Friday, 31 March 2017

The Process of Biur Chametz


Few mitzvos are planned and prepared for to the extent we are used to seeing with biur chametz. A mitzvah which on a Biblical level applies only from midday on Erev Pesach, and rabbinically starts the night before, in practice tends to be prepared for weeks beforehand.

There are many details of this mitzvah which require clarification, and I will to try to do justice to a few of them. The basis for everything here is this passuk:

שבעת ימים מצות תאכלו אך ביום הראשון תשביתו שאר מבתיכם כי כל אכל חמץ ונכרתה הנפש ההוא מישראל מיום הראשן עד יום השבעי

)שמות יב, טו)

“You shall eat matzos for seven days, but on the day beforehand you shall nullify leaven from your homes. If anyone eats chametz from the first day until the seventh day, that soul will be cut off from Yisrael.”

(Shemos 12:15)

Bitul Chametz

The gemara tells us that on a Biblical level, all we are required to do to our chametz is ‘bitul’ (nullification).[1] The simplest explanation of this is given by Rashi[2] and the Rambam- the word תשביתו means nullification in the mind.[3] Others explain that bitul is a synonym for hefker, relinquishing of ownership.[4]

Either way, the requirement to search out and destroy all chametz in one’s possession is rabbinic. This rabbinic obligation applies only to someone who is in his own home in the thirty days before Pesach. One who is away during this entire period may rely on bitul alone[5] (although chametz remaining in his possession must be burned upon return according to most, even after Pesach[6]).

Bedikas Chametz

Most people are aware that the ‘Pesach-cleaning’ that they do is above and beyond what is strictly necessary, although many do not realise the extent of this. Nowhere in Chazal do we find any obligation to start cleaning the house from chametz until the night of Erev Pesach (or if one will not be at home then, the night before he leaves[7]).

I am not suggesting that everyone should wait until the night of Erev Pesach to start cleaning. This may have worked in the tiny houses people lived in in the time of Chazal, but in much bigger houses it can be impractical.[8] However, to put what we do in perspective it is important to understand what the basic obligation is.

In addition to this, there are a number of points that remain completely relevant even in the biggest houses. Firstly, the obligation to search for chametz applies only to places where one normally brings chametz.[9] In homes where food consumption is limited to small areas, the search can be a simple and quick task.

Secondly, although generally people know that ‘dust is not chametz’, less well known is the fact that insignificant chametz crumbs also need not be removed.[10] The only halachic problem that could be caused by such crumbs is the unlikely possibility of them falling into the food on Pesach, in which case the food may become forbidden to eat.[11]

The last halacha that must be pointed out in this area is a stringency. No matter how meticulously the house has been cleaned beforehand, there is no exemption from the obligation to check the house on the night of Erev Pesach.[12] If chametz is normally brought into all (or most) rooms in a large house, it would be wise to leave much of the job until that night and delegate amongst the members of the family.[13]

Mechiras Chametz

What I have written until now is more or less agreed upon by the vast majority of halachic authorities. When it comes to the question of selling versus burning of chametz, two opposite views have become more popular in recent times. I reject both of them, as I will try to explain.

The first view is that of the extreme pro-mechira camp. Sometimes based on a healthy loathing of wastefulness, they claim that burning chametz is a violation of the negative commandment of ‘Bal Tashchis’ (a paraphrasing of the Torah in Devarim 20:19, referring to destruction of fruit trees).[14]

This claim is not hard to refute. The fulfilment of a mitzvah cannot seriously be described as purposeless destruction.[15] All the more so when it comes to destroying something that the Torah considers valueless.[16] However, I do agree that it is appropriate to limit the chametz one burns by being prudent in the weeks before Pesach.

The opposite argument is that the sale we do is fictitious, or at best a ‘haaramah’ (halachic trickery). There are different levels of extremity to this claim, some not wanting to rely on any kind of sale or even to buy chametz after pesach from shops who sold. More common is the practice to sell only items which have not been supervised as chametz-free while not containing known or complete chametz, and to be more lenient when it comes to buying chametz after pesach.[17]

My view is that as long as the sale is legally valid (by secular as well as Torah law), it can be relied upon by all without hesitation. The only stipulation I would add is that it would not be within the spirit of the law to purposely stock up on chametz before pesach in order to have it ready for after pesach. To support this position, I will first quote precedents and then attempt to refute the various counter-claims.

