Friday, 10 December 2021

Fixing the Jewish Calendar

Introduction

Measurement of time by the date, day, hour and minute is a fundamental part of human life. Thanks to modern technology, most of us do not need to make much of an effort to determine the exact time, and as a result, the calendar is something we tend to take for granted.

However, the methodology involved in calibrating any calendar with the astronomical cycles in our Universe is anything but simple. This is true of the secular calendar in respect to the seasons of the year – the 365.2425 days used by the Gregorian calendar for the average solar (tropical) year is not 100% accurate.[1] Similarly, the 24-hour period measured by atomic clocks, used in Coordinated Universal Time, does not correlate exactly to the average rotation time of the Earth.

In both cases, the discrepancies cannot be fully negated just by using a 'more accurate' system (e.g. by adjusting the length of the second or the number of leap years), as the speed of the Earth's rotation is getting gradually slower over time, and also fluctuates due to several unpredictable contributing factors. To mitigate for this, a decision is made every six months as to whether a second must be added on June 30 or December 31. A total of 27 'leap seconds' have been added since 1972.[2]

The halachic day and night are dependent only on the rotation of the Earth (not by any fixed length second or hour), which seemingly avoids any problems caused by changes in the speed of rotation. However, the Jewish calendar also uses lunar (synodic) months, introducing another factor that is extremely difficult to calculate exactly. Here we shall examine some problems that this may cause, and some potential solutions.

The Mean Synodic Month

The interval between new moons varies significantly due to various factors, from a minimum of about 29 days 6 1/2 hours to a maximum of about 29 days 20 hours. Our calendar is based on the average interval (mean synodic month), measured by Chazal as being 29 days, 12 hours and 793 chalakim (there are 1080 chalakim in an hour).[3] The molad (lit. birth) of each month is defined as this interval of time after the molad of the previous month,[4] and the date of Rosh Hashana each year is fixed using the molad of Tishrei of that year.[5]

This measurement of the average interval is extremely accurate. The small discrepancy that does exist today is primarily because the length of the mean synodic month gets gradually shorter over time. The cause of this change is the same factor that causes discrepancies in the secular calendar – the reducing speed of the Earth's rotation.

Even today, Chazal's measurement of the length of the mean synodic month is correct to the nearest chelek (i.e. it is as accurate as it could be using chalakim as the smallest unit of time). Cumulatively, this means that the molad times used today are only around 100 minutes later than they should be.[6] However, using a more accurate mean interval for the molad would affect the date of Rosh Hashana (and therefore of other Yamim Tovim as well) in about 7% of years.[7] This is not a significant problem, as the halachic calendar follows the decisions of the Jewish People and its leaders, even when mistaken.[8]

The Lunisolar Calendar

It is well known that a year consisting of twelve lunar months is roughly eleven days shorter than the solar year, and that the Jewish year sometimes contains a thirteenth month in order to address this imbalance. The Torah says that Pesach is in 'the month of the spring,' Shavuos is the 'harvest festival' and Sukkos is the 'festival of ingathering (of crops)', and this could not be maintained using a uniform year of twelve lunar months.

The extra month of Adar Sheni is therefore added in seven out of every nineteen years. The resulting 235 lunar months in nineteen years produce an average year length of 365.2468 days; the actual solar year is 365.2422 days long.[9] The average discrepancy is about seven minutes per year, or a day every 216 years. Cumulatively, this has caused a seasonal drift of around seven days from the time that the calendar was originally fixed.[10] The spring equinox is astronomically on March 20-21, but by halachic calculations is currently on March 27-28.[11]

This discrepancy is far larger than the 100-minute discrepancy that exists with measurement of the molad. The current effect of it is that three times in nineteen years, an extra month is added a year earlier than necessary in order to keep Pesach in the spring (the original halachic requirement is to ensure that the first day of Pesach falls on or after the spring equinox[12]).

If no intervention is made, this gradual shift will eventually push Pesach into the summer.[13] Although this is not likely to be for thousands of years, I would nevertheless like to discuss a possible mechanism for correcting the small discrepancies. While there is no pressing need to use this mechanism, it is certainly useful to get a better understanding of the halachic authority behind the fixing of the calendar.

