Free Will & Hashem's Omniscience

Introduction

One of the oldest philosophical questions within Judaism (and outside of it) is the possible contradiction between Hashem's Omniscience (knowledge of all) and our own free will. The question was perhaps made famous by the Rambam, but was already recorded many years previously.

The apparent contradiction is that if Hashem knows everything, including future events, a human (or any other creation) cannot possibly choose to act differently to the way Hashem knows he will act. Thus, even though a person is unaware of what he himself will decide in the future, he cannot be said to be acting out of free will.

Whenever there are two seemingly contradicting principles, there can only be three options:

1)      The contradiction can be resolved.
2)      The first principle is wrong.
3)      The second principle is wrong.

It may come as a surprise to many, but to some extent, all three possibilities have their advocates among the rishonim. We will start by analysing the first option, which is perhaps the most commonly accepted and the position of the oldest Jewish written works.

Is there even a problem?

Although many do believe that this contradiction can be resolved, there is considerable variance within this school of thought as to how easy the resolution is. R' Sa'adia Ga'on (10^th century, Egypt/ Eretz Yisrael / Baghdad) dismisses the whole issue as a non-question – although Hashem knows what a person will do, this knowledge is not the cause of the person's choice. On the contrary, the person's choice affects Hashem's knowledge in the past.[1]

What was obvious to R' Sa'adia was far from obvious to others. The idea that the future can affect the past (Retrocausality) is a topic debated by philosophers and is not limited to theological discussions.[2] It is also worth noting that R' Sa'adia's argument is not dependent on any Divine qualities that are beyond our understanding – according to his logic, there would also be no inherent problem in a human foreseeing a free will choice made by another human with 100% accuracy.[3]

By contrast, R' Bachaye ibn Pekuda (11^th century, Spain) writes that were we able to understand the resolution of this contradiction, Hashem would have revealed it to us.[4] In other words, although there is a resolution, we are incapable of understanding it.

This view is echoed by the Rambam, although he adds more of an explanation as to why we are incapable of understanding. While humans have characteristics that are separable from their essence, Hashem does not. No positive characteristics can be attributed to Hashem – He and 'His knowledge' are One. As this is a concept that us humans cannot fully fathom, we are also incapable of understanding how Hashem attains knowledge of human choices. The only thing we can be assured of is that we do indeed have free will.[5]

The problem with this is that even after we accept that Hashem's capability of seeing the future is not something we can understand, we are left with a contradiction from the human point of view. Unless we accept the retrocausality of R' Sa'adia Ga'on,[6] Hashem's unerring knowledge of the future means that there is no possibility that we will in fact decide something different.

It would therefore appear that when the Rambam insists that we have free will, this only means that our decisions are made willingly. We do not actually have any real option to do something different to that which Hashem knows we will do.[7] This is notwithstanding the fact that the Rambam spends this entire chapter stressing that free will is a fundamental principle of the Torah[8] and that those who deny it are foolish.

If this understanding of the Rambam is correct, we can better understand the criticism of the Ra'avad of his words. The Ra'avad writes that a wise person should not raise difficult questions without resolving them, lest this causes any heretical thoughts in the mind of the reader. This criticism is more understandable if the Rambam himself could have helped us by clarifying that free will is more limited than we may have thought.[9]

'Inability' to do the impossible

We now move on to the second option above. Suggesting any limits to Hashem's knowledge may seem heretical, but this is based on a lack of both knowledge and understanding. Nowhere do Chazal state in an unequivocal manner that Hashem foresees all future events (although it is quite clear from Tanach that He does foresee many of them).[10]

The Rambam's himself, while listing Hashem's Omniscience as the tenth principle of faith, does not mention the future. His statement of Hashem's knowledge of all future events only appears in the context of his discussion of free will. It appears that the Rambam derived this concept from the general principle that Hashem is perfect and is lacking nothing.

