What's in a name?

For a change I decided to write briefly about a perhaps relatively minor issue. Different attitudes exist about naming children. Usually the more emotional among us attach great importance to name selection, whereas the rationalists like me are less bothered.

When reading the Torah the clear impression seems to support the first group, as a huge number of words are dedicated to naming. With the exception of Binyamin (who was named twice), the naming of all of the twelve tribes is accompanied with an explanation. The same is true about the names of Chava, Kayin, Sheis, Noach, Yaakov, Moshe and his sons. All of this is hard to dismiss as inconsequential.

Even if we could downplay the importance of these names given by humans, G-d himself gets involved with many names. The names Adam, Avraham, Sarah, Yishmael, Yitzchak and Yisrael are all given by G-d or His angels. Hashem even indicates the importance of the naming of species of, animals instructing Adam to name them.[1]

Chazal also tell us that a person’s name can affect his actions, deriving this from an alternative reading of a pasuk in Tehilim 46:9.[2] Elsewhere they tell us of a case where R’ Yehuda and R’ Yossi entrusted an innkeeper with their money, whereas R’ Meir did not out of concern that his name (Kidor) hinted at crookedness.[3] The innkeeper subsequently denied receiving the money, confirming R’ Meir’s fears.[4]

However, clearly a person has free will and is capable of doing good or bad whatever his name is. This point is also explicit in Chazal, who tell us that some people have repulsive actions despite having pleasing names (Yishmael and Esav are given as examples), while others have pleasing actions despite their repulsive names (Bakbuk, Chakufa and Charchur in Ezra 2:51).[5]

The Maharam ibn Chaviv (1654-1696) points out this seeming ‘contradiction’, and resolves that although most peoples’ actions follow their names, there is a minority who ‘buck the trend.’ He also raises the possibility that only new names have an effect on their bearers, whereas old names that ‘the multitudes are familiar with’ do not indicate anything.[6]

A rationalist view

From all the above it should be clear that names can play an important role in the development of a person, although nothing is set in stone. I am naturally sceptical of mystical explanations of this, and even if I believed in such explanations I would lack the tools to analyse them.[7] But here I think one can interpret in a rather simple and rational way.

To varying extents, all of us are influenced by many emotional factors. In many places Chazal tell us about the severity of the prohibition of causing pain to others verbally, despite the fact that the damage is merely psychological.[8]

A person’s name can be a strong psychological influence, as it is the code-word used to describe his entire entity. For this reason Chazal list one who calls someone else by a derogatory nickname amongst those who go to gehinom and never come out.[9]

A name that represents something positive, either in its inherent meaning or by association to a character in history, will often direct a person.[10] In contrast, a name associated with evil can cause unwanted effects. Although the child may not assume that he is supposed to live up to his name, he may well wonder why his parents chose this name for him and about how they view him.

This also explains the suggestion of Maharam ibn Chaviv, that well-known names may not have an effect. Someone with the same name as several of his friends will probably not think twice about his parents’ intentions.

Practical conclusions

Unsurprisingly, I have very little patience for most of the ‘rules’ one sometimes hears about which names are acceptable and unacceptable. However, one rule is given by Chazal- we should not name after wicked people.[11] Generally speaking this rule is adhered to amongst religious Jews, although in recent times certain questionable names have gained popularity.

The name Nimrod exists on the fringes, and the name Omri is not uncommon. I suspect that in part ignorance is to blame (for those who don’t know, Omri was one of the worst kings of Israel[12]). Although in all likelihood, those who first revived these names wanted to take from Tanach only the values of physical strength and leadership. They may even have purposely looked for names of those who rebelled against the Torah and its values.[13]

May we merit the most precious crown, that of a ‘Shem Tov’.[14]

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[1] Bereishis 2:20. Although the Rambam (Moreh Nevuchim 2:30) proves from this that languages are man-made and not inherent.

[2] Berachos 7a

[3] Based on a hint from Devarim 32:20.

[4] Yoma 83b

[5] Bereishis Rabba, Vayetze 71:3

[6] Tosefes Yom Hakipurim, Yoma 83b. Interestingly his series of sefarim is rather aptly named ‘Shemos Baaretz,’ perhaps after this comment.