Kidush HaChodesh

A clear assumption of Chazal in many places is that beis din declares Rosh Chodesh based on testimony of sighting of the new moon.[14] At some point in history, this practice was discontinued and a fixed calendar was implemented, but there is surprisingly no explicit mention of this in the gemara. The obvious question is who had the authority to make this change, and in general who has the authority to fix the calendar.

There is a broad halachic consensus that once no beis din existed whose members had semicha (rabbinical ordination passed down in an unbroken chain from Moshe Rabbeinu), it was no longer possible to continue declaring Rosh Chodesh based on sightings of the new moon.[15] Thus towards the end of the amoraic period (in the 4th century CE), it was necessary to move to a calendar based on calculations.

The Rambam writes that it is part of the Oral Tradition taught to Moshe at Sinai that when there is a Sanhedrin, Rosh Chodesh is declared based on sighting of the new moon; when there is no Sanhedrin, we must use the calculations in place today.[16] However, even today, only the calculation of the inhabitants of Eretz Yisrael is authoritative. Jews outside Eretz Yisrael may only rely on the knowledge of the methodology used by the community in Eretz Yisrael, and replicate the same calculations.[17]

The perhaps surprising, but clear implication of the words of the Rambam, is that to this day, the Jewish calendar and the yamim tovim are fixed by the word of the Jewish community in Eretz Yisrael. Were we to decide that the algorithm used until today requires updating, we would have the halachic authority to do so, even without the Sanhedrin.[18]

Ramban disagrees with all of this, arguing that it is not possible for those without semicha to have any authority in regards to the calendar.[19] Rather, as semicha was ending, the sage Hillel II (who did have semicha) instituted the fixed calendar and declared all the Roshei Chodashim and leap years until the end of time, in advance.[20]

Thus according to the Ramban, nothing can be done to re-calibrate our calendar until the Sanhedrin is re-established. However, the Ramban's account of the original fixing of the calendar is not accepted by historians. Aside from the gaping omission in the gemara of the fixing of the calendar, a letter of R' Sherira Ga'on attests to a date in the year CE 506 that is impossible according to the fixed calendar of today.[21] This can only mean that our fixed calendar was finalised at a later date, when there was no-one alive with the authority to do so according to the Ramban.[22]

Our conclusion is therefore that it would indeed be possible to re-calibrate our calendar today, even without the Sanhedrin. However, as practically speaking, there is no great need, and establishing a consensus on doing so would be challenging to say the least, it may be better to concentrate our efforts in more pressing need of change.


[1] This discrepancy is small enough to have been largely ignored. Although a suggestion has been made to make the system of secular leap years more accurate, this will only be relevant from the year 4000 CE. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gregorian_calendar#Accuracy

[3] Rosh Hashana 25a. This measurement also appears in non-Jewish ancient sources and it is unclear who should be credited with its determination, but this is not important for our purposes.

[4] As the time used for the molad is based on the average interval, the molad is sometimes known as מולד האמצעי (the average molad), in contrast to the מולד האמיתי (the true molad), which has no halachic significance.

[5] Rosh Hashana is either on the day of the molad or on one of the two subsequent days, following an algorithm codified by the Rambam in Hilchos Kidush HaChodesh, chapter 7 (the definition and calculation of the molad are explained in chapter 6).

[6] This discrepancy is increasing at around three hours in 2,000 years. Due to the reducing Earth rotation speed, the rate of increase in the discrepancy is itself increasing.

[7] By my calculations, the last time this would have happened would have been in the year 5766 / CE 2005 (Rosh Hashana would have been on a Monday instead of a Tuesday). It would happen again in 5789 / CE 2028 (Rosh Hashana would be on a Tuesday instead of a Thursday) and the following year (Rosh Hashana would be on a Shabbos instead of a Monday).

[8] See Rosh Hashana 25a. Who exactly has the power to decide, and how this applies in our times, will be discussed below.