However, as the Rambam writes elsewhere, it does not make sense to describe Hashem as able to do the logically impossible, such as creating another entity like Him.[11] It follows that if knowledge of our future decisions is a direct contradiction to our free will, Hashem's 'lack of ability' to create such a contradiction would not reflect any real lack. He simply chose to grant us free will, thus 'forgoing' His own prior knowledge of what we would choose.

This is the position of Ralbag (1288-1344, Southern France).[12] The Rambam could not follow this line of logic, as his view is that time itself is merely a creation of Hashem.[13] The idea that Hashem's own creation could limit Him is itself a contradiction.

One thing should be clear. As the view of the Ralbag does not attribute any lack of perfection to Hashem, and the dispute revolves around the philosophical understanding of the concept of time – this view is well within the acceptable limits of Jewish religious belief.[14]

Determinism

Perhaps even more surprisingly, R' Chisdai Kreskas goes to the opposite extreme. Preferring to accept the position that Hashem does foresee all future events, as well as due to other philosophical arguments, he concludes that human actions are always just the net results of all the natural causes acting on a person (both from within the person's nature and from external sources). Although we do not feel anything forcing us to act in a certain way, the reality is that we have no choice.

This leads to the obvious question as to the justification of reward and punishment for our actions, which are not in our control.[15] R' Chisdai is clearly aware of the problem and writes at great length to attempt to resolve this. He first claims that reward and punishment are necessary tools with which to influence our decisions for the good (these are some of the many factors that force us to act in the way we do), and this end justifies even the punishment of the innocent.

However, he goes on to ask that if this is the case, why can't there be punishment even for those who act entirely under noticeable duress? His conclusion is that in fact reward and punishment is not for the actions themselves that a person carries out, rather for the frame of mind in which they act. One who happily serves Hashem earns reward for his joy, and the same is true for the converse.

With this, R' Chisdai Kreskas concedes that regarding our feelings, we do in fact have free will. Although he does not revisit the question of Hashem's prior knowledge of everything, the clear implication is that Hashem can only foresee what our actions will be, not our mental attitude towards them. Thus this view actually combines both the second and third options, limiting both Hashem's knowledge of the future and our free will!

On a philosophical level, it is hard to see what is gained by this strange combination. Nevertheless, as R' Chisdai Kreskas does not deny the concept of reward and punishment or the justness of the ways of Hashem, this view also certainly remains within the limits of legitimacy.

May we use our free will (whatever level we have) for the good, and on Yom Kippur attain forgiveness for any bad decisions we may have made in the past!

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[1] Emunos v'Deyos, Ma'amar 4.

[2] One of the main arguments against the possibility of retrocausality is that were it possible to have an effect on the past, this would lead to time paradoxes. On the other hand, retrocausality is observed within quantum mechanics. Therefore, R' Michael Avraham argues that retrocausality is only possible within deterministic processes and not cannot be affected by decisions made with free will.

[3] Of course, humans cannot do anything with 100% accuracy. However, this is due to human qualitative deficiency, rather than any logical impossibility.

[4] Chovos Halvavos, Sha'ar 3 (Sha'ar Avodas HaElokim), chapter 8.

[5] Hilchos Teshuva 5:5

[6] The Rambam appears not to – otherwise the question would not require an answer unfathomable to us.

[7] Thus the Rambam is not as strong an adherent to option 1 above – his position is somewhere between option 1 and option 3.

[8] R' Nahum Rabinovitch calls this the 'fourteenth principle of faith' of the Rambam (Mesilot Bilvavam, p.54).

[9] I understand the answer that the Ra'avad suggests, that Hashem knows 'like the knowledge of astrologers, who know through an external power how another will act', as being equivalent to my understanding of the Rambam. The Ra'avad's conclusion, that this answer is not enough, is presumably because of a reluctance to accept that free will is limited in this way.

[10] The Rambam understands that a statement to this effect, together with the principle of free will, appears in the Mishna in Pirkei Avos (3:15). However, this explanation is not obvious from the context of the Mishna, and neither is it unanimously agreed upon (see for example Bartenura for an alternative explanation).

