Firstly, if anyone is expecting a
list of reliable and unreliable hechsherim here, forget it. That kind of thing
is not my purpose here (see the ‘About this blog’ page). Rather I will try to
explain the guidelines we should be following in order to decide.
The basic rules
The gemara tells us that a single
witness is believed when it comes to prohibitions[1] (e.g.
to tell us whether a piece of meat is kosher or not), as opposed to monetary
cases and punishments (two are required to testify that someone owes money, or
that he is liable to punishment for having transgressed). The only limitation
is that if the witness tells us that something previously forbidden is now
permitted (e.g. that an animal was slaughtered in accordance with halacha), he
is only believed if it was within his capability to do what was necessary to
achieve this (i.e. he could have slaughtered it himself[2]).
The question that needs to be
asked is who is a kosher witness for this purpose. To qualify as a witness for
other testimony there are many requirements- anyone who violates a prohibition
subject to lashes or stricter, relatives of the relevant people, and anyone who
stands to gain or lose from the testimony is invalid.[3] Does
this apply here?
The answer is that some of it
applies, but not most of it. Relatives certainly are believed, and even the
owner of the food himself is believed (if there is no other reason to
invalidate him). This is clear from the gemara.[4]
Many transgressors are also
believed, provided that they are particular themselves about the relevant
prohibition they are testifying about.[5]
However, idolaters and those who violate the laws of Shabbos in public have the
same status (for these purposes) as those who keep nothing.[6]
The issue of the testimony of
someone with a vested interest is not explicit in the gemara. This omission
though does seemingly imply that he is believed. Based on the above we clearly
cannot extrapolate automatically from the rules of testimony for monetary
cases. Also, the fact that one is believed about his own food is a strong
indication that personal interest is not a factor here. The Rambam indeed
confirms that we can rely on a single witness for this kind of testimony
irrespective of what he stands to gain.[7]
Another important leniency that
applies here is that it one can rely on what one hears in the name of someone
else (provided that both parties are reliable, as defined above).[8] In
general, all the formal rules of how testimony is given are not relevant.[9]
Application
In summary of the above, anyone
who keeps kosher and shabbos and is not an idolater should be trusted. This
explains the standard practice for people to eat in the homes of others without
the need for any further clarification. The need for a mashgiach for kashrus of
shops, factories, restaurants etc. is because of workers who do not keep kosher
or shabbos themselves.
The point that we need to clarify
is how we can rely on the mashgiach in such circumstances. Even if he is
completely trustworthy, how can he know that nothing improper has happened
behind his back? The answer is relatively simple. Chazal tell us that when
people know what the rules are, we can rely on their fear of the possibility of
being caught red-handed even if normally they are not people we could trust.[10]
It follows from this that in
order to be able to eat at a restaurant, buy food from a shop etc. where not
all the workers are religious, we can rely on the mashgiach assuming that he is
religious. We can also rely on the rav who takes responsibility for the
hechsher. Even though he usually is not directly involved with overseeing
anything, he should know that the mashgichim or those responsible for
appointing them are reliable.
What happens if we don’t know who
the mashgichim are, and we don’t know anything about the rav who gives the
hechsher? There are two questions that need to be dealt with here. Firstly,
what is the status of a regular person who we don’t know? Do we need to know
that he keeps kosher, or can we assume that every Jew is reliable until proven
otherwise? And if normally we need to be sure, can we assume that the title
‘rabbi’ means that someone is reliable?
The first question is subject to
discussion in the gemara and rishonim. At one stage all were assumed to be
reliable, but at a certain point Chazal instituted that in Syria certain
products can only be bought from someone known to be reliable.[11] The
rishonim debate whether this was a limited local issue or something more
general,[12] but the
underlying principle seems to be commonsense. In a closed community where the
reality is that most people are reliable, anyone can be relied upon until we
know otherwise. Today we certainly cannot rely on this in general, although
every case must be judged on its merits.[13]
In my view the same is true for
someone with the title ‘Rabbi’. Unfortunately not all that have this title are
trustworthy, and it is impossible to generalise. Just like with business,
whether we can trust someone is very subjective and dependent on the instincts
of each individual. This is one of the reasons I would never publicise a list
of who I feel that I can rely on and who not.[14]
Following the majority
Often with kashrus the question
goes beyond trust. Even if we can trust someone completely, it is important to
realise what he is actually telling us. What many may not realise is that no
hechsher certifies that the food is kosher without any doubt whatsoever.
