The Torah
contains many commandments against various forms of witchcraft and
superstition. Nevertheless, there seem to be several examples of superstition
approved of by Chazal. In order to attempt to resolve the apparent
contradictions, we need to try to clarify how we are supposed to relate to
witchcraft, and what exactly the Torah is forbidding.
Necromancy
The first
description that we have of use of a forbidden means of divining is when Shaul
HaMelech asks the ov-woman to wake Shmuel HaNavi from the dead. We are
told that Shaul knew that it was Shmuel, and that Shmuel admonished Shaul for
awakening him. He then repeated a previous message that the kingdom has been
taken from him, and added that tomorrow he (Shaul) would be with him (Shmuel,
i.e. dead[1]).[2]
The language
that Shaul knew that it was Shmuel seems to imply that it really was. The
apparent corollary is that the prohibition of consulting an ov was made
despite the fact that it really works. However, the Radak quotes a dispute
between the Geonim about how to understand what happened, and all are in
agreement that the actions of the ov are 'nonsense, empty, false and futility.'
Some say that it was all a trick performed by the woman (and the word 'knew' is
not meant literally). Others explain that in this case Hashem decided to
resurrect Shmuel, shocking the ov-woman.
This position is
corroborated by the Rambam, who writes: "All of these things (forms of
divining) are false and dishonest, and they are the means that the early
idolaters used to mislead the nations into following them. It is not fitting
for Yisrael, who are the most wise, to be drawn after these nonsenses or to
consider that they have any purpose. … Anyone who believes in these things or
similar, and thinks that they are truth and a matter of wisdom, just that the
Torah forbids them, is nothing but one of the fools and those lacking in
understanding …"[3]
The Ramban
disagrees, claiming that the results of divining have 'already been publicised
in front of viewers.' He explains that when Hashem made the world He implanted
in it a nature which would lead to various events, but He also gave the stars
and other forces the power to change it. The Torah forbids Jews from using these
forces to change the natural order, put in place by Hashem.[4]
The Vilna Gaon
goes further, criticising the Rambam sharply. He writes: "Philosophy lead
him (the Rambam) astray with most of its teachings, to explain the gemara all
metaphorically and to detach it from its simple meaning. I do not, chas
v'shalom, believe them, not part of them nor their multitudes. Rather, all the
words (of Chazal) are according to their simple meaning, although they have
depth. Not the depth of the philosophers, which must be thrown into the waste
as it is really superficial. Rather, (the depth) of the possessors of
truth."[5]
The Gaon is
referring here to many cases where Chazal do seem to describe real powers of
witchcraft. His strong belief in literal interpretations of Agada is extreme
(see Drush
and Divrei Agada), but in this case I am inclined to agree with his
understanding of Chazal in the places that he quotes. However, this does not
necessarily mean that this is the only view in Chazal.[6]
And even if it was, this does not forbid us from thinking differently (see Divine
Providence, Free Will and Coincidence).
Halachic
Implications
The issue that
is perhaps more bothersome for rationalists like myself is the seeming occurrence
of halachos based on a real understanding of witchcraft. The clearest example
of this is the distinction made between a 'magician' who 'does an action' and
one who merely creates an illusion. One who does an action is punishable by
death, whereas one who creates an illusion is exempt from (human) punishment.[7]
If 'magic' has no real power, what is 'doing an action'?
In reality, this
should not trouble us any more than the agaddic sources in Chazal that mention
the power of witchcraft. Although the words of Chazal are absolutely binding
for halachic purposes, this has very little relevance here. If someone 'did an
action' of sorcery he would be liable to the death penalty, but any beis din
has the right to decide that no action was done.[8]
Demons
We also find
halachic sections of gemara that relate to the occurrence of demons. A mishna
tells us that one who hears a voice coming from a pit giving instructions to
write a get for his wife, may act upon these instructions as the agent of the
one trapped in the pit.
The gemara
questions why we are not concerned about the possibility that the voice might
be that of a demon, deliberately misleading us. The gemara concludes that the
rule of the mishna only applies if the one hearing the voice can also see a
'reflection of a reflection' of the person in the pit. Demons do not have a
'reflection of a reflection,' thus we can be sure that the one giving the
instructions is a human being.[9]
The Rambam seems
to ignore this explanation of the gemara. He states that one who hears a voice
coming from a pit may carry out the instructions to write the get, without
stipulating the need to see a 'reflection of a reflection.'[10]
Various suggestions have been made as to how this fits into the gemara,[11]
but to anyone familiar with the writings of the Rambam it is clear that a
concern for demons was not something that he would be willing to consider as
legitimate. There simply are too many laws related to mysticism that he omits
from Yad HaChazaka.
