Who has to serve in the army?

This question has gone backwards and forwards between the government and the High Court for several years now, and I thought it would be useful to put a halachic perspective in writing.

Firstly, it is important to differentiate between two parts of the question:

1) Who should the army be made up of ideally? (a question that the court should not deal with)

2) After the government have decided the rules (even in an unideal way), how should an individual act?

Without a king

                                                                                                                     

The first question is not an easy one to answer, as we are anyway in an unideal situation. Ideally the king is the one in charge of leading the army and deciding who is fit to serve, and has special powers for doing so.[1]

Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that we can to a great extent model what the army should look like without a king on the ideal situation with a king. The lack of a king raises questions of where the authority lies, but it should be obvious that there needs to be someone who has the power to do what it is necessary to protect the country from its enemies.

Before discussing who if anyone is supposed to have a special exemption from serving, a major decision that needs to be made is who should be included in the draft in the first place. Clearly only a small percentage of the population need be in the army at any given time, and the question is what should decide who these people should be.

One obvious factor involved is physical and mental ability. It goes without saying that we wouldn’t want to draft someone into a job that he is incapable of performing effectively, but to what extent we measure this ability is not clear-cut. One extreme would be to select only the most able-bodied (and able-minded where appropriate) for the army, in order to maximise our ability to defeat enemies.[2] However this extreme is impractical to implement, and how much testing of abilities is something to be decided by those who know best what works.

The current system is that with the exception of those who have various exemptions, all are drafted at the age of eighteen[3] for three years. At twenty-one soldiers are released, but still have to do reserve duty for a few weeks a year depending on what is needed. Those who want to can apply to serve longer or to take a permanent job in the army, and if they are suitable and there is a need they will be accepted.

In principle, this system is based on an estimate of how many soldiers are needed at any one time, and a calculation of how long eighteen-year-olds need to serve to reach these numbers. However, the reality is that there is not really a need for so many soldiers. Only a minority of those drafted are fit to serve as combat soldiers, and the three-year term is necessary to ensure that there are enough of these.[4] This results in a surplus of non-combat soldiers, one drawback of this system.

The obvious alternative is the system used by most countries, where there is no compulsory draft. Ensuring the necessary numbers is achieved by paying a salary high enough to draw people to serve voluntarily, and generally those who do serve will make this their job for life.[5]

The major advantages of this alternative system are the increased professionalism of a permanent army, and the alleviation of the necessity to force people to serve against their will. The major disadvantages are the cost to the taxpayer, and the almost inevitable deprivation of family life from those who choose to be soldiers.[6]

Does the Torah tell us how to decide on this question? R’ Yosef Carmel, Rosh Kolel of Eretz Chemda, suggests that it does. He sees the prohibition on the king from having too many horses as a way of preventing the establishment of a permanent army.[7] However, he also agrees that not all understood this prohibition in the same way.[8] At most this is a favoured direction given by the Torah, and not an obligation. As such, the decision depends on the circumstances and the judgement of those responsible.

Exemptions

The Torah exempts various people from going to war, due to tasks they have started but not yet completed or because of fear.[9] However, these exemptions do not apply to a milchemes mitzvah.[10] I explained the definition of milchemes mitzvah in War and Peace, and it should be clear that virtually all activity of the Israeli army nowadays falls into this category.[11]

There is one group who seem to be exempt even from milchemes mitzvah. The Rambam writes that the tribe of Levi do not wage war, and does not distinguish between milchemes mitzvah and milchemes reshus.[12] This exemption was given in order to allow the levi’im to be free to serve in the Beis Hamikdash, as well as (most of their time) teaching Torah.[13]

Ideally we may have wanted to apply this exemption for levi’im (and kohanim) today as well, although one could argue that it does not apply when there is no Beis Hamikdash. But I doubt discrimination of this kind would be possible under international law, and in any case it would not be practical to suddenly expect all levi’im to spend all their time teaching Torah.

Due to this impracticality, some would like to exempt all those who are learning Torah from serving in the army. This may well be a meritorious idea, but there certainly is no obligation to give such an exemption.[14] Obviously, such an idea would only be praiseworthy if those exempted actually learned seriously.

