What is Torah?

Most of the material written about the mitzvah of learning Torah concentrates either on the amount required (how many hours etc.) or on the motivation behind the mitzvah. Here I will ignore the former and deal with a halachic issue closely related to the latter – the definition of Torah and learning Torah.

What texts are we obligated to learn? Is saying Tehilim, or learning other parts of Nach, learning Torah? What about the stories in the Gemara, or the medical advice in the Gemara (if these are part of Torah, what about studying contemporary medical advice)? Analysing philosophical questions about Hashem and the world? Although many of us may have preconceived ideas about the answers to some of these questions, careful analysis can show that the truth is not always as straightforward as we might think.

Before answering any of these questions, it is helpful to start by mentioning that the Gemara and Rambam divide Torah into three parts in relation to the mitzvah of learning Torah. For any study to count as Torah study, it will have to fall into one of these categories:

1.      Mikra / Torah Shebichsav (Written Torah)
2.      Mishna / Torah Sheba'al Peh (Oral Torah)
3.      Talmud (studying how one halacha follows from another, how the Torah is expounded upon etc.)[1]

Rabbinic Law

Belief in the Torah Sheba'al Peh having been dictated to Moshe at Sinai, and forming an inseparable part of the Torah, is a fundamental tenet of our belief.[2] This certainly applies to the traditional interpretation of the Torah Shebichsav (Written Torah, i.e. the Pentateuch) and to halachos such as the water libation on Succos, which Chazal tell us are Halacha l'Moshe miSinai (laws taught to Moshe at Sinai, despite not appearing in the Written Torah). Does it also apply to Rabbinic decrees?

The Gemara tells us that Hashem did teach Moshe things that would later be instituted by the 'sofrim,' such as the reading of the Megila.[3] Elsewhere we are told that Moshe even made Bnei Yisrael swear that they would keep mitzvos yet to exist, with the reading of the Megila again given as an example.[4] This perhaps explains why Behag counts rabbinic mitzvos, such as lighting candles on Chanuka and reading the megila on Purim, in his list of the 613 mitzvos.[5]

The Rambam attacks Behag for this, writing "I can't see how anyone could imagine, or entertain the thought, that Moshe was commanded at Sinai that at the end of our kingdom, when such things would happen to us with the Greeks, we would be obligated to light Chanuka candles."[6] It appears that the Rambam understood that the undertaking to keep future mitzvos was a general one, and although the Gemara specifies the reading of the Megila, this was not specified to Bnei Yisrael.[7] Moshe may have been taught the details, but not as a command.

Presumably, Moshe merely being taught about these mitzvos is not a fact critical enough to be included in the Eighth Principle. Furthermore, it can be shown that rabbinic laws do not form part of the Oral Torah according to the Rambam. He lists Torah Sheba'al Peh and rabbinic laws as different categories in his introduction to Mishne Torah,[8] and more clearly in Hilchos Mamrim (1:2):

כל מי שאינו עושה כהוראתן עובר בלא תעשה, שנאמר לא תסור מכל הדבר אשר יגידו לך ימין ושמאל. ... אחד דברים שלמדו אותן מפי השמועה והם תורה שבעל פה, ואחד דברים שלמדום מפי דעתם באחת מן המדות שהתורה נדרשת בהן ונראה בעיניהם שדבר זה כך הוא, ואחד דברים שעשאום סייג לתורה ולפי מה שהשעה צריכה והן הגזרות והתקנות והמנהגות, כל אחד ואחד מאלו השלשה דברים מצות עשה לשמוע להן, והעובר על כל אחד מהן עובר בלא תעשה.

 "Anyone who does not follow their (the Sanhedrin's) instructions violates the negative commandment of 'Do not turn to the right or the left from anything that they tell you.' Whether concerning laws that they taught based on tradition, being the Oral Torah, whether concerning laws that they derived themselves with one of the methods that the Torah is expounded, or whether concerning laws that they made as a fence for the Torah according to what the time required, being the decrees, institutions and customs, there is a positive commandment to listen to them concerning each one of these three types of laws and one who violates any of them transgresses a negative commandment."