[7] It would be especially hard to explain why some are unaffected by these mystical forces, unless we apply the principle that ‘only those who believe are affected’ (see Pesachim 110b).

[8] See Bava Metsia 58b-59a

[9] Ibid.

[10] Even if the person named after is not so well known, the choice of a name of someone who is part of our heritage says something.

[11] Yoma 38b, based on the pasuk ושם רשעים ירקב (Mishlei 10:7).

[12] See Melachim 1, 16:25-6

[13] If anyone can either support or challenge this hypothesis with evidence, I would be grateful.

[14] See Avos 4:13

Genealogy and Modern Technology

Historically, few issues have been as crucial to the Jewish People as the preservation of a pure Jewish lineage. Although technically there are more severe crimes than intermarriage, in the minds of even the least observant of parents it is often the worst that can happen to their children apart from death. The dread of knowing that the next generation will no longer be Jewish is something no-one wants to suffer.[1]

Chazal instructed even those who would never dream of marrying out intentionally to take precautions when looking for a spouse. Many assimilated during the Babylonian exile, leaving Ezra Hasofer with the difficult task of gathering evidence of the ancestry of the entire community. Chazal tell us that although in Babylon itself he succeeded in siphoning off the impure families, elsewhere the communities were like ‘dough’ (an inseparable mixture).[2]

Because of this, some required one to check several of the ancestors of a potential spouse before marriage. Although the bottom line halacha is that one may marry anyone from a family within the known Jewish community (ie one that people relate to as Jewish without any known problems),[3] Chazal advised to keep a distance from families with bad character traits.[4] Apart from the obvious reasons, we are told that quarrelsomeness and brazenness are potential signs of problematic descent.

In the modern age

Nowadays, although assimilation remains a serious problem, thanks to meticulous birth registration uncertainty over maternal lineage is rare when it comes to natural births. However, modern technology for all its benefits brings new challenges.

Thank G-d we live in an age where women without a womb can have children through a surrogate mother, and those with no ovulation can receive egg donation. Clearly though, it is impossible to say that in both cases the one raising the children is the natural mother. Chazal did not have this question to answer, and in my view it is futile to attempt to prove either way from their words.

Contemporary poskim are split over this question. Although some of them do attempt to support their positions from statements of Chazal, it seems that the main factor influencing both sides is instinct. To many (myself included) it would not make sense to say that the mother is anyone other than the genetic mother, who the child will often resemble physically. Others cannot fathom how a woman can carry a child for nine months, only for us to declare that the real mother is the one who merely had minor surgery to produce the child.

This question has major halachic ramifications. If only one of the two potential mothers is Jewish, the child may require conversion. Worse still, if one of them is related to the father or married to another man, the child may be a mamzer with all that this entails.[5]

Deciding on a communal level

Ideally, an issue like this would be brought to the Sanhedrin and all would have to accept their ruling. Until the Sanhedrin is re-established, the issue will certainly remain unresolved and we have to deal with this in the best way possible. To help determine what this way is, we can draw on Chazal.

If we are looking for a dispute over an equally severe issue as a precedent, one existed in the times of the Mishna. Beis Shamai and Beis Hilel disagreed over the complicated case of ‘Tzaras Erva’, an issue which requires a brief introduction.

If a married man dies leaving a brother but no children, his wife and brother have two options. They can either marry (yibum), or perform chalitza (a special ‘divorce’ process involving the wife removing her brother-in-law’s shoe). However, if the wife is one of the close relatives forbidden to her brother-in-law (eg if she is also his daughter, in a case where the deceased married his niece), no chalitza is required.

The dispute occurred in a case where the deceased brother had more than one wife, and one of the wives is forbidden to her brother-in-law. Beis Shamai required one of the other wives to perform either yibum or chalitza, whereas Beis Hilel maintained that the exemption of one wife is enough to exempt all the wives.

The Mishna tells us that despite this dispute, Beis Shamai and Beis Hilel did not refrain from intermarrying.[6] The gemara explains that although the performance of yibum created mamzerim according to Beis Hilel,[7] Beis Shamai informed Beis Hilel of such cases so that they would not marry those forbidden to them according to their view. And Beis Hilel would also inform Beis Shamai about any cases of ‘Tzaras Erva’, so that Beis Shamai would not marry women who required chalitza according to their view.[8]

In our case, if it is necessary to use a married or non-Jewish surrogate mother it is generally well known, and it is relatively easy for those who believe that the surrogate is the real mother to act accordingly. However, the use egg donation is not usually publicised.