After the rules have been made

Communities have the right to force individuals to pay their share of the needs of the community.[15] The needs of an entire country are no different, and those chosen by the country to decide on these issues have the authority to do so when there is no conflict with the Torah.[16]

Thus unless going to the army involved some kind of Torah violation, it should be clear that those who illegally dodge the army are in the wrong. On the other hand, those who keep to the rules and use the exemptions given by the government cannot be called transgressors. Often the most productive thing for them to do may be to serve in the army, but this should be decided case by case.[17]

The spiritual dangers of the army

It seems to me that the main reason why certain sections of the community are strongly against serving in the army is the fear of spiritual deterioration. Citing the numbers that have stopped adhering to the Torah in the army, they claim that serving inevitably leads to Torah violations and thus the law of the land is pushed aside.

I do not want to discuss statistics here, or to study what the spiritual effects of the army are in depth. I will just say that the spiritual danger is real, and in fact inevitable in any army. The Torah recognises this, and for the purposes of damage limitation allowed (under certain circumstances and with many restrictions) a soldier to enter a relationship with a non-Jewish woman.[18]

Anyone going to the army should be aware of this, and prepare for the challenge to stay strong both physically and spiritually. For someone who is not legally obliged to serve, this should certainly be one of the factors that affect his decision. Although he should also bear in mind that there has to be an army, and the fact that he will likely do a better job than someone less concerned.

I am saddened to have to write this, but for someone who is legally obligated to serve the claim that this is against the Torah is completely incorrect. When there is no alternative way to carrying out a certain task (even one that is not mitzvah related), a person is never obligated to refrain because of the potential pitfalls on the way.[19]

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[1] See Rambam Melachim 4:1-2

[2] This is probably what happened in ancient times, as the Rambam writes that the king takes the strong and the men of valour for his chariots and horsemen (Melachim 4:2).

[3] The age of eighteen is chosen for practical reasons, as this is when compulsory education ends. Some claim that according to the Torah the age should be twenty, as indicated many times (e.g. Bamidbar 1:3). While I do agree that there are advantages of drafting at a more mature age, and of having more time to learn before serving in the army, I do not believe that the age of twenty is something that was meant to be set in stone. I am aware of no halachic source that forbids drafting those under twenty.

[4] Some claim that even for this it is unnecessary to have such a long term, but this is a question for the army to decide.

[5] It is also possible to have a combination of the two systems, shortening mandatory service and increasing the salary of those who continue voluntarily.

[6] This also carries with it a lowering of moral standards within the army.

[7] Devarim 17:16

[8] See his shiur on this topic here.

[9] Devarim 20:5-8

[10] Mishna Sotah 44a-b

[11] As they are defending against enemy attacks. Even though the majority of the time the army are training, planning or even sitting idly rather than engaging in actual combat, it should be obvious that no-one can exempt himself because of this. The nature of modern warfare requires an army to be ready at all times, and one who abstains from these parts of army service will not be able to fight at the crucial time.

[12] Shmita v’Yovel 13:12. See also Derech Emunah there, who points out that many levi’im did serve in the army voluntarily.

[13] See Ma'aser- religious income tax

[14] Although the Rambam continues that even non-levi’im who dedicate their life to Torah and don’t worry about earning a living are holy and inherit Olam Haba, he does not say that they are exempt from going to war.

[15] See Bava Basra 7b

[16] See The right to resist the abuse of power where I wrote about the limits of such power. See also Amud Hayemini siman 7 (the whole book is available here) for an extensive proof of the halachic authority of a democratically elected government. There is enough there to prove that the government have the right not just to collect taxes, but also to force people to serve in the army and other positions. Although even if this was not the case, few would be able to pay for another soldier to replace them.

[17] If the person involved is learning Torah seriously, the general rule is that he does not have to stop in order to do a mitzvah that can be done by others (Rambam Talmud Torah 3:4). However, whether this principle should be used by the government to exempt learners from the army against the will of the majority is extremely questionable. It seems logical that relying on others to do the mitzvah only makes sense when the others are willing, and when this is not the case it is hard to define the mitzvah as something that can be done by others.

[18] See Devarim 21:10-14, Kidushin 21b-22a

[19] See Bava Basra 57b. See also Tosfos Avoda Zara 48b (ד"ה אי)

Living in the succah

Every year during succos I struggle to decide what the best way to fulfil the mitzvah of living in the succah is in the circumstances, and how we can attempt to change these circumstances in order to enhance the performance of this mitzvah. The issues are both halachic and philosophical.

