Fasting and Affliction

Introduction

Yom Kippur is unique in many ways. The aspect that I would like to discuss here is the idea of physical self-affliction, something that elsewhere in the Torah we only find in a negative way (as in the prohibitions against self-mutilation and leaving bald patches as a sign of mourning), or as something that a person can voluntarily take upon himself (as in the case of the nazir).

What is the idea behind fasting and other forms of self-deprivation? The prophet Yeshayahu tells us that the ultimate goal of fasting is 'untying the knots of wickedness' and 'releasing the crushed to freedom,' rather than merely 'bending ones head like a fish-hook' and displaying sackcloth.[1] However, the question remains as to what the actual fasting is supposed to achieve. Could we not have days of repentance without fasting, perhaps enabling some to concentrate more effectively on their prayers and self-improvement?

Furthermore, if the only imaginable purpose of fasting is to lead a person to repentance, what exactly did those who 'bent their heads like fish-hooks' think they were achieving? It is hard to believe that all of these actions were only meant as a show for others – if the general population were impressed by pretences like these, taking it as sincere worship, this would at least have meant that the majority were not worthy of the wrath of Yeshayahu.[2]

Thus, to me it is clear that these people believed that there is an inherent value to self-affliction, even without any improvement in their conduct. They were mistaken, but how mistaken is not entirely clear. The question is whether or not there is an inherent value to self-affliction for one who does meet the prerequisite of examining his ways.

Purifying the soul

The Chovos Halvavos writes that there are two levels of abstinence. The basic level is the control of one's physical desires in a manner designed to preserve physical health. Hashem intentionally made man and many animals in this way, 'causing the soul to suffer and be tested' in this world in order to purify it and 'be of the form of the angels.'[3]

There is also a unique level of abstinence, which has the purpose of 'fixing our souls' for Olam Haba. After quoting several opinions as to what this abstinence consists of, his favoured definition is abstinence from all physical relaxation and pleasure, besides what a person cannot naturally live without.[4]

Although this view did not become the mainstream in Spain, where the author of the Chovos Halvavos (Rabbeinu Bachya ibn Pakuda) lived in the 11^th century, the Chasidei Ashkenaz of the 12^th and 13^th centuries did adopt many practices based on a similar philosophy. One example relevant to the days we are in now is the concept of 'Teshuvas HaMishkal' – its proponents say that if one had any forbidden physical pleasure, he should cause himself an equivalent level of pain.[5]

One who learns the Shulchan Aruch and its commentators in depth should see that the Chasidei Ashkenaz had a significant influence on the accepted halacha in Ashkenazi communities.[6] To this day, many say the Tefila Zaka prayer before Kol Nidrei at the start of Yom Kippur.[7] One of the more overlooked sections of this prayer contains the statement that we are 'obligated' to atone for our sins through Teshuvas HaMishkal, however we ask for mercy as we lack the strength to do so.

According to this view, Yom Kippur is the day that all of us rise to the level we would ideally be on the entire year, those unable to repeat this on a regular basis praying that this one day of self-affliction should suffice to purify our souls and prepare them for Olam Haba. It won't work without teshuva, but equally teshuva can only be complete with an element of physical suffering.[8]

The opposing view

This way of life was rejected entirely by R' Saadya Gaon (born 882 in Egypt). He criticises a group of people who distance themselves from the world in an extreme way, detailing how impractical and dangerous this way of life is. He then argues that abstinence should only be practiced in its correct place, which is when something forbidden is presented to a person.[9]

Similar criticism can be found in the words of the Kuzari[10] and the Rambam.[11] In the case of the Rambam, rejection of the idea of purification through physical suffering is fundamental – the physical can never be elevated to a different inherent state and will always have the limitations we know of.[12]

According to this, there is no inherent value to self-affliction and the people Yeshayahu was criticising had missed the point entirely. Why then do we fast on Yom Kippur? The Rambam explains that it is in order to fix our minds on repentance and complete worship of G-d, without being distracted by physical needs. Work is forbidden for the same reason.[13]

Affliction and Cessation

According to both views, it is important to pay attention to the language that the Torah uses when telling us to fast. The usual translation of the term עינוי נפש, 'affliction of the soul,' can be misleading. One thing is certain – at no time is there any mitzvah or praiseworthy practice of actively causing oneself pain.[14] The term עינוי refers to the holding back of something usually wanted, rather than to active affliction.[15] The debate is whether one purpose of this passive affliction is to cause 'active' suffering, or merely to be a preventative measure.