The use of a married donor should certainly not be done secretly, as it could create an irreversible problem of mamzerus. I imagine even those who believe that the birth mother is the real one would not one their children to be viewed as mamzerim by others, so this should rule out any egg donation (or surrogacy) by a married woman.

The problem caused by non-Jewish egg donation is a smaller one, as the child can go through conversion relatively easily.[9] However, here also parents may not like the idea of having a child who is a convert.[10] If they believe that the birth mother is the real one they may choose not to convert the child, but if they make this decision it is incumbent on them to publicise the fact that their child is not Jewish according to those who disagree. It would be more prudent to convert him ‘just to be sure’.

Taking responsibility

It was recently brought to my attention that not all rabbis follow the example of Beis Shamai and Beis Hilel. One major proponent of the view that maternal lineage follows the birth mother actually advised against converting in a case of non-Jewish egg donation, in order ‘not to create doubts in the mind of the child.’

As I did not manage to clarify all the details of the case, I can only assume that this advice was given at a time when the question was a new one, and that the rabbi involved did not realise that so many would disagree with his ruling. Nevertheless, one who is truly wise anticipates the future.[11]

Sadly, the policy of one significant voice in the world of fertility-related halacha is to continue ruling this way. But unlike the talmid chacham in the original case, he does not do this out of conviction that the real mother is the one who gives birth. He tells those who need non-Jewish egg donation to take it, and those who need the services of a non-Jewish surrogate mother to use them. In neither case does he tell them to convert the child. In other words, he knowingly causes religious Jews to marry non-Jews.[12]

This is yet another product of a warped perception of halacha, where everything is a sea of different opinions and in every circumstance a different card can be played. No wonder so many people expect rabbis to rule leniently always, and are suspect when told that there is no way round a certain problem.[13]

In the future

The world of fertility treatment is developing at a fast pace. Soon the ‘egg or birth’ question will be one of the least complex. Already now it is possible to use part of one egg with another part of another egg, and it is technically possible to grow embryos outside of any mother (although this has not yet been approved legally). Eventually eggs may even be produced artificially.

Rabbis need to keep up with the latest developments in order to stay relevant. And we must work towards achieving the ideal means of deciding questions of this magnitude, by re-establishing the Sanhedrin.

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[1] Even if it is a daughter marrying out, it is clear to most that the chances of preserving Judaism this way are minimal. In addition, a child without a Jewish father has no tribal lineage (his status is similar to that of a convert).

[2] Kidushin 71b

[3] Ibid. 76b, Shulchan Aruch Even Haezer 2:2

[4] Kidushin 71b

[5] See Minchas Shlomo 3:124, where R’ Shlomo Zalman Orbach makes a compelling argument that mamzerus can exist even when no forbidden sexual relations have occurred.

[6] Yevamos 14a

[7] As when there is no mitzvah of yibum, ones dead brother’s wife is also one of the forbidden relatives.

[8] Yevamos 14b

[9] The parents or beis din can convert their child without any need for him to accept, see Kesuvos 11a. Although he can reject this conversion when he reaches adulthood, this will be rare provided that he has any kind of relationship with his parents and a good Jewish education.

[10] There are also halachic ramifications, as a female convert and daughters of a male convert cannot marry Kohanim.

[11] Tamid 32a

[12] The result is that the Shechina does not rest on these families, see Kidushin 70b. אוי לאזניים שכך שומעות!

[13] See “How does halacha work?” for an explanation of how a posek is supposed to rule.

The obligation of learning Torah

Anyone who has had even limited exposure to the religious Jewish world will know that much stress is placed on the importance of learning Torah. Chazal convey this message in a number of places, perhaps the most famous being the statement that “Study of Torah is equal to all of them (the mitzvos)”.[1]

Those who have learnt in yeshiva will probably have become accustomed to hearing that every free minute must be used to learn Torah. Reactions to this expectation are varied. Some happily follow this instruction (usually after a period of acclimatisation), others do so out of guilt. Some who are more relaxed take this message ‘with a pinch of salt,’ while a significant minority resent the pressure which overwhelms them.

