Kashrus- who can we trust?

Firstly, if anyone is expecting a list of reliable and unreliable hechsherim here, forget it. That kind of thing is not my purpose here (see the ‘About this blog’ page). Rather I will try to explain the guidelines we should be following in order to decide.

The basic rules

The gemara tells us that a single witness is believed when it comes to prohibitions[1] (e.g. to tell us whether a piece of meat is kosher or not), as opposed to monetary cases and punishments (two are required to testify that someone owes money, or that he is liable to punishment for having transgressed). The only limitation is that if the witness tells us that something previously forbidden is now permitted (e.g. that an animal was slaughtered in accordance with halacha), he is only believed if it was within his capability to do what was necessary to achieve this (i.e. he could have slaughtered it himself[2]).

The question that needs to be asked is who is a kosher witness for this purpose. To qualify as a witness for other testimony there are many requirements- anyone who violates a prohibition subject to lashes or stricter, relatives of the relevant people, and anyone who stands to gain or lose from the testimony is invalid.[3] Does this apply here?

The answer is that some of it applies, but not most of it. Relatives certainly are believed, and even the owner of the food himself is believed (if there is no other reason to invalidate him). This is clear from the gemara.[4]

Many transgressors are also believed, provided that they are particular themselves about the relevant prohibition they are testifying about.[5] However, idolaters and those who violate the laws of Shabbos in public have the same status (for these purposes) as those who keep nothing.[6]

The issue of the testimony of someone with a vested interest is not explicit in the gemara. This omission though does seemingly imply that he is believed. Based on the above we clearly cannot extrapolate automatically from the rules of testimony for monetary cases. Also, the fact that one is believed about his own food is a strong indication that personal interest is not a factor here. The Rambam indeed confirms that we can rely on a single witness for this kind of testimony irrespective of what he stands to gain.[7]

Another important leniency that applies here is that it one can rely on what one hears in the name of someone else (provided that both parties are reliable, as defined above).[8] In general, all the formal rules of how testimony is given are not relevant.[9]

Application

In summary of the above, anyone who keeps kosher and shabbos and is not an idolater should be trusted. This explains the standard practice for people to eat in the homes of others without the need for any further clarification. The need for a mashgiach for kashrus of shops, factories, restaurants etc. is because of workers who do not keep kosher or shabbos themselves.

The point that we need to clarify is how we can rely on the mashgiach in such circumstances. Even if he is completely trustworthy, how can he know that nothing improper has happened behind his back? The answer is relatively simple. Chazal tell us that when people know what the rules are, we can rely on their fear of the possibility of being caught red-handed even if normally they are not people we could trust.[10]

It follows from this that in order to be able to eat at a restaurant, buy food from a shop etc. where not all the workers are religious, we can rely on the mashgiach assuming that he is religious. We can also rely on the rav who takes responsibility for the hechsher. Even though he usually is not directly involved with overseeing anything, he should know that the mashgichim or those responsible for appointing them are reliable.

What happens if we don’t know who the mashgichim are, and we don’t know anything about the rav who gives the hechsher? There are two questions that need to be dealt with here. Firstly, what is the status of a regular person who we don’t know? Do we need to know that he keeps kosher, or can we assume that every Jew is reliable until proven otherwise? And if normally we need to be sure, can we assume that the title ‘rabbi’ means that someone is reliable?

The first question is subject to discussion in the gemara and rishonim. At one stage all were assumed to be reliable, but at a certain point Chazal instituted that in Syria certain products can only be bought from someone known to be reliable.[11] The rishonim debate whether this was a limited local issue or something more general,[12] but the underlying principle seems to be commonsense. In a closed community where the reality is that most people are reliable, anyone can be relied upon until we know otherwise. Today we certainly cannot rely on this in general, although every case must be judged on its merits.[13]

In my view the same is true for someone with the title ‘Rabbi’. Unfortunately not all that have this title are trustworthy, and it is impossible to generalise. Just like with business, whether we can trust someone is very subjective and dependent on the instincts of each individual. This is one of the reasons I would never publicise a list of who I feel that I can rely on and who not.[14]

Following the majority

Often with kashrus the question goes beyond trust. Even if we can trust someone completely, it is important to realise what he is actually telling us. What many may not realise is that no hechsher certifies that the food is kosher without any doubt whatsoever.