However, Chazal infer that another verb used in reference to Yom Kippur also relates to abstinence. The gemara learns from the extra word 'Shabbaton' that not just food and drink are forbidden – washing, rubbing oil on oneself, wearing shoes and marital relations must also be refrained from.[16]

As 'Shabbaton' means rest, or cessation, this would appear to indicate that the purpose is indeed the avoidance of distraction, rather than any inherent value to suffering. Presumably all would agree that this aspect exists on Yom Kippur, even if it is not the only reason for fasting.

On the other hand, those who deny any inherent value to self-affliction have difficulty explaining what the two different verbs used by the Torah (affliction and cessation) represent. The Rambam uses the two terms interchangeably, and it would appear that he understands that the Torah only described the 'Shabbaton' as an 'affliction' in order to clarify what it is we are supposed to rest from.[17]

Conclusion

Personally, here I have a conflict between the view that appears to be slightly better supported by the sources (that of the Chovos Halvavos and the Chasidei Ashkenaz) and the position that makes more sense to me philosophically (that of the Rambam). As this is ostensibly a non-halachic (or meta-halachic) issue, my aim on Yom Kippur (and the rest of the year where possible) is to achieve the right frame of mind rather than a physical purge from impurity.

Wishing all Klal Yisrael a Yom Kippur used in the appropriate way (whatever that is!) and a Gmar Chasima Tova.

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[1] See Yeshaya 58:5-6 (and the rest of that section), read as the Haftarah for Yom Kippur in the morning.

[2] There is a possibility that people fasted in accordance with the practices of their ancestors, without any real thought as to why they were doing so (such a phenomenon exists today as well among the non-religious, traditional community, who tend to fast on Yom Kippur). However, the castigation of Yeshayahu implies that people attached real value to what they were doing, not just sentimental or cultural value.

[3] Chovos Halevavos, Sha'ar HaPerishus, chapter 1.

[4] Ibid. chapter 2. He goes on to explain the details of this at length in the rest of Sha'ar HaPerishus.

[5] See Rokeach (R' Elazar of Worms), Hilchos Teshuva, siman 6 onwards. This idea is one offshoot of the broader philosophy of the Chasidei Ashkenaz - the mitzvos of the Torah that obligate all only consist of the bare minimum of what Hashem expects of us. Thus they wrote extensively about additional recommended practices that are not found in the Torah or even in the words of Chazal.

[6] Although the group ceased to exist after the passing of the Rokeach, many of the talmidim of the Rokeach and their talmidim (e.g. the Or Zarua, Maharam MiRotenburg and the Rosh) were the primary Ashkenazi poskim together with the Ba'alei HaTosfos. This is likely at least one of the reasons that the Rema tends to be more stringent than the Shulchan Aruch in his rulings.

[7] This tefila was authored by R' Avraham Danzig (1748-1820, Eastern Europe), the author of the Chayei Adam, who was not known as a mystic.

[8] A possible precedent to this view in Chazal could be the practice of R' Tzadok, who fasted for 40 years in an attempt to prevent the destruction of Yerushalayim (Gittin 56a).

[9] HaEmunos v'HaDeyos, Ma'amar 10. However, it is not entirely clear from R' Saadya's words whether this rejection is for practical reasons alone, or because of something more fundamental. For similar reasons it is hard to find a concrete proof from the words of Chazal for this view – although there is plenty of criticism of self-affliction, this may be merely for practical reasons.

[10] Kuzari 2:50; 3:1.

[11] Hilchos Deyos 3:1; Introduction to Avos (Shmona Prakim) chapter 4. However, the Rambam does not share R' Saadya's view that abstinence should be only from the forbidden – see Lust - permitted  and forbidden. The common denominator between them is that physical pleasure is only negative insofar as it distracts from constructive pursuits.