As with so many things, it is beneficial for all of these people to understand what the Torah expects of us more clearly. While generally the clichés used by those teaching mussar (rebuke) are not untrue, they can be misleading or show an incomplete picture.

The basic obligation and the recommended path

The gemara discusses this in various places, with a focus on the instruction Hashem gives Yehoshua:

לא ימוש ספר התורה הזה מפיך והגית בו יומם ולילה למען תשמר לעשות ככל הכתוב בו כי אז תצליח את דרכך ואז תשכיל

(יהושע א, ח)

This book of the Torah should not move from your mouth- you shall study it day and night in order to make sure to do all that it is written in it. Then you will be successful in your ways and be intelligent.

(Yehoshua 1:8)

In Berachos 35b, the tana’im dispute how this should be applied. R’ Yishmael learns from the blessing “You shall gather in your crops” (Devarim 11) that the command to Yehoshua was not meant to be taken literally. Rather, one should act in the normal way of the world. R’ Shimon Bar Yochai argues that in this way one will always be pre-occupied with work and there will be no time to learn. Rather when we fulfil the will of Hashem, our work will be done for us by others.

Abaye concludes “Many followed R’ Yishmael and succeeded (to work and also have time to learn), and many followed R’ Shimon bar Yochai and did not succeed. Rava also instructs his talmidim not to come before him during Nisan and Tishrei (the times when work in the field needed to be done), in order that they should not be occupied with searching for food the rest of the year.

There are many questions to ask on the gemara above, but first we will quote another gemara which seemingly compounds the difficulty. In Menachos 99b R’ Shimon Bar Yochai is quoted as saying that one who just recites Shema in the morning and evening fulfils his obligation of studying day and night.[2] However, R’ Yishmael tells his nephew that even though he already knows the whole Torah, due to the command given to Yehoshua he may only learn Greek wisdom at an hour which is ‘neither day nor night’.[3]

Seemingly here R’ Yishmael and R’ Shimon bar Yochai have switched their views, with R’ Yishmael taking the uncompromising position. Based on this seeming contradiction, the Rosh explains that when R’ Shimon argued with R’ Yishmael about gathering crops, he did not mean that there is an obligation to learn Torah constantly.[4] He does not specify what R’ Shimon did mean, but presumably the idea is that although all agree that the basic obligation can be fulfilled by reciting Shema, we are generally expected to go beyond this basic obligation.

If this is the case, the dispute between the tana’im is a subtle one. All agree over the basic obligation, and all agree that it is unacceptable to limit oneself to the minimum. They differ over what the average person should strive for. According to R’ Yishmael he should aim to provide for himself in a normal manner, utilising any free time for Torah learning. R’ Shimon bar Yochai expects more, insisting that the need to work for a living exists only when Am Yisrael are not doing G-d’s will.

This helps explain the method Abaye used to settle the dispute. The main issue is a practical one, with R’ Shimon bar Yochai claiming that R’ Yishmael’s method will result in people not having time to learn, and R’ Yishmael maintaining that relying on others to provide sustenance is not the way of the world. Abaye simply carried out a survey, and concluded that more often than not R’ Yishmael’s recommendation is the one that works.

An obligation to know?

The position of the Rosh explained above, that all agree that the basic obligation of learning Torah can be fulfilled by reciting Shema, seems to be confirmed by the gemara in Nedarim 8a. Here the gemara tells us that an oath to study a certain part of the Torah is not a superfluous oath, as without this oath one could exempt himself by saying Shema day and night. No dissenting view is presented.

The Rambam also states that the obligation incumbent on every Jewish man is to fix time during the day and night to learn Torah.[5] However, the Ran claims that the gemara in Nedarim cannot be taken literally, and only refers to the obligation explicit in the Torah.[6] In fact everyone is obligated to learn constantly, within his capabilities.

The Ran proves this from the gemara in Kiddushin 30a. Here the gemara derives from the command ושננתם לבניך (“You shall teach them thoroughly to your children”)[7] that one must learn until the words of the Torah are sharp in his mouth, to the extent that he can answer any question immediately.