‘Similar to the way you live at home’

Chazal tell us that during succos, all of the things normally done in one’s home should be done in the succah. This is based on the principle of 'תשבו כעין תדורו', literally “You must dwell (temporarily) in the same way you live (normally).” Thus one must bring his ornate utensils and decorations into the succah, and eating, drinking and various other household activities should be carried out there.[1]

The requirement to decorate ones succah with the ornaments of the house is not easy for a number of reasons. Many of these items are likely to be damaged by the elements if left in the succah, and it is obvious that one is not obligated to take such a risk.[2] The widespread custom to make specially designed succah decorations may be a reasonable substitute, although logically these should be of the quality that one would use in his house.

Another reason for succah decorations is the more general concept of hiddur mitzvah, beautification of the mitzvah. Chazal tell us that mitzvah items should be aesthetically pleasing, and succah is given as one example.[3] However, it is worth noting that there is an inherent difference between these two reasons. While the standard paper-chains, fruit and other shiny decorations do achieve hiddur mitzvah, I would question whether they can be a replacement for the standard household decoration required as part of normal living.

Lack of space

Many are faced with far a bigger problem with the mitzvah of succah. Some simply do not own or have any rights of usage of areas appropriate for building a kosher succah. In this situation the best option may be to spend succos with the extended family, or to stay in a hotel. However, for those who do not normally live in such a fashion doing so specifically on succos seems far from ideal. One doing so is also usually unable to control how the succah is built and decorated, or even what he can do there.

Some do not have the option of staying elsewhere. Assuming that it is possible to rent a space to build a succah, theoretically one is obligated to spend up to a fifth of his money in doing so.[4] Practically it would probably be cheaper to move house once rather than to incur this expense every year, and this realisation may lead those serious about mitzvos to find more creative solutions.

Perhaps a more common situation is when one does have an area for a succah, but the distance between it and the house make the fulfilment of the mitzvah in its entirety extremely tedious or completely impractical. It is clear that one is not obligated to build a separate kitchen for his succah,[5] and having to carry food and utensils for each meal up and down several flights of stairs can hardly be called a normal way of living.

Family life

Even when a man can deal with all the problems mentioned so far, keeping the mitzvah of succah to perfection often places a big burden on his wife. The gemara says that although the mitzvah of succah is time-bound, as we are required to live in the normal way there logically would have been a rationale to obligate women in this mitzvah. The conclusion is that this is not the case, due to an inference from the masculine language the Torah uses for this mitzvah.[6]

The simple way to understand this conclusion is that although the obligation is to temporarily exchange normal life in the home for similar normal life in the succah, this is only on an individual level. When it comes to the family, unless ones wife takes on the mitzvah voluntarily, a man is effectively commanded to separate from her.[7]

This aspect of the mitzvah becomes harder when there are also young children, and one’s succah is far from the house. Either the wife is left alone with the children, the children are forced to stay in the succah, or the whole family live in the succah (if it is practical to make a succah big enough). Yet the husband also has a mitzvah of rejoicing, and of making his wife and children happy.[8]

The purpose of the mitzvah

Unlike most mitzvos, here the Torah explicitly states the purpose:

לְמַעַן יֵדְעוּ דֹרֹתֵיכֶם כִּי בַסֻּכּוֹת הוֹשַׁבְתִּי אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּהוֹצִיאִי אוֹתָם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם אֲנִי ה' אֱלֹהֵיכֶם:

(ויקרא כג, מג)

In order that your generations should know that I housed B’nei Yisrael in succos when I took them out of Egypt. I am Hashem your G-d.

(Vayikra 23:43)

However, we still need to ask what the purpose of remembering this historic event is. The simple explanation is that we are supposed to remember how Hashem took care of us in the desert, and presumably internalise the extension of the principle of Divine Providence to our times.

Rashbam and the Rambam add that the mitzvah of succah also teaches us midos. One who once went through difficult times should remember them even during the good times. This leads a person to thank Hashem, and to learn humility. Therefore we leave the finely crafted houses that Hashem has given us in his kindness, and live in succos like desert dwellers in discomfort.[9]

Despite succos being zman simchaseinu (the time of our rejoicing), the Rambam points out that full simcha cannot be achieved when living in a temporary, flimsy dwelling. For this reason we need Shmini Atzeres to complete the simcha.