[12] See Moreh Nevuchim 3:12. This is also why Olam Haba has to be free from physicality according to the Rambam (Hilchos Teshuva 8:2).

[13] Moreh Nevuchim 3:43. See also Chinuch, mitzvah 313, who adds that it would not be fitting for a servant to come to judgement in front of his master whilst under the effects of food and drink, thinking about physical things. However, against this one could argue that fasting may have the opposite effect, diverting the attention of some to their physical hunger.

[14] On the contrary, active self-harm is forbidden. See Devarim 14:1 (where this is the most explicit in the Torah) and Bava Kama 90b.

[15] Thus the same term is used by the Torah to describe nedarim, personal undertakings to abstain from certain things (Bamidbar 30:14). The same verb is used by Lavan when warning Ya'akov not to mistreat his daughters (Bereishis 31:50), and this is understood by Chazal to be referring to the withholding of marital obligations (Yoma 77a). See also Yoma 74b, where Chazal interpret this term similarly regarding the Egyptians' treatment of Bnei Yisra'el.

[16] Yoma 74a. The rishonim debate whether or not these prohibitions are Biblical or Rabbinic, but even if they are entirely Rabbinic, one can see from the word used what Chazal's intentions were when making these restrictions.

[17] Hilchos Shevisas Asor 1:4-6

The Text of Tefila

Introduction

In Prayer - Fundamental Principles, I explained that the primary purpose of prayer is to focus our minds on Hashem and that He is the One who is ultimately in control of all our needs and wants. It would thus seem most natural for our prayers to be personal and not limited to a text written by others. However, there are some conflicting factors that need to be taken into account.

Firstly, one of the strongest influences on the strength of the Jewish People is our unity and communal awareness. For that reason, Chazal tell us that Hashem never rejects the prayers of multitudes.[1] In order for us to unite in prayer, it is necessary to have at least some common text to use.

Furthermore, even for one unable to join in communal prayer, it would not be easy to compose prayers spontaneously on a regular basis. Without a common fixed text, most individuals would probably either design their own one or limit prayer to times of great need. For those who are happy with their lives, it would be easy to forget to daven at all.

The Shemoneh Esrei

The above and more is summed up by the Rambam at the beginning of Hilchos Tefila. He writes that the basic Biblical obligation to daven every day has no fixed text, time or amount. Only around the time of the building of the second Beis Hamikdash, Ezra saw that standards of Hebrew literacy had fallen and that it would be necessary to institute a fixed order of prayer. Thus the Shemoneh Esrei was written, with instructions as to when and how often it must be said.[2]

However, it was always understood that the Shemoneh Esrei could not satisfy the individual's need for personal expression. To this end, Chazal allowed anyone to add their own prayers at the end of an appropriate beracha, or to add any prayer in the beracha of 'Shomeya Tefila,' where we ask Hashem generally to accept our prayers.[3]

What happens if a person doesn't identify with a part of the Shemoneh Esrei, wanting to remove rather than to add? For example, some are not willing to accept that the restoration of the monarchy is something we need, and therefore have a problem with the beracha relating to the Davidic dynasty.[4] Our automatic reaction might be to say that this indicates a problem with the person which halacha does not have to cater for, but I believe this is not completely accurate.

The gemara tells us that although the way we describe Hashem at the beginning of our Shmoneh Esrei, הא-ל הגדול הגבור והנורא (the great, mighty and awesome G-d), was a language already used by Moshe Rabbeinu,[5] Yirmiyahu and Daniel were not comfortable with using all of these praises in their times. They could not see Hashem's awe and strength when the Beis HaMikdash was occupied by our enemies and the Jewish People were enslaved, and they didn't want to lie to Hashem, whose 'seal is truth.' They therefore omitted these words.[6] The Anshei Kneses Hagdola later restored the full phrase, explaining that Hashem's 'resistance of His urge' to punish our enemies and our preservation as a nation in exile, are themselves evidence of Hashem's strength and awe.[7]

This passage clearly shows that what might be perceived as a lack of faith can not only be legitimate; it is much better than the intellectual or emotional dishonesty of chanting mantras that one is unable to internalise. However, it is not sufficient proof for the permissibility of a similar omission in our generation. Yirmiyahu and Daniel lived in a time where the text of tefila had not been formalised and thus were not required to use Moshe Rabbeinu's full phrase;[8] we, on the other hand, do have this obligation.