[11] Moreh Nevuchim 3:15

[12] Milchamos Hashem, Ma'amar 3, Chapter 4. This was also later the position of the Or HaChayim (Bereishis 6:5) and the Sh'lah (in his introduction).

[13] Moreh Nevuchim 2:13. It is however unclear how the Rambam knew that time was a creation.

[14] See The Limits of Legitimate Belief, where we supported the view of the Ra'avad, that the same is true even regarding the mistaken view that Hashem has a physical form.

[15] Or Hashem, Ma'amar 2, Klal 5.

Carrying on Shabbos Part 2 - Entrances or Imaginary Walls?

Rabbinic Prohibitions

Our discussion in Part 1 focussed almost entirely on the definition of the reshus harabim (public domain), in which carrying is Biblically forbidden on Shabbos. Other than negating the status of a reshus harabim by building gates at the ends, there is no way to make carrying in or through the reshus harabim permissible.[1]

Carrying in or between areas which are not reshuyos harabim is permitted on a Biblical level. However, Chazal forbade carrying in many of these areas out of concern that either the physical or the conceptual boundaries of the reshus harabim could easily become blurred. Broadly speaking, these rabbinic prohibitions fall into four categories:

1. Areas that are open enough to resemble a reshus harabim were given the name 'Carmelis,' an area that is neither a reshus harabim nor a reshus hayachid (literally private domain).[2] Carrying in these areas, between them and a reshus hayachid or between them and a reshus harabim, is forbidden rabbinically until they are suitably enclosed.
2. In some areas that are sufficiently enclosed to have the halachic status of a reshus hayachid, it is nevertheless rabbinically forbidden to carry due to the proximity to the reshus harabim and the concern that one may not notice where the reshus harabim starts. Depending on the situation, these prohibitions may be obviated by erecting a marker post (lechi) or crossbeam (korah) at the exit to the reshus harabim, as a sign to remind people not to carry any further.[3]
3. In areas that are not intended for human habitation, such as crop fields or industrial areas (known as karpifos), even if fully enclosed, it is forbidden to carry unless the area is no larger than 5,000 square amos (roughly 1,100 m²).
4. Due to the conceptual similarity to the reshus harabim, Shlomo HaMelech instituted that in order to carry in areas that more than one person or household have right of access to, an 'eruv' (known as eruvei chatzeros) is required.[4] A loaf of bread[5] is transferred to the joint ownership of all of those with access to the common area, thereby uniting everyone as if they all lived in the place where the food is kept. 

Practically speaking, nowadays the second category of restrictions is usually subsumed within the first. Due to complications as to when a lechi or korah may be sufficient to permit carrying, we require the more significant marker of a tzuras hapesach, consisting of two posts and a crossbeam or crosswire on top of them.[6] The tzuras hapesach serves the dual purpose of both completing a halachic enclosure (as will be explained shortly) and acting as a boundary marker.

Our discussion here will therefore focus on the remaining points above, starting with point 1.

Halachic Enclosures

We first need to establish what is considered halachically 'enclosed.' The rishonim dispute how many of the four sides must be walled in order for an area to count as a reshus hayachid – the Rambam requires all four whereas the Ra'avad argues that three are sufficient. However, this dispute is not relevant to our discussion, as the Ra'avad agrees that on a rabbinic level, walls are required on all sides in order to permit carrying.[7]

This does not mean that solid walls are required for the entire length of all four sides. Small gaps, with a width of less than three tefachim (around 23cm), are considered 'filled.' Larger gaps are also permitted, as long as 1) they do not form the majority of any side, and 2) each gap is of less than ten amos (around 4.6m), and as such can be viewed as an 'entrance.'[8]

We have also already seen that where there are already walls on three sides, the fourth side requires only a tzuras hapesach. The Mishna tells us that this is sufficient even if the entrance is more than ten amos wide,[9] and this is the accepted halacha despite a dissenting opinion in the gemara.[10]

The simple explanation for this is that as the tzuras hapesach creates a clearer appearance of an entrance, the gap does not invalidate the enclosed nature of the area despite being wider than an ordinary entrance. This will also explain another halacha of the tzuras hapesach – it must be strong enough to hold a simple straw door. According to one opinion in the gemara (not commonly accepted as halacha), there must also be hinges.[11]

Walls Out Of Nothing?