The fact that selling to a non-Jew is a legitimate way of getting rid of chametz is explicit in the Mishna.[18] The Tosefta (another collection of teachings from the mishnaic period) tells us that it is also ok to buy the chametz back from the non-Jew after pesach and to mention this possibility beforehand, provided that the original sale was genuine.[19]

There are two main claims of the anti-mechira camp against the applying of this Tosefta to our sale. The first is that the Tosefta deals with a case of a Jew and a non-Jew on a boat on Erev Pesach, and the solution of selling was only given for lack of a better alternative.[20]

This interpretation of the Tosefta seems flawed. As the chametz in question is with the Jew on the boat[21], there is a perfectly viable option of throwing it into the sea. This explains why the Shulchan Aruch writes this option of selling chametz without the limitation to the case of the boat.[22]

The second claim is that the way we do our sale today is problematic, and not similar to the sale mentioned in the Tosefta and the Shulchan Aruch. The main basis for this is the stipulation of the Terumas Hadeshen, quoted in the Shulchan Aruch, that the chametz must not remain in the house of the Jew.[23]

The Mishna Berura quotes a dispute over the reason for this stipulation.[24] Some say that it is a mere technicality, to ensure the non-Jew halachically acquires the chametz. According to this if the non-Jew removes the chametz with the intention of acquiring it, the problem is solved even if he then returns it to the house of the Jew. In the sale we do today this technical problem is circumvented by the performance of a number of methods of halachic acquisition, to be safe.

Others say that if the chametz stays in the house of the Jew, it ‘looks like’ the chametz of the Jew. There is also a concern that he may forget that it is pesach and eat the chametz. But these problems also have a solution through the sale of the place that the chametz is kept, and sealing it.

Another objection some have is to the practice of a rav selling the chametz of an entire supermarket chain or city. They claim that the non-Jew cannot possibly have real intention to buy the chametz, including the possibility of a huge loss in the event that something unforeseen happens to the chametz over pesach.

This objection may sometimes have some validity, and it is the responsibility of the rav involved to ensure that the non-Jew is aware of the ramifications of the sale. Provided that the contract is written in a way that it will be upheld in court, this should not be too difficult a task.

Chag Kasher v’Sameach!


[1] Pesachim 4b
[2] Ibid.
[3] Chametz Umatzah 2:2-3
[4] See Tosfos and Ran. Among other problems with this explanation, it is hard to understand why the gemara used the new terminology of bitul instead of the usual word ‘hefker’.
[5] Pesachim 6a. See also Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 436:2, that if he intends to return during Pesach this may not be the case.
[6] O.C. 488:5. See also Biur Halacha in 488:3 (ד"ה אפילו).
[7] O.C. 436:1, Mishna Berura 3.
[8] Although even this is usually not so much a function of the mitzvah of biur chametz, and more a preventative measure against the consumption of chametz during Pesach.
[9] Pesachim 2a (Mishna)
[10] Ibid. 6b. See also Yabia Omer 7, Orach Chaim 43.
[11] See Pesachim 30a, O.C. 447:1 (see also Mishna Berura 2).
[12] O.C. 433:11
[13] Even children under the age of bar/bas mitzvah may be entrusted, see Pesachim 4a-b.
[14] See Rambam Melachim 6:8-10, that any needless destruction of something useful is included in this prohibition.
[15] See Bava Kama 91b where it is clear that even fruit trees may be destroyed if they are causing damage.
[16] See for example Bava Kama 98b, that one who destroys someone else’s chametz on Pesach is exempt from payment, as all are commanded to destroy it.
[17] Many believe that the sale is technically valid and may be relied on by shops in a case of large monetary loss, but should not be used by private individuals when the loss due to burning is minimal.
[18] Pesachim 21a
[19] Pesachim ch. 2. This Tosefta is quoted by many rishonim, and to the best of my knowledge no-one questions its authority.
[20] See Maharam Chalava, Pesachim 30b in the name of Rav Amram Gaon who explains similarly. However, this seems to be a lone view.
[21] The language of the Tosefta is that the chametz is ‘in the hand of the Jew.’ Even though the term ‘in the hand of’ is not always meant literally, here it is hard to explain otherwise. Because as mentioned previously, one who left home thirty days before pesach may rely on bitul alone.
[22] O.C. 448:3-4
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid. 12

Friday, 3 March 2017

Drush and Divrei Agada

Throughout the ages, rabbis have provided Torah insight in matters that are not clear-cut. For a long time I have been bothered by the question of where these teachings come from, and how we are supposed to replicate this regarding the issues of today. Writing about this helps immensely for personal clarification, and I hope it will also help others.

