The Shul and its Sanctity

Introduction

Thank G-d communities in Eretz Yisrael are now all able to return to our shuls with no restrictions, safely and legally. Over the past 18 months or so, something that we took for granted for so long has been difficult and at times dangerous and impossible. We must now be appreciative of the ability to daven as normal, and it is appropriate to write about the manner in which our holy places must be treated at all times.[1]

As the laws pertaining to shuls are numerous, I will concentrate on two issues. I will start with a discussion of the overall nature of the sanctity involved, and then move on to analyse the halachos relating to some of the questionable practices that are common in shuls today.

What makes a shul holy?

This might seem like a strange question, as we are used to the notion that nothing could be holier than a place of worship. This is the common understanding in the secular world, as well as within most religions. However, it is actually not so clear-cut that this is the Jewish view. The concept of a shul does not appear in the Torah or even clearly in Tanach, for reasons we shall discuss.

The term קדושה (holiness or sanctity) in halacha usually applies to things that are set aside (מוקדש) for Hashem, such as sacrifices. The word of G-d, found in Torah scrolls or in tefilin and mezuzos, also has inherent sanctity and these objects therefore must be buried when they are no longer usable.

Ramban writes that shuls do not fall into the categories above, and as such do not have any inherent sanctity. There are explicit halachos relating to the sale of a shul building, but following the sale, the building may be used for mundane purposes. If the sale was authorised by the city leaders in the presence of the people of the city, the proceeds of the sale may also be used for non-sacred purposes.[2] This is not the case with inherently sacred objects.[3]

Therefore, Ramban concludes that the respect that we must have for shuls and the related laws stem only from the shul's use in performing a mitzvah (prayer). Other objects used for mitzvos, such as a lulav or a sukka, have a similar status and must not be treated with contempt, but are not sacred.

The Ran rejects this explanation, arguing that if there were no sanctity to a shul, there would also be no restrictions whatsoever on the use of the proceeds of the sale. Rather, as sacred matters (דברים שבקדושה, including parts of our davening such as kedusha and kaddish) are recited in shuls, Chazal assigned them sanctity on a Rabbinic level.[4]

This view, that the status of a shul stems only from Rabbinic decree, is consistent with the lack of Scriptural reference to shuls, as mentioned above. I believe that this 'omission' is for good reason – the Torah prescribes just one, centralised place of worship for us all to focus on. The concept of multiple shuls only became a positive idea once there was no other choice, when we were scattered to the corners of the earth and were no longer able to serve Hashem as one geographically.[5]

The centralised place of worship is of course the Beis HaMikdash (or the Mishkan beforehand). The obligation to treat the Beis HaMikdash with respect, or more precisely, to be in awe of it, is an explicit Biblical command.[6] Chazal tell us that shuls and batei midrash (study halls) are the miniature 'Mikdash' that Hashem promised Yechezkel that the Jews would have in exile.[7]

Based on this concept, R' Eliezer miMetz (Western Europe, 1140-1237) writes that the mitzvah to be in awe of the Mikdash extends to shuls. The related halachos are therefore of Biblical origin, although Chazal defined the boundaries of what is appropriate in each place, according to its level of kedusha.[8]

Before we move on, it is important to note that although the view of R' Eliezer miMetz seems logical, it is certainly not obvious. Although Chazal called the shul a miniature Mikdash, this only appears in aggadic passages and there is no clear indication that this has halachic ramifications. It is presumably for this reason that Ramban and the Ran looked for other explanations for the halachos of shuls.

Eating and Drinking

The gemara quotes a Beraisa which explicitly prohibits eating and drinking in shuls and batei midrash.[9] However, in almost every active shul that I have davened in, consumption of some form of food and drink has been common and virtually unquestioned. We need to analyse the reasons for this discrepancy, and to decide whether the common practice is justified and when.

Two leniencies appear in the continuation of the gemara. One is that these prohibitions do not apply to the Chachamim and their students, as the shul is their house.[10] The Rambam writes that this leniency only applies out of great necessity,[11] although the Tur does not make this stipulation.[12] Either way, it does seem clear that this dispensation only applies to those who spend a significant portion of their time studying in shul, and we need to look for something more extensive.

The other leniency is that shuls in Bavel (Babylon) are built conditionally, i.e. with a stipulation that not all of the prohibitions will apply. The gemara qualifies that it is nevertheless forbidden to use them for mundane purposes such as accounting, but the extent of what is allowed is not explicitly defined.

Tosfos and many other rishonim infer from other cases in the gemara that even in Bavel, shuls may not be used for one's own personal benefit, such as for protection from the elements. They conclude that the stipulation made with these shuls only has effect once the shul falls into disuse. This is also the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch.[13] Thus this leniency too appears to be insufficient.[14]

However, several questions remain. Firstly, we need to try to understand why the Rambam does not mention any halachos regarding shuls built conditionally, even when they are no longer in use. Secondly, why is it that stipulation works only after a shul is defunct? Finally, if shuls can be built with such a stipulation, why would any community limit themselves by building a shul without any conditions?