With the above in mind, it is surprising that the gemara also tells us that the Chachamim approved of an innovative solution to the problem of Kilayei Zeraim (mixed sowing) implemented by a person from the valley of Beis Chursan. He put up four posts in the four corners of a field and stretched a branch on top of them, thereby 'enclosing' the area and allowing it to be sown with a different crop than the one in the surrounding area.[12]

From this gemara it would seem that a tzuras hapesach can function not just as an 'entrance' – it can make up an entire wall, even if all four 'walls' are mere 'entrances.' This is a major extension to the more intuitive use of a tzuras hapesach. Furthermore, the gemara proceeds by equating to Hilchos Shabbos.[13] How does this fit in with our understanding above?

There are (at least) three basic approaches within the Rishonim:

Tosfos – Tzuros Hapesach really can act as complete 'walls', even on all four sides. According to this view, any area without a reshus harabim can become halachically 'enclosed' as if by magic, using poles and wires alone (i.e. the 'entrance' approach described above is not correct).

Ritva – The comparison to the laws of Kilayim is not in fact a full comparison. Regarding Kilayim there is no need for an enclosure, as only one 'wall' is required to separate between two types of crop. Although in the case in the gemara it happened to be that the crops in the middle were surrounded by different crops and required tzuros hapesach on all sides, these four tzuros hapesach worked independently from each other. Regarding Hilchos Shabbos, it certainly would not be possible to 'enclose' an area using poles and wires alone.

Rambam – Concerning Kilayim, the halacha is not in accordance with the ruling of the Chachamim in the case above, and a tzuras hapesach is not a valid way to separate between two types of crop.[14] As far as Hilchos Shabbos is concerned, tzuros hapesach can only be used if the majority of the circumference of the enclosure consists of real walls.[15]

The majority of large scale Eruvin rely on poles and wires for most of the circumference of the 'enclosed' area, based on the view of Tosfos.[16] While it is unusual to hear of objections to Eruvin for this reason, the reality is that this leniency is far from insignificant.

Other Issues

We are now ready to move on to the remaining categories of related Rabbinic prohibitions. I do not have much to write about the third category above, relating to areas not designed for human habitation.[17] It is just important to bear in mind that any such areas within an 'Eruv' will need to be enclosed independently, in order to separate them from the areas in which carrying may be permitted. 

The final issue that does require some clarification is the eruv itself (note that the 'eruv' is the food used to join everyone together, not the poles and wires). While making this eruv is not hard, two difficulties often arise.

Non-Jews, or those who 'do not believe in the eruv' (i.e. those who are not religious), cannot be included in the eruv and as such, their presence may forbid everyone else from carrying. These people need to be symbolically 'bought out' by paying them a minimal amount for their rights of use of the communal areas (this does not affect their actual rights of use, and is purely symbolic).[18]

In most big cities, it would clearly be impractical to make these 'purchases' from all such individuals. Instead, we rely on a leniency given by the gemara, allowing the purchase to be made from anyone who has access to the person's property, including any workers that he may employ.[19]

By extension, it is common practice to 'purchase' the rights of all non-Jews and non-observant Jews from a centralised authority, who has the rights to enter all private property in an emergency. This may be the police, the fire brigade, or even the government.[20] However, in democratic countries nowadays it is not so clear that the more limited power held by these institutions is sufficient. As a minimum, it is imperative to ensure that the 'purchase' is made from an authority that holds at least this minimal power.[21]

Conclusion

These two posts are far from a comprehensive explanation of all the laws of carrying on Shabbos, or even of all the laws commonly relevant. I hope however that I have provided a rough outline, and increased appreciation of the complexities of some of the issues. As always, any questions or challenges are welcome.