Drush

Chazal frequently interpret pesukim in a non-literal way. When it comes to halacha, it is often clear that the end result was known and the question was only about the source. For example, the gemara never entertains any real possibility that ‘an eye for an eye’ was supposed to be taken literally. Despite this, much discussion exists over the biblical source of the non-literal interpretation.[1]

Even when it is less clear whether the end result was known or not, halachic interpretations of pesukim come under careful scrutiny. If the reading is imprecise, it is usually rejected.[2]

When it comes to non-halachic explanations, the situation sometimes seems to be slightly different. Often Chazal will tell us not to understand a word exactly the way that it is written (‘Al Tikri’),[3] one famous example being the word בניך (your sons) in Yeshayahu 54:13 which we are told to interpret as בוניך (your builders).[4]

This difference in style is not limited to word alteration. In the above example, Chazal do not even understand the altered word ‘your builders’ literally. The message that we are supposed to take is that talmidei chachamim increase shalom in the world, the new interpretation of the phrase ורב שלום בניך. As already mentioned, the question that I would like to address here is what basis Chazal had for this type of interpretation.[5]

Prophecy

To attempt to answer this question, I believe that it is important to point out that the ideal method of clarifying what Hashem wants from us at a particular time is simply to ask. We are told that we have no need to resort to various forms of divining, because G-d will send us prophets that can tell us what we need to know.[6] Until prophecy is restored, the best alternative we have is to try to learn from recordings of previous prophecies in the Tanach.[7]

The truth is that even for our prophets understanding the word of G-d was not a simple task. It is clear in the Torah that with the exception of Moshe Rabbeinu, Hashem spoke to nevi’im in unclear visions, dreams and riddles.[8] The Rambam writes that one prerequisite for nevuah is a powerful imagination, and that nevuah and dreams are operated by the same mechanism.[9] However, the near perfect character traits of the navi ensure that the meaning is automatically ‘engraved in his heart’.[10]

Sometimes these visions were already interpreted clearly for us by the nevi’im. But often even their interpretations are expressed in a vague form,[11] and in order to understand them a similar imaginative process is necessary. And as to the best of my knowledge we do not yet have nevi’im, we cannot be certain that we have hit the mark. Even Chazal could not be a hundred percent sure of the veracity of their interpretations, which explains their non-binding status in this area.[12]

Divrei Agada

Chazal themselves in many places chose to express themselves in abstract metaphors. Sometimes their phraseology is cryptic, at other times they give apparently unambiguous descriptions but a literal understanding seems implausible. One thing that does appear to be clear is that Chazal followed the style of the nevi’im. But why did they not want to transmit their messages more directly?

The Rambam in his introduction to the Mishna gives two reasons. Firstly, this style is a way of engaging and arousing the interest of learners. Secondly, it is also important to hide certain parts of the Torah from those who are not ready to appreciate them. In the same way that someone will not accept the fact that the Sun is many times bigger than the Earth without the appropriate background in astronomy and geometry.[13]

We are urged to make an effort to understand these parts of the Torah, as through them one can comprehend the ‘absolute good’ that is unsurpassable.[14] Theological matters that scientists hid, and philosophers yearned for, can be revealed. One must direct his heart to Hashem, and daven that He give us wisdom and help to reveal the foundations hidden in the Scriptures.[15]

Preaching

With the above in mind, we can start to understand what happens (or at least what should happen) when rabbis draw on Tanach and midrashim in order to impart a message that in their eyes is crucial for the time. Usually this message is far from clear from the sources quoted, and this is often a cause of consternation.

If people understand that these ideas are subjective interpretations of the rabbi in question (or that of an earlier rabbi quoted), and are not meant as something absolutely authoritative, they should become more palatable. And if the rabbi has the respect of those he is talking to, they will likely consider the message seriously as the advice of someone worth listening to.

Of course the primary responsibility for this rests with the rabbi himself. If he does not clearly differentiate between inarguable halacha[16] and more subjective ethics, the likelihood is that neither will be accepted.

I believe there are two other points that we can learn from the nevi’im when trying to be the best substitute for them. Firstly, even a superficial reading of Tanach indicates that most of the prophecies fell on deaf ears. It does not take a huge amount of humility to realise that even our best efforts to transmit what we believe to be the truth may be unsuccessful.

Secondly, although unlike the nevi’im we can never be absolutely sure that our understanding of the Torah is the truth, we must give it our best honest efforts. One almost certain path to failure is to approach an issue with a predetermined goal of finding a source for something we like the sound of.

