The Limits of Legitimate Belief

It is no secret that in recent times there has been a polarisation of views of a large number of issues important to the Jewish world. The question of how to define who is a believer and who is a heretic is an extreme example of this, and much remains to be clarified.

In certain sectors of the community it has become fashionable to allow only a very narrow perception of theology, and philosophy in general. Views of even some of the most accepted Jewish philosophers have been brushed under the carpet, and the only explanation offered is that a certain view “wasn’t accepted,” or “Had (insert ancient thinker) been aware of the Zohar/Ari/other later source, he would never have said it.” This phenomenon has already been well documented by those on the other end of the spectrum, and I don’t plan to demonstrate it here.[1]

The other extreme is the view that it really doesn’t matter what you believe, as long as you keep halacha.[2] They point to the fact that virtually no ‘Principle of Faith’ was accepted by all, and that historically the only thing that put someone ‘outside the camp’ was disregard for keeping mitzvos.[3]

I do not accept these arguments any more than those of the first group. Although I do not dispute the historical observations, I am not so interested by what made people social or philosophical outcasts. The question I am trying to answer is what beliefs are acceptable in the eyes of Hashem and His Torah.

To do this, I will discuss a number of examples. As the most well-known formulation of what a Jew must believe is the thirteen principles of the Rambam in his introduction to Perek Cheilek, it makes sense to use them as a basis and to analyse disputes that have arisen over some of them.

Anthropomorphism and Pantheism

The Rambam’s Third Principle states that G-d has no physical form or attributes. Despite the fact that R’ Saadia Gaon had already written this about 350 years earlier,[4] it is clear from the length the Rambam goes to in Moreh Nevuchim to argue this point that at the time it was not agreed upon by all.[5] I already mentioned in “He has no physical form” that R’ Moshe Taku attacked the Rambam for this, and that the Ramban needed to defend him.

Here I am taking as a given that the Rambam was right, in accordance with the contemporary consensus. The question is how we should relate to someone like R’ Moshe Taku, who erred. The Rambam writes quite clearly that such a person is a min (heretic), and has no portion in Olam Haba.[6]

The Ra’avad disagrees, pointing out that many ‘great and good’ did believe that Hashem has a physical form based on their understanding of pesukim, and divrei agada that ‘distort the mind.’[7] Clearly the Ra’avad agrees that this view is mistaken, but he argues that one can be forgiven for making this mistake.

The Rambam himself responds to this claim in Moreh Nevuchim, saying that even those with a lower level of intelligence are capable of understanding the impossibility of G-d being physical. One who follows the literal meaning of the anthropomorphism in certain pesukim is guilty of intellectual laziness, especially when there are translations available that steer clear of this literal interpretation.[8]

It seems then that the main point of contention between the Rambam and the Ra’avad is what the simple man is capable of understanding through his own intellect, or what degree of thought is expected from him. However, I believe that there is another issue here.

There does not seem to be an explicit source in the words of Chazal for the labelling of belief in a corporeal god as heretical. The Rambam seems to have based this ruling on the fact that physicality implies multiplicity, as he points out himself.[9] It is clear from Chazal that belief in multiple gods is heretical.[10]

The question is over the status of someone who believes in one G-d, but due to shortcomings in his analysis also believes that G-d is physical. Despite the implicit contradiction, can it really be said that he believes in multiple gods when he declares steadfastly that he doesn’t? It seems that the Rambam would say yes, belief in one G‑d is worthless without understanding what it entails. However, this is far from obvious.

All of this may seem irrelevant to us now, when believers in a physical god are all but extinct.[11] However, a similar mistake is still relatively commonplace. Based on misinterpretations of various sources, or simplistic ideas that we learnt in kindergarten, some still believe that everything in our physical world is somehow a part of G-d.

These people do not believe that G-d has a physical form, without realising that this is the corollary of the pantheism (sometimes disguised as panentheism) that they subscribe to. My inclination is that they are not considered heretics, although I am not sure that the Rambam would agree.

The Divine Origin of the Torah

The Eighth Principle is that the Torah, in its entirety, was Divinely revealed to Moshe

Rabbeinu. The source for this being a basic principle of faith is the Mishna in Perek Cheilek, which states that one who denies Torah being from Heaven has no portion in The World to Come.[12] The gemara quotes a Beraisa that elaborates further, saying that even if a person believes that the entire Torah came from Heaven with the exception of one verse or halacha that Moshe said by himself, he has scorned the word of Hashem.[13]

It seems unimaginable that anyone could claim to be an Orthodox Jew if he does not believe in this principle, and in fact none do deny it entirely. However, many do differ to varying degrees. I would like to discuss the most extreme position that I have found among halacha-abiding Jewish scholars, the view of Nissim of Marseilles (14^th century).

