The Limits of Legitimate Belief

It is no secret that in recent times there has been a polarisation of views of a large number of issues important to the Jewish world. The question of how to define who is a believer and who is a heretic is an extreme example of this, and much remains to be clarified.

In certain sectors of the community it has become fashionable to allow only a very narrow perception of theology, and philosophy in general. Views of even some of the most accepted Jewish philosophers have been brushed under the carpet, and the only explanation offered is that a certain view “wasn’t accepted,” or “Had (insert ancient thinker) been aware of the Zohar/Ari/other later source, he would never have said it.” This phenomenon has already been well documented by those on the other end of the spectrum, and I don’t plan to demonstrate it here.[1]

The other extreme is the view that it really doesn’t matter what you believe, as long as you keep halacha.[2] They point to the fact that virtually no ‘Principle of Faith’ was accepted by all, and that historically the only thing that put someone ‘outside the camp’ was disregard for keeping mitzvos.[3]

I do not accept these arguments any more than those of the first group. Although I do not dispute the historical observations, I am not so interested by what made people social or philosophical outcasts. The question I am trying to answer is what beliefs are acceptable in the eyes of Hashem and His Torah.

To do this, I will discuss a number of examples. As the most well-known formulation of what a Jew must believe is the thirteen principles of the Rambam in his introduction to Perek Cheilek, it makes sense to use them as a basis and to analyse disputes that have arisen over some of them.

Anthropomorphism and Pantheism

The Rambam’s Third Principle states that G-d has no physical form or attributes. Despite the fact that R’ Saadia Gaon had already written this about 350 years earlier,[4] it is clear from the length the Rambam goes to in Moreh Nevuchim to argue this point that at the time it was not agreed upon by all.[5] I already mentioned in “He has no physical form” that R’ Moshe Taku attacked the Rambam for this, and that the Ramban needed to defend him.

Here I am taking as a given that the Rambam was right, in accordance with the contemporary consensus. The question is how we should relate to someone like R’ Moshe Taku, who erred. The Rambam writes quite clearly that such a person is a min (heretic), and has no portion in Olam Haba.[6]

The Ra’avad disagrees, pointing out that many ‘great and good’ did believe that Hashem has a physical form based on their understanding of pesukim, and divrei agada that ‘distort the mind.’[7] Clearly the Ra’avad agrees that this view is mistaken, but he argues that one can be forgiven for making this mistake.

The Rambam himself responds to this claim in Moreh Nevuchim, saying that even those with a lower level of intelligence are capable of understanding the impossibility of G-d being physical. One who follows the literal meaning of the anthropomorphism in certain pesukim is guilty of intellectual laziness, especially when there are translations available that steer clear of this literal interpretation.[8]

It seems then that the main point of contention between the Rambam and the Ra’avad is what the simple man is capable of understanding through his own intellect, or what degree of thought is expected from him. However, I believe that there is another issue here.

There does not seem to be an explicit source in the words of Chazal for the labelling of belief in a corporeal god as heretical. The Rambam seems to have based this ruling on the fact that physicality implies multiplicity, as he points out himself.[9] It is clear from Chazal that belief in multiple gods is heretical.[10]

The question is over the status of someone who believes in one G-d, but due to shortcomings in his analysis also believes that G-d is physical. Despite the implicit contradiction, can it really be said that he believes in multiple gods when he declares steadfastly that he doesn’t? It seems that the Rambam would say yes, belief in one G‑d is worthless without understanding what it entails. However, this is far from obvious.

All of this may seem irrelevant to us now, when believers in a physical god are all but extinct.[11] However, a similar mistake is still relatively commonplace. Based on misinterpretations of various sources, or simplistic ideas that we learnt in kindergarten, some still believe that everything in our physical world is somehow a part of G-d.

These people do not believe that G-d has a physical form, without realising that this is the corollary of the pantheism (sometimes disguised as panentheism) that they subscribe to. My inclination is that they are not considered heretics, although I am not sure that the Rambam would agree.