It is quite explicit here that the Oral Torah and Rabbinical institutions are two separate categories, albeit with an equal Torah obligation to follow the instructions of the Sanhedrin in their regard.[9] Indeed, the term Torah Sheba'al Peh is not used for Rabbinic law anywhere in the Yad HaChazaka.[10]

It would therefore appear that the study of the details of Rabbinic laws does not fall under any of the three categories (the third category, Talmud, refers to in-depth expounding of the first two categories). While it is incumbent upon us to study these laws so that we know how to observe them, the perhaps surprising conclusion is that this study is not a mitzvah in its own right.[11]

Cantillation (Trop)

A further proof to this can be found in a ruling of the Rema. With certain limitations, there is a prohibition on taking money for teaching Torah. The amoraim dispute whether it is permitted to take money to teach how to correctly cantillate pesukim, and the gemara explains that the stringent ruling is based on a view that the traditional method of reading (trop) is itself part of the Torah.[12]

Rabbeinu Simcha understands that the lenient opinion holds that the cantillation marks were only a rabbinic institution, and this is why it is permitted to take payment for teaching them. The corollary is that it is permitted to take money for teaching any rabbinic laws, and this is undisputed in the Gemara.[13] The Rema quotes this as halacha in Shulchan Aruch, with no dissenting opinion.[14] This can only make sense if the teaching of these halachos is not part of the mitzvah of Torah study.[15]

In order to make this conclusion easier to swallow, it helps to consider the fact that when there is a Sanhedrin in place, rabbinic laws can be very fluid. Chazal tell us that the laws concerning which utensils may be moved on Shabbos, originally instituted by Nechemia, were changed several times.[16] Torah is everlasting and unchanging, while its application can change dependent on the situation. Rabbinic law is an application of the Torah's command to follow our Sages, rather than part of the Torah itself. This explains why it can change.

Nach

The conclusion above is based on the important distinction between Torah and halacha – while Rabbinic law is certainly part of halacha, it is not part of Torah. The inverse of this may be seen with Nach. While we are told that Biblical law cannot be learned from Nach,[17] the Rambam writes concerning the mitzvah of Torah study that Nach is part of the Written Torah, and its interpretation is part of the Oral Torah.[18]

In this context, it is common to quote the Midrash that says that David HaMelech davened that the reward for study of Tehilim should be equivalent to that for study of the laws of Nega'im (tzara'as) and Ohalos (ritual impurity transmitted between objects under the same roof),[19] and the discussion concerning whether this request was granted or not.[20] However, in my view the more important questions concern the nature of the request itself. For example, it is probable that at the time, Tehilim was yet to have been accepted as part of the Tanach. The request may have been to include it in Tanach (in which case the request certainly was granted), and this would automatically make it on a par with Nega'im and Ohalos.

Either way, as already mentioned, the Rambam certainly does equate Nach to the Torah.[21] The reason for preferring study of halacha to study of Nach is probably not based on anything inherent, but on the difficulty of achieving any degree of certainty when studying Nach on a deep level.[22] The same applies to the aggadic parts of the Gemara.[23]

Philosophy

Questions about the nature of Hashem and the origins of our Universe are clearly fundamental to Judaism. However, it would appear that the answers to these questions do not require Torah knowledge - these questions are critical for all human beings, and non-Jews are not expected or even encouraged to learn Torah.[24] How then can studying philosophy of this nature be considered Torah study?

The Rambam understands that the study of these matters is what Chazal refer to as 'Pardes' (lit. orchard, but clearly a metaphor for something deeper[25]),[26] which is included in the term 'Talmud.' Study of the nature of Hashem is also referred to as מעשה מרכבה (lit. 'the work of the chariot'), whereas study of the Universe and its creation is referred to as מעשה בראשית.[27]

These names can help us to understand why such study is part of learning Torah, as they refer to sections of Tanach. The term מעשה מרכבה is based on the vision of the chariot seen by Yechezkel,[28] whereas מעשה בראשית is clearly represented in the Torah by the story of Creation. From Chazal it is clear that there was also a tradition as to how to explain these sections, albeit known only to a small number of people.[29] The study of these materials certainly is part of the mitzvah of learning Torah, as explained above.[30]

The difficulty is that the Rambam himself did not seem to base his philosophy either on these sections of Tanach (at least in the main), or on any tradition. In Moreh Nevuchim, the Rambam writes his philosophical arguments concerning Hashem and the world at the beginning of part 2. In this section, he rarely quotes Tanach or Chazal, instead examining the philosophical principles of Aristotle and others. Not until the beginning of part 3 of the Moreh does the Rambam start to explain מעשה מרכבה and מעשה בראשית as they appear in Tanach, and there is little overlap between these two sections. In his introduction to part 3, he also states explicitly that his explanation of מעשה מרכבה was not taught to him by any teacher.