[9] The average year length produced by the Jewish calendar is thus more accurate than that produced by the Julian calendar (365.25 days), used by the secular world until 1582, but less accurate than the average year length produced by the Gregorian calendar (365.2425 days). It is interesting to note that were we to update the mean molad interval to a more accurate measure, correcting the inaccuracy in measuring the lunar months, the Jewish calendar would produce a mean year length of 365.2426 days and the inaccuracy of the current lunisolar calendar would also be virtually eliminated.

[10] The length of the solar year, measured in solar days (the rotation time of the Earth), has not changed significantly over this time (the length measured in fixed length seconds has changed by a similar degree to the change in the length of time taken for the Earth to rotate).

[11] These halachic calculations are codified by the Rambam in Hilchos Kidush HaChodesh, chapter 9.

[12] Rosh Hashana 21a. It should be noted that our fixed calendar does appear to allow for a small breach of this rule on rare occasions. In the year 5773 (CE 2013), the first day of Pesach was on March 26, the day before the halachic equinox (the next recurrence is in 5849 / CE 2089). The Meiri explains that ensuring Pesach falls in the spring is only a strict requirement when Sanhedrin are ruling on each month in its time, based on testimony of sighting of the New Moon. Now that we have a fixed calendar, it is only necessary to ensure that the calendar stays approximately in sync with the seasons of the year (Sanhedrin 13a). However, see also Yad Rama there (13b), who reinterprets the gemara to mean that only the first day of Chol Hamoed need be on or after the equinox.

[13] Chazal did not define when the 'spring' ends, but there clearly is significant leeway. Before the calendar was fixed, the extra month could be added for a variety of reasons, even when there was no danger of Pesach being before the spring.

[14] See Rosh Hashana 22a-26a.

[15] The Rambam writes that the power to declare Rosh Chodesh in this manner lies solely with the Sanhedrin, or with another beis din in Eretz Yisrael delegated by the Sanhedrin (Kidush HaChodesh 5:1). Ramban agrees that this was true while the Sanhedrin existed, but argues that in times when there is no Sanhedrin, any beis din comprising of three people with semicha may declare Rosh Chodesh. If no such beis din exists in Eretz Yisrael, a beis din with semicha outside Eretz Yisrael may declare Rosh Chodesh based on testimony (Sefer Hamitzvos, Asei 153).

[16] Kidush Hachodesh 5:2

[17] Ibid. 5:13. See also Sefer Hamitzvos (Asei 153), where the Rambam adds that were it possible for Eretz Yisrael to become empty of Jews, the calculations would be of no use and we would not be able to fix months and years outside Eretz Yisrael.

[18] One could argue that the traditional method of calculation in its entirety is part of the Oral Tradition, and that we therefore must not deviate from it. To me it seems improbable that Hashem would have taught Moshe an imperfect system, and it is far more likely that the Oral Tradition was more generic, teaching us that human calculation is to be used when there is no Sanhedrin. Even if I am wrong and we are commanded to stick to the old system, it does seem clear that if we did decide to make a change, ipso facto this change would be halachically binding.

[19] He also has a historic objection to the Rambam's view, based on midrashim that state that for a period after the destruction of the first Beis HaMikdash, there was no community in Eretz Yisrael. However, it would appear that this difficulty can be reconciled easily. The Rambam also agrees that if a great man was exiled, leaving no-one of his stature in Eretz Yisrael, he can make a beis din in his place and declare Roshei Chodashim (based on testimony of sightings of the new moon) and leap years (Kidush HaChodesh 1:8).

[20] Sefer Hamitzvos, Asei 153. The attribution of the fixing of the calendar to Hillel is first found in a responsa of Rav Hai Gaon quoted in Sefer Ha'Ibur (Ma'amar 3, Sha'ar 7); Rambam writes that this change was made in the days of Abaye and Rava (Kidush HaChodesh 5:3), contemporaries of Hillel II.

[21] At the end of the section about the savoraim, he writes that Rav Achai bar Rav Huna died on Sunday, Adar 4 of year 506 (he records this as the year 816, based on the Seleucid calendar in use at the time). According to the system in place now, this date would have been a Monday. If it were a Sunday then Pesach of that year would be on a Friday and the following Rosh Hashana would be on a Sunday, in violation of a basic rule of our calendar.