Tosfos write further that the stipulation only applies to shuls in Chutz La'aretz, as the sanctity of these shuls will anyway terminate when Mashiach comes. Shuls in Eretz Yisrael are consecrated forever, and no conditions can be made. This answers our last two questions – the 'stipulation' is not made by choice, rather exists automatically for shuls in Chutz La'aretz, which can only have temporary sanctity.

The Rambam clearly does not subscribe to this position, as he would certainly have recorded such a major difference between shuls in Eretz Yisrael and Chutz La'aretz if he held of it. I would therefore like to suggest an alternative approach.[15]

I believe that the Rambam omitted the halachos of a 'conditional shul' because there is actually no novelty involved. The Rambam does write that if people start davening in a building (or room) without designating it as a shul, the halachos of a shul do not apply.[16] Communities in Bavel used a logical extension of this, designating shuls on a temporary basis only.[17]

When shuls are built (or existing buildings designated for tefila) with clear intention to be used for non-sacred purposes as well, it could be argued that de facto these 'shuls' do not have the halachos of a shul. Thus it would be permitted to eat and drink in them, without limitation. However, it is crucial to point out that under normal circumstances, communities are obligated to build a fully consecrated shul to daven in.[18] Where possible, it is certainly preferable to daven in a shul that is used for prayer and Torah study alone.[19]

Implementation

Much of the responsibility to maintain appropriate conduct in shul lies with community leaders. However, enforcement of the ideal standard described above will usually not be practical, unless members of the community can see the benefit of having a shul dedicated for sacred matters. This involves efficient running of services, cutting out unnecessary delays and creating a feeling of relevance.[20] Without this, we should not be surprised if shuls become mere community centres, where people come to chat and to read colourful newsletters.

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[1] After starting to write this post, the outbreak of the Delta Variant has cast doubts over how long this return to normal may last. This doubt should serve as a further reminder not to be complacent, and to use our shuls appropriately.

[2] Mishna and gemara, Megila 25b-26a

[3] Chidushei HaRamban, Megila 25b

[4] Ran, Rif Megila 8a

[5] I have written about this concept at length previously, in He has no physical form.

[6] Vayikra 19:30

[7] Yechezkel 11:16; Megila 29a

[8] Sefer Yere'im, siman 409. This explains why despite being part of the same mitzvah, wearing shoes and carrying certain items are forbidden on Har HaBayis but permitted in a shul.

[9] Megila 28a-b

[10] Ibid. Although it is not so clear from the gemara exactly which of the restrictions are relaxed for Chachamim, from the words of the rishonim it is clear that the leniency applies at least to eating and drinking.

[11] Hilchos Tefila 11:6. The acharonim discuss where the Rambam may have learnt this from, but I have not found any convincing answer.

[12] Orach Chaim 151. The Rashba differentiates between shuls and batei midrash in this regard, writing that in the beit midrash, talmidim are allowed to eat and drink even without great need (nowadays many shuls function as batei midrash outside of davening times, and this leniency would therefore apply).

[13] Orach Chaim 151:11

[14] R' Moshe Feinstein writes that we are forced to say that the prevalent custom is according to the dissenting view of Rashi and the Or Zarua, that stipulation allows use of functioning shuls for non-sacred purposes (Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim 1:45).

[15] The Magen Avraham (151:12) writes that the Rambam's position is that this leniency only applied historically to shuls in Bavel and is not relevant today. This is difficult however, as there does not appear to be any reason why such a stipulation could not be made today as well, and the Rambam should have mentioned this.

[16] Hilchos Tefila 11:21. This point is undisputed.

[17] The Mishna Berura (Biur Halacha 151:11 ד"ה להשתמש בו) writes that such a stipulation prevents any kedusha taking effect on the shul, even on a temporary basis. However, I believe that the Rambam would disagree.

[18] See Rambam, Hilchos Tefila 11:1. This point was already made in Corona Observations.

[19] See Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim 2:44, where R' Moshe Feinstein writes along similar lines. However, his position is that unless it is explicitly stipulated that there will be no kedusha, a building designated for davening does have the halachos of a shul. Stipulation to allow eating and drinking is invalid (according to Tosfos and the Shulchan Aruch), as this conflicts with halacha (מתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה, or מתנה על דברי חכמים). I would argue that while this may have been true historically, now that eating and drinking in shuls has become so common, there is no requirement for an explicit stipulation. It is understood that there is no intention to imbue sanctity on the shul, at least not the halachic sanctity of which Chazal spoke.

[20] See The Text of Tefila regarding possible modifications to our tefila.