Application

With the above in mind, we can suggest some ways to view the problems more positively. We mentioned three major issues (not including those who cannot do the mitzvah at all, which is rare):

1) The difficulty in bringing ornaments into the succah

2) The difficulty of replicating normal living when the succah is far from the kitchen

3) Separation of man and wife

With the first two issues, although I have no great solution, I believe that we don’t need to look at them as problems. With all mitzvos we are only expected to do the best that we can, but with succah the issue is more inherent. The command to replicate normal living in an abnormal environment is somewhat of a contradiction. Part of the idea is to realise the limits of such a dwelling, and these limits also affect our ability to perform mitzvos in the way we would want. We must rejoice despite this, although this rejoicing will also not be complete until Shmini Atzeres.

The same is true when it comes to the possible separation of man and wife, although here I believe that there is an extra point. Normal living should have included women in the mitzvah as well, but to impose a blanket obligation on women like men would not have been practical.

Therefore ideally the husband should do all that he can to facilitate his wife and family joining him in the succah. This makes his own mitzvah of living normally more complete, and also achieves part of his mitzvah to make his family happy on Yom Tov. Although they are not obligated, he should attempt to create a situation where they will want to take part in this mitzvah.[10]

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[1] Succah 28b. More details can be seen there, notably the fact that drinking utensils are also supposed to be kept in the succah (29a).

[2] As one would not leave things at such a risk at home, and a weather-proof succah would constitute a ‘permanent abode’ (see Tosfos Succah 2a). However, if the only concern is for thieves, where possible one should make appropriate security arrangements for his succah like he does for his house.

[3] Shabbos 133b

[4] The same rule applies to all positive mitzvos, see Rema Orach Chaim 656:1.

[5] The gemara in Succah 29a says that food utensils are not kept in the succah.

[6] Succah 28a

[7] Although the Rema suggests that a married man may be exempt from sleeping in the succah (Orach Chaim 639:2), this suggestion that limits the words of the gemara to married men is very difficult (see also Aruch Hashulchan). And even according to this suggestion, there will be separation during waking hours.

[8] Pesachim 109a. Admittedly the method given for doing this, buying colourful clothing for ones wife and confectionery for the children, is not limited by the mitzvah of succah, and if this or similar can keep the family happy without need for the husband’s presence then there is no problem.

[9] Rashbam on the pasuk above, Moreh Nevuchim 3:43

[10] Perhaps a support for this idea can be brought from the gemara in Arachin . At least at one stage, the gemara says that the kohanim on duty who cannot be together with their wives (for reasons not connected to the succah), are exempt from the mitzvah of succah. See Rashi and Rabeinu Chananel there.

The 'laws' of tznius

Introduction

In recent times, many sefarim have been published about tznius, concentrating almost entirely on the way women are supposed to dress. This phenomenon did not exist in the past. The Rambam, Shulchan Aruch and their contemporaries did not devote sections of their compilations to this topic.[1]

One reason some have given for this new development is a decline in standards. Women used to know intuitively which clothes were appropriate, and it was not necessary to spell out every detail. The new publications are written with a considerable degree of sadness over their necessity.[2]

I do not dispute this explanation, although I believe that the issue is deeper. The Rambam did not leave out the prohibition of murder, despite the fact that it is intuitive.[3] As he writes in his introduction, his compilation was intended to be all-encompassing.

I am aware of only one place where Chazal describe a specific instruction to women over dress. The gemara infers from the uncovering of the head of the sotah that generally speaking, Jewish women are commanded not to go out with their heads uncovered.[4]

This does not mean that heads is the only part of the body that needs to be covered. In other places in the gemara it is clear that certain styles of dress are inappropriate, but we must pay attention to the way that these ideas are written.

‘Das Yehudis’

The gemara tells us that if a woman reveals the upper part of her arms in public, she is considered a ‘violator of das yehudis’ (the code of Jewish women) and her husband may divorce her without paying her kesuvah.[5] This is the source many bring to obligate a woman to cover her upper arms. Practically, I do not disagree with this conclusion. However, I believe that it is a mistake to relate to halachos like these in the same way we relate to the measurements Chazal give us for mitzvos like sukkah and lulav.