It seems that the Rambam must have understood that even if the Torah itself is not the source used to study these topics, their importance is so great that their study must be at least on a par to study of halacha. In fact, according to the Rambam, the 'basic' parts of the Torah are there in order to straighten the mind in preparation for understanding the deeper, metaphysical parts, and to facilitate orderly civilization in this world so that we can progress to the next.[31]

This view is far from unanimous. Many disagree strongly with the Rambam's entire contention that מעשה מרכבה refers to metaphysics.[32] Support for the opposing view can be found in the statement of Chazal that one should not believe a claim that Torah exists among the non-Jews.[33] The main thing that separates us from the non-Jews is halacha and not philosophy, and Chazal appear to be using the term 'Torah' to refer to halacha.[34]

Medicine and Science

The Gemara contains a fair measure of medical advice, as well as other information relating to astronomy and geology. Assuming that this information is meant literally and not allegorically, we must ask which sources Chazal used to derive it. As there is no indication that a Torah source was used, the simplest explanation is that Chazal either used their own understanding of chemistry and biology, or followed the common medical and scientific wisdom of the time.

As such, it is questionable whether the study of these parts of the Gemara is considered Torah learning. The Rambam writes that preserving a healthy body is one of the ways of Hashem, as it is impossible to attain knowledge of Hashem while ill. He then proceeds to give general health guidelines, all within the Yad HaChazaka.[35] However, the omission of these topics when discussing the mitzvah of learning Torah, while mentioning philosophy explicitly, seems to indicate that the two are not on the same level. Health guidelines were important for the Rambam in order to facilitate learning and observance of mitzvos, but the guidelines are not inherently part of the Torah.

May Hashem enlighten us in all parts of his Torah!

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[1] Kiddushin 30a; Rambam Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:11

[2] See for example the Rambam's formulation of the Eighth Principle of Faith (Commentary on the Mishna, Sanhedrin chapter 10). There is no dispute regarding this aspect of the Eighth Principle within Orthodox Jewry.

[3] Megila 19b

[4] Shevuos 39a

[5] Introduction to Halachos Gedolos, positive mitzvos 139 and 200.

[6] Sefer Hamitzvos, Shoresh 1. The Ramban offers various defences for the Behag, one of which references the Gemara in Shevuos quoted above (in footnote 3). However, he too does not dispute the Rambam regarding whether these individual mitzvos were commanded to Moshe.

[7] See Birkei Yosef, Orach Chaim 124:1 (section 3).

[8] The relevant quote is"נמצא רבינא ורב אשי וחבריהם. סוף גדולי חכמי ישראל המעתיקים תורה שבעל פה. ושגזרו גזירות והתקינו התקנות והנהיגו מנהגות".

[9] The Ramban famously disputes this point in his 'corrections' to Sefer Hamitzvos, Shoresh 1.

[10] R' Hershel Schachter makes a counterargument from the Rambam's introduction to his commentary on the Mishna, where he lists five categories of Torah laws, the last two being Rabbinic fences and institutions. However, I believe that these categories are categories of laws that the Torah obligates us to follow, rather than parts of the Torah itself.

[11] This is somewhat similar to a situation where a person takes an oath to perform a certain action, and is therefore obligated by the Torah to keep the terms of his oath. Study of the details of what exactly is included in his oath is essential, but it is not part of the mitzvah of learning Torah.

[12] Nedarim 37a-b

[13] Hagahos Maimoniyos, Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:5

[14] Yoreh Deah 246:5. See however Aroch HaShulchan 18, who questions this.

[15] See however Sha'ar Mishpat 28:2.

[16] Shabbos 123b

[17] Bava Kama 2b, among other places. Although elsewhere the Gemara does equate laws instituted by the Nevi'im with Biblical law (Rosh Hashana 19a), this is only in respect to the seriousness commonly attributed to these laws by the people and the resulting lack of need to further reinforce them.