The Divine Origin of the Torah

The Eighth Principle is that the Torah, in its entirety, was Divinely revealed to Moshe

Rabbeinu. The source for this being a basic principle of faith is the Mishna in Perek Cheilek, which states that one who denies Torah being from Heaven has no portion in The World to Come.[12] The gemara quotes a Beraisa that elaborates further, saying that even if a person believes that the entire Torah came from Heaven with the exception of one verse or halacha that Moshe said by himself, he has scorned the word of Hashem.[13]

It seems unimaginable that anyone could claim to be an Orthodox Jew if he does not believe in this principle, and in fact none do deny it entirely. However, many do differ to varying degrees. I would like to discuss the most extreme position that I have found among halacha-abiding Jewish scholars, the view of Nissim of Marseilles (14^th century).

In his commentary on the Torah, R’ Nissim claims that Hashem told Moshe all of the mitzvos in a very general form. The details, even the ones explicit in the Torah, were entrusted to Moshe’s intellect. Out of his great humility, and in order to increase fear of G-d and distance from sin, Moshe wrote that all these details were in accordance to the command of Hashem.[14]

These comments were not made in order to belittle the Torah or Moshe Rabbeinu- the opposite is true. Attaching great importance to human intellect, and believing that G‑d’s revelation in this world is kept to an absolute minimum, in R’ Nissim’s eyes this interpretation made the Torah greater. How are we supposed to view subscribers to such a belief?

As I have written many times before, when it comes to halacha the word of Chazal is absolutely authoritative. As Chazal stated clearly that the belief that even one verse was written by Moshe on his own is heretical, this puts the view of R’ Nissim outside the acceptable limits. Although some might want to use his view as a means to make Judaism and the Torah more inclusive, this is not consistent with halacha.[15]

The Afterlife

The thirteenth and final principle of the Rambam is the belief in resurrection of the dead. This principle also appears explicitly in the same Mishna quoted above, and to my knowledge was historically never doubted by Orthodox Jewish thinkers (although the Rambam was falsely accused of denying it[16]).

The reason that I chose to discuss this example here is because this principle has been questioned by one modern thinker who I have a degree of respect for. R’ Michael Avraham, formerly a Ram in the Hesder Yeshiva in Yerucham, has been accused of being a heretic by some for this, and even wrote a post on his blog discussing whether this is true or not.

R’ Michael explains that the concept of the World to Come certainly makes sense. Because of this, he is unsure if Chazal deduce this concept from their own logic, or if it was part of the Oral Tradition given to Moshe at Sinai. He does not deny the authority of Chazal in deciding halacha, but believes that it is impossible to obligate someone to believe something that he does not believe. Whether or not this makes him a heretic according to halacha is unimportant in his eyes.

There are two main claims here, one of which I agree with and one of which I disagree with. I agree that a person cannot be expected to believe more than what his own intellect is capable of understanding, and that there is very little value in someone declaring belief in principles that he does not understand for ‘religious reasons.’[17]

However, I disagree with the statement that the definition of a heretic is unimportant. R’ Michael’s philosophy is that halacha and morality are unrelated, a view that I have rejected on this blog in the past.[18] I strongly believe that the halachos of heretics, like all other halachos, are strongly rooted in logic.

There could many reasons to keep a distance from heretics, and I will conclude with one that I know R’ Michael can relate to. Our brains are the greatest gift that Hashem has given us, and failure to utilise this gift to capacity is serious. Alienating those who do this is an extreme step, but it is necessary in order to reinforce this value. There often are other considerations to take account of, and these are recognised by halacha.[19] But we mustn’t forget the default position.

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[1] I already mentioned one example of this in Divine providence, free will and Coincidence. For a lengthy analysis of many more examples, see “The Limits of Orthodox Theology” by Marc Shapiro.

