Corona Observations

Introduction

Although for some time the Coronavirus has been at the forefront of most of our minds, my first instinct was not to write about this here. In the main, the way we are supposed to act is based on common sense and the instructions of the relevant authorities (wherever you live) and dare I say it, one does not need the Torah as a guide in this area.[1]

The underlying principle is the necessity of a central authority to assess and decide which precautions are necessary and effective. While I have written before in favour of drastically limiting the size of government, including the privatisation of all healthcare services,[2] it is clear that in this case national decisions are required. It would not be effective for everyone (or every sector) to decide for himself how to act[3] and nor would it be moral, considering that the ramifications of our actions affect everyone.[4]

However, a number of halachic questions do remain. My primary purpose in this post is to clarify the nature of some of our religious obligations in general. Although I will also give some examples of how I believe we are expected to act under the circumstances, these are case-specific. For practical instructions, people will need to use their own intelligence and if necessary contact the relevant helplines.

Instructions for Shuls

When an early Israeli government instruction allowed gatherings of up to 100 people (mistakenly, as it transpired), it wasn't difficult for most shuls to keep to this. Once the limit was reduced to 10, it became much harder. As 10 is also the minimum required for tefilah betzibur, getting this exact number to congregate in each area requires a lot of planning and some good fortune (or the willingness of the remainder to go back home).

More confusingly, there was an allowance for two groups of 10 each to conduct prayer and religious ceremonies at a time, provided that a distance of 2 metres is kept between person to person. From the outset, I struggled to understand exactly what this means. Are 20 people allowed to come to shul together, as long as they split into two separate minyanim (with two chazanim)? It's hard to believe that this was the intention, but it's equally hard to understand what else it means (at least to my small mind). What exactly separates the 20 people into 'two groups of 10'?

I have a feeling that this rule was deliberately worded in an unclear way. Many of those responsible for the decision were well aware of the difficulty of keeping to exactly 10 people in shul and they understood that some leeway would be necessary. At the same time, allowing 20 straight out would not be effective enough at slowing the spread of the virus. It was left to us to understand by ourselves that while up to 20 may not be forbidden, we are supposed to limit this as far as possible.

Should shuls close?

With the above in mind, we can better understand the decision of an esteemed colleague of mine who is also the Rabbi of a congregation. Perhaps the first to publicise his difficult decision to close the shul until further notice, he noted the following points (the article went to press on the morning of כ' אדר (Monday 16^th March):

• Anyone who manages to read between the lines of the notifications of the Ministry of Health and investigates the subject a little, understands that from a health perspective even gatherings of fewer than 10 people carry a danger.
• It would appear that the government does not forbid such gatherings due to wider considerations, connected to concern of causing panic in the community and the severe damage to the economy resulting from total lockdown.
• Davening with a minyan is not an absolute halachic duty.
• Danger to life overrides virtually all the mitzvos of the Torah, certainly including davening with a minyan.

The conclusion therefore was that "With a torn heart and crying eyes," all minyanim in the shul are to cease temporarily until Hashem has mercy on us and removes the severe epidemic.

As you all know, this would later become a widespread position in communities across the world, although as yet it is far from unanimous.

I agree with all the four points above entirely and would likely agree to the conclusion as well. However, I also feel that there some significant holes in the line of reasoning as presented above (perhaps due to over-simplification by the press and not necessarily representative of the position of the primary writer). I will attempt to fill these holes here.

Does anything come before human life?

The first question to ask relates to the second point above. If the government has considered wider social considerations in allowing religious gatherings up to 10 people, why should we ignore these considerations?[5] Although one could argue that danger to life overrides all of these considerations, many factors pose indirect threats to human life. These include economic downturn and social dysfunction, and the government should be the best to judge when the Corona threat is stronger.[6]

I raised this point with the writer, who agreed that these other considerations are valid to an extent. He explained to me that his conclusion was in fact based on additional factors, some of which would be inappropriate to publicise. However, one major factor is certainly worth explaining.

Private and Communal Solutions

I agree that most minyanim should cease to function temporarily, due to the inherent difficulties with keeping to the new rules. As there is a question of danger to human life, which although indirect is still more tangible than the threat of social dysfunction, I would favour following a strict as an interpretation of the rules as possible. Thus no more than ten people should be in one level enclosed airspace.