In his commentary on the Torah, R’ Nissim claims that Hashem told Moshe all of the mitzvos in a very general form. The details, even the ones explicit in the Torah, were entrusted to Moshe’s intellect. Out of his great humility, and in order to increase fear of G-d and distance from sin, Moshe wrote that all these details were in accordance to the command of Hashem.[14]

These comments were not made in order to belittle the Torah or Moshe Rabbeinu- the opposite is true. Attaching great importance to human intellect, and believing that G‑d’s revelation in this world is kept to an absolute minimum, in R’ Nissim’s eyes this interpretation made the Torah greater. How are we supposed to view subscribers to such a belief?

As I have written many times before, when it comes to halacha the word of Chazal is absolutely authoritative. As Chazal stated clearly that the belief that even one verse was written by Moshe on his own is heretical, this puts the view of R’ Nissim outside the acceptable limits. Although some might want to use his view as a means to make Judaism and the Torah more inclusive, this is not consistent with halacha.[15]

The Afterlife

The thirteenth and final principle of the Rambam is the belief in resurrection of the dead. This principle also appears explicitly in the same Mishna quoted above, and to my knowledge was historically never doubted by Orthodox Jewish thinkers (although the Rambam was falsely accused of denying it[16]).

The reason that I chose to discuss this example here is because this principle has been questioned by one modern thinker who I have a degree of respect for. R’ Michael Avraham, formerly a Ram in the Hesder Yeshiva in Yerucham, has been accused of being a heretic by some for this, and even wrote a post on his blog discussing whether this is true or not.

R’ Michael explains that the concept of the World to Come certainly makes sense. Because of this, he is unsure if Chazal deduce this concept from their own logic, or if it was part of the Oral Tradition given to Moshe at Sinai. He does not deny the authority of Chazal in deciding halacha, but believes that it is impossible to obligate someone to believe something that he does not believe. Whether or not this makes him a heretic according to halacha is unimportant in his eyes.

There are two main claims here, one of which I agree with and one of which I disagree with. I agree that a person cannot be expected to believe more than what his own intellect is capable of understanding, and that there is very little value in someone declaring belief in principles that he does not understand for ‘religious reasons.’[17]

However, I disagree with the statement that the definition of a heretic is unimportant. R’ Michael’s philosophy is that halacha and morality are unrelated, a view that I have rejected on this blog in the past.[18] I strongly believe that the halachos of heretics, like all other halachos, are strongly rooted in logic.

There could many reasons to keep a distance from heretics, and I will conclude with one that I know R’ Michael can relate to. Our brains are the greatest gift that Hashem has given us, and failure to utilise this gift to capacity is serious. Alienating those who do this is an extreme step, but it is necessary in order to reinforce this value. There often are other considerations to take account of, and these are recognised by halacha.[19] But we mustn’t forget the default position.

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[1] I already mentioned one example of this in Divine providence, free will and Coincidence. For a lengthy analysis of many more examples, see “The Limits of Orthodox Theology” by Marc Shapiro.

[2] This is the most plausible version of this view. Worse versions say that all that matters is adherence to certain social norms or being good to others.

[3] Although throughout the ages many mitzvos were also not adhered to, virtually no-one could treat mitzvos lightly and be respected by Orthodox Judaism as a legitimate Torah scholar.

[4] Emunos v’Deyos, Ma’amar 1

[5] See also Igeres Techiyas Hameisim

[6] Hilchos Teshuva 3:6-7

[7] See Drush and Divrei Agada

[8] 1:35-6

[9] Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 1:7, Moreh Nevuchim ibid.

[10] See for example Sanhedrin 38a.

[11] See Yerushalayim and the World

[12] Sanhedrin 90a

[13] Ibid. 99a, based on Bamidbar 15:31

[14] Maaseh Nissim, pages 177-8. An excerpt is available here.

[15] See this article (in Hebrew) for such an argument. The author argues that the benefits of keeping halacha and staying within religious society are numerous, and therefore we should take on the view that the Torah can incorporate any philosophical belief. I also agree that there are many benefits to keeping halacha (see Torah and Morals), but one part of halacha that also cannot be sacrificed is the way that we are supposed to relate to heretics.
[16] See Igeres Techiyas Hameisim at length. In interests of simplicity, I have not differentiated here between Techiyas Hameisim and Olam Haba (although the Rambam certainly does).

[17] See Obligations of the mind

[18] See Torah and Morals

[19] Although as I have written many times before, no system can be perfect and sometimes keeping halacha will cause local damage.