Introduction – the mitzvah of Hakhel
Several of the
mitzvos in the Torah are addressed to the Jewish People as a whole. I am not
referring to the mitzvos which merely apply to every individual at all times,
such as believing in G-d or loving a fellow Jew. While these mitzvos are
enhanced tremendously when they are kept by multitudes, they have an inherent
value even if observed by just one individual. I wish to discuss mitzvos which
cannot be fulfilled by a single individual on any level and require communal
observance.[1]
The clearest
example is the mitzvah, of Hakhel, the gathering of the entire people
during Sukkos in the year following Shemita to hear the reading of the Torah.
If only one person wants to do this mitzvah and cannot persuade others to join,
he will earn reward for trying but ultimately he will be exempt from the
mitzvah.
Equally, if one
individual decides not to come while the rest of the nation attends, the purpose
of the mitzvah has arguably been fully achieved. While a separatist may lose
out personally, the purpose of the mitzvah is not personal but communal. On a
communal level, the effect of one individual not attending is usually
negligible.[2]
The question I
want to discuss is when the absentee is not a separatist and understands the
value of the mitzvah, but comes to the conclusion that as his part in the
mitzvah is negligible, he would be better off using his time differently.
Obviously if everyone or a significant number of people came to the same
conclusion, the purpose of the mitzvah would not be achieved, but why is this
important? He is careful to make sure that no-one notices his absence, such
that his decision will have no effect on anyone else's. Our instincts tell us
that this is not acceptable, but at first glance it is not so easy to explain
why.
The Chinuch
writes that anyone who does not come at the relevant time to hear the Torah
reading, or if the king cancels the reading, they violate this command
and will bear a severe punishment.[3]
In other words, the absconder is not just a sinner - he is in some way equivalent
to a king who cancels the entire reading! Where did the Chinuch know this from?
The answer is
that the Torah's command regarding the mitzvah of Hakhel inherently includes an
obligation on every individual. This is not because the individual's
contribution is necessarily significant; it may very well not be. It is simply
because if there were no obligation on the individual, the command to the
nation would be toothless.
Tax Evasion
Similar logic
applies to other communal mitzvos such as Kriyas HaTorah and appointing a king.[4]
However, most of the mitzvos of the Torah are not inherently communal. I would
like to discuss how the addition of a communal aspect to these mitzvos affects
their severity, if at all.
The crime of
theft is a good example of a prohibition which is primarily individual.[5]
One person who steals from another person is guilty of a serious transgression.
It is also clearly possible to steal something which is jointly owned, or owned
by the inhabitants of an entire city or country. Does this variation of the
transgression carry a different level of severity to private theft?
On the one hand,
one who steals 1,000 NIS from the average individual will likely cause a
significant amount of distress; one who evades a similar amount in taxes
(without anyone else noticing) will not make a significant difference to anyone
else. On the other hand, if we were to apply a similar principle to that of the
Chinuch above, considering it as if the tax evader was responsible for the
equivalent damage had everyone acted similarly, he would be a far more serious
criminal than the common thief.
It is however
far from clear that this extrapolation is correct. A more severe punishment for
one who steals public funds is not inherent in the command not to steal.[6]
In this instance, logic would seem to dictate that a tax evader is equivalent
to a simple thief and not any better or worse.[7]
Nevertheless,
the Tosefta singles out public theft as being more severe than private theft
for a technical reason. As one who steals from the public typically will not
know who he has stolen from, he will also not be able to do teshuva to
perfection.[8]
Depending on the circumstances, a variation of this technical reason may also
apply to tax evasion as it is not always easy to 'overpay' on taxes and
persuade the authorities to accept the payment without a good explanation.
Elsewhere,
Chazal list public theft as one of the sins that result in tzara'as
afflictions.[9] Here
no explicit reason is given, although it is likely that here too the reason is
technical. The example given is that of Shevna, an official in the Beis
Hamikdash who misappropriated sacred property.[10]
The aspect that seems to warrant the punishment of tzara'as is the breach of trust
given to the person, more than the communal nature of the theft.
Voting
Communal
responsibility is perhaps more often an issue when it comes to actions we do
which are not mitzvos in a clearly defined way, but which certainly are
important on a large scale. Let's assume for the moment that the makeup of the
Knesset (or parliaments elsewhere in the world) is something worth influencing.[11]
We still need to explain why the individual, whose individual vote will almost
certainly not have any influence, should bother voting (assuming that he does
not publicise his actions and does not influence anyone else to vote or not to
vote).
