morning any earlier than one can fulfil the mitzvah of Shema, despite the fact that Shemoneh Esrei may be said earlier in times of need.[19]

For this reason, when I bring in Shabbos early, I postpone Shema and its berachos until after the meal. While for a shul it may not be a great idea to cut out part of the davening and tell people to do it on their own at home, while we are davening at home anyway due to Corona this problem is less relevant. I believe that this is also what the amora'im did when they brought in Shabbos early.

The correct order

It would appear that the Vilna Ga'on would not have approved of my practice either. How then would he have explained the practice of the amora'im? While we don't have any written record of his reasoning, the practice was already called into question long beforehand, with an explicit reason.

The Rambam writes that although the time for ma'ariv is at night, one may daven ma'ariv for Shabbos or for Motzei Shabbos early. As ma'ariv was originally instituted as an optional tefila, there is no need to be precise about its time.[20]

The Ra'avad argues that it is only proper to daven early due to a temporary pressing need. Under normal circumstances, one must say Shema and the following beracha, relating to redemption (ending גאל ישראל), immediately prior to Shemoneh Esrei. One can only assume that the Vilna Ga'on concurred.

In fact, the preferred order of the tefila at night is subject to a dispute in the gemara. The halacha indeed follows the view that Shema comes first, for the reason quoted by the Ra'avad. However, the statement of the gemara is that one who says the beracha of redemption immediately prior to Shemoneh Esrei is a 'son of the World to Come.'[21] This accolade clearly implies that we are dealing with a meritorious practice and not with an obligation.

We can now understand why the Rambam was less concerned about changing the order, and allowed it on Friday night (and even at the end of Shabbos) without any caveats. Rav Hai Gaon also writes explicitly that when davening early, one need not be concerned with following the correct order.[22] This is also the more straightforward reading of the gemara, which quotes the practice of the amora'im who davened early and does not stipulate that this was only due to an unusual need.

Furthermore, even those who daven later do not in general fully juxtapose Shemoneh Esrei to the beracha of redemption (at least when davening in shul). There are different customs regarding what is said between the berachos of Shema and the Shemoneh Esrei,[23] but all say at least Kaddish. The reasons for this are beyond the scope of this post, but in short, we are not particularly careful about the recommended juxtaposition at night.

Eating First

There is potentially another way to start Shabbos early without any of the problems described above. After davening mincha on Friday, one could simply make Kiddush and start to eat (provided that it is after Plag). Ma'ariv could be postponed until after the meal, at the right time in the right order.[24] Timing davening in shul might be difficult, but while we are davening at home what could be the problem?

The Magen Avraham indeed sanctions such a practice,[25] and most of the poskim follow suit.[26] However, the Vilna Ga'on is quoted as being against this solution too. The claim attributed to him is that when the gemara concludes that Kiddush may also be said before night, this is only as an extension to the leniency regarding davening. It therefore only applies when one has already davened ma'ariv.[27]

Personally, while I certainly do not subscribe to the alleged position of the Vilna Ga'on here,[28] my preference is to daven first for a simple reason - davening after the Friday night meal would be harder for both my children and myself. Others may not have this issue and prefer this option.

Have a great Shabbos, however you start it!

---

[1] While there are many other articles on the topic online (even in English), I have not found one that gives a satisfactory explanation of the reasons for being stringent (other than by citing opinions of other Rabbis who ruled stringently).

[2] It can be shown that the 'evening' here means sunset, as the gemara explicitly equates the end of the time for Mincha according to the Tana Kama with the end of the twelve hours of the halachic day (Berachos 27a). It is nowadays commonly accepted that the twelve hours of the halachic day run from sunrise until sunset, as only when using these times will the length of the halachic day be equal to the length of the halachic night during Nissan and Tishrei (as stated in Niddah 65b. See Shu"t B'Mareh Habazak, volume 8 siman 1, footnote 2).

[3] Berachos 26a (see gemara there 26b-27a).

[4] Berachos 27a.

[5] Most rishonim assume that the same is true for weekday nights, as the gemara also says that R' Yoshiya and other Tana'im and Amora'im davened Motzei Shabbos ma'ariv on Shabbos (Berachos 27b).

[6] Berachos 27b.

[7] Berachos 4:4

[8] See Meiri, Berachos 26b who says that one only needs to be concerned about a contradiction on the same day. The Rambam (Tefila 3:4, 6) does not mention any requirement to avoid a contradiction.

[9] Orach Chaim 233:1

[10] Orach Chaim 267:2, based on Seder Rav Amram Ga'on and Machzor Vitri siman 102. This distinction does seem to run contrary to the gemara quoted above, which uses the practices of amora'im on Friday night as a proof of the halacha during the entire week (see Bi'ur HaGra who alludes to this; Rav Amram Ga'on and Rashi may well not have subscribed to the stringency of the Rosh at all). It is however possible that the Tur and Shulchan Aruch felt that it was not appropriate to apply the stringency of the Rosh to Shabbos, as bringing in Shabbos early is clearly a meritorious practice.

[11] Ma'aseh Rav siman 65

[12] The rishonim at the beginning of Berachos all discuss this and the resultant problem of saying Shema before the correct time.

[13] Mishna and gemara, Berachos 2a. While there are other views there, and Tosfos and the Rosh both conclude that we indeed rely on these views when we daven early, it is explicit in the words of the Rosh that this is a contrived leniency due to the public need.

[14] Berachos 1:1. Tosfos, defending the position that one can fulfil the mitzvah of Shema early, are forced to explain that the Yerushalmi is referring to a now defunct practice of saying Shema before Mincha.

[15] Rav Hai is quoted by the Rashba and Rosh at the beginning of Berachos; Ra'avad Hilchos Tefila 3:7.

[16] Berachos 2a (ד"ה עד סוף)

[17] Responsa of the Rashba 1:47. See also Chidushei Talmidei Rabbeinu Yona, Berachos 1a-b, who write that even the berachos may only be said after sunset. Beforehand, the references to night within the first beracha are not appropriate. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 235:1) quotes only the view of the Rashba in his responsa.

[18] Berachos 10b

[19] Berachos 30a. This proof is pointed out by R' Moshe Feinstein in Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim 2:60. His attempt to resolve this gemara according to Rashi is a stretch.

[20] Hilchos Tefila 3:6-7. The Rambam appears not to have accepted the gemara's assertion that davening ma'ariv early is based on the view of R' Yehuda regarding mincha. Presumably, he had another source unknown to us.

[21] All in Berachos 4b.

[22] See footnote 15.

[23] The second beracha, starting השכיבנו, is considered an extension of the beracha of redemption (Berachos 4b).

[24] If one started eating a regular meal on Friday afternoon and it got dark, it is certainly permitted to continue the meal by first making Kiddush, despite not having davened ma'ariv (Pesachim 100a).

[25] 271:5

[26] See for example Mishna Berura 271:11.

[27] Ma'aseh Rav siman 117.

[28] It reads rather more into the gemara than what appears to be written.