Rashi explains that ‘das yehudis’ refers to restrictions that are customary, despite not being written (in the Torah). Rabbeinu Yehonasan adds that these practices of Jewish women are out of tznius b’alma (‘mere’ modesty). Clearly then we are dealing with something subjective, dependent on the norms of the community. But how can a failure to adhere to a ‘custom’ be grounds for divorce?

The answer lies within the very definition of tznius. The Rambam writes that a talmid chacham wears neither clothes of kings that everyone looks at, nor the clothes of paupers that shame those who wear them.[6] The idea is clear, that dress is just one part of the modest conduct we are supposed to engage in. The same principle applies both to men and women, except that due to a difference in human nature certain types of clothing worn by women may draw attention where similar clothing on men would not.

This explains why ‘custom’ is so critical in this area. If someone walked on the streets of a modern city in clothes from the days of the Roman Empire, this would not be modest conduct no matter how much of his or her body was covered. The same would apply if clothing commonly worn in mid-Africa was worn in Europe.

If a married woman acts or dresses in a fashion that is considered unbecoming by her peers, this can cause the breakdown of her marriage.[7] This would not be the case if she violated a custom in another area, for example by eating kitniyos on Pesach in an Asheknazi community. In fact, even real transgressions are not grounds for divorce if they are unrelated to the family.[8]

With this in mind, we must ask if there is any basis for obligating an unmarried woman to a dress code. Certainly unmarried women are also supposed to act modestly like with other midos, and this includes dressing in a way that does not draw attention. The question is whether there is any formal obligation or prohibition involved.

Lifnei Iver

The answer to this question is dependent on a prohibition addressed to men. A man must not look extensively at a woman who is forbidden to him, or even at her clothes.[9] It follows that if a woman dresses in a way designed to draw such attention, she violates the prohibition of causing others to sin. However, to get a clearer idea of what is included in this we must define the commandment not to put ‘obstacles in front of the blind’ in more general terms.

Chazal learn from this commandment that one must not offer wine to a nazir, or meat detached from a live animal to a non-Jew.[10] It is clear that the prohibition applies even when there is no desire to cause a transgression, as the gemara includes in it the sale of things that will be used for idolatry or forbidden work during shmita.[11] No dispensation is given for the fact that the intention is merely to do business.

However, elsewhere the gemara tells us an important rule. Whenever there is a reasonable possibility that no prohibition will be violated, it is permitted to sell something that could be used in a forbidden way. For this reason one may sell farming tools during shmita if they are not always readily available to buy, relying on the possibility that the buyer plans to use them after shmita.[12]

It would seem that the same principle applies when it comes to dress. Whenever there is a reasonable chance that dress will not cause men to look extensively, the prohibition of lifnei iver does not apply.

Obviously it is impossible to know exactly which clothing falls into this category, but one thing is clear to me. The boundaries cannot be fixed by any codebook, and depend on the time, place and a large number of other factors. The main thing is to follow the guidelines of the Rambam, acting and dressing in a way that does not draw attention.

Erva

One other major issue still needs to be explained. The gemara tells us that a tefach (fist-area) of the body of a woman is considered an erva (lit. nakedness or lewdness). The gemara explains that here we are not discussing the prohibition of looking at women, as this prohibition applies even to a little finger. Rather the issue of erva applies to one’s wife, at the time one is reciting Shema (or other divrei torah). Due to the sanctity of what one is doing, at this time he must not be able to see a tefach of his wife’s body (in an area that is normally covered).[13]

The gemara goes on to say that the calf (שוק) is also considered an erva for this purpose. The rishonim explain that although this part of the body of a man is not considered private, it is an erva for a woman.[14] The acharonim debate whether this is a blanket rule irrespective of minhag, or whether this too is dependent on the prevalent custom.[15]

The generally accepted rule that women must cover their legs up to the knee is derived from this gemara. This is based on a mistranslation of the Hebrew word שוק as being the thigh. The truth is that it is quite clear elsewhere that the term refers to the calf, with the word ירך used for the thigh.[16] However, despite the fact that this minhag may have started from a mistake, deviating from it in a place where it has become accepted constitutes a violation of das yehudis as explained above.