As mentioned above, it is in general impossible to keep to this. Moreover, it would not be correct to maintain services in shul for only some of those who would want them. In the words of R' Osher Weiss quoted to me by the community rabbi, what is not right for everyone is not right for anyone.[7]

Real Obligations

While it is indeed correct to close shuls when this is required, it is important to clarify the halachic severity of this step. Although there is no complete obligation on the individual to daven with a minyan,[8] there certainly is a communal obligation to make a shul available for this purpose.[9] There is also a communal obligation to read from the Torah at the appropriate times.[10]

Thus we should not misunderstand the situation – at the current time the danger to life involved is overriding these obligations.

Should the question be asked?

I will conclude by returning to the point I made at the beginning of the post – the decision to avoid gathering in shul should not need rabbinic enforcement. The Yerushalmi tells us that a Rav who is asked a practical question regarding saving a life is 'shameful' (as he should have already taught people to act immediately) and one who asks is a murderer (for delaying).[11]

While the Yerushalmi would seem to be referring to a case where someone is in immediate danger of death, the same principle should be applied when a delay in imposing restrictions will lead to unnecessary deaths.

This point is illustrated by a famous story about R' Yisrael Salanter. During the cholera epidemic of 1848, he ate and drank in front of everyone in shul on Yom Kippur, urging others to follow his example despite this being against the rabbinic consensus (aged 38 at the time, he was not the recognised halachic authority).

Later, R' Yisrael was asked why he did not first argue his case to the local rabbis instead of making his point in a disrespectful manner. He answered that he did not want to make the rabbis guilty of being 'asked' about danger to life!

---

[1] I am not commenting on mistaken interpretations of the Torah which have diverted some away from common sense, as it appears that by now the overwhelming majority have rejected these interpretations and never really believed them in the first place.

[2] See Who should we vote for? (part 2)

[3] The huge number of factors influencing this decision can only be assessed with any degree of accuracy by those who have the best access to all the relevant information (or as much as it as possible). This is what Chazal tell us that "were all the seas ink, the marshes quills, the heavens parchment and all people scribes, they would not manage to write the depth of the hearts of the authorities" (Shabbos 11a).

[4] There is no need to consider the halachic authority that the government has to enforce the measures that it takes; even were these institutions not inherently binding from a halachic perspective, it would behove us to follow them as the only way to save lives. (The truth is that government decrees are halachically binding as long as they don't contradict the Torah, but this is a topic for another time).

[5] Of course, these considerations may vary in their magnitude from community to community. However, this ruling was not meant as an exception for one community, but as a general rule.

[6] I already wrote in War and Peace that although even a single human life is priceless, there is a limit to the amount of public money that can be spent on individual medical costs. Similarly, there is a limit to the price society as a whole can pay in order to save those at threat from Corona.

[7] This is of course an alternative wording of Kant's Categorical Imperative, explained in a recent post.

[8] I have already written as much in Rav Peninim, chapter 2 halacha 4 (in detail in footnote 12).

[9] See Rambam, Hilchos Tefila 11:1. Although there is no clear source in Chazal for this obligation, I believe that it is clearly indicated by the numerous halachos associated with shuls, especially the strict rules about when a shul can be destroyed and what the community may do with the proceeds of the sale of a shul.

[10] For more about communal obligations in general, see a recent post on the topic.

[11] Yoma 8:5 

Fire and Light

Introduction

Before the discovery of electricity, the only practical way for humans to create light was through fire. Thus for generations, there was no great need for poskim to question whether various halachos involving light require (or forbid) light from a fire – there simply was no other option.

With the invention of the lightbulb, a large number of new halachic questions needed to be evaluated. Is turning on such a light on Shabbos akin to lighting a fire? Can electric light be used for Shabbos lights, Havdalah, Chanuka or searching for Chametz on Erev Pesach?

In all of these cases, there are really two questions involved:

1)      Is any light is good enough, or do we require a fire?

2)      Even if a fire is required, does an electric light count as a fire?

The answer to the first question will likely be different in each case. It may be obvious that only making a fire is included in the melacha of Ma'avir (burning) on Shabbos; intuitively there is no obvious reason to require a fire in order to search for Chametz.[1] Each of the halachos must be examined separately, and no scientific knowledge is required.