Does this mean that we must say the words of the Shemoneh Esrei even if we don't believe in them? In my view, for a simple reason the answer is no. Doing so would not fulfil the obligation of tefila, which requires intent.[9] In other words, we must both say the words and believe in them. One who currently does not identify, must make every effort to correct this.[10] If he is psychologically unable to do so, he is no different to any other person who is unable to perform a mitzvah, whom the Torah exempts.

Other Tefilos and Changing Times

The above is all true regarding the Shemoneh Esrei, which since the days of Ezra is our main obligation of prayer. The rest of our tefilos do not carry the same halachic weight, mostly having the status of minhagim. With these, if it is necessary to alter the wording this should pose far less of a problem.[11]

Many may be asking what the relevance of all this is to them, being quite happy with our existing tefilos. However, the truth is that the text of a number of our tefilos has become increasingly removed from the reality of our lives, irrespective of our philosophical view of the modern world.

The clearest examples of this are found in Selichos. At several points, the text implies that we are davening to Hashem at night. However, nowadays many say these selichos after daybreak. The poskim note that those doing this should not say these phrases.[12] Similarly, one who is not fasting should not say any tefilos that imply that he is.

For exactly the same reason, I believe that many parts of our selichos, as well as other parts of our tefila during the year, need to be closely examined for anachronisms. Many of these reflect the fact they were composed at times when Jews lived in constant fear of pogroms, disease and other problems which are almost unheard of in today's civilised world. Nowadays, asking Hashem to pity us because of how poor and downtrodden we are is for the large part simply inappropriate.

Many will object to this, out of the often legitimate fear of strengthening those who seek to 'modernise' our religion in destructive ways. There is also a practical problem on a communal level, as we currently have no way of making universal changes to the text of our tefilos. However, on an individual level these concerns are not significant. Each individual who pays attention to what he is saying is capable of making adjustments where necessary, without publicising it to all.

Theological Problems

Some of our tefilos may be difficult for a completely different reason. Also featuring in our selichos is the well-known prayer that starts 'Machnisei Rachamim.' The straight-forward reading of this passage (and other similar ones) would seem to indicate that we are asking the angels to intercede in front of Hashem on our behalf. Although this tefila is over a thousand years old and appears in the Seder of Rav Amram Gaon (9^th century!), it would seem to be profoundly problematic.

In the Rambam's 5^th principle of faith, he states that we must not serve angels and similar beings, as they do not have any power or choice. We must not use them as an intermediary to reach Hashem, rather we must direct ourselves to Hashem and leave all others.

On this occasion, the Rambam's view is far from a lone one. The Ramban writes that davening to angels is a form of idolatry, and this was the first stage of the downfall of mankind before the flood.[13] Maharal, often one of the Rambam's strongest critics, also says that the language of this prayer should be changed to the third person. Thus we daven to Hashem that He should instruct the angels to bring Him our prayers.[14]

Similar entreaties to angels and metaphorical beings appear in many other areas of our liturgy. Some do not say the verse 'Barchuni Leshalom' on Friday night, as it is a request to angels to bless us.[15] A similar argument could be made against some of the verses of Lecha Dodi, where we turn to Yerushalayim and ask it to rise from the dust.[16] However, my feeling is that these passages were only ever meant as poetry and not as real prayers. As no worship is involved, there should be no need to omit these sections.[17]

May Hashem help us find the right words and proper concentration, and accept all our tefilos.

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[1] Berachos 8a

[2] Hilchos Tefila 1:1-5

[3] Avoda Zara 8a

[4] It may be possible to reconcile this beracha with a more modern form of government, but this is not our topic here.

[5] Devarim 10:17

[6] Based on Yirmiya 32:18 and Daniel 9:4.