[18] Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:12. The Vilna Ga'on cites Kiddushin 49a as a source for this (Biur HaGra, Yoreh Deah 246:5).

[19] Midrash Tehilim (Shocher Tov) 1:1, paragraph 8

[20] See for example https://forum.otzar.org/viewtopic.php?t=32099

[21] Although the acronym Tanach used for Torah, Nevi'im and Kesuvim, would seem to indicate that Nevi'im and Kesuvim do not form part of the Torah (this acronym is of medieval origin, but the three-way division already appears in the gemara), this distinction does not affect the mitzvah of Torah study. It is likely that this distinction was made mainly in relation to the actual scrolls, where we do find that the sanctity of a Sefer Torah is higher than that of Nevi'im and Kesuvim. This represents the difference between the prophecy of Moshe Rabbeinu and that of other prophets.

[22] Nach tends to be used merely to reinforce view held previously – it is extremely difficult to find examples of people changing their views on anything based on what they have learned from Nach.

[23] See https://torahclarity.blogspot.com/2017/03/drush-and-divrei-agada.html

[24] Sanhderin 59a. Although non-Jews also get reward for studying the seven mitzvos incumbent upon them, this only makes sense once they have established that Hashem exists and that these mitzvos were indeed commanded by Him.

[25] See Chagiga 14b

[26] Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 4:10-13

[27] Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:12.

[28] In the first chapter.

[29] See Chagiga 11b (the Mishna) and 13a.

[30] Presumably these sections carry within them information that the human brain is in general incapable of deducing from logic alone.

[31] Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 4:13

[32] See Or Hashem (R' Chisdai Kreskas) Ma'amar 4, Drush 10; Biur HaGra, Yoreh Deah 246:18.

[33] Eicha Rabba 2:9

[34] Although even the written Torah has non-halachic parts, the overall message within the Torah is a halachic one. See Rashi to Bereishis 1:1.

[35] Hilchos De'os Chapter 4

The Worst Form of Government

"Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."

Winston Churchill

Events of the past months and years in Israel have made it easy to understand Churchill's reservations regarding democracy. Some are even questioning whether the 'except' clause is correct, seeing the chaos that democracy can cause and the fact that we may be no closer to a solution than we were after the first set of elections in the last two years. I do not plan to make the practical arguments for or against any form of democratic elections here. Instead, I would like to examine, from a halachic perspective, the main form of government described by the Torah (and the rest of Tanach) – monarchy.

An Ideal or an Improper Request?

The articles I have seen on this topic concentrate on the ancient debate surrounding the statement of the Torah "שום תשים עליך מלך" (you shall appoint a king over you).[1] The Tana'im dispute the nature of this verse – R' Yehuda understands this as a positive commandment, whereas R' Nehorai argues that the idea of appointing a king is only a response to the improper demand in the previous verse, "אשימה עלי מלך ככל הגוים אשר סביבותי" (I shall appoint a king over me, like all the nations around me).[2]

A common narrative here is that R' Yehuda sees monarchy as the ideal, whereas R' Nehorai prefers a limit on the power of any individual leader (e.g. through some form of democracy[3]) or even the absence of leadership (anarchy).[4] However, this understanding of the Tana'ic dispute is questionable.

If we look at the time when the events foretold in the Torah actually take place, when Shaul is appointed as king, we see that Hashem tells Shmuel Hanavi that the demand for a king is not merely a rejection of Shmuel – it is a rejection of Hashem.[5] This statement would seem to imply that the problem was not to do with the specific dangers of monarchy as a system of government. The people were expected to see only Hashem as their leader, with any human representative appointed directly by Hashem. In other words, the better alternative to monarchy is theocracy rather than democracy or anarchy.

R' Yehuda also cannot deny the fact that the demand for a king in the times of Shmuel was severely criticised. According to R' Yehuda, the criticism must have been specific to the circumstances (the timing or manner of the demand), but the problem is similar. The rejection of Shmuel, Hashem's prophet,[6] or the desire to be similar to other nations,[7] was symptomatic of an underlying rebellion against Hashem and theocratic rule.