[2] This is the most plausible version of this view. Worse versions say that all that matters is adherence to certain social norms or being good to others.

[3] Although throughout the ages many mitzvos were also not adhered to, virtually no-one could treat mitzvos lightly and be respected by Orthodox Judaism as a legitimate Torah scholar.

[4] Emunos v’Deyos, Ma’amar 1

[5] See also Igeres Techiyas Hameisim

[6] Hilchos Teshuva 3:6-7

[7] See Drush and Divrei Agada

[8] 1:35-6

[9] Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 1:7, Moreh Nevuchim ibid.

[10] See for example Sanhedrin 38a.

[11] See Yerushalayim and the World

[12] Sanhedrin 90a

[13] Ibid. 99a, based on Bamidbar 15:31

[14] Maaseh Nissim, pages 177-8. An excerpt is available here.

[15] See this article (in Hebrew) for such an argument. The author argues that the benefits of keeping halacha and staying within religious society are numerous, and therefore we should take on the view that the Torah can incorporate any philosophical belief. I also agree that there are many benefits to keeping halacha (see Torah and Morals), but one part of halacha that also cannot be sacrificed is the way that we are supposed to relate to heretics.
[16] See Igeres Techiyas Hameisim at length. In interests of simplicity, I have not differentiated here between Techiyas Hameisim and Olam Haba (although the Rambam certainly does).

[17] See Obligations of the mind

[18] See Torah and Morals

[19] Although as I have written many times before, no system can be perfect and sometimes keeping halacha will cause local damage.

Civil Marriage- does it mean anything?

Several years ago I wrote an article in a journal produced by a distinguished Beis Medrash in London, which touched upon the issue of civil and non-Orthodox marriage and whether they have any halachic significance. As it wasn’t the main topic then I didn’t do it full justice, and my viewpoint has also changed since then. So now I will attempt to explain the issues involved in depth.

Firstly, we need to explain the assumption that a civil, non-Jewish or non-Orthodox wedding ceremony almost always will not be halachically valid when standing alone.

The kiddushin (betrothal), the first stage of the marriage, consists of the man giving something of certain worth (traditionally a ring) to his prospective wife, and declaring that he is betrothing her to him with it (obviously this only works if she consents).[1] Although this might happen even in a non-Orthodox ceremony, if it is not done in front of kosher witnesses it is worthless.[2] Defining who exactly is a kosher witness can be complicated, but a bare minimum is belief in the truth of the Torah (Written and Oral) and our obligation to it.[3]

With an Orthodox wedding, even if it turns out that one of the designated witnesses is invalid, some significant authorities rule that we can rely on the presence of other kosher witnesses. Even if they don’t see exactly what is happening under the chuppa, they know what is going on and this is enough.[4] When it comes to a non-Orthodox wedding, this is not the case. Even if the reality is that the kiddushin was performed according to halacha, witnesses in the background cannot know for sure that this was the case.[5]

Despite this, three different reasons have been proposed to require a get (halachic divorce document) if a couple married civilly wish to split up. We need to analyse these reasons independently.

Kiddushei Bi’ah

Although nowadays kiddushin is almost exclusively done in the way described above, the truth is that there are two other ways that it can be done. A man could also give his prospective wife a document stating that he is betrothing her (not to be confused with the kesuva, which sets out monetary obligations during and after marriage). The third way is strongly discouraged, but if done it is a hundred per cent valid. Marital relations themselves can effectuate kiddushin.[6]

Furthermore, there are times when even if no intent of kiddushin was declared, we assume that a couple do not want their relationship to be mere promiscuity, and they are married. One explicit example is after a person stipulated that kiddushin (performed in the normal way) should only take effect under certain conditions. Even if the conditions were not met, if the marriage was consummated we assume either that the stipulation was forgone or that new kiddushin was performed.[7]

How far we extend this principle is debatable. The Rambam strongly rejected applying it outside of the examples in the gemara,[8] and this is the generally accepted opinion.[9] However, one could argue that the case of a couple who we know want to be married, and have stated this explicitly in a ceremony (albeit an invalid one) is no different to the case of kiddushin invalidated due to a stipulation not being met.