Something for Purim

It feels inappropriate to end this post without an example of an attempt to follow my own guidelines. Although some of the ideas I will try to present are not original, there is definitely a personal touch. And there also are some examples of the interpretations of Chazal.

Throughout Megilas Esther and the midrashim on it, there is a clear background theme. The Jews are in exile, and they must not lose track of three interrelated things. They are subservient to G-d alone, it is crucial to get out of exile, and they must unite to achieve this purpose leaving individual needs aside. Otherwise, there is no shortage of enemies determined to divert us from these aims, and they will prevail chas v’shalom.

The prelude is that the rebuilding of the Beis Hamikdash, sanctioned by Coresh, is halted by Achashverosh.[17] The Jews then begin to lose sight of the above goals, bowing to an image (and later to Haman) and partaking of a feast held to celebrate the Beis Hamikdash not being rebuilt.[18] Mordechai becomes the sole protester, at first making him extremely unpopular.[19]

The turning point is when the edict is issued to wipe out the entire Jewish People, based on the probably accurate claim that they are ‘scattered and dispersed’.[20] Nothing is more effective at waking us up to our purpose in life.[21] Esther is reminded by Mordechai that her special status will not save her if she does not do all she can for her people. She responds by saying that all the Jews must be united, making amends for the claim of Haman.[22]

Chazal tell us that when Achashverosh tells Esther that he will grant anything up to half of his kingdom, he means that the one thing he will not allow is the rebuilding of the Beis Hamikdash, which would divide his kingdom.[23] He understands that if G-d is once again glorified on Earth, people will realise that he (Achashverosh) is not the real king. Eventually he is forced to concede defeat.[24]

Today we also live in an age when despite a clear start to a process of redemption, our goals have become clouded. In order to complete the job we must refocus, this time without being forced to by those out to destroy us.

Purim Sameach!


[1] Bava Kama 83b-84a. Even when R’ Eliezer states that it is in fact literal, the gemara contends that all he means is that the damager must pay the value of his own limb, not that of the wounded. See the Rambam’s introduction to the Mishna for elaboration.
[2] See for example Bava Basra 111b. Although the methodology is often hard to understand, the presence of a consistent system is clear.
[3] To the best of my knowledge this method does not exist with regards to halacha, although we do find explanations based on differences between the way a word is written and the way it is read (יש אם למקרא/יש אם למסורת).
[4] Berachos 64a. For a literal explanation of the pasuk, see Metzudas David.
[5] It is difficult to say that all such explanations were passed down from Matan Torah, as they are presented as statements of individual amora’im. It is also clear that many of the commentators on Tanach felt free to offer novel interpretations.
[6] Devarim 18:14-5
[7] See Megila 14a that the reason that prophecies were recorded is because of their need for following generations.
[8] Bamidbar 12:6-8
[9] Moreh Nevuchim 2:36. He proves this from the statement of Chazal that a dream is a sixtieth of nevuah (Berachos 57b), implying that the difference is only quantitative.
[10] Hilchos Yesodei Hatorah 7:3
[11] Ibid.
[13] To support this idea the Rambam quotes the pasuk in Mishlei (23:9) באזני כסיל אל תדבר כי יבוז לשכל מליך (Don’t speak in the ears of a fool, as he will scoff at the intelligence of your words).
[14] See also Sifri Eikev (Piska 49) where Chazal say that learning Agada is the way to recognise Hashem and cling to his ways.
[15] As David Hamelech did in Tehilim 119:18- גל עיני ואביטה נפלאות מתורתיך (Open my eyes so that I will see wonders from Your Torah).
[16] Although halacha is also often not clear-cut, most of the halachos that a rav teaches are indisputed (perhaps against the common conception). He also usually will have the sense to prioritise the areas of halacha that fall under wide consensus. However when it comes to philosophy and non-halachic issues, it is rare to find complete agreement.
[17] Ezra 4
[18] Megila 12a
[19] Esther 3:1-2, Megila 12b-13a. Although it seems from Megila 12a that even Mordechai was guilty of partaking from the feast.
[20] Esther 3:8
[21] See Megila 14a
[22] Esther 4:13-6
[23] Megila 15b
[24] See Esther 9:12, where Achashverosh does not mention the limitation of ‘up to half of the kingdom.’ I heard this point from Uri bin-Nun, formerly director general of the Electric Company.

