Introduction
The fact that we are obligated to
subscribe to certain beliefs is explicit in Chazal. One who declares that there
is no resurrection of the dead in the Torah, or that the Torah did not come
from Heaven, has no portion in Olam Haba.[1] Who
is defined as an heretic also has halachic relevance for others when it comes
to returning lost objects and other issues.[2]
What exactly we are obligated to
believe is not completely clear, and subject to much dispute between the
rishonim. Here I want to deal with a different question- what constitutes
belief? In Judaism the obligation to know that G-d exists and that multiple
gods do not exist is undisputed.[3] But
what is far less clear is how well we have to know this. There are several
levels (this list is not exhaustive and the order is not necessarily definitive):
1) One who has studied the issue
thoroughly, and understands intellectually the proofs of the issue beyond
dispute.
2) One who has studied
exhaustively and has come to the conclusion that there is no absolute proof.
However, his research has led him to believe that the probability of this tenet
of Judaism being untrue is small enough to discount.
3) One who has not done any
intellectual study (or failed to come to any conclusion from it), but senses
the existence of G-d emotionally to the extent that he is left with no doubt.
4) One who has studied to an
extent and in his mind no doubt remains. However, if questioned he may not be
able to successfully defend his arguments (even in his own mind).
5) One who has no proof either
intellectual or emotional, but based on habit, social norms or fear of
punishment declares that he has no doubt based on blind faith.
The question is which of these
levels are acceptable? I will start with number 5 and try to work up the list.
At the moment I am not discussing those who lack the mental capacity to get to
the highest levels, rather those who have used their abilities to different
extents.
Blind faith
With number 5 we have to ask
whether we are commanded to know or just to believe. The answer should be
obvious, but also can be found explicitly in the Torah:
וְיָדַעְתָּ הַיּוֹם וַהֲשֵׁבֹתָ אֶל לְבָבֶךָ כִּי ה' הוּא
הָאֱלֹקִים בַּשָּׁמַיִם מִמַּעַל וְעַל הָאָרֶץ מִתָּחַת אֵין עוֹד.
(דברים ד, לט)
You should know and set in your
heart that Hashem is G-d in heaven above and on the Earth below- there is no
other.
(Devarim 4:39)
The Rambam also states that the mitzvah
is knowledge (ידיעה) of G-d’s existence
rather than belief.[4] Although
many of the other compilations listing the 613 mitzvos do use the root אמונה, the truth is that even this term does not
refer to blind faith.[5] The
Torah uses this root to tell us that Avraham Avinu trusted in Hashem
when he was promised that his descendants will be as numerous as the stars.[6] The
term describes a relationship usually based on experience, although with Hashem
an intellectual understanding of His ways may be sufficient to create this
trust.
I will concede that although
those with blind faith do not fulfil the mental obligations the Torah expects
of us, they are not defined by anyone as heretics (and as such we must still
return their lost items and may drink their wine).[7]
However, this is far from complimentary to such people.[8] The
Rambam writes explicitly that those who don’t have positive belief in his
thirteen principles do not have a share in Olam Haba.[9]
Level 4 (those who claim to have
intellectual proof of G-d but in fact have flawed arguments) differs from level
5 only quantitatively. Although I know of no source that deals with such a
level, logically it makes sense to say that those who have done part of the
intellectual work they are supposed to can receive part of the share in Olam
Haba set aside for them.
Emotional proof
In Tanach we find various
examples of those who did not need to contemplate too much to know that G-d
existed. Are ancestors who witnessed the miracles in Egypt, the splitting of
the sea and Matan Torah are the clearest example. Not only is such experiential
evidence an acceptable means of knowing, the Torah in several places encourages
faith based on these experiences.[10]
Furthermore, even for those who
were not alive then, our belief in the truth of the Torah stems from acceptance
of the tradition passed down from those who were. For this reason the mitzvah
of remembering the Exodus from Egypt is so crucial.[11]
Clearly then, the philosophical
arguments used by Avraham Avinu and the Rambam to prove the existence of G-d
are not a must for those who have enough proof from their experiences. However,
these proofs are not merely emotional. In the same way Avraham Avinu and the
Rambam deduced the existence of G-d from what they observed in the natural
world, others used their observations of the supernatural.
We can conclude that those who
genuinely experience G-d without much mental effort (Level 3 above) have
fulfilled the mitzvah incumbent upon them. The only question is whether such
people actually exist nowadays, or if what they are actually experiencing is a
product of their imagination, driven by emotion alone.
For someone who has never had
this kind of experience, it is impossible to know the answer to this question.
All I can do is to urge those who feel this way to carefully scrutinise the
source of their emotions. The dangers of following ones instinct alone are
severe.[12]
Can we really know?