Hair

In summary, all of the various issues involved in modest dress are subjective, which explains why no attempt to codify these ‘laws’ was made until recent times. However, as I wrote at the beginning, there is one exception. A direct command was given to women to cover their hair, explaining why the vast majority of poskim maintain that this command is not dependent on minhag.[17]

Here, as we are dealing with a formal commandment it is relevant to discuss precise measurements. R’ Moshe Feinstein claims that it is ok to leave up to a tefach of hair uncovered. In short, he argues that all we can learn from the uncovering of the hair of the sotah is that uncovering the hair in similar fashion is forbidden. As presumably a large amount of the hair of the sotah was uncovered, only a similar amount of uncovering is forbidden normally. However, since hair is also an erva, women must not uncover more than a tefach.[18]

This ruling of R’ Moshe is novel to say the least. One would have expected Chazal to spell out such a measurement in regards to the hair if it existed. On the other hand, it is also clear that only the hairs on the head need be covered and not the hairs around the ear. It is not clear where the cut-off point is, or more precisely where the head ends and the face starts.

With questions like this, until we can find a clear proof we again turn to minhag. As Chazal say, “Whenever an halacha is doubtful, follow the common practice.”[19] Obviously though, the practice of those who are not attempting to keep this halacha in its entirety can be discounted.

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[1] Although the Shulchan Aruch has a section about the laws of tznius, this deals not with dress but with marital relations.

[2] R’ Falk in his introduction to ‘Oz vehadar levusha’.

[3] The Rambam himself writes in his introduction to Pirkei Avos that even if this and similar prohibitions would not have been written in the Torah, it would have been correct for us to forbid them.

[4] Kesuvos 72a

[5] Ibid. 72b in explanation of the Mishna. I have translated the term זרוע as ‘upper part of the arm’ (from the elbow) based on the Mishna in Aholos 1:8, although I have refrained from discussing this at length as my conclusion makes it irrelevant.

[6] Hilchos Deios 5:9

[7] In the times of Chazal this did not apply to similar behaviour by men, as women generally preferred having an ungainly husband over no husband (see Kesuvos 75a). Grounds for forcing the husband to divorce included certain physical illnesses as well as those involved in particularly unpleasant jobs (Kesuvos 77a, Yevamos 65b).

[8] See Rosh (Kesuvos 7:9) who says that if she eats non-kosher privately and does not also mislead her husband into eating, she does not lose her kesuvah.

[9] See Avoda Zara 20a-b. Practically this prohibition applies to any adult woman except ones wife, as all others are either married to someone else or in a state of niddah (menstrual impurity). I have translated the root להסתכל as looking extensively, based on the gemara that deals with a case of the beracha made upon seeing beautiful people (or animals). It is clear from many places that men are not required to avoid all sight of women (see for example Bava Basra 57b), but it is also clear from the gemara in Avoda Zara that the prohibition applies even when there is no lustful intent.

[10] Avoda Zara 6b

[11] Ibid., Shevi’is 5:8

[12] Avoda Zara 15b. However, when it comes to non-Jews it seems that this leniency only applies when in the majority of cases no violation will be caused. See Nedarim 62b.

[13] Berachos 24a

[14] Rashba in the name of the Ra’avad.

[15] See Divrei Chamudos 116 (on the Rosh), Mishna Berura 75:2

[16] See for example Mishna Aholos 1:8. This is pointed out at length by the Chazon Ish, Orach Chaim 16:8

[17] Although here too das yehudis requires women to cover their hair even in situations when the Biblical obligation does not apply, see Kesuvos 72a.

[18] Igros Moshe, Even Haezer 1:58

[19] Yerushalmi Peah 7:5

Obligations of the mind

Introduction

The fact that we are obligated to subscribe to certain beliefs is explicit in Chazal. One who declares that there is no resurrection of the dead in the Torah, or that the Torah did not come from Heaven, has no portion in Olam Haba.[1] Who is defined as an heretic also has halachic relevance for others when it comes to returning lost objects and other issues.[2]

What exactly we are obligated to believe is not completely clear, and subject to much dispute between the rishonim. Here I want to deal with a different question- what constitutes belief? In Judaism the obligation to know that G-d exists and that multiple gods do not exist is undisputed.[3] But what is far less clear is how well we have to know this. There are several levels (this list is not exhaustive and the order is not necessarily definitive):

1) One who has studied the issue thoroughly, and understands intellectually the proofs of the issue beyond dispute.