Thursday, 9 February 2017

The role of women


I was at first reluctant to write about this topic. However, after a number of requests (all from men), I realised that these issues remain in the forefront of many people’s minds, and require clarification.

In many shuls, few discussions are as heated and sensitive as those related to what women may or may not do. But as regular readers of this blog will know, I have no problem writing about controversial matters.

The cause of my hesitance is the point that I will now attempt to prove. I claim that the majority of the answers to questions asked in this field are not only non-halachic; they are not even directly based on Torah principles. I do not mean that there are not halachic questions here, just that they usually are not the real issue. I will try to illustrate this with some examples.

K’vod Hatzibur

The gemara tells us that women may not read from the Torah in public because of k’vod tzibur, respect for the congregation.[1] The relevant halachic question here is what happens if the congregation are indifferent about this respect due to them? Is this comparable to a parent who forgoes the honour that his children must give him, where the halacha is that the children are no longer obligated?[2]

This question is dependent on the nature of the principle of k’vod tzibur. To clarify this, we need to look at the other halachos based on the same principle. There are four others in the gemara:

1) One who is dressed inappropriately may not read from the Torah, lead tefila or ascend the duchan (platform) to recite birkas cohanim.[3]
2) The one responsible for putting the sefer Torah away must not also uncover the table it is read from at the same time. The congregation wait for the sefer to leave, and they should not be made to wait longer.[4]
3) The sefer Torah must not be rolled in front of the congregation (so that they should not have to wait).[5]
4) Chumashim (scrolls with only one of the five books of the Torah written on them) may not be used for public Torah reading.[6]

Whether or not such halachos are dependent on the feeling of a particular congregation was first discussed in relation to a fifth halacha. The gemara tells us that a youngster should not be appointed as a shliach tzibur (even though he is over thirteen years old),[7] and the Rambam explains that is is also because of k’vod hatzibur.[8]

The Beis Yosef assumes that according to the Rambam, the congregation have the right to forgo their honour and to allow a youngster to lead tefila. The Bach disputes this, one of his claims being that it seems implausible that all the above halachos should be different for each congregation.[9] He explains that k’vod hatzibur refers not to the personal honour due to the congregation, rather to the honour appropriate for one who acts as their representative in front of G-d.[10]

The majority of later poskim rule in accordance with the Bach, that the congregation cannot forgo their honour.[11] Personally I find the view of the Beis Yosef much easier to understand,[12] but the truth is that this is not the main issue here. If a rav approved the appointment of a youngster to be his shul’s regular shliach tzibur, I doubt it would cause much controversy. And sadly, in many places the congregation regularly have to wait while the sefer is rolled, even when they have not consented to this.

Female ‘rabbis’

The title ‘rabbi’ nowadays has little significance, even for men. The original semicha was passed down from rav to talmid in an unbroken chain from Moshe Rabbeinu, and was necessary in order to judge capital cases and some some monetary cases in court.[13] This chain was broken long ago, and the authentic semicha no longer exists.[14]

The Rivash (1326-1408, Spain and Algeria) explains the function of what was known as semicha in Western Europe. The gemara tells us that after a misunderstanding based on an ambiguous halachic ruling, Chazal required one to get permission from his rav before issuing rulings.[15] This permission is only relevant for someone who has already has the necessary scholarship in order to rule, and it is sufficient for one to get permission from just one of his rabbanim.[16]

The original semicha was irrelevant for women, as women cannot halachically act as judges.[17] Whether or not women can receive the modern form of semicha is hard to prove from the gemara, but there are early sources that indicate that women can give halachic rulings.[18] This expalins the existence of yoatzot halacha (female halachic advisers) in the field of family purity, and the lack of strong opposition to it.

The controversial issue here, whether women can have positions in the clergy, is not necessarily dependent on either type of semicha. Many communal ‘rabbis’ nowadays do not issue halachic rulings, nor are they capable of doing so. Pastoral leaders do an important job, but the title ‘rabbi’ assigned to them is a modern usage of the word.