In an era without prophecy, such that a literal theocracy is not possible, the ramifications of the dispute between the Tana'im are limited. Although according to R' Nehorai there is no command to appoint a king, and it would be permissible to alter the system of government, there is no proof from his words as to whether this would be recommended. Furthermore, after an interruption in the monarchy, even according to R' Yehuda the appointment of a new king requires a prophet.[8]

I therefore conclude that according to either opinion, halacha has very little to say regarding which form of government should be used nowadays. We should look for whichever system works best.

Future Aspirations

The question remains as to whether our end goal, after the restoration of prophecy, should include the restoration of the monarchy. Many will baulk at the idea of the end of democracy (despite the events of recent years) – is their view compatible with the Torah?

The answer is a conditional yes. We have already seen that according to R' Nehorai, there is no mitzvah to appoint a king (or any other government). Although the Rambam rules according to R' Yehuda,[9] there is no guarantee that the Sanhedrin (also required in order to appoint a king[10]) will agree. Ultimately, we will anyway need a prophet to inform us of Hashem's will.

One thing that does seem clear is that the special status of the tribe of Yehuda in general and the Davidic dynasty in particular, is ensured. Ya'akov Avinu assures that "rulership will not depart from Yehuda,"[11] and David is promised by Hashem (through Nasan Hanavi) that his throne and kingdom will be firm (נכון) forever.[12]

These assurances present a challenge to the view of R' Nehorai. If ideally we would never have had a monarchy, why does Hashem promise that the monarchy will stay in the hands of the family of David forever? It does not seem reasonable that one mistake in the time of Shaul resulted in a curse of eternal monarchy.

Abarbanel contends that these assurances can be fulfilled without a monarchy. Yehuda was the leader of his brothers long before there was a Jewish king, and Chazal tells us that the Babylonian Exilarchs also came from the tribe of Yehuda. He even makes the astonishing claim that "Even today, throughout the long exile until France and Spain, there is no doubt that the presidents and officers that the kings appoint over Bnei Yisrael were all from the Davidic dynasty."[13]

There is one major practical ramification to all of this, in our tefilos every day of the week. An entire beracha of our Shemoneh Esrei is devoted to the restoration of the Davidic line (את צמח דוד). We ask this from Hashem three times a day – according to R' Yehuda we should have the monarchy in mind, whereas presumably according to R' Nehorai (based on the Abarbanel's understanding), it is enough to want a stronger representation of the Davidic line in any positions of power.[14]

Checks and Balances

It is important to point out that when deciding on a form of government, we should not allow any form of idealism to negate real practical concerns.[15] Just as it is not possible to make all decisions via referendum, it may sometimes be necessary to compromise on democracy in order to facilitate efficiency.

The flip side is that if we are to restore a monarchy, this would need to be accompanied with measures to ensure that the monarch cannot abuse his power. I already wrote at length in Separation of Powers about the limitations the Torah makes on the power of the king, but practically there would need to be a method of enforcing these limitations.

With some creativity, it may be possible to design a system that would fulfil the mitzvah of appointing a king according to R' Yehuda, while simultaneously using a democratic system as a counterbalance.[16] Perhaps this could restore stability, while maintaining the basic human freedoms to which we have become accustomed.

I believe that if such a system could be designed, it could be an improvement even on the reign of David HaMelech. When David erred, there were prophets who could guide him back to the correct path. His willingness to admit his mistakes allowed his kingdom to flourish, but most of his successors were not as righteous and this eventually led to collapse and exile. One of the lessons that we should have learnt over the past two thousand years is that each one of us must take personal responsibility and not rely on human leaders, as great as they may be.

To conclude, Churchill was probably right that democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried . However, this should not deter us from striving to achieve an improved form of government, whatever its nature may be.

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[1] Devarim 17:15

[2] See Sanhedrin 20b

[3] This was the position of Abarbanel in his commentary to the Torah. Many have pointed out that his view was influenced by his own experience in the employ of the kings of Portugal and Spain, the expulsion of Jews from these countries, and subsequently seeing systems he viewed as superior in Italy.

[4] See for example this article (in Hebrew) by R' Elchanan Samet.

[5] Shmuel 1, 8:4-9

[6] The Rambam's understanding in Hilchos Melachim 1:2.

[7] Ramban's understanding in his commentary on the Torah.