The Rambam and the Rosh do not quote this gemara in Kiddushin, and it appears that they do not accept it as being halacha. Instead, they both quote another halacha derived from the same pasuk by the gemara there, that one should divide his learning into three categories (Tanach, mishna and gemara).[8] This ruling was likely influenced by the sources quoted above, limiting the basic obligation to once a day and once a night.[9]

The truth is that there is very little practical difference between the two views. Although the Rambam’s position is that there is no technical obligation to know the whole Torah, or even to utilise every spare moment for learning, this certainly is the recommended path.[10] This is what R’ Yishmael told his nephew, that the attitude that since he has ‘already learned the whole Torah’ and now has free time for other pursuits is unacceptable.[11]

Similarly, although according to the Ran there is a basic obligation to learn constantly in order to know the entire Torah fluently, he states explicitly that this obligation is dependent on his capabilities. No-one is expected to do more than is suited to his personal limitations, whether they are financial, intellectual or psychological.

The importance of learning Torah

It should be clear from what we have written so far that the ‘minimum amount’ set for learning Torah is not similar to minimum amounts set for other mitzvos.[12] I need to explain briefly why this is the case, although in I will not do this full justice here.

Chazal explain that the phrase “one who scorns the word of G-d”[13] refers to one who is able to occupy himself with Torah and does not do so.[14] This comment seems quite extreme, as clearly there are many who don’t learn Torah out of laziness, and not with any malicious intent.

I believe that in fact this statement of Chazal does not refer to those who are too lazy to learn. In a way, these people do something worse than ‘scorning the word of G-d.’ Hashem’s most precious gift to us is our intelligence, and one who prefers to concentrate only on physical and emotional pursuits does not fulfil any meaningful purpose. Chazal are talking about someone who does think, but comes to the conclusion that there are intellectual activities on a higher level than Torah.

When it comes to learning Torah one who ‘does the minimum’ despite being capable of more, is either completely wasting the abilities Hashem has given him, or is ‘scorning the word of G-d.’ This explains why throughout history so much stress has been put on this mitzvah.

Summary

1) The basic obligation of learning Torah is once a day and once a night.

2) According to one view, there is also an obligation to spend all of one’s available time learning, and to know the whole Torah. However, this obligation is subjective to each person’s abilities.

3) All agree that even if there is no technical obligation, there is no intellectual pursuit more worthwhile than Torah, and one should act accordingly.

4) One whose main strengths lie in other areas should set aside time for learning according to his capability. He should not feel guilty for pursuing other interests.

5) Generally speaking, neglecting one’s physical needs in order to learn more Torah is counter-productive.

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[1] Mishna Peah 1:1

[2] There is a dispute over whether one should tell this to an ‘am haaretz’ (one with limited understanding), but this debate is merely a psychological one. The question is whether this piece of information will stop the am ha’aretz from learning more, or encourage him that even the little that he is able to do is worthwile.

[3] The gemara continues by quoting a third view, that the verse above is neither an obligation nor a mitzvah. It is a blessing given to Yehoshua that he will have time to learn the Torah that is so precious to him. However, this view seems not to have been accepted as halacha.

[4] Tosfos HaRosh, Berachos 35b

[5] Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:8

[6] He explains that an oath to fulfil an obligation that is not explicit in the Torah is not superfluous.

[7] Devarim 6:7

[8] Rambam Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:11, Rosh Kidushin 1:43

[9] See however R’ Yerucham Fishel Perlow, Asin 14-5 (ד"ה ואמנם) and Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:110.

[10] See for example Hilchos Talmud Torah 3:12-3.

[11] It is quite possible that R’ Yishmael’s stern answer was a response to his nephew’s desire to free himself from the burden of Torah. Had the question stemmed from a desire to learn something productive from ‘Greek wisdom,’ the answer may well have been different. See “Wisdom of the Nations”

[12] Mitzvos like the hagada on pesach, tzedaka and mishloach manos on Purim all have minimum amounts, and with all of them we are told that “Whoever increase is praiseworthy.” However, with these mitzvos one who does the minimum is not criticised unless it stems from stinginess or disdain for mitzvos.

[13] Bamidbar 15:31

[14] Sanhedrin 99a

Zionism and Yom Ha'atzmaut

For many, the need to clarify what the Torah’s attitude is to Zionism will be surprising. The aim to build a nation in Eretz Yisrael is clear throughout the Torah and the rest of Tanach, and even the partial achievement of this aim is surely something to be celebrated.