The two categories we have yet to
explain seem to be in direct conflict. Clearly the philosophy that G-d’s
existence cannot be proved outright (level 2) implies that level 1 (those who
know how to prove G-d’s existence) does not exist. Those who feel that they are
at level 1 may argue that level 2 doesn’t really exist, as the intellectually
honest are capable of getting to level 1 (unless their intelligence is limited
to the extent that may exempt them from mitzvos).
The Rambam, quoting the
philosophy of Aristotle, clearly expects us to reach level 1. In short, his
proof of the existence of an infinite G-d is that if there was none and
everything had an end, this end should have already come.[13] A
way of thinking we are not used to, added to the language barrier caused by the
Arabic used,[14] make the
understanding of this proof inaccessible to most of us.
The main other rishon who writes
about this issue preceded the Rambam.[15] The
Chovas Halvavos (11th century, Spain) also expects us to reach level
1, and writes in a much clearer and more understandable way.[16]
However, there seem to be holes in his logic, and the Rambam explicitly negates
the arguments he makes.[17] Thus
according to the Rambam, the Chovos Halvavos himself was only on level 4.
As far as I am aware, the view of
those on level 2 does not have a source in classic Jewish philosophy. It seems
also not to have a source in any non-Jewish medieval philosophy, stemming from
those who more generally rejected the Aristotelian methodology used by both the
Chovos Halvavos and the Rambam. They maintain that we cannot prove anything about
the transcendental from the world we live in.
What is a proof?
My claim is that the difference
between levels 1 and 2 is merely in semantics. Those who say they have absolute
proof also realise that with a finite human brain, there exists a possibility of
mistake. One who says he is not 100% sure but does not consider the doubt
significant is also legitimate, and essentially means the same thing.
Are we 100% sure about who our
father is, or that the food we are about to eat isn’t poisonous? Whether or not
we think we have proof for such things is not really relevant.
The existence of atheism means
that most do not treat their belief in G-d in the same unquestioning way, and as
I wrote above this is a good thing. However, when judging what level of proof
is satisfactory, we should not set an aim higher than we do with more mundane
matters.
To prove anything we will always
need to make certain assumptions. For example, proving something from what we
see assumes that our eyesight is accurate to some degree, and the same is true
for all the senses. My rule here (the axiom of axioms) is that any assumption
agreed upon by the overwhelming majority of people without expecting proof is
valid.
[1]
Mishna Sanhedrin 90a. As all the ways of G-d are just (see Devarim 32:4), we
can discount the possibility that this individual has no part in the World to
Come through no fault of his own.
[2] See
Avoda Zara 26b-27b. Here is not the place to discuss the intricacies of these
halachos or how and when they should be applied. But the existence of an
halachic side here is crucial, because when it comes to halacha we are
absolutely obligated by Chazal. See “Divine
providence, free will and Coincidence”.
[3]
Although the Behag does not count this as one of the 613 mitzvos, the Ramban
(Mitzas Asei 1) explains that this is because this principle is the basis of
all the mitzvos.
[4]
Yesodei Hatorah 1:1-6. This is also the accurate translation in
Sefer Hamitzvos, Mitzvas Aseh 1 as attested by R’ Kapach (Sefer Hamitzvos was
written by the Rambam in Arabic).
[5] To my
knowledge there is no word in Biblical Hebrew signifying blind faith,
perhaps because such a concept was and should be completely foreign to us.
[6] Bereishis
15:4
[7] See for
example the Rambam’s definitions in Hilchos Teshuva 3:7-8.
[8] In all
probability, the failure to categorise them stems from the worthlessness of
those who do not use the brain that separates them from animals.
[9]
Commentary to the Mishna, introduction to Perek Chelek. See also Chovos
Halvavos, Sha’ar Hayichud ch. 3 who confirms that all are obligated to
understand the Oneness of G-d according to their ability.
[10] See for
example Shemos 19:9
[11] See Ramban
Shemos 13:16
[12] If
the experience is not genuine, it is just as easy for someone to ‘instinctively
know’ that they need to do things prohibited by the Torah. Sadly, there is no
shortage of case studies showing this.
[13] Moreh
Nevuchim part 2, introduction and ch. 1-2
[14]
Without any claims of expertise in this field, from the little I have seen it
appears that no translation out preserves both accuracy and coherency.
[15] It
seems that for those who wrote after the time of the Rambam until the modern
day, the main arguments that needed to be made were within monotheism.
[16] Sha’ar
Hayichud, ch. 5-6
[17] The
Chovos Halvavos first proves that the world was created and is not eternal, and
uses this to prove the existence of G-d. The Rambam )M.N. part 1 ch. 71) writes that there
is no philosophical proof that the world was created (the only proof is from
the existence of miracles in the Torah), and strongly criticises using this
method to prove G-d. Nowadays this debate is anachronistic, as the scientific
world agrees to the fact that the world had a beginning. Thus we can use the
method of the Chovos Halvavos without any hesitation.
