Introduction
Although for
some time the Coronavirus has been at the forefront of most of our minds, my
first instinct was not to write about this here. In the main, the way we are
supposed to act is based on common sense and the instructions of the relevant
authorities (wherever you live) and dare I say it, one does not need the Torah
as a guide in this area.[1]
The underlying
principle is the necessity of a central authority to assess and decide which
precautions are necessary and effective. While I have written before in favour
of drastically limiting the size of government, including the privatisation of
all healthcare services,[2]
it is clear that in this case national decisions are required. It would not be
effective for everyone (or every sector) to decide for himself how to act[3]
and nor would it be moral, considering that the ramifications of our actions
affect everyone.[4]
However, a
number of halachic questions do remain. My primary purpose in this post is to
clarify the nature of some of our religious obligations in general. Although I
will also give some examples of how I believe we are expected to act under the
circumstances, these are case-specific. For practical instructions, people will
need to use their own intelligence and if necessary contact the relevant
helplines.
Instructions
for Shuls
When an early
Israeli government instruction allowed gatherings of up to 100 people
(mistakenly, as it transpired), it wasn't difficult for most shuls to keep to
this. Once the limit was reduced to 10, it became much harder. As 10 is also
the minimum required for tefilah betzibur, getting this exact number to
congregate in each area requires a lot of planning and some good fortune (or
the willingness of the remainder to go back home).
More
confusingly, there was an allowance for two groups
of 10 each to conduct prayer and religious ceremonies at a time, provided that
a distance of 2 metres is kept between person to person. From the outset, I
struggled to understand exactly what this means. Are 20 people allowed to come
to shul together, as long as they split into two separate minyanim (with two
chazanim)? It's hard to believe that this was the intention, but it's equally
hard to understand what else it means (at least to my small mind). What exactly
separates the 20 people into 'two groups of 10'?
I have a feeling
that this rule was deliberately worded in an unclear way. Many of those
responsible for the decision were well aware of the difficulty of keeping to
exactly 10 people in shul and they understood that some leeway would be
necessary. At the same time, allowing 20 straight out would not be effective
enough at slowing the spread of the virus. It was left to us to understand by
ourselves that while up to 20 may not be forbidden, we are supposed to limit
this as far as possible.
Should shuls
close?
With the above
in mind, we can better understand the decision of an esteemed colleague of mine
who is also the Rabbi of a congregation. Perhaps the first to publicise his
difficult decision to close the shul until further notice, he noted the
following points (the article went to press on the morning of כ' אדר (Monday 16th
March):
- Anyone who manages to read between the lines of the notifications of the Ministry of Health and investigates the subject a little, understands that from a health perspective even gatherings of fewer than 10 people carry a danger.
- It would appear that the government does not forbid such gatherings due to wider considerations, connected to concern of causing panic in the community and the severe damage to the economy resulting from total lockdown.
- Davening with a minyan is not an absolute halachic duty.
- Danger to life overrides virtually all the mitzvos of the Torah, certainly including davening with a minyan.
The conclusion
therefore was that "With a torn heart and crying eyes," all minyanim
in the shul are to cease temporarily until Hashem has mercy on us and removes
the severe epidemic.
As you all know,
this would later become a widespread position in communities across the world,
although as yet it is far from unanimous.
I agree with all
the four points above entirely and would likely agree to the conclusion as
well. However, I also feel that there some significant holes in the line of
reasoning as presented above (perhaps due to over-simplification by the press
and not necessarily representative of the position of the primary writer). I
will attempt to fill these holes here.
Does anything
come before human life?
The first
question to ask relates to the second point above. If the government has
considered wider social considerations in allowing religious gatherings up to
10 people, why should we ignore these considerations?[5]
Although one could argue that danger to life overrides all of these
considerations, many factors pose indirect threats to human life. These include
economic downturn and social dysfunction, and the government should be the best
to judge when the Corona threat is stronger.[6]
I raised this
point with the writer, who agreed that these other considerations are valid to
an extent. He explained to me that his conclusion was in fact based on additional
factors, some of which would be inappropriate to publicise. However, one major
factor is certainly worth explaining.
