Introduction
Recent court rulings in Europe allowing the banning of shechita have once again highlighted the need to clarify the Torah's position on cruelty to animals. While it is reasonably safe to say that the Torah does not see shechita as problematic, and perhaps that this method was chosen specifically to avoid unnecessary cruelty,[1] it is more than equally clear that it is also possible to carry out perfectly kosher shechita in inhumane conditions. The purpose of this post is to examine what our general attitude to causing pain to animals should be, and how this should be implemented in relation to meat and animal products.
While causing unnecessary pain to animals is certainly prohibited, the fact that the Torah allows meat to be eaten through shechita shows that inflicting some amount of pain on animals for the purpose of human benefit is certainly permitted. The key question is how to evaluate how much pain may be inflicted in order to achieve what level of human benefit. Before we attempt to answer this question, we must first clarify the nature and severity of the prohibition of causing pain to animals.
Biblical or Rabbinic?
Prevention of pain to animals may lie at the root of the mitzvah to help unload a donkey struggling under its burden:
כִּי תִרְאֶה חֲמוֹר שֹׂנַאֲךָ רֹבֵץ תַּחַת מַשָּׂאוֹ וְחָדַלְתָּ מֵעֲזֹב לוֹ עָזֹב תַּעֲזֹב עִמּוֹ:
שמות כג, ה
"If you see the donkey of your hater crouching under its burden, would you desist from helping him? You must help him!"[2]
Shemos 23:5
The gemara discusses whether the purpose of this mitzvah is indeed the prevention of pain to the donkey, or simply to help the human owner of the animal. No definite conclusion is reached, and the gemara finds no practical halachic difference regarding this mitzvah.[3]
Elsewhere, the gemara invokes the idea of prevention of pain to animals in relation to the laws of Shabbos. If an animal fell into an aqueduct on Shabbos and it is not possible to bring it food, one may place cushions underneath the animal, in order to help the animal to get out. The gemara explains that although it is in general forbidden to render items useless on Shabbos[4] (the cushions will now be unusable), as this prohibition is Rabbinic, it is superseded by the Biblical imperative to prevent pain to animals.[5] This halacha is undisputed, and most of the rishonim see this as decisive in concluding that prevention of pain to animals is indeed a Biblical obligation.[6]
Nevertheless, the fact that this obligation appears as the rationale for the specific commandment of helping to unload a donkey, rather than being expressed directly as a more general instruction to prevent animal pain, is significant.[7] This explains why activities such as shechita are permitted, despite the pain involved. There is no blanket obligation to prevent all pain to animals; other considerations such as human benefit take precedence in some circumstances.
On the other hand, in some ways the motivation behind a mitzvah may be more important than the mitzvah itself. Concepts such as desirable character traits, communal awareness and settling Eretz Yisrael are the bigger picture behind other mitzvos rather than direct commandments themselves.[8] The Torah's concern for animal welfare should certainly not be taken lightly.
Orders of Precedence
The case of the animal in the aqueduct appears at first glance to give us the first rule regarding the importance of prevention of pain to animals – rabbinic injunctions are waived. However, closer analysis would seem to reveal that even this is not absolute. The implication is that lifting the animal out of the aqueduct is forbidden, despite the fact that this too would only be a violation of the rabbinic prohibition of moving a muktzeh item (the animal[9]) on Shabbos.
The Rambam indeed confirms that lifting out the animal is forbidden.[10] The Magen Avraham explains that it is impossible to compare all rabbinic prohibitions; some decrees explicitly stand even against severe Biblical commandments.[11] However, the Rid (R' Yeshaya d'Trani – 1180-1260, Italy) writes that if it is not possible to help the animal out using cushions, it is permitted to pull it out directly.[12]
Even according to the Rid, we may have a clear rule that any rabbinic edict gives way for the sake of preventing pain to animals, but we also need to explain what level of pain is included. It does seem obvious that the Torah was not concerned about pain caused by tasks commonly carried out by animals, such as donkeys transporting a reasonable load.[13]
Monetary Loss
A third gemara provides us with more information regarding orders of priority. A beraisa relates that once R' Gamliel's did not want to unload muktzeh items from his donkey until after Shabbos; the donkey died after Shabbos. The gemara explains that he didn't want to untie the load and let it fall as then the containers would break; he also could not protect them by putting cushions on the ground, as they would become dirty and unusable on Shabbos. As R' Gamliel was of the position that prevention of animal pain is only a rabbinic obligation, the best option was to let the donkey suffer.[14]
As explained above, the accepted halacha is not in accordance with R' Gamliel and the animal should be protected in such a situation.[15] The rishonim dispute what the correct course of action would be. Rashi writes that as with the case of the animal in the aqueduct, the rabbinic prohibition of rendering items useless on Shabbos is waived because of animal pain, and it would be permitted to use the cushions to prevent the loss of the containers.