The Rivash (1326-1408, Spain then Algeria) ruled that the opposite is true when it comes to a non-Jewish marriage ceremony. Even those who extend the principle that ‘one does not make his relationship promiscuity’ would agree that it cannot be applied here. Getting married in a non-Jewish ceremony is a declaration that the couple do not want a marriage valid according to the Torah.[10]

Despite this precedent, R’ Yosef Eliyahu Henkin (1881-1973, Russia then America) ruled that a couple married civilly do require a get in order to terminate their marriage. He claims that the Rivash spoke only of a case where the decision to marry in church was evidence of immoral intention (to allow adultery). When this is not the case, as the couple do intend to be married, their marital relations act as kiddushin even if there is no thought of religious marriage.[11]

R’ Moshe Feinstein strongly rejects this reading of the ruling of the Rivash. He points out that the case the Rivash ruled on involved a Marrano community where many did keep mitzvos in private. Despite this, the intention for kiddushin could not be assumed as many members of the community were not particular about the laws of family purity or even about relationships with non-Jews.[12]

Marriage for non-Jews

The Rogatchover (R’ Yosef Rosen, 1858-1936) claimed that a get is required for another reason. Among non-Jews, neither kiddushin nor chuppa have any halachic significance. A couple are only considered married once marital relations have taken place.[13] As there is no significant religious ceremony, it is clear that they after marital relations the couple are married even without any religious intent.

This being the case, the Rogatchover argues that although Jews have a higher level of marriage, if they choose not to do what is required for this higher level they still have the ‘non-Jewish level’ of marriage. As long as they live together as man and wife, one who commits ‘adultery’ with the wife transgresses the positive command “He shall cling to his wife” given to all human beings.[14]

The problem with this view is that even if we accept the concept of two tiers of marriage for Jews, it is unclear why the lower tier requires a get. The Rambam writes explicitly that no get is required to end a non-Jewish marriage, and either partner can terminate it unilaterally by walking out of the marital home (permanently) or evicting the spouse.[15]

What changed when the Torah was given?

The third possibility incorporates elements of the previous two. R’ Henkin’s view, that kiddushin can be achieved without any religious intent, is perhaps counter-intuitive. As the whole concept of kiddushin only has significance for Jews, and only after the Torah was given, the simple understanding is that it can only be valid as a religious act. As the Rambam writes:

קודם מתן תורה היה אדם פוגע אשה בשוק, אם רצה הוא והיא לישא אותה מכניסה לביתו ובועלה בינו לבין עצמו ותהיה לו לאשה. כיון שנתנה תורה, נצטוו ישראל שאם ירצה האיש לישא אשה יקנה אותה תחלה בפני עדים, ואחר כך תהיה לו לאשה.

הלכות אישות פרק א הלכה א

Before the giving of the Torah, a man could meet a woman on the street and if both wanted to get married he would bring her into his house and have marital relations in private, in order that she should become his wife. Once the Torah was given, (the people of) Israel were commanded that if a man wants to marry a woman, he must ‘acquire’ her first in front of witnesses. Subsequently she can become his wife.

Hilchos Ishus 1:1

However, the kiddushin is merely the preliminary stage that Jews were commanded to do. Marriage is only complete after nissuin, the second stage. This stage is not unique to Jews, although for Jews nissuin can be achieved by chuppa alone.[16] It makes sense to say that no religious intent is required to achieve nissuin.