2) One who has studied exhaustively and has come to the conclusion that there is no absolute proof. However, his research has led him to believe that the probability of this tenet of Judaism being untrue is small enough to discount.

3) One who has not done any intellectual study (or failed to come to any conclusion from it), but senses the existence of G-d emotionally to the extent that he is left with no doubt.

4) One who has studied to an extent and in his mind no doubt remains. However, if questioned he may not be able to successfully defend his arguments (even in his own mind).

5) One who has no proof either intellectual or emotional, but based on habit, social norms or fear of punishment declares that he has no doubt based on blind faith.

The question is which of these levels are acceptable? I will start with number 5 and try to work up the list. At the moment I am not discussing those who lack the mental capacity to get to the highest levels, rather those who have used their abilities to different extents.

Blind faith

With number 5 we have to ask whether we are commanded to know or just to believe. The answer should be obvious, but also can be found explicitly in the Torah:

וְיָדַעְתָּ הַיּוֹם וַהֲשֵׁבֹתָ אֶל לְבָבֶךָ כִּי ה' הוּא הָאֱלֹקִים בַּשָּׁמַיִם מִמַּעַל וְעַל הָאָרֶץ מִתָּחַת אֵין עוֹד.

(דברים ד, לט)

You should know and set in your heart that Hashem is G-d in heaven above and on the Earth below- there is no other.

(Devarim 4:39)

The Rambam also states that the mitzvah is knowledge (ידיעה) of G-d’s existence rather than belief.[4] Although many of the other compilations listing the 613 mitzvos do use the root אמונה, the truth is that even this term does not refer to blind faith.[5] The Torah uses this root to tell us that Avraham Avinu trusted in Hashem when he was promised that his descendants will be as numerous as the stars.[6] The term describes a relationship usually based on experience, although with Hashem an intellectual understanding of His ways may be sufficient to create this trust.

I will concede that although those with blind faith do not fulfil the mental obligations the Torah expects of us, they are not defined by anyone as heretics (and as such we must still return their lost items and may drink their wine).[7] However, this is far from complimentary to such people.[8] The Rambam writes explicitly that those who don’t have positive belief in his thirteen principles do not have a share in Olam Haba.[9]

Level 4 (those who claim to have intellectual proof of G-d but in fact have flawed arguments) differs from level 5 only quantitatively. Although I know of no source that deals with such a level, logically it makes sense to say that those who have done part of the intellectual work they are supposed to can receive part of the share in Olam Haba set aside for them.

Emotional proof

In Tanach we find various examples of those who did not need to contemplate too much to know that G-d existed. Are ancestors who witnessed the miracles in Egypt, the splitting of the sea and Matan Torah are the clearest example. Not only is such experiential evidence an acceptable means of knowing, the Torah in several places encourages faith based on these experiences.[10]

Furthermore, even for those who were not alive then, our belief in the truth of the Torah stems from acceptance of the tradition passed down from those who were. For this reason the mitzvah of remembering the Exodus from Egypt is so crucial.[11]

Clearly then, the philosophical arguments used by Avraham Avinu and the Rambam to prove the existence of G-d are not a must for those who have enough proof from their experiences. However, these proofs are not merely emotional. In the same way Avraham Avinu and the Rambam deduced the existence of G-d from what they observed in the natural world, others used their observations of the supernatural.

We can conclude that those who genuinely experience G-d without much mental effort (Level 3 above) have fulfilled the mitzvah incumbent upon them. The only question is whether such people actually exist nowadays, or if what they are actually experiencing is a product of their imagination, driven by emotion alone.

For someone who has never had this kind of experience, it is impossible to know the answer to this question. All I can do is to urge those who feel this way to carefully scrutinise the source of their emotions. The dangers of following ones instinct alone are severe.[12]

Can we really know?

The two categories we have yet to explain seem to be in direct conflict. Clearly the philosophy that G-d’s existence cannot be proved outright (level 2) implies that level 1 (those who know how to prove G-d’s existence) does not exist. Those who feel that they are at level 1 may argue that level 2 doesn’t really exist, as the intellectually honest are capable of getting to level 1 (unless their intelligence is limited to the extent that may exempt them from mitzvos).