[22] Although the Rambam also writes that the switch to a fixed calendar happened earlier, it is quite possible that the original fixed calendar did not have the same rules as today's calendar, and these were added or edited over time.

Sunday, 17 October 2021

Levels of Ownership

Introduction

Ownership of an item does not have to be complete. Two or more people can own something jointly, with equal or unequal shares in it. The split also does not have to be defined by a percentage. Using the example of a cow, an arrangement can be made whereby one person's owns the cow in respect to its milk (they will receive the milk), another person owns the rights to any offspring born by the cow and a third person owns the meat once the cow can no longer give milk.

There will then be questions as to who has the right to decide how much the cow is milked, how expenses are shared etc. Any legal system needs to have an answer to these questions, as well as any other issues that are owner-dependent according to the system. For example, the Torah imposes a fine on a thief who is testified against in court and found guilty – he must pay double. The owners of the cow will divide the payment between them, but this is more complicated when their shares are not defined by percentages.[1]

Here I would like to discuss a particular case subject to a dispute in the gemara, and some ramifications for Hilchos Shemita.[2]

Leasehold and Freehold

While the laws of Yovel (the Jubilee Year) applied, one who sold land in Eretz Yisrael did so only for a limited period. When Yovel came, the land would return to its original owner. In other words, only the leasehold could be sold and not the freehold. In halacha, the leasehold is known as קניין פירות (lit. ownership of the produce).

The dispute in the gemara is in regard to the laws of bikurim (the first fruits, which must be brought to the Beis Hamikdash). One who brings bikurim usually needs to make the declaration spelled out in the Torah,[3] but as this declaration refers to 'the land which you have given me', it can only be made by the true owner of the land. Reish Lakish therefore maintains that one who buys only the leasehold of the land, including any buyer when the laws of Yovel apply,[4] cannot make this declaration. R' Yochanan disagrees, and the gemara explains that he holds that the leaseholder is considered the true owner (קניין פירות כקניין הגוף דמי).[5]

The halacha follows Reish Lakish, i.e. that only the freeholder is the 'real' owner of the land.[6] While there are other applications to this halacha in the gemara, there are not as many as we might have expected for such a fundamental principle. It would seem that the main ramifications are for bikurim and other land-related mitzvos, and we shall discuss this in relation to Shemita.

Non-Jewish Ownership

Produce of non-Jewish owned land is not subject to the prohibition of Sefichim according to the Rambam, and nowadays this view is the complete halachic consensus. Furthermore, according to the Beis Yosef, none of the laws of Shemita apply to the produce of non-Jewish owned land.[7] As the leaseholder of land is not the halachic owner, these leniencies can only be applied to land where a non-Jew is also the freeholder.

This creates a potential problem for Heter Mechira, whereby Jewish landowners 'sell' their land to non-Jews in order to circumvent the laws of Shemita. For both halachic and practical reasons, there is no desire to sell the land permanently; selling just the leasehold will not achieve anything.

A Temporary Freehold?

One of the solutions suggested to overcome this problem will sound to many like a contradiction in terms. The Rambam (not in relation to Hilchos Shemita) differentiates between selling land for its produce (מכירת גוף לפירותיו) and selling for a limited period (מכירה לזמן). The former has no right to make changes to the land such as building or destroying, whereas the latter may make such changes during his tenure as owner of the land.[8]

The suggestion is that instead of selling the land only in respect to its produce, the entire ownership of the land should be sold for a limited period. In this way, the argument is that the non-Jewish buyer will be the true halachic owner even according to Reish Lakish.