The necessity to explain further stems from two things. Firstly, to a large percentage of the Jewish People the point above is far from obvious. Secondly, even the rest of us should be able to appreciate that what is clear to us is based at least partly on hindsight. Before Ben Gurion declared the forming of the State of Israel, it was far from clear whether the move would result in anything positive. Many claimed the risk simply was not worth it.[1]

There are three basic questions here:

1) Were the Jewish People in exile supposed to attempt to bring redemption actively, or just to wait for Hashem to do it?

2) Based on or despite the answer to the first question, was it correct to risk so much in 1948 without knowing what the outcome would be?

3) Based on or despite the answers to the first two questions, is it appropriate to thank Hashem and/or celebrate what happened?

The first question is answered by the Ramban unambiguously. We are obligated to conquer Eretz Yisrael, and must not let others possess it.[2] The Rambam does not list such a mitvah, and seemingly his view is that this is not an obligation. Whether or not he would consider the struggle to achieve this aim as something positive or not is unclear,[3] but there certainly is no evidence to suggest that he forbids it.

The only source for such a position is what the gemara tells us, that Hashem imposed on us oaths not to ascend (to Eretz Yisrael) ‘like a wall’ and not to rebel against the other nations.[4] Much has been written already about this, and with the exception of Satmar it has generally been accepted that this gemara is not of halachic significance.[5] In my mind what Chazal meant to say here is that without us realising, Hashem removed from us the will to fight for independence until an auspicious time for this.

Assuming therefore that conquering Eretz Yisrael is something positive or at the very least optional, the second question is mainly an issue of historical analysis. It is impossible to prove whether more or fewer lives would have been lost had the State not been declared. Even if fewer lives would have been lost in the short term, when it comes to national issues the calculations that need to be taken are more complicated (see “War and Peace”).

With hindsight, I certainly agree with the decision made in 1948 although I respect the legitimacy of dissenting views. But one thing I would expect all to agree with is the fact that those responsible for making this decision did so with the best physical interests of the Jewish People in mind.

The effect on Torah and Mitzvos

The answer to our third question is not necessarily dependent on the answer to the first two questions, whatever it is. Some may agree with what I have written above but nevertheless object to celebrating the achievements of those who were far from G-d and the Torah. Furthermore, many believe that these achievements are outweighed by widespread spiritual decline they see as resulting from the State of Israel.

These claims must be taken seriously. We cannot ignore the fact that many of the early leaders of Zionism saw it as a replacement to the Torah and mitzvos. This aim also had some degree of success, with the most famous example being the treatment of Yemenite Jews and others from similar ‘unenlightened’ backgrounds.[6]

For simplification, let us pretend that all those who helped found the State of Israel were irreligious and that net Torah observance is less than what it would have been without the State (although the first statement is wrong and the second mere conjecture). My firm belief is that even if this were true, and even if the decision made by Ben Gurion and his advisers in 1948 was ‘wrong’, it would still be correct both to thank Hashem and to celebrate on Yom Ha’atzmaut.

It is rather obvious that we must thank Hashem for all the good that He gives us, even if we afterwards decide to misuse it. In case anyone might argue that thanking Hashem does not include celebrating, the Torah tells us regarding the mitvah of bikurim (bringing the first fruits to the Beis Hamikdash):

ושמחת בכל הטוב אשר נתן לך ה' אלהיך ולביתך.

(דברים כו)

You shall rejoice over all the good that Hashem your G-d has given to you and your household.

(Devarim 26)

What exactly are we celebrating?

Believe it or not, some argue that having control over Eretz Yisrael and the right for any Jew to live here is not something inherently good. They claim that this repetitive blessing in the Torah is only a means to keeping Torah and mitzvos. Although to most thinking people I know this claim is intuitively wrong, it is not immediately obvious how to refute it. The best way to do so is to show that our intuition was shared by our prestigious predecessors.

The Rambam describes what we celebrate on Chanuka:

“In the (time of) the Second Beis Hamikdash, while the Greeks ruled, they made decrees against Israel, nullified their religion, did not allow them to occupy themselves with Torah and mitzvos, took from their money and daughters, entered the Temple and breached it, and defiled the pure items. Israel had much distress because of them, and they pressurised them greatly until the G-d of our fathers had mercy on them and saved them (the Jews) from their (the Greeks) hands.