[8] Sifri, Shoftim 157; Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 1:3. Although the kings of the Chashmonaic dynasty ruled in the post-prophetic era (and according to the Rambam there was no problem with this – see for example Hilchos Megila v'Chanuka 3:1), it would seem that this was not a fulfilment of the mitzvah to appoint a king in its fullest sense. Any form of Jewish rule was something to be celebrated, but this could just as easily have been achieved through an alternative form of government.

[9] Hilchos Melachim 1:1

[10] Tosefta, Sanhedrin chapter 3; Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 1:3

[11] Bereishis 49:10

[12] Shmuel 2, 7:16

[13] Abarbanel, Bereishis 49:8. Although he is primarily referring to the words of Ya'akov Avinu, his several references to David imply that the same applies to the later promise (although it should be noted that this is a stretch, bearing in mind that the promise through Nasan Hanavi specifically mentions David's throne and kingdom).

[14] Some may have reservations whether the special status given to descendants of David is consistent with true democracy. However, the truth is that Abarbanel implies that there is no obligation to check whether a candidate for a position of power is descended from David – this will happen naturally or through Divine intervention.

[15] Although I don't discuss politics here, I will state that we would be in a better situation if politicians from across the spectrum would heed this message.

[16] I do not mean to replicate a UK-style monarchy, where the monarch is a mere figurehead. This would clearly not be a fulfilment of the mitzvah according to R' Yehuda.

Understanding Halacha - Hilchos Shemita

The time has now come to reveal the project promised in the previous post – below is a link to a new English language publication on Hilchos Shemita. The reasons for doing this are explained in the introduction, although regular readers of this blog will be used to the style.

B'ezras Hashem I plan to translate this to Hebrew over the coming weeks and months. I would really appreciate any feedback, and of course if the link could be sent to anyone who may find it useful.

If anyone would find a hard copy beneficial, please let me know.

Understanding Halacha - Hilchos Shemita

Erev Pesach on Shabbos

This is going to be by far my shortest post on this blog so far - I have recently been working on finishing off a project that I hope to publicise here before Pesach. As this project is not Pesach-related, I felt that I had to provide at least something that is.

The motivation for this piece came when reading the recommendation of a certain talmid chacham to avoid eating any chametz this coming Shabbos (using matza ashira[1] for lechem mishne), to ensure that no Chametz crumbs remain in the house for Pesach. As I shall explain, I strongly disagree.

The first thing to point out is that there is clearly no obligation to get rid of all Chametz before Shabbos, nor do Chazal or the rishonim indicate that this is praiseworthy. This is most easily shown by quoting the Rambam:

If the fourteenth (of Nissan) falls on Shabbos, we search for Chametz on Thursday night, the thirteenth. One leaves enough Chametz to eat until four hours in to the day on Shabbos, in a safe place, and destroys the remainder before Shabbos. If any Chametz remains on Shabbos day after four hours, one nullifies it, covers it with a utensil until after first day Yom Tov and then destroys it.[2]

The lack of concern that Chametz may remain is striking. Others do suggest that one should get rid of any remaining Chametz by giving it to a non-Jew or feeding it to animals,[3] but there is nothing remotely close to avoiding Chametz on Shabbos altogether.[4]

Oneg Shabbos

The above is enough to explain why I believe that the suggestion to avoid Chametz this coming Shabbos is unnecessary. I also believe that this suggestion is a bad one – unnecessarily compromising ones enjoyment of Shabbos detracts from the quality of the mitzvah of Oneg Shabbos.

I am aware that there can be some practical difficulties with having Chametz at the table this Shabbos, and the more nervous among us may enjoy their Shabbos more without it. However, this should be a personal choice, and those who feel able to manage the situation with Chametz should certainly not be discouraged from doing so.

Wishing everyone a good and enjoyable Shabbos HaGadol, as well as a Chag Sameach![5]

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[1] Matzah made with liquids other than water (often egg). As this matzah cannot be used for the mitzvah on Seder night, it may be eaten on Erev Pesach (although many Ashkenazim do not eat it once Chametz is forbidden).

[2] Hilchos Chametz u'Matzah 3:3

[3] See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 444:4-5 and Mishna Berura 11 there.

[4] It should be pointed out that any crumbs that are missed do not pose any halachic problem unless they fall into food during Pesach – see Pesachim 6b.

[5] As the old quip goes, you don't need my bracha for a kosher Pesach as it almost certainly will be (even if you eat Chametz on Shabbos).