However, this claim is far from straightforward. Firstly, the Ran writes explicitly that any temporary ownership is akin to ownership of the produce alone.[9] He proves this from the same gemara quoted above regarding bikurim, which says that any land sale at the time where the laws of Yovel apply is a sale of the land only in respect to its produce.[10]

It is not even clear that the Rambam is in dispute with the Ran. The Ran certainly agrees that it is possible to have an arrangement where the buyer is allowed to build and destroy, but must return the land at the end of his tenure. Although he classifies this as mere קניין פירות and the Rambam calls it קניין הגוף לזמן קצוב, the Rambam may agree that this level of ownership is also not sufficient to make the declaration when bringing bikurim, or to avoid the prohibition of Sefichim during Shemita.[11]

Fictitious Sales

The truth is that there is a more significant problem, which applies even if we assume that the 'temporary freeholder' is the real owner. Landowners do not want to allow non-Jews to build on their land during Shemita, so it is not practical to implement a genuine sale of the body of the land, even for a limited period. The whole point of Heter Mechira is to ensure that crops can be grown on the 'sold' land, but if the sale is genuine there is no way to achieve this.

The Mishna tells of a case where a father, apparently upset with his son, took a vow not to get any benefit from his son's possessions. The son tried to circumvent this vow by giving a meal as a 'present' to his friend, so that his father could partake from it. The friend then declared that if this meal is really his, it is now consecrated to Heaven (and forbidden for consumption)! When the son backtracked and said that the 'present' was not meant for this purpose, the Chachamim ruled that the gift was fictitious and the father may not eat. They formulated a general rule, that "any gift that the recipient is unable to consecrate is not a gift."[12]

The Rosh points out that a person certainly can make a gift with limitations, resulting in some form of shared ownership. A limitation on the recipient's ability to consecrate the gift is no different, and this would have been valid. The problem with the case of the Mishna is that no such clarification was made at the time of sale, and in reality, the son did not intend to give any meaningful gift at all. If the recipient is given real control over the item in one regard alone, this is sufficient to make it halachically valid.[13]

The implication is that a heavily limited gift (or sale) is sufficient to make the recipient the new halachic owner as far as the laws of vows are concerned, and presumably for other laws as well. Extrapolating to Hilchos Shemita, this would imply that giving the non-Jewish buyer any limited right to the land would be sufficient to prevent any issue of Sefichim.[14]

This corollary to the comments of the Rosh is astonishing to me, as it seems to make the halachic ownership subject to the arbitrary decision of the buyer and seller, irrespective of the breakdown of their financial rights in the object.[15] Furthermore, it would appear to be in contradiction to the gemara regarding the status of the leaseholder. The leaseholder also has ownership of the land in one respect, and according to both views, the halachic 'real' owner is determined objectively.[16]

Limitations and Stipulations

Partly due to the concerns described above, in recent times an alternative to the sale of land for a limited period has been suggested. It is possible to transfer full ownership of an object, on condition that a certain term is fulfilled. The recipient owns the item completely, from the moment that the transaction takes place, provided that the condition be met at a specified later date. If the term is not met, in retrospect we will know that the transaction was not effective.

The gemara says that with a few exceptions due to technicalities, one can even make a gift contingent on the recipient returning the item later (מתנה על מנת להחזיר). As long as the item is indeed returned, it is considered the property of the recipient in the interim. One may utilise this method to give an esrog to one who doesn't have one, allowing him to fulfil the mitzvah provided that he returns it afterwards.[17]

The new form of Heter Mechira works along similar lines. Land is sold to a non-Jew on condition that he will agree to sell it back after Shemita. The claim is that during Shemita, the land will belong to the non-Jew entirely; at the same time, there will be no risk of the seller not getting his land back.

However, this method is not without its problems. One major risk is that if the non-Jew decides not to sell the land back, the original sale will be invalidated and all Shemita-related prohibitions will turn out to have been in full force.[18] Proponents of this solution argue that as long as we find an honest non-Jew who has our interest at heart, this risk can be mitigated.[19]

Perhaps more importantly, this method does nothing to solve the problem of the non-Jew being able to use the land as he chooses during Shemita. As long as he returns the land in the state he received it, he could theoretically sow whatever he wants or rent the land to a third party.

