Thursday, 23 July 2020

For Sacramental Purposes Only

Wine plays an important part in Jewish life. We have several obligations involving wine (Kiddush, havdala, four cups at Seder etc.), we customarily use wine during other rituals (weddings, circumcisions etc.) and there are a number of prohibitions that apply specifically to wine (consumption of wine made by non-Jews, or of any wine during certain periods of mourning[1]).

It is therefore important to define what constitutes wine, and for which purposes. To do this, we will first need to analyse the various Biblical commandments and injunctions regarding wine, although most of these do not have wide applications nowadays. We will start by examining whether unfermented grape juice is considered wine, in relation to each case.

The laws of the Nazir

Regarding one of these commandments, the Torah is unambiguous. The Nazir may not consume any grape product or (mixture including grape products) whatsoever.[2] This is despite the fact that Chazal and all the major commentaries clearly understood that one main purpose of this undertaking is to be removed from the physical pleasures of this world, and in particular, the intoxication that wine can induce.[3] The devotion required of the Nazir includes distancing from anything close to wine, presumably in order to strengthen the psychological effect of his abstinence.[4]

The law of the Nazir seems to tell us little about the definition of wine, as the prohibition includes all grape derivatives and is not limited to wine. However, I believe there is much to be learned from the way that the Rambam categorises the prohibitions. He counts five separate negative commandments: the Nazir must not 1) drink wine, mixtures including wine or vinegar; 2) eat grapes; 3) eat raisins; 4) eat grape skins; 5) eat grape pips.[5]

Grape juice is clearly a grape derivative, and must be included in one of the five categories. The only option is the first one, as this is the only one that refers to drinking rather than eating.[6] The Rambam specified wine, wine mixture and vinegar, but did not feel it necessary to spell out that grape juice is included. This can only be because grape juice is simply a type of wine.

Kohanim on duty

In contrast to the Nazir, regarding the prohibition on Kohanim drinking wine prior to serving in the Beis HaMikdash, grape juice does not have the same halacha as wine. The punishment of death by the hand of Heaven only applies to one who drinks wine that has fermented for at least 40 days and is thus capable of causing intoxication.[7]

However, from the derivation of this halacha, it is clear that grape juice is in fact considered wine. The word יין (wine) would have included grape juice; the juxtaposition to the word שכר (lit. intoxicating drink, commonly referring to beer) teaches us that the main prohibition is when the Kohen drinks wine that has the potential to cause drunkenness.

Libations and Kiddush

A third Biblical commandment regarding wine is the mitzvah of bringing libations together with sacrifices. Here, although the written Torah does not define wine clearly, Chazal state that grape juice should not be used.[8] However, if one did use grape juice, the libation is valid, and a corollary of this is that one may use unfermented wine (i.e. grape juice) for Kiddush.[9]

From all the above it is clear that one may use grape juice for Kiddush and all similar obligations, such as Havdalah and the four cups at the Seder.[10] However, we need to ask a fundamental question, regarding the special status of wine.

The gemara questions what makes wine different to all other fruit and fruit products, for which the beracha of Borei Pri HaEtz suffices.[11] The gemara concludes that wine was given the special beracha of Borei Pri HaGefen because of the combination of two factors – it is both consumed during formal meals and causes joy.[12]

Although grape juice also brings an element of joy to some (especially children), it seems improbable that the gemara was referring to this kind of joy.[13] It is also rare to see grape juice being drunk as part of a meal. Why then do we make Borei Pri HaGefen, and even Kiddush, over grape juice?

The simple answer is that once Chazal instituted a particular beracha over wine, for whatever reason, that institution remains in place even when the reason may not apply to a specific wine. They did not expect us to check each type of wine and decide whether it meets a list of criteria, as long as it falls into the category of wine.

Erev Tisha b'Av & the Nine Days

The gemara tells us that although one may not drink wine during the meal immediately preceding Tisha b'Av, one may drink grape juice which has not been left to ferment for three days.[14] Rashi explains that this this 'wine' is of inferior quality, and even physically harmful.

