Most of the
material written about the mitzvah of learning Torah concentrates either on the
amount required (how many hours etc.) or on the motivation behind the mitzvah.
Here I will ignore the former and deal with a halachic issue closely related to
the latter – the definition of Torah and learning Torah.
What texts are we obligated to learn? Is saying Tehilim, or learning other parts of Nach, learning Torah? What about the stories in the Gemara, or the medical advice in the Gemara (if these are part of Torah, what about studying contemporary medical advice)? Analysing philosophical questions about Hashem and the world? Although many of us may have preconceived ideas about the answers to some of these questions, careful analysis can show that the truth is not always as straightforward as we might think.
Before answering any of these questions, it is helpful to start by mentioning that the Gemara and Rambam divide Torah into three parts in relation to the mitzvah of learning Torah. For any study to count as Torah study, it will have to fall into one of these categories:
2. Mishna / Torah Sheba'al Peh (Oral Torah)
3. Talmud (studying how one halacha follows from another, how the Torah is expounded upon etc.)[1]
Rabbinic Law
Belief in the Torah Sheba'al Peh having been dictated to Moshe at Sinai, and forming an inseparable part of the Torah, is a fundamental tenet of our belief.[2] This certainly applies to the traditional interpretation of the Torah Shebichsav (Written Torah, i.e. the Pentateuch) and to halachos such as the water libation on Succos, which Chazal tell us are Halacha l'Moshe miSinai (laws taught to Moshe at Sinai, despite not appearing in the Written Torah). Does it also apply to Rabbinic decrees?
The Gemara tells us that Hashem did teach Moshe things that would later be instituted by the 'sofrim,' such as the reading of the Megila.[3] Elsewhere we are told that Moshe even made Bnei Yisrael swear that they would keep mitzvos yet to exist, with the reading of the Megila again given as an example.[4] This perhaps explains why Behag counts rabbinic mitzvos, such as lighting candles on Chanuka and reading the megila on Purim, in his list of the 613 mitzvos.[5]
The Rambam attacks Behag for this, writing "I can't see how anyone could imagine, or entertain the thought, that Moshe was commanded at Sinai that at the end of our kingdom, when such things would happen to us with the Greeks, we would be obligated to light Chanuka candles."[6] It appears that the Rambam understood that the undertaking to keep future mitzvos was a general one, and although the Gemara specifies the reading of the Megila, this was not specified to Bnei Yisrael.[7] Moshe may have been taught the details, but not as a command.
Presumably, Moshe merely being taught about these mitzvos is not a fact critical enough to be included in the Eighth Principle. Furthermore, it can be shown that rabbinic laws do not form part of the Oral Torah according to the Rambam. He lists Torah Sheba'al Peh and rabbinic laws as different categories in his introduction to Mishne Torah,[8] and more clearly in Hilchos Mamrim (1:2):
כל מי שאינו עושה כהוראתן עובר בלא תעשה, שנאמר לא תסור מכל
הדבר אשר יגידו לך ימין ושמאל. ... אחד דברים שלמדו אותן מפי השמועה והם תורה
שבעל פה, ואחד דברים שלמדום מפי דעתם באחת מן המדות שהתורה נדרשת בהן ונראה
בעיניהם שדבר זה כך הוא, ואחד דברים שעשאום סייג לתורה ולפי מה שהשעה צריכה והן
הגזרות והתקנות והמנהגות, כל אחד ואחד מאלו השלשה דברים מצות עשה לשמוע
להן, והעובר על כל אחד מהן עובר בלא תעשה.
It is quite explicit here that the Oral Torah and Rabbinical institutions are two separate categories, albeit with an equal Torah obligation to follow the instructions of the Sanhedrin in their regard.[9] Indeed, the term Torah Sheba'al Peh is not used for Rabbinic law anywhere in the Yad HaChazaka.[10]
It would therefore appear that the study of the details of Rabbinic laws does not fall under any of the three categories (the third category, Talmud, refers to in-depth expounding of the first two categories). While it is incumbent upon us to study these laws so that we know how to observe them, the perhaps surprising conclusion is that this study is not a mitzvah in its own right.[11]
Cantillation (Trop)
A further proof to this can be found in a ruling of the Rema. With certain limitations, there is a prohibition on taking money for teaching Torah. The amoraim dispute whether it is permitted to take money to teach how to correctly cantillate pesukim, and the gemara explains that the stringent ruling is based on a view that the traditional method of reading (trop) is itself part of the Torah.[12]
Rabbeinu Simcha understands that the lenient opinion holds that the cantillation marks were only a rabbinic institution, and this is why it is permitted to take payment for teaching them. The corollary is that it is permitted to take money for teaching any rabbinic laws, and this is undisputed in the Gemara.[13] The Rema quotes this as halacha in Shulchan Aruch, with no dissenting opinion.[14] This can only make sense if the teaching of these halachos is not part of the mitzvah of Torah study.[15]
In order to make this conclusion easier to swallow, it helps to consider the fact that when there is a Sanhedrin in place, rabbinic laws can be very fluid. Chazal tell us that the laws concerning which utensils may be moved on Shabbos, originally instituted by Nechemia, were changed several times.[16] Torah is everlasting and unchanging, while its application can change dependent on the situation. Rabbinic law is an application of the Torah's command to follow our Sages, rather than part of the Torah itself. This explains why it can change.