Regarding the second question, logically the halachic definition of fire should be constant throughout. The question is only whether electric light fits the definition, and to answer this some scientific knowledge may be necessary. Of course, there may be room to differentiate between the various different types of lightbulbs and heating elements available.

What is a Fire?

The gemara deals with this question explicitly in the context of lesser known halachos – those of tzara'as (ritual 'leprosy'). One of the types of tzara'as mentioned in the Torah is when an affliction appears on a part of the skin that was burned by fire.[2]

The gemara derives from the pesukim that this type of tzara'as applies even if the afflicted area of skin was burned by a hot coal, or other hot substances. The gemara then questions the need for this derivation- as a burning coal is also on fire, why would there be any reason to distinguish? The gemara concludes that the pesukim are teaching us that even skin burnt by a glowing hot piece of metal is included, despite there being no fire involved.

This is then questioned further. One of the four methods in which the death penalty is administered is through burning.[3] This is achieved by forcing the guilty person to swallow a glowing strip of lead. If hot metal is not considered 'fire,' how can this method fulfil the requirement of burning the guilty to death in fire?

The gemara answers that in this case no fire is required – other methods of burning are acceptable (in fact this is the only acceptable method, as the gemara derives there). This is derived from the extra word תשרף (You shall burn) used in reference to this death penalty. Although the word אש (fire) is also used, this merely teaches us that the hot lead must be heated using fire.[4]

From this gemara it would appear that while glowing hot metal 'burns,' it is not considered a 'fire.' The conclusion should be that the light and heat given off by incandescent lightbulbs and most heating elements (which are essentially pieces of hot metal), do not meet the halachic criteria for a fire. Thus we have answered the second question above.[5]

Electric Light on Shabbos

Based on the above, it should be clear that turning on an electric light is not included in the Biblical command:

לֹא תְבַעֲרוּ אֵשׁ בְּכֹל מֹשְׁבֹתֵיכֶם בְּיוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת:

(שמות לה, ג)

"You must not burn fire in any of your dwellings on the Shabbos day."

Shemos 35:3

This pasuk does not include burning through means other than fire. It should therefore be no surprise that the gemara permits 'extinguishing' a hot piece of metal in order to prevent public damage (even when lives are not in danger),[6] and that some Rishonim write explicitly that the melachos of burning and extinguishing do not apply to metal.[7]

However, the Rambam writes that heating up metal in order to purify it is a tolada (derivative) of the melacha of burning.[8] On Shabbos, the Torah forbids us to perform any of the 39 av melachos (primary forbidden activities) as well as actions broadly similar to these melachos. Thus although glowing metal is not a 'fire,' the Rambam feels that heating metal until it glows is potentially a Biblically forbidden derivative.[9]

It is unclear why the Rambam limited this tolada to heating up metal for the purpose of purification.[10] Some have suggested that this was only because in his time, there was no other purpose of heating metal to such high temperatures.[11] Nowadays, the Rambam would extend the tolada to turning on incandescent lightbulbs or heating elements that work in the same way.[12]

Of course, even if this is not the case, turning on incandescent lights on Shabbos constitutes a Rabbinic form of 'burning' as well as other potential violations.[13] The 'burning' question (excuse the pun) becomes particularly important concerning turning off these lights, when some of the other problems may not exist.[14] If turning on a light is not a tolada of burning, neither is turning it off a tolada of extinguishing.[15]

Shabbos Candles

Unlike the melacha of 'burning,' it is quite clear that the purpose of Shabbos candles is to create light rather than fire. Light is needed to ensure Shalom Bayis[16] and Oneg Shabbos.[17] However, one could theoretically still make an argument that as in the times of Chazal, the only way of making light was through fire, the institution was made to light a fire specifically.

I believe that such an argument is mistaken. While Chazal forbade lighting with certain types of wicks and oils (in general due to them not burning well),[18] we never find that they told us what we should use to light with. The clear implication is that any light is ok, with the exception of those on the forbidden list.