What right did
the Rambam have to do this? No-one can argue with halachic rulings of the
gemara! Presumably, the answer is that when a halachic ruling is based on a
certain perception of physical reality, we do have the right to reject this
perception based on improved scientific knowledge (based on an assumption that
Chazal would also have ruled differently with the benefit of the same
knowledge). Only when it comes to understanding of the Torah, the authority of
Chazal is absolute.[12]
Simanim
When it comes to
defining what is forbidden as witchcraft, the rulings of the gemara are
definitely binding. The gemara tells us that "regarding a house, a child
and a woman, although there is no sorcery, there is a siman."[13]
Rashi explains that the case is a person who built a house, had a baby or got
married and subsequently succeeded or failed in a business venture (three times
according to the conclusion of the gemara). It is forbidden to rely on this as
a guarantee that this trend will continue, but there is a good chance that it
will.
The Rambam
explains differently. In all of these cases it is still forbidden to act
differently based on the siman (even without relying on it a hundred percent). The
only thing that is permitted is to comment after the fact that building a
house, getting married etc. was a good siman.[14]
With this in
mind, we can try to understand the idea behind simanim practice more widely.
Elsewhere, the gemara says that since simanim are a genuine concept, a person
should be used to seeing (some texts read: eating) a gourd, fenugreek, leek,
beet and a date on Rosh Hashana.[15]
The various commentaries explain that these things symbolise the things we want
for the year ahead.
What exactly is
the gemara saying we can achieve by seeing (or eating) these fruits? According
to Rashi, perhaps these simanim may have some effect on the year ahead
(although one mustn't rely on this). However, these simanim seem much more
far-fetched than building a house, getting married or having a baby.
According to the
Rambam, the only way I can see to resolve this gemara halachically is by
explaining that the purpose of the simanim is not to directly affect the year
ahead. They are to remind us that all the things we want in the year ahead are
being decided on Rosh Hashana, and to act accordingly.
In reality, the
Rambam does not mention these simanim at all in Yad HaChazaka (or anywhere
else). It could well be that he felt that it contradicts the gemara about the
house, the child and the woman. If it is forbidden to act differently based on
simanim, it certainly is forbidden to orchestrate simanim in order to attempt
to influence the future.
Miracles
Our distance
from superstition is not because we are afraid of believing in anything
supernatural. At least in my view, the various miracles performed by Hashem
described by the Torah are to be taken reasonably literally, and not explained
as naturally occurring phenomena.[16]
I am aware that different opinions exist,[17]
but I believe that there is not sufficient justification to stray from the
simple meaning of the pesukim.
The severity
that the Torah attaches to witchcraft and superstition is because we are
supposed to direct our service to Hashem, and not to other imaginary forces (or
even to real forces according to those who believe in them). The Rema quotes a
dispute about making a siman for something in the future, and concludes (based
on Tehilim 32:10): "The one who acts wholesomely and trusts in Hashem will
be surrounded by kindness."[18]
[1] See also Brachos 12b, where Chazal explain that this is an allusion
that his death would atone for his sins and bring him to Olam Haba.
[2] Shmuel 1, 28:7-19.
[3] Hilchos Avoda Zara 11:16
[4] Commentary on the Torah, Devarim 18:9-12. There seems to be an
explanation there as to why Hashem gave such power to 'change His plans,' but
at least for the moment I do not understand it.
[5] Bi'ur HaGra, Yoreh Deah 179:13
[8] Practically, this question would only come up after the Sanhedrin
is restored, as until then beis din does not have the power to judge capital
cases. And the Sanhedrin will have the right to reject even halachic rulings of
Chazal, making the whole problem redundant.
[9] Gitin 66a
[10] Geirushin 2:13
[11] See for example Kesef Mishne ibid.
[12] In other words, Chazal's understanding of a Torah law is binding,
but their understanding of science is not. For example, Chazal define for us
what is considered melacha and thus forbidden on Shabbos. They decided that
killing any creature that reproduces sexually is considered melacha, and we
cannot argue with this definition. They also decided that lice do not reproduce
sexually and thus may be killed on Shabbos (Shabbos 107b), but as this has been
proved inaccurate by science this leniency should not be relied on (this topic
is more complicated, see for example this article
at length).
[13] Chulin 95b
[14] Avoda Zara 11:5. He also explains the case of the child
differently, asking a child which passuk he is learning and inferring a good
omen from it.
[15] Horayos 12a
[16] See Moreh Nevuchim 2:25, where the Rambam explains that the main proof that the world was
created (and is not eternal) is from the supernatural wonders in the Torah.
[17] See for example Bechor Shor, Shemos 9:8
[18] Yoreh Deah 179:4
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