In practice, the non-Jew would not be allowed to exercise such a right. I can only assume that additional conditions or limitations are made to the sale designed to prevent this possibility, but I do not know how these limitations could be valid while preserving the genuineness of the sale. Unfortunately, I have not been able to obtain the text of the contract used.[20]


[1] In practice, an assessment of the value of the various different shares of the cow will need to be made. It is questionable whether the owner to sell the cow only in respect to the right to these fines – see Bava Metsia 33b-34a and Tosfos there (ד"ה כגון); Ktzos HaChoshen and Nesivos HaMishpat siman 295.

[2] These ramifications were discussed in Chapter 6 of Understanding Halacha - Hilchos Shemita and there is some overlap, but here I elaborate more on the general issue of ownership, using Hilchos Shemita as an example.

[3] Devarim 26

[4] While all the twelve tribes were living in their individual territories.

[5] Gitin 47b-48a

[6] Yevamos 36b

[7] See Chapter 6 of Understanding Halacha - Hilchos Shemita for an in-depth discussion.

[8] Hilchos Mechira 23:6. Both of these are able to sow or plant whichever species they want, and have the right to rent the land to a third party – this right distinguishes them from a renter of land (Ibid. 23:8).

[9] Nedarim 29a

[10] Were there to be an in-between possibility of selling the body of the land for a limited period, the gemara should have applied this rule to Yovel as well. It is possible that the Rambam would counter that although this possibility exists in theory, when the laws of Yovel apply this too is impossible. The Torah says explicitly that under Yovel, a sale of land is essentially a sale of harvests of produce (Vayikra 25:15).

[11] See also Ktzos HaChoshen and Nesivos HaMishpat siman 241.

[12] Nedarim 48a

[13] Bava Basra 8:38 (also quoted in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 241:5). There is some discussion as to how clear an indication is required as to the intentions of the person making the gift, and when we should apply the rule of דברים שבלב אינם דברים (unspoken words do not count). But this is not relevant to our discussion, as we are dealing with cases where the terms of the sale are spelled out explicitly.

[14] In practice, I am under the impression that the non-Jew 'purchasing' under Heter Mechira actually has no rights at all, but I have been unable to verify this fully.

[15] Perhaps this is similar to the possibility of selling a cow only in respect to the right to the fine payable for stealing it, discussed briefly in footnote 1 above.

[16] The Rosh would presumably be forced to make a distinction between a temporary owner, who can never be considered the 'real' owner, and a permanent owner of one of the rights of an object.

[17] Kidushin 6b

[18] It is for this reason that we do not sell Chametz before Pesach on condition that the non-Jew will sell it back – such an arrangement risks transgressing the prohibition of owning Chametz on Pesach.

[19] Although of course there is no guarantee that the non-Jew will stay in good health.

[20] From this article (in Hebrew) it appears that the new method was first implemented in the Shemita of תשס"ח (2007-8), but I have not even been able to verify whether this has continued for the current Shemita year. If anyone has more information, I would be grateful to hear.

Wednesday, 22 September 2021

Torah will Emanate from Zion


The role of the Jewish People in relation to the other nations of the world is described by the Torah, the rest of Tanach and Chazal in various places. However, as these references tend to be vague or abstract,[1] a variety of different approaches have been taken by leading figures throughout our history. I will analyse the sources and some of these approaches, trying to clarify what our aims should be as well as the practicalities of achieving these aims.

A Receptacle for the World

The choosing of the Jewish People starts with Hashem's first words to Avraham Avinu. After the promises of great nationhood and other blessings, Avraham is told somewhat cryptically:

"... ונברכו בך כל משפחת האדמה."            (בראשית יב, ג)

"All the families of the Earth will be blessed through you."              (Bereishis 12:3)

The mechanism of this transmission of blessing is unclear. It could be a metaphysical transmission, unrelated to any connection between Jews and non-Jews on Earth, or perhaps non-Jews will earn their blessings following Jewish influence on their ways.[2]

Avraham himself took a proactive approach to this. When commanded in the same passage to leave his homeland for Eretz Yisrael, he takes with him "the souls that they had 'made' in Charan,"[3] which Chazal explain as referring to people whom Avraham and Sarah had brought close to Hashem (the first 'kiruv' workers).[4] Although these people seem to have been recruited prior to Hashem's words to Avraham, presumably Avraham was chosen in part because of the work he had already done.