Private and
Communal Solutions
I agree that most
minyanim should cease to function temporarily, due to the inherent difficulties
with keeping to the new rules. As there is a question of danger to human life, which
although indirect is still more tangible than the threat of social dysfunction,
I would favour following a strict as an interpretation of the rules as possible.
Thus no more than ten people should be in one level enclosed airspace.
As mentioned
above, it is in general impossible to keep to this. Moreover, it would not be
correct to maintain services in shul for only some of those who would want
them. In the words of R' Osher Weiss quoted to me by the community rabbi, what
is not right for everyone is not right for anyone.[7]
Real Obligations
While it is
indeed correct to close shuls when this is required, it is important to clarify
the halachic severity of this step. Although there is no complete obligation on
the individual to daven with a minyan,[8]
there certainly is a communal obligation to make a shul available for this
purpose.[9]
There is also a communal obligation to read from the Torah at the appropriate
times.[10]
Thus we should not
misunderstand the situation – at the current time the danger to life involved is
overriding these obligations.
Should the
question be asked?
I will conclude
by returning to the point I made at the beginning of the post – the decision to
avoid gathering in shul should not need rabbinic enforcement. The Yerushalmi
tells us that a Rav who is asked a practical question regarding saving a life
is 'shameful' (as he should have already taught people to act immediately) and
one who asks is a murderer (for delaying).[11]
While the
Yerushalmi would seem to be referring to a case where someone is in immediate
danger of death, the same principle should be applied when a delay in imposing
restrictions will lead to unnecessary deaths.
This point is illustrated
by a famous story about R' Yisrael Salanter. During the cholera epidemic of
1848, he ate and drank in front of everyone in shul on Yom Kippur, urging
others to follow his example despite this being against the rabbinic consensus (aged
38 at the time, he was not the recognised halachic authority).
Later, R'
Yisrael was asked why he did not first argue his case to the local rabbis instead
of making his point in a disrespectful manner. He answered that he did not want
to make the rabbis guilty of being 'asked' about danger to life!
[1] I am not commenting on mistaken interpretations of the Torah which
have diverted some away from common sense, as it appears that by now the
overwhelming majority have rejected these interpretations and never really
believed them in the first place.
[3] The huge number of factors influencing this decision can only be
assessed with any degree of accuracy by those who have the best access to all
the relevant information (or as much as it as possible). This is what Chazal
tell us that "were all the seas ink, the marshes quills, the heavens parchment and
all people scribes, they would not manage to write the depth of the hearts of
the authorities" (Shabbos 11a).
[4] There is no need to consider the halachic authority that the
government has to enforce the measures that it takes; even were these
institutions not inherently binding from a halachic perspective, it would
behove us to follow them as the only way to save lives. (The truth is that
government decrees are halachically binding as long as they don't contradict
the Torah, but this is a topic for another time).
[5] Of course, these considerations may vary in their magnitude from
community to community. However, this ruling was not meant as an exception for
one community, but as a general rule.
[6] I already wrote in War and
Peace that although even a single human life is priceless, there is a limit
to the amount of public money that can be spent on individual medical costs.
Similarly, there is a limit to the price society as a whole can pay in order to
save those at threat from Corona.
[7] This is of course an alternative wording of Kant's Categorical Imperative,
explained in a
recent post.
[8] I have already written as much in Rav
Peninim, chapter 2 halacha 4 (in detail in footnote 12).
[9] See Rambam, Hilchos Tefila 11:1. Although there is no clear source
in Chazal for this obligation, I believe that it is clearly indicated by the
numerous halachos associated with shuls, especially the strict rules about when
a shul can be destroyed and what the community may do with the proceeds of the
sale of a shul.
[10] For more about communal obligations in general, see a
recent post on the topic.
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