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[1] See Eruvin 6a-b, commentaries thereon and Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 364:2. As this is not a practical option in almost any city in the world, I will not elaborate on the requirements. I will simply say that even according to the view of the Rambam, that these gates need not be locked each night (Hilchos Shabbos 17:10), I believe that they do have to have the real appearance of gates, and not something hidden away that has no possible non-halachic function.

[2] See Rambam, Commentary to Mishna Shabbos 1:1 regarding the etymology of this name.

[3] The function of the lechi and korah is subject to a dispute in the gemara (Eruvin 11b-12a) and rishonim which requires extensive analysis. However, according to the overwhelming majority of views, a minimum requirement of these markers is to act as a distinctive sign as described above.

[4] Eruvin 21b.

[5] In order to join several alleyways together (shituf mevo'os), other food items can be used.

[6] See Shulchan Aruch and Rema, Orach Chaim 363:26

[7] Hilchos Shabbos 17:9. The practical ramification to the dispute is regarding one who carries from the reshus harabim to an area enclosed on three sides (or vice versa). According to the Ra'avad, this is a Biblical violation and a sin-offering is required for atonement – the need for a fourth wall is only rabbinic. The Rambam, on the other hand, maintains that an area with only three walls is never a Biblical reshus hayachid. According to him, an alleyway with just a korah (crossbeam) at the end is a special case where Chazal allowed carrying in an area that is not a Biblical reshus hayachid.

[8] Mishna, Eruvin 15b.

[9] Eruvin 2a.

[10] See Eruvin 11a (also see Rosh and Hagahos Asheri there), Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 363:26.

[11] Eruvin 11b, Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 362:11.

[12] Eruvin 11a.

[13] Although there is a dispute to what extent the laws of Kilayim and the laws of Shabbos are equivalent, the conclusion of the gemara is that this dispute is regarding a technicality. The basic halacha appears to apply equally to Shabbos.

[14] In Hilchos Kilayim, chapters 3-4, the Rambam discusses various ways of separating between different crops, never mentioning the idea of a tzuras hapesach or anything similar (there must be a physical separation, either a land feature or a certain distance). Presumably, the Rambam understood from the omission of this solution in Mishnayos in Kilayim and other related gemaros, that the consensus of Chazal was against the lone gemara quoted above.

[15] Hilchos Shabbos 16:16. See Magid Mishne there, who raises a possibility that the Rambam may agree that tzuros hapesach of less than ten amos width may be used even for the majority of the circumference, similar to his position in Hilchos Sukka (4:12). However, in the words of the Rambam in Hilchos Shabbos there is no hint even to this leniency.

[16] The Shulchan Aruch appears to understand that this is the majority opinion, and also assumes the lenient understanding of the view of the Rambam suggested by the Magid Mishne above (Orach Chaim 362:10).

[17] There are disputes regarding what constitutes a 'karpaf' that cannot be included in an eruv, but much of this is subjective and it is hard to write about it in general terms.

[18] This requirement was made as a means of dissuading people from allowing non-Jews, who were historically often an antagonistic presence, to reside in Jewish areas. See Eruvin 61b-62a.

[19] Eruvin 64a.

[20] See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 391:1.

[21] The problem may be exacerbated by home movers (in Israel it is not at all unusual for irreligious Jews to move on Shabbos). Although in general the halacha is that once a kosher eruv is made, new arrivals do not create a problem (see Eruvin 89b and 93b), there are several exceptions to this (see Chazon Ish, Orach Chaim 88:2 for a summary). However, it would seem logical to say that if the 'purchase' from the relevant authority was valid, it should be effective with respect to the new residents as well.