However, it is unclear whether Avraham's project had long-term success. In Avraham's lifetime, we see further references to members of the clan, perhaps most notably the 318 people who assisted in the rescue of Lot (and the kingdom of Sedom) from the conquest of K'darlaomer.[5] Yitzchak also appears to have had a following,[6] although when Yaakov is forced to flee from Esav, all of this is left behind. When Yaakov eventually travels to Egypt, only his family (numbering seventy) comes with him.[7]

What became of these people is therefore somewhat of a mystery.[8] The praise given to Avraham for his actions indicates that the project was a worthy one, which leads me to believe that it also had at least a degree of success. The fact that the people did not ultimately become part of the Jewish nation is wholly consistent with the view unanimously accepted within Judaism – non-Jews can serve Hashem without converting.[9]

Shlomo HaMelech

Avraham Avinu was a significant figure in the world that he lived in, as is indicated by his conversations with various kings in the area. However, he did not have a kingdom and his influence was limited by the relatively small area of land that he occupied. The next figure who explicitly and actively engaged in spreading the influence of the Jewish People to other nations was Shlomo HaMelech, who was not held back by such limitations.

Shlomo was the first person to mention the idea of the Beis HaMikdash being a place that non-Jews could also come to serve Hashem.[10] He also enlisted non-Jewish assistance in its building,[11] promoted other international trade[12] and received warmly those who came to seek his counsel from far and wide.[13]

All of this appears to be viewed in a positive light in Tanach. The criticism comes over Shlomo marrying 1,000 wives, from nations whom we are explicitly commanded not to marry, who subsequently turned Shlomo to idolatry (either actively, as the simple reading of Tanach suggests, or at least by allowing idolatry to take place in Israel).[14]

Marrying these wives was certainly part of Shlomo's wider plan to further international relations, presumably with the aim of spreading the word of Hashem. It is possible that ulterior, lustful motives also were part of it, ultimately leading to Shlomo's downfall. It also seems likely that there was an inherent problem with this part of Shlomo's plan, even if his intentions were pure.

While the details are not clear, the simple message seems to be that spreading the word of Hashem among the non-Jews is an important task, but one that must be done with care. The more ambitious the project, the greater the risks that may be involved.

Another point to take from the episode is that a leader cannot hope for a plan of this nature to be successful without widespread support from the people. The physical and financial toil of Shlomo's project proved to be too much, eventually leading to the split of the kingdom.[15] Whether or not this rebellion could have been avoided had the spiritual decline been mitigated,[16] it is important for all leaders to heed the fact that they are representatives of the people and must act accordingly.

For the Individual

For various reasons that I will not go into, I do not think that today's government has the ability to undertake projects such as that of Shlomo HaMelech. Regular individuals certainly do not have this power, but it may be possible to have an influence on non-Jews on a smaller scale, in a similar manner to Avraham Avinu.

However, the Torah and Chazal warn us clearly to avoid getting too close to non-Jews, out of concern that the influence will be in the opposite direction.[17] The Torah mandates the removal of the idolatrous nations from Eretz Yisrael, the explicit reason being the prevention of intermarriage and learning from their sinful practices.[18] Chazal added the rabbinic prohibitions of eating food cooked by a non-Jew, bread baked by a non-Jew, and more, as a further strengthening of this barrier.[19]

None of this is necessarily at odds with the work of Avraham Avinu, who invited guests into his own home but did not eat out in the homes of others, at least as far as we know.[20] We are only discouraged from socialising with those who do not share our values as equal friends. Nevertheless, this barrier is itself a limitation on the influence we can have, and we can hardly expect that the Avraham Avinu model of 'kiruv' will change the world.[21]

In the Internet Age

I believe that at least one reason why Tanach and Chazal do not give us any clear formula for how we should be a 'light unto nations', is because by nature this will vary considerably based on the time and place. A Jew fleeing from pogroms, or even living during the more peaceful periods of our exile, had his work cut out to live his own life according to the Torah and to care for his family and community.