Nach
The conclusion above is based on the important distinction between Torah and halacha – while Rabbinic law is certainly part of halacha, it is not part of Torah. The inverse of this may be seen with Nach. While we are told that Biblical law cannot be learned from Nach,[17] the Rambam writes concerning the mitzvah of Torah study that Nach is part of the Written Torah, and its interpretation is part of the Oral Torah.[18]
In this context, it is common to quote the Midrash that says that David HaMelech davened that the reward for study of Tehilim should be equivalent to that for study of the laws of Nega'im (tzara'as) and Ohalos (ritual impurity transmitted between objects under the same roof),[19] and the discussion concerning whether this request was granted or not.[20] However, in my view the more important questions concern the nature of the request itself. For example, it is probable that at the time, Tehilim was yet to have been accepted as part of the Tanach. The request may have been to include it in Tanach (in which case the request certainly was granted), and this would automatically make it on a par with Nega'im and Ohalos.
Either way, as already mentioned, the Rambam certainly does equate Nach to the Torah.[21] The reason for preferring study of halacha to study of Nach is probably not based on anything inherent, but on the difficulty of achieving any degree of certainty when studying Nach on a deep level.[22] The same applies to the aggadic parts of the Gemara.[23]
Philosophy
Questions about the nature of Hashem and the origins of our Universe are clearly fundamental to Judaism. However, it would appear that the answers to these questions do not require Torah knowledge - these questions are critical for all human beings, and non-Jews are not expected or even encouraged to learn Torah.[24] How then can studying philosophy of this nature be considered Torah study?
The Rambam understands that the study of these matters is what Chazal refer to as 'Pardes' (lit. orchard, but clearly a metaphor for something deeper[25]),[26] which is included in the term 'Talmud.' Study of the nature of Hashem is also referred to as מעשה מרכבה (lit. 'the work of the chariot'), whereas study of the Universe and its creation is referred to as מעשה בראשית.[27]
These names can help us to understand why such study is part of learning Torah, as they refer to sections of Tanach. The term מעשה מרכבה is based on the vision of the chariot seen by Yechezkel,[28] whereas מעשה בראשית is clearly represented in the Torah by the story of Creation. From Chazal it is clear that there was also a tradition as to how to explain these sections, albeit known only to a small number of people.[29] The study of these materials certainly is part of the mitzvah of learning Torah, as explained above.[30]
The difficulty is that the Rambam himself did not seem to base his philosophy either on these sections of Tanach (at least in the main), or on any tradition. In Moreh Nevuchim, the Rambam writes his philosophical arguments concerning Hashem and the world at the beginning of part 2. In this section, he rarely quotes Tanach or Chazal, instead examining the philosophical principles of Aristotle and others. Not until the beginning of part 3 of the Moreh does the Rambam start to explain מעשה מרכבה and מעשה בראשית as they appear in Tanach, and there is little overlap between these two sections. In his introduction to part 3, he also states explicitly that his explanation of מעשה מרכבה was not taught to him by any teacher.
It seems that the Rambam must have understood that even if the Torah itself is not the source used to study these topics, their importance is so great that their study must be at least on a par to study of halacha. In fact, according to the Rambam, the 'basic' parts of the Torah are there in order to straighten the mind in preparation for understanding the deeper, metaphysical parts, and to facilitate orderly civilization in this world so that we can progress to the next.[31]
This view is far from unanimous. Many disagree strongly with the Rambam's entire contention that מעשה מרכבה refers to metaphysics.[32] Support for the opposing view can be found in the statement of Chazal that one should not believe a claim that Torah exists among the non-Jews.[33] The main thing that separates us from the non-Jews is halacha and not philosophy, and Chazal appear to be using the term 'Torah' to refer to halacha.[34]
Medicine and Science
The Gemara contains a fair measure of medical advice, as well as other information relating to astronomy and geology. Assuming that this information is meant literally and not allegorically, we must ask which sources Chazal used to derive it. As there is no indication that a Torah source was used, the simplest explanation is that Chazal either used their own understanding of chemistry and biology, or followed the common medical and scientific wisdom of the time.