For example, strictly speaking halacha requires the shechita knife to be checked between the shechita of each animal or bird and the next.[15] This is because if a blemish is found on the knife, all the animals that were slaughtered since the last time it was checked are not kosher because of the possibility that the blemish was there when they were slaughtered.[16]

Nowadays, as far as I am aware no commercial shechita does this with chickens. In an age where every extra minute carries significant costs, it simply is not financially viable. Instead, the knife is checked periodically (how often depends on the hechsher), and if a blemish is found the chickens under doubt have already been mixed up with many others. They are all given a hechsher, based on the principle of bitul b’rov (the minority is ‘cancelled out’ by the majority).

While this situation is far from the ideal described by Chazal, provided that the majority is clear it is halachically sound at least b’dieved (once this is done, the chickens may certainly be eaten). Even in the times of Chazal, it was necessary to rely on the majority in order to forgo checking each chicken for the numerous possibilities of tarfus (fatal damage rendering it non-kosher).[17]

The truth is that this principle could be extended to permit all food with a hechsher, even if the particular kashrus authority isn’t particularly trustworthy. It is hard to imagine that any authority is so negligent that the majority of the food it supervises is non-kosher (unless there is a particular issue that they are lenient about incorrectly). And although according to many, when there is a significant minority that is not kosher we are obligated to check each item,[18] this applies only when it is reasonably practical to do so.[19]

Non-halachic considerations

So if the majority principle can allow one to eat from almost any hechsher, why are so many (even knowledgeable) people so particular about which hechsherim they eat? Sometimes there is a known issue involved, such as non-glatt meat or different halachic viewpoints over shmita. But this is not enough to explain everything.

I have not discussed this extensively with others, so I can only write my own reason and assume that I am not alone. Although technically speaking halacha allows us to rely on the majority even when the proper care has not been taken, I want to support those who are trustworthy and particular about halacha. If no-one paid attention to the standard of the hechsher, those who are more meticulous would soon go out of business due to the higher costs involved.

This is not always so straightforward, as sometimes the rabbi of a particular town has an interest to lower the standards out of fear that otherwise people will choose not to eat kosher altogether. The common solution to this is to have a two-tiered system, with a regular hechsher and a ‘mehadrin’ one.[20] But this can also lead to problems when those who insist on mehadrin eat together with those who don’t.

Since this a non-halachic concern, it is clear to me that it should be overlooked whenever there is a possibility of offending, embarrassing or causing resentment by others. It is appropriate to end with the reason the rishonim quote from the Yerushalmi for the rule that one witness is sufficient for these matters: “Because if this was not the case, no-one would be able to eat the food of his fellow.”[21]

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[1] Gitin 2b

[2] Tosfos explain that even if he is not a trained shochet, the ability to learn or to hire someone else is enough.

[3] For full details see Choshen Mishpat 33-37.

[4] See Rosh, Gitin 5:8 in rule no. 4, based on Yevamos 88a.

[5] See Mishna Bechoros 30a and gemara there.

[6] Chulin 5a

[7] Shechita 10:14. See however Nachlas David (1794-1861), Responsum 26 (in the footnote) who suggests that with certain exceptions, someone with financial interest is not believed. He himself says that this is not to be taken as a final ruling (it is only an attempt to resolve a diificulty with the Yerushalmi), but nevertheless his failure even to mention the words of the Rambam is surprising.

[8] See Bechoros 36a concerning testimony about a blemish on a firstborn animal, and Kesuvos 72a concerning the halachic status of a particular bloodstain.

[9] The reason why this kind of evidence is not valid for monetary and capital cases is because of the requirement that testimony be given in court.

[10] Mishna Avoda Zara 69a and gemara there 69b.

[11] Avoda Zara 39b

[12] See Yoreh Deah 119:1 and commentaries there.

[13] See Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 119:11.

[14] Although I can mention one rule: I do not trust any hechsher that is merely a brand name, with no named rabbi or rabbis clearly accepting responsibility.

[15] Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 18:11, based on Chulin 10a-b

[16] Ibid. Although see Rema there that if one prefers to take the risk of having to lose all the animals, he has the right to do so.

[17] See Rashi Chulin 12a, and Yoreh Deah 39:1 that only the lungs of mammals need be checked.

[18] Similar to the obligation to check the lungs of an animal after shechita.

[19] If the lungs were lost before they could be checked, the rishonim debate whether the animal may be eaten (see Yoreh Deah 39:2). But the Shach (ibid.) explains that even those who are stringent agree to the above principle, and their stringency is merely to prevent them being ‘lost’ intentionally.

[20] Although the term ‘mehadrin’ does not really have any halachic meaning when it comes to kashrus, and unfortunately its definition can vary significantly amongst the different hechsherim. Thank G-d there has lately been a slight increase in transparency, and in the information available for those who are interested.

[21] Ramban Chullin 10b.