Historically, few issues have
been as crucial to the Jewish People as the preservation of a pure Jewish lineage.
Although technically there are more severe crimes than intermarriage, in the
minds of even the least observant of parents it is often the worst that can
happen to their children apart from death. The dread of knowing that the next
generation will no longer be Jewish is something no-one wants to suffer.[1]
Chazal instructed even those who
would never dream of marrying out intentionally to take precautions when
looking for a spouse. Many assimilated during the Babylonian exile, leaving
Ezra Hasofer with the difficult task of gathering evidence of the ancestry of
the entire community. Chazal tell us that although in Babylon itself he
succeeded in siphoning off the impure families, elsewhere the communities were
like ‘dough’ (an inseparable mixture).[2]
Because of this, some required
one to check several of the ancestors of a potential spouse before marriage.
Although the bottom line halacha is that one may marry anyone from a family
within the known Jewish community (ie one that people relate to as Jewish
without any known problems),[3]
Chazal advised to keep a distance from families with bad character traits.[4] Apart
from the obvious reasons, we are told that quarrelsomeness and brazenness are
potential signs of problematic descent.
In the modern age
Nowadays, although assimilation
remains a serious problem, thanks to meticulous birth registration uncertainty
over maternal lineage is rare when it comes to natural births. However, modern
technology for all its benefits brings new challenges.
Thank G-d we live in an age where
women without a womb can have children through a surrogate mother, and those
with no ovulation can receive egg donation. Clearly though, it is impossible to
say that in both cases the one raising the children is the natural mother.
Chazal did not have this question to answer, and in my view it is futile to
attempt to prove either way from their words.
Contemporary poskim are split
over this question. Although some of them do attempt to support their positions
from statements of Chazal, it seems that the main factor influencing both sides
is instinct. To many (myself included) it would not make sense to say that the
mother is anyone other than the genetic mother, who the child will often
resemble physically. Others cannot fathom how a woman can carry a child for
nine months, only for us to declare that the real mother is the one who merely
had minor surgery to produce the child.
This question has major halachic
ramifications. If only one of the two potential mothers is Jewish, the child
may require conversion. Worse still, if one of them is related to the father or
married to another man, the child may be a mamzer with all that this entails.[5]
Deciding on a communal level
Ideally, an issue like this would
be brought to the Sanhedrin and all would have to accept their ruling. Until
the Sanhedrin is re-established, the issue will certainly remain unresolved and
we have to deal with this in the best way possible. To help determine what this
way is, we can draw on Chazal.
If we are looking for a dispute
over an equally severe issue as a precedent, one existed in the times of the
Mishna. Beis Shamai and Beis Hilel disagreed over the complicated case of
‘Tzaras Erva’, an issue which requires a brief introduction.
If a married man dies leaving a
brother but no children, his wife and brother have two options. They can either
marry (yibum), or perform chalitza (a special ‘divorce’ process involving the
wife removing her brother-in-law’s shoe). However, if the wife is one of the
close relatives forbidden to her brother-in-law (eg if she is also his
daughter, in a case where the deceased married his niece), no chalitza is
required.
The dispute occurred in a case
where the deceased brother had more than one wife, and one of the wives is
forbidden to her brother-in-law. Beis Shamai required one of the other wives to
perform either yibum or chalitza, whereas Beis Hilel maintained that the
exemption of one wife is enough to exempt all the wives.
The Mishna tells us that despite
this dispute, Beis Shamai and Beis Hilel did not refrain from intermarrying.[6] The
gemara explains that although the performance of yibum created mamzerim
according to Beis Hilel,[7] Beis
Shamai informed Beis Hilel of such cases so that they would not marry those
forbidden to them according to their view. And Beis Hilel would also inform
Beis Shamai about any cases of ‘Tzaras Erva’, so that Beis Shamai would not
marry women who required chalitza according to their view.[8]
In our case, if it is necessary
to use a married or non-Jewish surrogate mother it is generally well known, and
it is relatively easy for those who believe that the surrogate is the real
mother to act accordingly. However, the use egg donation is not usually
publicised.
The use of a married donor should
certainly not be done secretly, as it could create an irreversible problem of
mamzerus. I imagine even those who believe that the birth mother is the real
one would not one their children to be viewed as mamzerim by others, so this
should rule out any egg donation (or surrogacy) by a married woman.
The problem caused by non-Jewish
egg donation is a smaller one, as the child can go through conversion relatively
easily.[9]
However, here also parents may not like the idea of having a child who is a
convert.[10] If they
believe that the birth mother is the real one they may choose not to convert
the child, but if they make this decision it is incumbent on them to publicise
the fact that their child is not Jewish according to those who disagree. It
would be more prudent to convert him ‘just to be sure’.
Taking responsibility
It was recently brought to my
attention that not all rabbis follow the example of Beis Shamai and Beis Hilel.
One major proponent of the view that maternal lineage follows the birth mother
actually advised against converting in a case of non-Jewish egg donation, in
order ‘not to create doubts in the mind of the child.’
As I did not manage to clarify
all the details of the case, I can only assume that this advice was given at a
time when the question was a new one, and that the rabbi involved did not
realise that so many would disagree with his ruling. Nevertheless, one who is
truly wise anticipates the future.[11]
Sadly, the policy of one
significant voice in the world of fertility-related halacha is to continue
ruling this way. But unlike the talmid chacham in the original case, he does
not do this out of conviction that the real mother is the one who gives birth.