It would appear that for these purposes, Chazal forbade drinking grape juice once fermentation has started even though the wine is not yet capable of causing intoxication (as we have seen above, this is only after 40 days). This may be connected to the laws of libations, as it is likely that the requirement to refrain from drinking wine is in order to remember that we are unable to perform this service in the Beis HaMikdash.[15]

The custom of most Jewish communities is to extend this prohibition to the first nine days of the month of Av, and to refrain from drinking grape juice as well as wine.[16]

'Cooked' Wine

It is relatively well known that the prohibition of drinking wine touched by non-Jews does not apply to wine that is mevushal ('cooked'). The gemara explains that there is no concern that anyone would have used this wine for idolatry.[17]

A related, undisputed but lesser known halacha is that cooked wine is invalid for libations, even ipso facto.[18] This would seem to imply that it also must not be used for Kiddush.[19] However, the Yerushalmi says explicitly that cooked wine can be used for the four cups on Seder night[20] (the first of which is also Kiddush), an apparent contradiction.

The resolution of all this is disputed by the Rishonim, with two main views:

Rambam – Cooked wine must not be used for Kiddush, due to its inferior quality.[21] For the same reason, non-Jews would not use it for their libations. Although the Yerushalmi allows use of cooked wine for the four cups, this is not the accepted halacha.[22]

Ramban – Cooked wine is in fact of superior quality, and therefore may be used for Kiddush. It is invalid for libations due to having undergone a significant change from its natural state. As cooked wine is scarce, there was also no concern that the consumption of cooked wine touched by non-Jews would lead to intermarriage, and therefore no need to forbid it.[23]

There is an obvious problem with accepted practice nowadays. Using 'cooked' wine or grape juice for Kiddush is almost universal, in accordance with the view of the Ramban.[24] However, no wine drinker would accept the Ramban's contention that our 'cooked' Kiddush wine (or grape juice) is superior in quality!

I can see only one way of reconciling all of this. We must be following the view of the Rambam; cooked wine touched by non-Jews was not forbidden due to its inferior quality.[25] The reason that we do use 'cooked' wine for Kiddush is because nowadays, the cooking process does not spoil the wine.[26] [27]


[1] These periods can also be divided into those in which halacha forbids drinking of wine (during aninus, or at the Seudah HaMafsekes before Tisha b'Av) and those in which there is a widespread custom not to drink (during the nine days).

[2] Bamidbar 6:1-4

[3] See Nazir 2a, Moreh Nevuchim 3:33, Sefer HaChinuch 374.

[4] It is no accident that Chazal use the example of the Nazir when referencing the general idea of distancing from sin – see for example Yevamos 46a. The Nazir is encouraged by Chazal to distance himself from wine even beyond what the Torah requires, not even coming close to a vineyard.

[5] Negative Mitzvos 202-206; Hilchos Nezirus 5:1-10. See also the Ramban's gloss to Sefer HaMitzvos, rule 9.

[6] While the Rambam also includes consumption of congealed wine in the first category, no mentions of drinking are made in any of the other categories. This is not inconsequential – a Nazir who eats an olive-sized amount of the products forbidden to him is liable to lashes, whereas for drinking, the larger volume of a revi'is (between 74-86 cm3) is required.

[7] Kerisus 13b. Whether or not there is any Biblical injunction against drinking grape juice prior to serving is disputed by the Tana'im there and the final halacha is also not 100% clear - see Rambam, Hilchos Bi'as Mikdash 1:1 and Kesef Mishne there. See also Minchas Chinuch, Mitzvah 152.