As such, it is questionable whether the study of these parts of the Gemara is considered Torah learning. The Rambam writes that preserving a healthy body is one of the ways of Hashem, as it is impossible to attain knowledge of Hashem while ill. He then proceeds to give general health guidelines, all within the Yad HaChazaka.[35] However, the omission of these topics when discussing the mitzvah of learning Torah, while mentioning philosophy explicitly, seems to indicate that the two are not on the same level. Health guidelines were important for the Rambam in order to facilitate learning and observance of mitzvos, but the guidelines are not inherently part of the Torah.
May Hashem enlighten us in all parts of his Torah!
[1] Kiddushin 30a; Rambam Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:11
[2] See for example the Rambam's formulation of the Eighth Principle of
Faith (Commentary on the Mishna, Sanhedrin chapter 10). There is no dispute
regarding this aspect of the Eighth Principle within Orthodox Jewry.
[3] Megila 19b
[4] Shevuos 39a
[5] Introduction to Halachos Gedolos, positive mitzvos 139 and 200.
[6] Sefer Hamitzvos, Shoresh 1. The Ramban offers various defences for
the Behag, one of which references the Gemara in Shevuos quoted above (in
footnote 3). However, he too does not dispute the Rambam regarding whether
these individual mitzvos were commanded to Moshe.
[7] See Birkei Yosef, Orach Chaim 124:1 (section 3).
[8] The relevant quote is"נמצא רבינא ורב אשי וחבריהם. סוף גדולי חכמי
ישראל המעתיקים תורה שבעל פה. ושגזרו גזירות והתקינו התקנות והנהיגו מנהגות".
[9] The Ramban famously disputes this point in his 'corrections' to
Sefer Hamitzvos, Shoresh 1.
[10] R' Hershel Schachter makes a counterargument from the Rambam's
introduction to his commentary on the Mishna, where he lists five categories of
Torah laws, the last two being Rabbinic fences and institutions. However, I
believe that these categories are categories of laws that the Torah obligates
us to follow, rather than parts of the Torah itself.
[11] This is somewhat similar to a situation where a person takes an
oath to perform a certain action, and is therefore obligated by the Torah to
keep the terms of his oath. Study of the details of what exactly is included in
his oath is essential, but it is not part of the mitzvah of learning Torah.
[12] Nedarim 37a-b
[13] Hagahos Maimoniyos, Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:5
[14] Yoreh Deah 246:5. See however Aroch HaShulchan 18, who questions
this.
[15] See however Sha'ar Mishpat 28:2.
[16] Shabbos 123b
[17] Bava Kama 2b, among other places. Although elsewhere the Gemara
does equate laws instituted by the Nevi'im with Biblical law (Rosh Hashana
19a), this is only in respect to the seriousness commonly attributed to these
laws by the people and the resulting lack of need to further reinforce them.
[18] Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:12. The Vilna Ga'on cites Kiddushin 49a as a
source for this (Biur HaGra, Yoreh Deah 246:5).
[19] Midrash Tehilim (Shocher Tov) 1:1, paragraph 8
[20] See for example https://forum.otzar.org/viewtopic.php?t=32099
[21] Although the acronym Tanach used for Torah, Nevi'im and Kesuvim, would
seem to indicate that Nevi'im and Kesuvim do not form part of the Torah (this
acronym is of medieval origin, but the three-way division already appears in
the gemara), this distinction does not affect the mitzvah of Torah study. It is
likely that this distinction was made mainly in relation to the actual scrolls,
where we do find that the sanctity of a Sefer Torah is higher than that of
Nevi'im and Kesuvim. This represents the difference between the prophecy of
Moshe Rabbeinu and that of other prophets.
[22] Nach tends to be used merely to reinforce view held previously – it
is extremely difficult to find examples of people changing their views on
anything based on what they have learned from Nach.
[24] Sanhderin 59a. Although non-Jews also get reward for studying the
seven mitzvos incumbent upon them, this only makes sense once they have
established that Hashem exists and that these mitzvos were indeed commanded by
Him.
[25] See Chagiga 14b
[26] Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 4:10-13
[27] Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:12.
[28] In the first chapter.
[29] See Chagiga 11b (the Mishna) and 13a.
[30] Presumably these sections carry within them information that the
human brain is in general incapable of deducing from logic alone.
[31] Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 4:13
[32] See Or Hashem (R' Chisdai Kreskas) Ma'amar 4, Drush 10; Biur HaGra,
Yoreh Deah 246:18.
[33] Eicha Rabba 2:9
[34] Although even the written Torah has non-halachic parts, the overall
message within the Torah is a halachic one. See Rashi to Bereishis 1:1.
[35] Hilchos De'os Chapter 4