[7] Yoma 69b

[8] Although the gemara there refers to the 'institution of Moshe Rabbeinu,' it appears that this was not a formal institution as we know it.

[9] This is unrelated to the question as to what level of kavana (concentration) is required during davening. Even if a tefila said while daydreaming is valid (while being far from ideal), this is only if the daydreamer subconsciously believes in the words he is saying. Otherwise his words cannot be called prayer.

[10] Regarding the philosophical question of how it is possible to obligate someone to a belief system, it seems clear that Chazal were convinced that if a person genuinely is seeking the truth, at least in the majority of cases he will find it. The obligation is to seek the truth and thus to arrive at the correct conclusions.

[11] See Brachos on Mitzvos.

[12] See Mateh Efraim 581:11.  One example which many may not realise is the pizmon that starts באשמורת הבוקר, "At the morning watch". See Rashi to Shemos 14:24, that the 'morning watch' refers to the last third of the night, closest to morning (see also Berachos 3a). It is not 100% clear whether for these purposes, the night ends at Alos Hashachar (in which case almost everyone will have this problem) or at sunrise (see The Twilight Zone, footnote 17 and Biur HaGra, Orach Chaim 459:2).

[13] Shemos 20:12.

[14] Nesiv Ha'Avoda, chapter 12. This small change will only be noticeable to the discerning ear. When it comes to the piyut in Ne'ila of Yom Kipur (also in selichos of Erev Yom Kipur) addressed to Hashem's attribute of mercy, a bigger effort is required (although some versions of the Koren Machzor do in fact have an amended text).

[15] Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim 5:43, in the name of his father.

[16] Interestingly, when the talmidim of the Gra started the First Aliya, they stopped saying these sections for a different reason. They believed that this rise had already started.

[17] Similar arguments have been made to justify 'Machnisei Rachamim' as well, although to me it would seem extremely strange to recite mere poetry as part of our selichos.

Suicide and Euthanasia

The euthanasia debate has existed for decades in most of the world. In most countries, it remains illegal to assist even the terminally ill to put an end to their pain once and for all. However, some surveys show that most doctors believe that these laws are unethical and need to undergo significant reform.^[1] Religious leaders and the conservative tend to remain opposed to these changes; here we will examine halachic sources to determine whether this position is so straightforward.

The value of life and the prohibition on suicide

It is no secret that the Torah views life as one of the greatest values, and commands us to guard life at almost any price. As we know, the vast majority of mitzvos are deferred when a life is in danger. The obligation to preserve life is a clear precursor to this rule and it goes without saying that suicide is forbidden. The Torah tells us almost at the outset that man was made in the image of G-d.^[2]

For this reason, it appears that the Torah did not need to write the prohibition to take one's own life explicitly. However, Chazal explain that the command given to Noach "But I will seek (vengeance) for the blood of your souls" (Bereishis 9:5), includes the message that "I will seek vengeance for your blood from your own souls."^[3]

This principle is significant for our lives even under normal circumstances, when there is no thought of suicide. Some write that a person has no halachic ownership over his own body, extrapolating that we are obligated to save a person who makes a suicide attempt. According to this opinion, it is also forbidden for a person to donate organs for a charge.^[4]

Even according to those who dispute this,^[5] it is certainly incumbent on each person to care for his body and he is not permitted to do as he chooses with it. Even if one owns his body, he receives it as a present from Hashem and must act accordingly.

How to relate to physical pain

The Torah also recognises the fact that sometimes physical pain is harder to endure than death. The gemara says that although Chananya, Mishael and Azarya were willing to give up their lives in order to avoid bowing to the image of Nebuchadnezzar, had they been beaten they would have bowed down. Although death is considered to be a more severe punishment than lashes, this only applies to a fixed number of lashes where the end is in sight.^[6]

The rishonim go to great length in explaining this gemara. Some write that as the image of Nebuchadnezzar was not worshipped as a deity, bowing down to it would not technically transgress the prohibition of idolatry.^[7] Others write that the truth is that one is obligated to bare the pain of lashes rather than serve an idol - the gemara merely questions why Chananya, Mishael and Azarya did not flee, trusting that they would manage to endure the test.^[8] However, there is also a view that the Torah could not expect a person to consciously choose unlimited physical affliction, a fate worse than death. In such a situation, it would be permitted to bow to even a bona fide idol.^[9]