[8] Rashbam explains that this is because the word שכר is also used in the context of libations in Bamidbar 28:7. He adds that grape juice is kosher b'dieved because it can become alcoholic (ע"ב, ד"ה יין קוסס). R' Shlomo Zalman questions whether standard commercial grape juice of today, which contains chemicals that prevent fermentation and thus could never become alcoholic, could be used for libations. However, as at the time of the squeezing of the grapes, the juice could have been made into wine, he argues that the addition of chemicals cannot make it unfit for Kiddush (Minchas Shlomo 1:4). R' Elyashiv, on the other hand, was quoted as ruling that one cannot make Kiddush on most commercial grape juice, and even that the beracha on this grape juice is shehakol! (My own view, for what it's worth, is that commercial grape juice is also considered wine for all purposes. I cannot accept that the technicalities as to whether this specific product could ferment are critical, even regarding libations.)

[9] Bava Basra 97a. The gemara states a general rule that anything that is kosher for libations ipso facto, may be used even in the first instance for Kiddush. This is probably because the requirement to use wine for Kiddush is Rabbinic.

[10] For all of these, there may well be a hiddur (enhancement of the mitzvah) to use higher quality wine. This is especially true for mitzvos such as the four cups at Seder, of which one of the purposes is to induce joy. However, for someone for whom this would be a burden, this cost would outweigh the benefit.

[11] Most fruit juices are considered 'mere moisture' and do not even merit this beracha. Their beracha is shehakol (See Berachos 38a).

[12] Berachos 35b

[13] No special beracha was instituted over dessert, and sweet foods are in general not even considered part of a meal (see Berachos 41b).

[14] Ta'anis 30a

[15] See Bava Basra 60b

[16] See Shulchan Aruch 551:10 and Mishna Berura 66 there.

[17] Avoda Zara 29b-30a

[18] Mishna, Menachos 86b

[19] Based on the rule in Bava Basra 97a (see footnote 9 above).

[20] Shekalim 3:2

[21] Hilchos Shabbos 29:14. This is also the view of several other Rishonim, who even say explicitly that the beracha on cooked wine is Shehakol. See Responsa of the Rif, 295; Tur, Orach Chaim 272, in the name of Rashi, Ritz Ge'at and R' Hai Gaon.

[22] This point is not explicit in the Rambam, but there appears to be no other option.

[23] Chidushei HaRamban, Bava Basra 97b and Avoda Zara 30a.

[24] See also Shulchan Aruch and Rema, Orach Chaim 272:8.

[25] Against the ruling of the Rema.

[26] Many wine connoisseurs would dispute this, and these people should use wine that meets their own standards for Kiddush. Those of us who do use 'cooked' wine should be reassured that this view is not unanimous, especially regarding wine which has merely undergone flash pasteurisation (which some poskim consider sufficient to count as 'cooking') – see http://guidetokosherwine.com/blog.php?id=46.

[27] This of course raises a question as to whether we can allow non-Jews to touch our wine, even if it is has been cooked. The answer to this is not simple, as we are contending that this wine is in a new category, similar to neither the regular nor the 'cooked' wine at the time of Chazal. It may well be better to be stringent in this regard.


Thursday, 2 July 2020

Separation of Powers

Over the past years, many laws passed by the Knesset have been revoked by the Supreme Court. Fierce arguments have been made within the legislature, judiciary and press regarding whether this process is desirable or acceptable in a democratic country.

This blog is not the place for these discussions, which are political in nature. At present, there has been tacit acceptance of the situation from the Knesset, and there is no real struggle for power between it and the Supreme Court.[1] While many individual Knesset members have expressed the need to adopt such a struggle, as yet no law has been passed which would limit (or clearly define) the current powers of the judiciary.

The question that I do feel has a place here is what would (or should) happen if a head-on clash does develop. If, for example, the Knesset legislated clearly that the Supreme Court will no longer have the right to revoke the laws that it passes,[2] and the Supreme Court attempted to revoke this new law, we would have a real battle on our hands.[3]

The government (the executive, who are responsible for implementing law) would need to decide whether to follow the Knesset (the legislature) or the Court (the judiciary). As the majority of the significant figures in the government are themselves part of the Knesset, we may expect them to be more sympathetic to their own decisions. However, in a situation so charged, it would be hard to predict whether rebellions (by the army, police, teachers, doctors and whoever else would normally take orders from the government) would prevent these decisions being carried out, leading to anarchy.