The Rambam, quoting the philosophy of Aristotle, clearly expects us to reach level 1. In short, his proof of the existence of an infinite G-d is that if there was none and everything had an end, this end should have already come.[13] A way of thinking we are not used to, added to the language barrier caused by the Arabic used,[14] make the understanding of this proof inaccessible to most of us.

The main other rishon who writes about this issue preceded the Rambam.[15] The Chovas Halvavos (11^th century, Spain) also expects us to reach level 1, and writes in a much clearer and more understandable way.[16] However, there seem to be holes in his logic, and the Rambam explicitly negates the arguments he makes.[17] Thus according to the Rambam, the Chovos Halvavos himself was only on level 4.

As far as I am aware, the view of those on level 2 does not have a source in classic Jewish philosophy. It seems also not to have a source in any non-Jewish medieval philosophy, stemming from those who more generally rejected the Aristotelian methodology used by both the Chovos Halvavos and the Rambam. They maintain that we cannot prove anything about the transcendental from the world we live in.

What is a proof?

My claim is that the difference between levels 1 and 2 is merely in semantics. Those who say they have absolute proof also realise that with a finite human brain, there exists a possibility of mistake. One who says he is not 100% sure but does not consider the doubt significant is also legitimate, and essentially means the same thing.

Are we 100% sure about who our father is, or that the food we are about to eat isn’t poisonous? Whether or not we think we have proof for such things is not really relevant.

The existence of atheism means that most do not treat their belief in G-d in the same unquestioning way, and as I wrote above this is a good thing. However, when judging what level of proof is satisfactory, we should not set an aim higher than we do with more mundane matters.

To prove anything we will always need to make certain assumptions. For example, proving something from what we see assumes that our eyesight is accurate to some degree, and the same is true for all the senses. My rule here (the axiom of axioms) is that any assumption agreed upon by the overwhelming majority of people without expecting proof is valid.

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[1] Mishna Sanhedrin 90a. As all the ways of G-d are just (see Devarim 32:4), we can discount the possibility that this individual has no part in the World to Come through no fault of his own.

[2] See Avoda Zara 26b-27b. Here is not the place to discuss the intricacies of these halachos or how and when they should be applied. But the existence of an halachic side here is crucial, because when it comes to halacha we are absolutely obligated by Chazal. See “Divine providence, free will and Coincidence”.

[3] Although the Behag does not count this as one of the 613 mitzvos, the Ramban (Mitzas Asei 1) explains that this is because this principle is the basis of all the mitzvos.

[4] Yesodei Hatorah 1:1-6. This is also the accurate translation in Sefer Hamitzvos, Mitzvas Aseh 1 as attested by R’ Kapach (Sefer Hamitzvos was written by the Rambam in Arabic).

[5] To my knowledge there is no word in Biblical Hebrew signifying blind faith, perhaps because such a concept was and should be completely foreign to us.

[6] Bereishis 15:4

[7] See for example the Rambam’s definitions in Hilchos Teshuva 3:7-8.

[8] In all probability, the failure to categorise them stems from the worthlessness of those who do not use the brain that separates them from animals.

[9] Commentary to the Mishna, introduction to Perek Chelek. See also Chovos Halvavos, Sha’ar Hayichud ch. 3 who confirms that all are obligated to understand the Oneness of G-d according to their ability.

[10] See for example Shemos 19:9

[11] See Ramban Shemos 13:16

[12] If the experience is not genuine, it is just as easy for someone to ‘instinctively know’ that they need to do things prohibited by the Torah. Sadly, there is no shortage of case studies showing this.

[13] Moreh Nevuchim part 2, introduction and ch. 1-2

[14] Without any claims of expertise in this field, from the little I have seen it appears that no translation out preserves both accuracy and coherency.

[15] It seems that for those who wrote after the time of the Rambam until the modern day, the main arguments that needed to be made were within monotheism.

[16] Sha’ar Hayichud, ch. 5-6

[17] The Chovos Halvavos first proves that the world was created and is not eternal, and uses this to prove the existence of G-d. The Rambam )M.N. part 1 ch. 71) writes that there is no philosophical proof that the world was created (the only proof is from the existence of miracles in the Torah), and strongly criticises using this method to prove G-d. Nowadays this debate is anachronistic, as the scientific world agrees to the fact that the world had a beginning. Thus we can use the method of the Chovos Halvavos without any hesitation.