According to this last opinion, it would appear that suicide is permitted in situations of severe, unrelenting pain. There is no indication that suicide is a transgression worse than idolatry – if even idolatry is allowed in these circumstances, suicide should be no different. However, one could counter that the leniency regarding idolatry is based on the fact that one bowing down under duress is not really worshipping the idol, as he has no belief in its purported powers.^[10] As such, this form of idol 'worship' is indeed a lesser crime than suicide, which may remain forbidden.^[11]

Either way, according to all views it is explicit that unlimited physical affliction is considered a harsher punishment than death. Our question is whether one suffering to this degree is nevertheless expected to continue serving Hashem, or whether the Torah did not obligate him to such an extent. Clearly, even if suicide is forbidden under all circumstances, it is impossible for us to judge one who does not live up to this.^[12]

Shaul's act

One of the most prominent precedents in Jewish history to learn from here is the case of Shaul Hamelech, in the war against the Philistines. Sefer Shmuel describes how Shaul asked his henchman to kill him, so that the Philistines would not stab and abuse him. When this request was denied, Shaul fell on his sword in an attempt at suicide.^[13] According to the Amalekite convert, Shaul did not die from this and asked him to complete the killing. As the convert saw that Shaul was to die anyway, he carried out Shaul's wish. However, David Hamelech scolded the convert for this act and had him put to death for it.^[14]

This episode raises many questions. Firstly, who was right and who was wrong? Shaul's henchman felt that killing Shaul would be inappropriate even under the circumstances and even though Shaul requested it. Shaul decided to commit suicide. The convert felt that carrying out the request was correct considering that he would die anyway; David strongly disagreed.

Chazal tell us that the Torah's warning of vengeance for those who commit suicide, quoted above, does not apply to Shaul.^[15] Shaul did not lose his portion in the World to Come due to this act. The Ba'alei HaTosfos quote two opinions as to whether Shaul's deed also had approval, but side with the view that it did not.^[16]

Even if Shaul acted appropriately, we cannot necessarily conclude that the same applies to anyone who suffers from severe pain. The 'lenient' view quoted by the Tosfos only talks about a case where "one is afraid that severe afflictions will be imposed on him and that he may not be able to manage the test." The implication is that pain is not enough, unless there is also a fear that enemies will force him to transgress.

Maharshal adds further factors that justified Shaul's act:

1)      He thought that the nation would sacrifice themselves in order to save their king, causing many thousands to fall.

2)      It would not be appropriate for the King of Israel to die in the hands of the uncircumcised and for them to kill him with affliction and shame. This would be a desecration of Hashem and our religion.^[17]

The martyrdom of R' Chanina ben Tradyon

Another potential source event is the story of R' Chanina ben Tradyon. Chazal tell us that the Romans killed R' Chanina in the most brutal fashion – they burned him together with a Sefer Torah, placing sponges soaked in water on his heart so that he should not die quickly, and suffer more. His students witnessed this and suggested that he should open his mouth in order to allow the fire in, to which R' Chanina responded "Better that the One who gave it (my soul) should take it, rather than me harming myself."

Subsequently, the king's executor asked R' Chanina if he would enter the World to Come if he would remove the sponges, to which R' Chanina responded in the affirmative and swore to that effect. The executor immediately strengthened the fire and removed the sponges, causing R' Chanina's soul to depart speedily. The executor then himself jumped into the fire, upon which a Heavenly voice proclaimed "R' Chanina and the executor are invited to life in the World to Come."^[18]

At first glance, we have here an internal contradiction within the words of R' Chanina. He was not willing to haste his own death, but promised the executor reward for doing the same thing. The Heavenly voice confirmed the truth of his second statement,^[19] but the clear implication is that his own refusal to act was also correct.