Other ‘appointments’

The real halachic issue here is broader. Chazal learn from the masculine language that the Torah uses regarding the appointment of a king, that we may not appoint a queen.[19] The Rambam extends this, saying that all ‘appointments’ must be male.[20] However his source is unclear, and there may be room to rely on dissenting views.[21]

Even according to the Rambam, there is considerable debate over which ‘appointments’ are referred to. R’ Moshe Feinstein explains that an employee who merely performs the tasks that his employer wants him to do (even if he has freedom to decide what this is) is not in this category.[22] R’ Shaul Yisraeli writes that only an appointment which cannot be rescinded is forbidden.[23]

Whichever view we follow here, the question is not limited to rabbinical positions. The fact that elsewhere there is not much controversy indicates that this too is not the real issue.[24]

The real issue

To me it is clear that the big debate here is over something more fundamental. For thousands of years men were generally the ones responsible for earning a living, leading and performing most tasks outside of the home. Women took care of the children and other domestic needs from inside. There is no denying that over the last hundred years this has started to change, and the question is whether or to what extent we wish to continue this process.

There is clearly no definitive halachic answer to this question. Although usually the husband is the one obligated to support his wife in return for performance of household tasks, the wife has the right to reject this arrangement and support herself.[25]

Even in non-halachic terms, it is virtually impossible to prove what the ideal is from Torah sources.[26] Although Torah values such as raising and educating families certainly should influence our outlook, at the end of the day the question is what the best method to achieve these goals is.

How we answer this question is very important, but in my view the answer is based more on practicality than on what we can derive from the Torah. As the purpose of this blog is to teach Torah, I will not write my view here.


[1] Megila 23a
[2] Kiddushin 32a
[3] Megila 24a-b
[4] Sotah 39b, according to Rashi there.
[5] Yoma 70a
[6] Gitin 60a
[7] Chulin 24b. The term used to describe the youngster is ‘one whose beard is not fully grown’, and here we will not discuss the precise meaning of this. It also should be noted that the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 53:6) rules that this only applies to a permanent shliach tzibur, considerably limiting the practical application of this halacha.
[8] Hilchos Tefila 8:11
[9] Orach Chaim 53
[10] As I do not really understand the view of the Bach, I will not attempt to explain why according to him it is inappropriate for a woman to read from the Torah (or for a youngster to be shliach tzibur).
[11] See Eliyahu Rabba (ibid. 10), Mishna Berura (23), Aruch Hashulchan (10) and Kaf Hachayim (37). R’ Ovadya Yosef (Yabia Omer 4, Orach Chaim siman 10, paragraph 6) also rules stringently on this question.
[12] I subsequently found support for this position in the Mordechai, Halachos Ketanos siman 968.
[13] Details can be found in the gemara in the first perek of Sanhedrin, and in the Rambam in the fourth perek of Hilchos Sanhedrin.
[14] Rambam, Hilchos Kiddush HaChodesh 5:1-3
[15] Sanhedrin 5b
[16] Responsa of the Rivash, siman 271.
[17] The gemara in Shevuos 30a derives that women are not kosher witnesses from the language of the \pasuk ועמדו שני האנשים (Devarim 19:17), referring to witnesses. There is a rule that all those who cannot give testimony also cannot be dayanim (Mishna, Niddah 49b). Although Tosfos suggest a possibility that women are an exception to this rule (Bava Kama 15a), the overwhelming consensus is that this is not the case (see Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 7:4).
All of this has little practical relevance nowadays, as litigants can consent even to invalid judges (see Sanhedrin 24a). As things stand, when the Sanhedrin is re-established women will not be able to serve, but theoretically the Sanhedrin could disagree with these rules (provided it is based on an honest interpretation of the Torah, not on external influences).
Regarding testimony, practically it is unusual for any of the witnesses in beis din to be kosher technically (people who know relevant information almost always have a reason to be impartial). The practice of all batei din is to hear testimony from everyone, but not to automatically accept it as the truth (this would be harder with two kosher witnesses).
[18] The Chinuch (mitzvah 152) mentions the possibility of ‘a wise woman who is fit for the issuing of rulings’. See also Pischei Teshuva, Choshen Mishpat 7:5. A contradictory source can be found in the midrash, Bamidbar Rabba 10:5.
[19] Sifri Devarim, Shoftim piska 157
[20] Hilchos Melachim 1:5
[21] R’ Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:44) shows that several rishonim do not accept the position of the Rambam here, and rules that in case of great need we can rely on their view.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Amud Hayemini, siman 12 perek 5.
[24] Sometimes one reason for the controversy is an objection to the incorporation of any idea associated with the Reform or similar movements. My belief is that this also is not a halachic issue, but a tactical one which varies from place to place. There is more to write here, but in order to do this justice I will leave it for another time.
[25] Kesuvos 58b, 107b
[26] One might want to derive principles from some of the halachos that we have discussed above, but as the reasons for them are not explicit this will most likely be mere conjecture.