We are fortunate enough to live in an age where our actions can have an effect on a large number of people, without even leaving home. While the internet and social media hold their own dangers, it is certainly practical to utilise them effectively without getting too close to harmful influences. Success is far from guaranteed, but in my view, for those who are well thought out it is also far from impossible.

This field has only caught my interest in in the last year or so.[22] In this time, I have observed that the Internet stores an unsurprisingly large amount of material promoting atheism, Christianity and Islam to others, but the same is not true for Judaism. There are plenty of websites, blogs (this one included), podcasts, YouTube channels and similar that are 'by Jews and for Jews', but there is very little aimed at spreading the Jewish view to those who are not Jewish.[23] The result is that the Jewish voice is either missing or poorly represented, to the detriment of the truth-seekers who consume this content.

One reason for this is likely the fact that historically Jews have been insular, for good reason. Our reluctance to 'impose' on the rest of the world when it can be avoided is well understood. However, for the reasons discussed above, it is high time for a change of direction.

May we merit to see (and to help bring about) the prophecy of Zecharia:

"וְהָיָה כָּל הַנּוֹתָר מִכָּל הַגּוֹיִם הַבָּאִים עַל יְרוּשָׁלָ‍ִם וְעָלוּ מִדֵּי שָׁנָה בְשָׁנָה לְהִשְׁתַּחֲו‍ֹת לְמֶלֶךְ ה' צְבָאוֹת וְלָחֹג אֶת חַג הַסֻּכּוֹת."

זכריה יד, טז

"The remnant of the nations that will come against Yerushalayim, will ascend each year to prostrate themselves to the King, Hashem Tzeva'os, and to celebrate the festival of Sukkos."

Zecharia 14:16


[1] I discussed one of the main sources in Yerushalayim and the World, but in that post I focussed on the passive influence of the internal actions of the Jewish People.

[2] See also Rashi and others who avoid this question by translating the term ונברכו בך differently.

[3] Bereishis 12:5

[4] See Rashi ibid, quoting Bereishis Rabbah. However, as Rashi also points out, it is possible to interpret this term in different ways.

[5] Bereishis 14:14

[6] See Bereishis 26:14.

[7] Bereishis 46:8-27

[8] While theories have been put forward, those that I have seen do not come close to being proven.

[9] I deliberately do not discuss the Erev Rav and the Torah's overall approach to converts here, as my purpose is defining our role in relation to those who do not choose to convert. The fact that the Torah does not encourage proselytisation is not relevant to this.

[10] Melachim 1, 8:41-3

[11] Ibid. 5:16-20

[12] Ibid. 10:28-9

[13] Ibid. 10:1-10

[14] Ibid. 11:1-11

[15] Ibid. 12:1-24

[16] It is quite possible that the people would have been happy to support the project had it not involved the financing of a home for the daughter of Pharaoh and her idolatry.

[17] There was also a safety concern – Chazal forbade being secluded with a non-Jew, as the non-Jews were suspected of wanting to murder us (Mishna, Avoda Zara 22a). It is generally assumed that this prohibition no longer applies in countries where law and order is upheld, although in truth this may be dependent on the general question as to whether rabbinical institutions dissipate when the reason is no longer relevant (see Eternal or Obsolete?).

[18] Shemos 24:32-3, Devarim 7:1-6.

[19] Avoda Zara 35b and other places.

[20] He, like us, was not in a position to be able to drive out idolaters from Eretz Yisrael.

[21] Avraham Avinu also seems to have predominantly influenced those who needed him, with the vast majority of the world around him remaining pagan.

[22] Corona has had its effects on all of us.

[23] This is of course partly explained by the demographics (roughly 31% of the world identify as Christian, 25% as Muslim, 16% as secular and just 0.18% as Jewish). However, one would expect someone like myself to be exposed to a disproportionate amount of Jewish material available (algorithms, echo chambers etc.). Furthermore, one would also expect the truth to be represented 'disproportionally,' and it should come as no surprise that I believe Judaism to be the truth.