Ramban and others argue that here there is no justification for using the cushions. R' Gamliel should simply have untied the load and let it fall, despite the fact that the containers would break. According to this view, the loss of the containers certainly does not justify allowing an animal to suffer.[16] There is no proof that Rashi disagrees with this – if there were no cushions available it is possible that Rashi would also agree that the only option would be to allow the containers to break.
However, it would not be right to extrapolate from here that any pain to animals must be avoided at all costs. According to Ramban, it is clear that the gemara is only dealing with a case of a small financial loss.[17] Furthermore, in this case the pain suffered by the donkey was significant.
The Vilna Gaon proves that causing pain to animals for human benefit can be permitted from another gemara, which allows the removal of the comb of a rooster in order to impede its fertility.[18] Presumably, the fact that shechita is permitted is not sufficient proof, as one could argue that the animal loses consciousness immediately.
Conclusions
From the above it should be clear that it is hard to derive comprehensive guidelines as to what level of animal pain can be justified for what level of gain. However, it is worth noting that all the sources for allowing actions that cause pain to animals do not even discuss the issue. Whenever the question of causing pain is raised, the only leniencies found are according to the view that the whole prohibition is rabbinic.
This leads me to conclude that the leniencies that do stand are only due to the relative insignificance of the suffering caused. There is no justification for leaving animals in pain for drawn out periods.
Another important observation is that the cases of animal pain in the gemara all involve tangible physical pain. While crowding animals into small spaces may be unpleasant for us to see and for the animals to experience, it is far from clear that this automatically constitutes the pain that is forbidden.
Regarding the facts on the ground as to how animals are treated, although I have not done any extensive research it is clear to me that the causing of real pain to animals, in a way that the Torah would not allow, is commonplace. One who is able to buy meat and other animal products from sources where these practices do not exist, or where they are minimised, should do so.
Currently, this will usually only be possible for those who have personal knowledge of specific farms or production lines. At least in Israel (and presumably in most countries), food labelling is not overly helpful. My understanding is that there is no official definition for terms like 'free-range' and 'organic', allowing unscrupulous companies to label almost as they choose. If anyone does have access to further information, I would be grateful if this could be shared in the comments.
A final thing to remember is that although it is true that religion is often under attack from animal rights groups, and there is no small amount of hypocrisy in the bans on shechita existing in some countries, this should not stop us learning from the areas in which these groups are correct. To paraphrase our first prime minister, we must fight bans on shechita as if there were no cruelty to animals, and we must fight cruelty to animals as if there were no bans on shechita.
[1] The explanation of the Rambam (Moreh Nevuchim 3:26) and the Chinuch (Mitzvah 551). I do not plan to discuss here whether it actually is the case nowadays that shechita is the most painless way of slaughtering animals, or whether pre-stunning reduces the pain.
It would also be beyond the scope of this post to discuss whether pre-stunning necessarily renders an animal non-kosher – see for example Shu"t Sridei Eish, volume 2 (Yoreh Deah), siman 4 who writes about this at great length. On a practical level, even if the overwhelming stringent consensus of opinion were to shift, the complications involved would require multiple additional checks of the inside of the animal to affirm that the stunning did not make the animal a treifah, which in turn would make the cost of meat prohibitive.
It is worth pointing out that the use of standard anaesthesia would both solve the halachic problem (see Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:18) and be more effective at eliminating pain than stunning. This option is not considered for either religious or non-religious slaughter due to the high costs that would be involved.
[2] Translation follows Rashi.
[3] Bava Metsia 32a-33a
[4] This is known as ביטול כלי מהיכנו, literally negating the usefulness
of a utensil.
[5] Shabbos 128b
[6] See for example Rosh, Bava Metsia 2:29.
[7] See Shu"t Radvaz Lilshonos HaRambam, siman 168 (Hilchos
Rotzeach 13:8).
[8] According to the Ramban (Sefer Hamitzvos, 'forgotten' positive mitzvah
4), settling Eretz Yisrael is
also an independent mitzvah.
[9] See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 308:39.
[10] Shabbos 25:26
[11] Magen Avraham 305:11
[12] Piskei Rid, Shabbos 128b
[13] Although presumably loading a donkey for no good purpose is forbidden,
as this would not be accepted as normal. The measure is somewhat subjective,
and what may have been considered normal and reasonable in one generation may
not be in another.
[14] Shabbos 154b
[15] The death of the donkey is perhaps being used as a hint that R'
Gamliel erred.
[16] The resultant death of the donkey, presumably more significant financially
than the containers, was perhaps 'midah keneged midah.'
[17] Earlier the gemara says explicitly that a minor loss is not
sufficient to allow ביטול כלי מהיכנו. The clear implication is
that a major loss is sufficient, and this is confirmed by the Rambam (Shabbos
21:10). Thus the dispute between Rashi and Ramban here would seem to be simply whether
the containers on R' Gamliel's donkey count as a significant loss.
[18] Biur HaGra, Even HaEzer 5:40. The gemara is in Shabbos 110b.
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