R' Yehoshua Boaz writes that although causing someone to die quicker is forbidden, if something such as a knocking sound or salt on the tongue is preventing death, it is permitted to remove it. He explains that this is not considered killing, but merely 'removal of prevention.'^[20]

However, it is not always easy to distinguish between a direct act of murder and ‘removal of prevention.’^[21] Some poskim allow disconnecting one whose hope of living has been lost from the life support machine;^[22] some add that the doctors are even obligated to do so.^[23] Others write that a life support machine is not merely a 'prevention’ of death, as it provides the basic requirements for life. The corollary is that disconnecting it is considered murder.^[24] There is also a view that 'removal of prevention’ is only permitted in a case where the ’prevention’ should never have been placed, as in the case of R’ Chanina ben Tradyon.^[25]

Conclusion

To conclude, it should be obvious that the practical application of all of this requires much thought and analysis of each particular situation. Decisions of this level should be left to those who have a deep knowledge both of halacha and the world around them – it will usually also be necessary for several rabbis to convene before coming to a final ruling.

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[1] See for example this article.

[2] Bereishis 9:6

[3] Bava Kama 91b

[4] L'or Hahalacha (Rav Zevin), "Mishpat Shylock according to halacha"

[5] Minchas Chinuch, Mitzva 237:1; Chavos Binyamin (Rav Shaul Yisraeli) 3:109

[6] Kesuvos 33b

[7] Tosfos ibid. in the name of Rabeinu Tam

[8] See Ramban ibid.

[9] Shita Mekuetzes ibid. citing the Kuntresim

[10] In Sanhedrin 61b, the amoraim dispute the law of one who serves idols out of fear. The halacha is in accordance with the view of Rava, that he is exempt from punishment.

[11] One could also suggest another reason to differentiate between one being forced to bow down to an idol and one who suffers from pain 'from Heaven' – as in the latter case no-one is trying to make the person transgress, his act is one of choice and not one of coercion.

[12] As according to the last explanation above, it is possible that even Chananya, Mishael and Azarya would not have managed. See also Shu"t Chasam Sofer, Even Ha'ezer 1:69; Sho'el U'meishiv, volume 1 3:217; Maharsham 6, Yoreh Deah 49.

[13] Shmuel 1, 31:5

[14] Shmuel 2, 1:1-16. Although the Mechilta (Masechta d'Amalek, parsha 2) implies that David would not have had him killed were it not for the fact that he was an Amalekite, from a simple reading of the pesukim it is clear that this was not the only reason. It was at least in part because he killed 'the anointed of Hashem.'

[15] Bereishis Rabbah, parsha 34.

[16] Da'as Zekeinim miBa'alei HaTosfos, Bereishis 9:5. See also Radak, Shmuel 1 ibid., who writes that Shaul did not sin.

[17] Yam Shel Shlomo, Bava Kama 8:59. See also Radak ibid., who writes that it was better for him to kill himself rather than the uncircumcised abusing him.

[18] Avoda Zara 18a

[19] It is unclear what justification there was for the executor to needlessly commit suicide. Perhaps this was not in fact correct, but he was nevertheless rewarded for his good action.

[20] Shiltei HaGiborim, Rif Mo'ed Katan 16b (according to Sefer Chasidim. See there further, that some are more lenient). This is also the ruling of the Rama in Yoreh Deah 339:1. It would appear that although murder and suicide are forbidden even in the event of great pain, these prohibitions only cover direct taking of life. When there is already something killing a person, 'removing prevention' is not murder. Usually even under these circumstances, one is obligated to do all that he can to save a person in danger, as the Torah commands us not to 'stand by over the blood of your friend' (Vayikra 19:16). However, this command is subjective, and severe pain is also a form of 'blood' that the sufferer should be saved from. In such situations, one must carefully weigh up which 'blood' is the more severe and save the ill person from it. Obviously, for one not experiencing the pain this decision is far from straightforward.

[21] See Taz, Yoreh Deah ibid. 2

[22] Rav Chaim David Halevi, Techumin volume 2; Tzitz Eliezer 13:89; Mishne Halachos 7:287.

[23] Rav Chaim David Halevi ibid.

[24] Rav Goren, Toras Harefuah page 54. See also Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg (sheyichye), Emek Halacha, Asya 1.

[25] Rav Eliya Katz, Techumin 3.