The children of the Hasmonean Kohanim Gedolim prevailed and killed them (the Greeks), saved Israel from their hands and appointed a king from the Kohanim. The kingdom was restored to Israel for more than two hundred years, until the Second Destruction.”

(Megila and Chanuka 3:1)

Although the majority of the troubles caused by the Greeks were religious ones, for Rambam the focus of the salvation brought about by the Hasmoneans is national. To him it was obvious that the self-rule achieved was something to celebrate. And a brief read of any of the historical accounts of the Hasmonean dynasty is enough to show that for most of this two-hundred year period, the leaders were far from perfect spiritually.[7]

Is this ‘Aschalta deGeula’ (the start of redemption)?

To answer this we first have to define what we mean by redemption. The term ‘Geula’ can refer simply to deliverance from troubles,[8] in which case calling the State of Israel ראשית צמיחת גאולתנו (‘the beginning of the sprouting of our redemption’) seems to be a huge understatement. The question that is far harder to answer is whether we are living through the start of the final redemption after which there will be no further exile.[9]

In fact, my belief is that only a prophet can know the answer to this question. There is no assurance that we could not (G-d forbid) experience another exile after the current redemption,[10] and indeed we have seen several retreats in recent years. We daven and actively try to prevent further such events, but we must also recognise that not everything is in our hands.

I also believe that the stubborn insistence of some to limit Zionism to decades-old teachings of some of the previous leaders of the Religious Zionist movement has had some much unwanted effects. Many to whom these teachings are foreign to (this is especially common amongst those born and raised outside Israel) are presented with a choice of accepting them unquestionably, or rejecting Zionism altogether. They often choose the latter.

This process is not limited to those unversed in these teachings. A few years ago a prominent and learned Rosh Yeshiva, who for many years was part of the Religious Zionist world, witnessed the destruction of Gush Katif and came to the conclusion that much of what he had learned and taught for years was mistaken. As his Zionism was based only on the concept of ‘Aschalta deGeula’ and the restoration of the Kingdom of G-d, he decided to stop celebrating Yom Ha’atzmaut, drawing his yeshiva and other institutions with him.

The phenomenon of Rabbis who claim to have a clear understanding of historical processes, even if it is based on their reading of the words of Chazal, can have far-reaching consequences. Often much division and animosity arises from talmidim who believe that only their rav is the one who truly understands, and the inevitable result is that those who represent the Torah have great difficulty in influencing those in positions of power.

May we learn to thank Hashem and rejoice over all the good that He has given us, and witness and bring about the ultimate redemption!

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[1] The historical precedent of Bar Kochva’s ultimately disastrous uprising against the Romans shows how hard decisions like these are to make.

[2] Sefer Hamitzvos, Mitzvah 4 in his collection of positive mitzvos that the Rambam ‘forgot’.

[3] See ‘War and Peace’.

[4] Kesuvos 111a

[5] As none of the Rishonim quote it in their halachic works. However, in and prior to 1948 this was a matter of considerable debate.

[6] I have not quoted sources here, as the extent of what happened is the matter of some debate and I do not pretend to be an historian. However, it is clear that the phenomenon described above existed to some degree. On the other hand, I believe it would be naïve to imagine that had the State of Israel not been founded, Eastern Jewish communities would have maintained their devotion to the Torah entirely. The challenges of modernity has taken its toll on the entire world (Jewish and non-Jewish), and no-one is immune to this.

[7] In fact, according to the Ramban the mere fact that they reigned as kings was a violation of the command never to remove this power from the tribe of Yehuda. See his commentary to Bereishis 49:10.

[8] See Rashi to Megila 17b

[9] See Yeshaya 60:20, Amos 9:15, and Yerushalmi Shvi’is 6:1.

[10] Some have claimed that an assurance to this can be seen in the Yerushalmi referenced in the previous footnote, but the truth is that the cryptic nature of such texts precludes any solid proof. See “Drush and Divrei Agada”. When I say the phrase ראשית צמיחת גאולתנו in davening, I mean a general redemption.