Chanuka

The mitzvah of lighting Chanuka candles is less straightforward. The purpose of these candles is to remember and publicise the miracle of Chanuka, which happened with the lights of the Menorah in the Beis HaMikdash, which required olive oil.[19] Even when the Third Beis HaMikdash is rebuilt, we certainly will not be able to use electric lights in the Menorah!

Presumably for this reason, there is a view in the gemara that the ideal way to light on Chanuka is using olive oil.[20] However, we are certainly not obligated to use olive oil and it is questionable to what extent we are required to imitate the Menorah in the Beis HaMikdash. It is possible that fire is needed as a minimum, although it is hard to prove either way.

Havdalah

After Shabbos, the beracha of בורא מאורי האש (the Creator of the lights of fire) couldn't be clearer. For this beracha, we certainly require both light and fire. From what we have written above, it should be obvious that electric light cannot be used.

The Mishna tells us that we cannot make this beracha unless we get benefit from the light.[21] Furthermore, we cannot make the beracha over a candle lit for respect alone, such as that customarily lit to accompany the dead.[22]

Based on this, I will end with an open question. Nowadays, no one I know lights a Havdalah candle in order to use its light. While there are some who turn off the electric lights so that the candle light is noticeable, there is ultimately only one reason that this candle is lit – in order to make the beracha. Is this not similar to a candle lit for respect alone, on which we do not make a beracha?

---

[1] Notwithstanding Pesachim 7b.

[2] Vayikra 13:24

[3] See Vayikra 20:14 and 21:9.

[4] Pesachim 75a

[5] As even incandescent light does not count as a 'fire,' the light emitted from florescent bulbs and LEDs (which are significantly cooler) certainly does not.

[6] Shabbos 42a. The implication is that the rabbinic prohibition is due to the apparent similarity to extinguishing a burning piece of wood.

[7] Piskei Rid there; Yere'im siman 274. This does not automatically follow from the law of extinguishing; even were glowing metal considered fire, its extinguishing may not have been Biblically prohibited. According to some views, the melacha of extinguishing is only violated when coal is created (see Shabbos 31b).

[8] Hilchos Shabbos 12:1

[9] Although there is no explicit source in the words of Chazal for this derivation or for any other tolada of the av melacha of burning, the gemara in Yevamos 6b takes it for granted that administering the death penalty by burning (using glowing metal as mentioned above), is Biblically prohibited on Shabbos. This gemara is a strong support for the view of the Rambam (see Avnei Nezer 229). Furthemore, the Rambam seems to have understood that all av melachos must have at least one tolada, which must be deduced from logic alone if necessary. See Hilchos Shabbos 10:8 for an example of this.

[10] See Maggid Mishne; Lechem Mishne; Avnei Nezer 229. See also Mincha Shlomo 1:12, who points out some flaws in the logic of the Avnei Nezer but is himself forced into a very difficult reading of the Rambam's words.

[11] Ovens were not made of metal until relatively recent times.

[12] See http://www.ybm.org.il/Admin/uploaddata/LessonsFiles/Pdf/476.pdf. See also Amud Hayemini. Siman 27, for a similar idea.

[13] These include the melacha of cooking according to the Ra'avad (on the Rambam there) as well as any possible transgressions involved in the use of any electricity on Shabbos (see Shabbos and Shevus). All of these need to be considered when dealing with any complex question about the use of these kind of lights on Shabbos and Yom Tov.

[14] For example, stopping something from cooking is not a melacha.

[15] Although the converse is not necessarily true – see footnote 7 above.

[16] See Shabbos 23b

[17] See Midrash Tanchuma at the beginning of Parshas Noach. My view is that one should not make a beracha when lighting candles in a room where there is plenty of electric light already – these candles will have no practical use (even if they serve a decorative purpose, this was not the purpose of the mitzvah). A simple solution is to turn off the lights before making the beracha, and include both the electric lights and the candles in the mitzvah (in reality there is no need for the candles, but which Jewish woman would accept that?)

[18] As is detailed in the second perek of Maseches Shabbos.

[19] See Shemos 27:21.

[20] Shabbos 23a. This is also the way the Rema rules (Orach Chaim 673:1; See also Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 264:6, who writes that olive oil is the best oil to use for Shabbos candles due to it producing a clean light).

[21] Berachos 51b; see also gemara there 53b.

[22] Ibid. and gemara there 53a.