The question is what happens if Jews do nissuin without kiddushin. Although we were commanded to do kiddushin first, what happens when a couple decide to ignore this? The generally accepted view is that after the Torah was given, for Jews there is no validity to nissuin without kiddushin. This is the clear assumption of the Rivash in his ruling quoted above.[17]

However, as was pointed out to me by a close friend, this is far from explicit in the words of the Rambam above. Although it is explicit in the gemara that chuppa only works after kiddushin,[18] it could well be that once a man and woman live together fully and view themselves as married, they are.

This argument was made explicitly by R’ Avraham Aharon Price (1900-1973, Toronto). He goes at length to prove the point, rebutting the arguments of R’ Yechezkel Abramsky.[19] One of his sources is the wording of the Rambam above. I would like to discuss two more sources that he does not mention.

The Talmud Yerushalmi says that if an unknown couple arrive from abroad claiming to be married, we cannot be sure that this is true until they live together in their new place for thirty days.[20] This ruling is quoted by the Rambam[21] and the Shulchan Aruch.[22] The question is, as we cannot believe the couple immediately, what changes after thirty days?

The Beis Shmuel explains that the thirty day period is only necessary in order to make it known to all that the couple is married (and in fact we do believe them straight away). Until then, one who commits adultery with the woman can claim that he didn’t know that she was married.[23]

If we assume that a couple who live together as man and wife are automatically married, there is no need for the (forced) explanation of the Beis Shmuel. Without witnesses we cannot just believe the couple that they are already married, but if they subsequently live together for thirty days it doesn’t matter. Even if they weren’t married, they have now demonstrated that they wish to live together as a married couple.

The problem with this approach is the gemara that we mentioned above, that discusses kiddushin that was invalidated due to a stipulation not being met. Even after the marriage was consummated, the gemara only raises the possibility of the stipulation being forgone, or of new kiddushin through marital relations. If we accept the position of R’ Price, we must assume that that gemara discusses a couple who do not continue to live together after having relations.

In my mind this question remains open. As always, if anyone has anything to contribute I would be grateful.

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[1] See Shulchan Aruch Even Haezer 27 for details.

[2] See Kiddushin 65a-b, Shulchan Aruch Even Haezer 42:2-5.

[3] See Rambam Hilchos Eidus 11:10, Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 34:22.

[4] Responsa of the Chasam Sofer 3:100. See also Pischei Teshuva Even Haezer 42:11

[5] For example, in many such ceremonies rings are exchanged, making it unclear who is performing the kiddushin. See Igros Moshe Even Haezer 1:76.

[6] Mishna Kiddushin 2a.

[7] See Kesuvos 73a

[8] Hilchos Geirushin 10:19

[9] See Shulchan Aruch Even Haezer 149:5

[10] Responsa of the Rivash, siman 6. This ruling is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch in Even Haezer 149:6.

[11] Pirushei Ivra siman 4

[12] Igros Moshe Even Haezer 1:76

[13] Sanhedrin 57b, Rambam Melachim 9:7

[14] See Responsa Dvar Avraham 3:29 who brings the words of the Rogatchover (amongst the writings of many other poskim, who ruled leniently almost unanimously).

[15] Hilchos Melachim 9:8. R’ Yisrael Meir Lau (Yachel Yisrael siman 94) points out that the Rashba disagrees, saying that non-Jews who marry are bound forever and have no way of terminating the marriage (new volume of Responsa, siman 36). This would explain the need for a get in the case of Jews, although it is highly unlikely that the Rogatchover was aware of this recently published source.

[16] There is much debate about what exactly chuppa is. Some say that it is what we call the chuppa (the canopy), others say that it is only when the chassan and kalla go into the yichud room afterwards. For non-Jews, only marital relations achieve nissuin as mentioned earlier.

[17] Otherwise the fact that a couple who married in a non-Jewish marriage did not do kiddushin would not have much significance.

[18] Kiddushin 5b

[19] Mishnas Avraham siman 10, starting from page 102b/204.

[20] Kiddushin 4:10

[21] Hilchos Issurei Biyah 1:21

[22] Even Haezer 19:2

[23] Ibid. 3