For example, strictly speaking
halacha requires the shechita knife to be checked between the shechita of each
animal or bird and the next.[15] This
is because if a blemish is found on the knife, all the animals that were
slaughtered since the last time it was checked are not kosher because of the
possibility that the blemish was there when they were slaughtered.[16]
Nowadays, as far as I am aware no
commercial shechita does this with chickens. In an age where every extra minute
carries significant costs, it simply is not financially viable. Instead, the
knife is checked periodically (how often depends on the hechsher), and if a
blemish is found the chickens under doubt have already been mixed up with many
others. They are all given a hechsher, based on the principle of bitul b’rov
(the minority is ‘cancelled out’ by the majority).
While this situation is far from
the ideal described by Chazal, provided that the majority is clear it is
halachically sound at least b’dieved (once this is done, the chickens may
certainly be eaten). Even in the times of Chazal, it was necessary to rely on the
majority in order to forgo checking each chicken for the numerous possibilities
of tarfus (fatal damage rendering it non-kosher).[17]
The truth is that this principle
could be extended to permit all food with a hechsher, even if the particular
kashrus authority isn’t particularly trustworthy. It is hard to imagine that
any authority is so negligent that the majority of the food it supervises is
non-kosher (unless there is a particular issue that they are lenient about
incorrectly). And although according to many, when there is a significant
minority that is not kosher we are obligated to check each item,[18] this
applies only when it is reasonably practical to do so.[19]
Non-halachic considerations
So if the majority principle can
allow one to eat from almost any hechsher, why are so many (even knowledgeable)
people so particular about which hechsherim they eat? Sometimes there is a
known issue involved, such as non-glatt meat or different halachic viewpoints
over shmita. But this is not enough to explain everything.
I have not discussed this
extensively with others, so I can only write my own reason and assume that I am
not alone. Although technically speaking halacha allows us to rely on the
majority even when the proper care has not been taken, I want to support those
who are trustworthy and particular about halacha. If no-one paid attention to
the standard of the hechsher, those who are more meticulous would soon go out
of business due to the higher costs involved.
This is not always so
straightforward, as sometimes the rabbi of a particular town has an interest to
lower the standards out of fear that otherwise people will choose not to eat
kosher altogether. The common solution to this is to have a two-tiered system,
with a regular hechsher and a ‘mehadrin’ one.[20] But
this can also lead to problems when those who insist on mehadrin eat together
with those who don’t.
Since this a non-halachic
concern, it is clear to me that it should be overlooked whenever there is a
possibility of offending, embarrassing or causing resentment by others. It is
appropriate to end with the reason the rishonim quote from the Yerushalmi for
the rule that one witness is sufficient for these matters: “Because if this was
not the case, no-one would be able to eat the food of his fellow.”[21]
[1] Gitin 2b
[2] Tosfos
explain that even if he is not a trained shochet, the ability to learn or to
hire someone else is enough.
[3] For full
details see Choshen Mishpat 33-37.
[4] See Rosh,
Gitin 5:8 in rule no. 4, based on Yevamos 88a.
[5] See Mishna
Bechoros 30a and gemara there.
[6] Chulin 5a
[7] Shechita
10:14. See however Nachlas David (1794-1861), Responsum 26 (in the footnote)
who suggests that with certain exceptions, someone with financial interest is
not believed. He himself says that this is not to be taken as a final ruling
(it is only an attempt to resolve a diificulty with the Yerushalmi), but
nevertheless his failure even to mention the words of the Rambam is surprising.
[8] See
Bechoros 36a concerning testimony about a blemish on a firstborn animal, and
Kesuvos 72a concerning the halachic status of a particular bloodstain.
[9] The
reason why this kind of evidence is not valid for monetary and capital cases is
because of the requirement that testimony be given in court.
[10] Mishna
Avoda Zara 69a and gemara there 69b.
[11] Avoda Zara
39b
[12] See Yoreh
Deah 119:1 and commentaries there.
[13] See Aruch
Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 119:11.
[14]
Although I can mention one rule: I do not trust any hechsher that is merely a
brand name, with no named rabbi or rabbis clearly accepting responsibility.
[15] Shulchan
Aruch Yoreh Deah 18:11, based on Chulin 10a-b
[16] Ibid.
Although see Rema there that if one prefers to take the risk of having to lose
all the animals, he has the right to do so.
[17] See Rashi
Chulin 12a, and Yoreh Deah 39:1 that only the lungs of mammals need be checked.
[18] Similar to
the obligation to check the lungs of an animal after shechita.
[19] If
the lungs were lost before they could be checked, the rishonim debate whether
the animal may be eaten (see Yoreh Deah 39:2). But the Shach (ibid.) explains
that even those who are stringent agree to the above principle, and their
stringency is merely to prevent them being ‘lost’ intentionally.
[20]
Although the term ‘mehadrin’ does not really have any halachic meaning when it
comes to kashrus, and unfortunately its definition can vary significantly
amongst the different hechsherim. Thank G-d there has lately been a slight
increase in transparency, and in the information available for those who are
interested.
[21] Ramban
Chullin 10b.