He tells those who need non-Jewish egg donation to take it, and those who need
the services of a non-Jewish surrogate mother to use them. In neither case does
he tell them to convert the child. In other words, he knowingly causes
religious Jews to marry non-Jews.[12]
This is yet another product of a
warped perception of halacha, where everything is a sea of different opinions
and in every circumstance a different card can be played. No wonder so many
people expect rabbis to rule leniently always, and are suspect when told that
there is no way round a certain problem.[13]
In the future
The world of fertility treatment
is developing at a fast pace. Soon the ‘egg or birth’ question will be one of
the least complex. Already now it is possible to use part of one egg with
another part of another egg, and it is technically possible to grow embryos
outside of any mother (although this has not yet been approved legally).
Eventually eggs may even be produced artificially.
Rabbis need to
keep up with the latest developments in order to stay relevant. And we must
work towards achieving the ideal means of deciding questions of this magnitude,
by re-establishing the Sanhedrin.
[1] Even
if it is a daughter marrying out, it is clear to most that the chances of
preserving Judaism this way are minimal. In addition, a child without a Jewish
father has no tribal lineage (his status is similar to that of a convert).
[2] Kidushin 71b
[3] Ibid. 76b,
Shulchan Aruch Even Haezer 2:2
[4] Kidushin
71b
[5] See
Minchas Shlomo 3:124, where R’ Shlomo Zalman Orbach makes a
compelling argument that mamzerus can exist even when no forbidden sexual
relations have occurred.
[6] Yevamos 14a
[7] As when
there is no mitzvah of yibum, ones dead brother’s wife is also one of the
forbidden relatives.
[8] Yevamos 14b
[9] The
parents or beis din can convert their child without any need for him to accept,
see Kesuvos 11a. Although he can reject this conversion when he reaches adulthood,
this will be rare provided that he has any kind of relationship with his
parents and a good Jewish education.
[10]
There are also halachic ramifications, as a female convert and daughters of a
male convert cannot marry Kohanim.
[11] Tamid 32a
[12] The
result is that the Shechina does not rest on these families, see Kidushin 70b. אוי לאזניים
שכך שומעות!
Rav Daniel -
ReplyDeleteThank you for another thoughtful and informative post.
Regarding note 5 - should be "Minchat [or, if you prefer, Mincahs] Shlomo". Also, I'm not sure why you accept his position as "compelling" when Rav Moshe and others disagree. Surely the Talmudic evidence in this case is no greater than that regarding the identity of the mother in egg-donation cases, which you yourself write is decided on "instinct" not argument.
Thank you.
ReplyDeleteI think R` Shlomo Zalman`s logic is compelling. He points out that even when an illegitimate child is conceived through normal means, the transgression is not related to the release of the sperm.
Also, here there is more room to bring proofs from Chazal, as they also were aware of the possibility of impregnation without sexual relations.
The simple understanding has always been that mamzarut is a product of sin. Arguing that it can happen without sin or, alternatively, that the artificial introduction of sperm into the womb is itself sinful is the chiddush.
DeleteAlso, those versions of the birth-of-Dina Midrash which speak of the fetuses (or feti) switching wombs show that Chazal were aware of the possibility of the genetic mother being different than the birth mother. And if you'll tell me that it's a fanciful account, I'll answer that it's no more fanciful than getting pregnant from the bathtub.
I would argue that the simple understanding is that mamzerut is a product of parents whose relationship would be one of sin, whether or not this relationship occurred (obviously in the overwhelming majority of cases sin is involved). Clearly there can be mamzerut without actual sin, as if two mentally disabled relatives had a child all would agree that he would be a mamzer.
DeleteEven if the midrashim about Dina are to be taken literally, Chazal were not aware of a possibility of the genetic mother being different to the birth mother through natural means and had no need to decide such an issue. Although we know that getting pregnant from the bathtub is not possible, it seems that Chazal believed otherwise. They even ruled halachically based on this possibility (see Chagiga 15a). Furthermore, even in the times of Chazal it would have been possible to impregnate using a syringe (although I do not know if this ever happened).
There is a huge difference between a normatively sinful act performed by people with diminished capacity and an act which is not sinful at all. I don’t see how you can learn from one to the other.
DeleteRabbenu Peretz, quoted le'halacha by the Bach and Taz in יו"ד קצה states explicitly that a child born to a married woman who became pregnant from another man's sperm left on a sheet which she subsequently lay upon is a kosher Jew, and the only concern is that the child might come to marry paternal relatives. To my mind, and to the mind of most poskim, this is case closed.
Against this, R` Shlomo Zalman has a diyuk in a Tosafot which is attempting to justify the opinion that the offspring of a married Jewish woman and a non-Jew is a mamzer - an opinion which is completely rejected le'halacha.
Calling his argument "compelling" is, I think, generous.
In any case, thanks again for the post and for the learning which it inspired.
I did not mean to prove anything from the case of the mentally disabled, just to show that the link between sin and mamzerut is not clear.
DeleteR' Shlomo Zalman's diyuk in Tosfot is just one of the sources for his argument. His main proof is from Yevamos 45b and the Ritva there, as well as the logical argument I mentioned previously. I believe that this is far stronger than a quote from Rabeinu Peretz which does not appear in our texts of Hagahot Smak, derived from an obscure Midrash about Ben Sira.
Thank you also for getting me to look this all up again. I have now amended the previously inaccurate reference to the Minchas Shlomo.
Rav Shlomo Zalman is certainly entitled to his opinion, as are you to accept it. But trying to undermine the authenticity and authority of the Rabeinu Peretz is pointless. It appears far too often and too early to make its absence in our text of the Hagahot Smak anything but a curiosity. For a full discussion, see here:
Deletehttp://www.machonso.org/uploads/images/11-D-2_31-38.pdf