In other words,
the question is whether or not to accept Kant's Categorical Imperative, which
states that one should "act only according to that maxim whereby you can,
at the same time, will that it should be a universal law."[12]
According to this rule, as I wouldn't want all of those who vote the same way
as I do to stay at home, I must not stay home myself (despite this having no effect).
The answer is
that it depends on my motivation for willing a particular act to be a universal
law. If this act is necessary on a communal level for the fulfilment of a
command of the Torah, this command also inherently obligates each individual (for
otherwise the command would be toothless, as described above). This is in
general the perception of religious Jews when it comes to voting.[13]
If there is no
Torah command that obligates a certain action, it is hard for me to see what
does obligate it even on a communal level.[14]
If an individual merely wants the government to do something for his own
reasons, without believing in any obligation to do so, he certainly is not
obligated to vote (according to his perception) and on a practical level there
is probably also no point in doing so (unless he also influences others).
Personal Circumstances
Aside from the
above, my major reservation with the Categorical Imperative is that rarely are
one person's circumstances identical to another person's. If Kant meant that
rules of conduct can have no exceptions based on the circumstances, I strongly
disagree. One who needs to steal to save his life must certainly do so (and
must pay back afterward when possible).[15]
Returning to the
example of voting, I would agree that in general a person should vote
even if he lives in an area where the vote will not be close (e.g. a non-swing
state in the US or a safe seat for any party in the UK). However, someone whose
circumstances mean that an abnormal effort is necessary in order to vote (e.g.
he lives abroad and postal voting is difficult) should ask himself whether or
not he would be happy for everyone in similar circumstances didn't vote. If the
answer is yes, he need not make the effort.[16]
[2] Assuming that this person is not a significant influence on a
significant number of people.
[3] Mitzvah 612.
[4] Each of these mitzvos have some organisational aspect which many
individuals may not have to be part of; they fulfil their obligation by merely
attending, consenting or paying dues. However, ultimately everyone is
responsible for this aspect too and if no-one does it, all are to blame.
[5] While there may be some technical differences between various
halachic categories of theft (גניבה, גזלה, עושק etc.), for the purposes
of this post there is no difference. Similarly, I have used the word 'theft'
and similar throughout, even where technically the correct English term may be
'fraud,' 'embezzlement' or evasion.
[6] The simple individual command not to steal is enough to give teeth
to the application to public theft as well.
[7] In democratic countries today, taxes are in general communal funds
and not the property of the king or government. One who evades paying is no
different to a member of a private club who refuses to pay his dues. He has no
right to the services that he receives, which are taken as a form of theft.
This is all irrespective of whether or not 'Dina demalchusa' applies, or
whether or not evading paying debts to non-Jews is forbidden.
[8] Bava Kama chapter 10.
[9] Vayikra Rabba, Parshas Metzora 17:3.
[10] See Yeshayahu 22:15-25
[11] I do not intend to state here whether I believe this is the case
even when elections are held 3 times a year.
[12] Regarding non-Jewish philosophy as a whole, I already discussed the
opposing views of the Rambam and Maharal in Wisdom
of the Nations, a few years ago but also approaching Chanuka. Regular
readers will probably not be surprised to learn that I subscribe to the
position of the Rambam – I am in principle happy to accept enlightenment from
whatever sources may be relevant. However, unlike with Torah, I do not see the
value of spending large amounts of time ensuring that I have the correct
understanding of the words of any particular philosopher. If I have completely
misunderstood Kant then so be it – what is important is whether a particular
philosophy is correct or not, whether or not Kant really meant it.
I do not
mean to negate the value of studying philosophical works inherently – if I was
sufficiently impressed by any philosopher's ability and intellectual honesty, I
would spend more time trying to find gems within his words. This is no
different to the way I approach the writings of our own commentators (both
halachic and philosophical). If I have a question that bothers me and I see
that several acharonim deal with it, I will usually only read the writings of
those who in my experience are likely to give an answer that satisfies me.
Although one can learn from anyone, there simply are not enough hours in the
day or years to live to be able to read everything.
[13] We all may have different things that we think the government needs
to do, but the thing that unites almost all Jews is the view that what I think
needs to be done is also something that must be done.
[14] Even if there are morals which are not included in the Torah but I
know intuitively (see Torah
and Morals), what obligates me to be moral? If I intuitively know that
Hashem wants me to do something, this would presumably be covered by mitzvos of
the Torah such as ועשית הישר והטוב.
[16] For this reason I did not vote in the recent UK elections – I did
not believe that the number of those living in Israel with a right to a postal
vote in my constituency would influence the local result. I did go to the
minimal effort of registering for a postal vote, but did not make any
arrangements for the event of the forms not arriving in time (to no great
surprise, this is what happened).