The Torah System

Any system based on separation of powers potentially faces similar questions. The Torah system also faces such an issue, despite having a completely different separation.

According to the Torah, the Sanhedrin fulfils a legislative role, albeit on a different scale to that of most modern democracies. The Sanhedrin is limited by an extensive constitution (the Torah, both Written and Oral), but has the power to make new institutions. The Sanhedrin is also entrusted with the interpretation of the Torah (the judicial role) and enforcement of law (the executive role).[4]

However, this is only one part of the picture. The king also has a part in all of the three roles (legislature, judiciary and executive). He can issue edicts, which are binding as long as they do not contradict the Torah.[5] He acts as a judge,[6] at least in respect to the laws that he makes.[7] Finally, implementation of laws and policies is the king's primary responsibility.[8]

The result of this is that within the Torah system, although there are no power struggles between legislature and judiciary (there is no separation between the two), there is a potential possibility of major clashes between the two bodies involved in both roles. However, as we shall see, the Torah (our 'constitution') also defines who has the power in different areas, and lays down rules for situations when agreement cannot be reached.

Defined Roles

The impression one gets from the examples in Tanach is that the legislative power of the king is a temporary one. He can instruct a person to undertake a task for him; he can also forbid a person from performing a particular action or from leaving a town or area. These commands are limited by the authority of the king who gives them, and become obsolete automatically after he dies.[9]

The Ran explains that the Sanhedrin has jurisdiction over Torah law, whereas the king's authority is in areas that are not Torah-related. We are no different to any other nation regarding the necessity to ensure that order and efficient management are maintained, and this is the responsibility of the king. As these requirements change with time, they cannot be fully covered by the Torah.[10]

There are also some areas of overlap. The Mishna tells us that if a king wants to wage a war that is not mandated by the Torah, he requires the permission of the Sanhedrin.[11] The same is true if he wishes to extend the boundaries of Jerusalem, or the courtyards of the Beis HaMikdash.[12] These decisions must be based on both Torah and national interests, so require both parties.

Despite the separation of roles, there would appear to be a clear hierarchy here. As the representatives of the Torah, the Sanhedrin can decide that the king's action are in breach of the 'constitution' and thus invalid. This can also be seen from the rules for appointing a king – the Sanhedrin must approve the decision.[13]

A Spiritual Leader

A potential difficulty with the Ran's approach is that Tanach seems to attach a great deal of importance to the spiritual level of the king. The Torah warns clearly that the king must study Torah and govern according to its words.[14] Throughout Sefer Melachim, perhaps the most persistent theme is that virtuous kings bring with them the assistance of G-d and vice versa, while the standard of the Sanhedrin is never mentioned explicitly.

I believe that the resolution to this lies in a more precise understanding of the respective roles of the Sanhedrin and the king. The Sanhedrin is the representative of the Torah (i.e. Hashem's word), charged with imparting it to the world and the Jewish People in particular.[15] The king is the representative of the people, responsible for leading them in both their physical and spiritual endeavours.[16]

Thus, when it comes to questions of halacha, the Sanhedrin is the sole adjudicator. However, the king is the person entrusted with ensuring that the Jewish People keep to the Torah. As a barometer for the spiritual level of the nation, he is far more significant than the Sanhedrin.

Furthermore, although the king may not sit on the Sanhedrin even if he is learned enough to do so,[17] a worthy king will take an active interest in the actions of the Sanhedrin and put ideas before them. Chazal tell us that the prohibition against the seclusion of a man and an unmarried woman was made following the incident of Amnon and Tamar.[18] Although they do not say explicitly who made this decree, the Rambam writes that it was "David HaMelech and his Beis Din."[19]

Practical Concerns

Chazal were also aware that practically, the one giving orders to the army and other officials would often have more power than the Sanhedrin. For this reason, the Mishna teaches us that a king cannot be tried in court.[20]

The gemara clarifies that this rule does not apply to the righteous kings of the House of David, as there is no inherent reason why a king cannot be judged. However, Chazal forbade judging the kings of Israel (the Northern Kingdom), after an incident involving a servant of Yanai, a wicked king in the times of the Second Beis HaMikdash.[21] Yanai used his power to influence the ruling of the majority of the judges, and when the head of the Sanhedrin, Shimon ben Shetach, realised this, he cursed the corrupt judges and the angel Gavriel crushed them to death.

At this point, Chazal realised that although in an ideal world no-one is above the law, when attempting to enforce this is futile we are better off accepting some level of injustice. They stepped in and instituted that a king cannot judge or be judged.[22]

Conclusion

If there ever were (or will be) power struggles between the king and the Sanhedrin, the Sanhedrin should have the upper hand. Whether or not this actually happens will ultimately depend on how God-fearing the king is, which will often be a function of the level of the nation as a whole.

Although the democratic system of today is worlds away, there are parallels to be drawn. The legislature, elected by the people, perform a similar role to the king – they are our representatives and their performance is to a significant degree a reflection of the character of the nation. One who perceives secular law in a similar light to that which we see the Torah in, may insist that the judiciary should be above the elected officials. Ultimately, the government decides whether to accept this position or not.


[1] The one exception that I can think of was the refusal of the Speaker of the Knesset to abide by a court ruling ordering a vote on his own position. As he instead resigned his post, the short-term effect of this decision was negligible, although many claim that this created an important precedent. Time will tell.

[2] Making this new law a 'Basic Law,' which would not be deferential to any existing laws.

[3] I will not discuss here whether this situation should be avoided at all costs, and if so who is responsible for preventing it.

[4] See Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin 1:1 who writes that the actions of the 'policemen' are on the sole instructions of the judges.

[5] Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 3:8-9, based on Sanhedrin 49a.

[6] Ibid. 4:10

[7] See Torah Temimah, Devarim 17:19 (footnote 94).

[8] This is clear throughout Tanach. The Torah requires the king not just to be responsible for implementation, but also to play an acting lead role. See Bamidbar 27:17.

[9] The Scriptural source of this power, in Yehoshua 1:18, indicates that the only transgression involved is disobedience.

[10] Drashos HaRan, Drush 11. The Ran actually writes that the purpose of the mitzvos of the Torah is entirely unrelated to keeping order and efficiency, but the distinction that he draws remains valid even if we dispute this point (as the Rambam and others do – see Torah and Morals).

[11] Sanhedrin 2a and 20b.

[12] Ibid. See also Shevuos 14a, where we are told that making these additions also requires the approval of a prophet and the Urim v'Tumim.

[13] Tosefta, Sanhedrin ch. 3. The members of the Sanhedrin themselves are appointed internally; see Rambam Hilchos Sanhedrin 2:8, based on Tosefta, Horayos ch. 2.

[14] Devarim 17:18-20

[16] Although the king is supposed to be chosen by Hashem (Devarim 17:15), and for this reason the Sanhedrin's approval is required, it is ultimately the people who appoint him (see Ramban ibid., who struggles with the apparent contradiction between Hashem choosing the king and at the same time giving instructions as to who the people may appoint).

[17] Sanhedrin 18b. The reason is a technical one – were the king to be part of the Sanhedrin, the other members would likely be scared to argue with him.

[18] Sanhedrin 21a-b.

[19] Hilchos Isurei Biah 22:3.

[20] Sanhedrin 18a.

[21] It appears that 'kings of Israel' does not refer solely to the kings of the Northern Kingdom – Yanai lived long after their demise. This term was used to describe any non-Davidic kings, or perhaps even descendants of David HaMelech who did not follow in his path. The Sanhedrin would need to decide at the time whether it would be productive to try the king in court.

[22] Sanhedrin 19a-b. I will leave it up to the readers to judge whether any comparisons can be made to contemporary events.