Suicide and Euthanasia

The euthanasia debate has existed for decades in most of the world. In most countries, it remains illegal to assist even the terminally ill to put an end to their pain once and for all. However, some surveys show that most doctors believe that these laws are unethical and need to undergo significant reform.^[1] Religious leaders and the conservative tend to remain opposed to these changes; here we will examine halachic sources to determine whether this position is so straightforward.

The value of life and the prohibition on suicide

It is no secret that the Torah views life as one of the greatest values, and commands us to guard life at almost any price. As we know, the vast majority of mitzvos are deferred when a life is in danger. The obligation to preserve life is a clear precursor to this rule and it goes without saying that suicide is forbidden. The Torah tells us almost at the outset that man was made in the image of G-d.^[2]

For this reason, it appears that the Torah did not need to write the prohibition to take one's own life explicitly. However, Chazal explain that the command given to Noach "But I will seek (vengeance) for the blood of your souls" (Bereishis 9:5), includes the message that "I will seek vengeance for your blood from your own souls."^[3]

This principle is significant for our lives even under normal circumstances, when there is no thought of suicide. Some write that a person has no halachic ownership over his own body, extrapolating that we are obligated to save a person who makes a suicide attempt. According to this opinion, it is also forbidden for a person to donate organs for a charge.^[4]

Even according to those who dispute this,^[5] it is certainly incumbent on each person to care for his body and he is not permitted to do as he chooses with it. Even if one owns his body, he receives it as a present from Hashem and must act accordingly.

How to relate to physical pain

The Torah also recognises the fact that sometimes physical pain is harder to endure than death. The gemara says that although Chananya, Mishael and Azarya were willing to give up their lives in order to avoid bowing to the image of Nebuchadnezzar, had they been beaten they would have bowed down. Although death is considered to be a more severe punishment than lashes, this only applies to a fixed number of lashes where the end is in sight.^[6]

The rishonim go to great length in explaining this gemara. Some write that as the image of Nebuchadnezzar was not worshipped as a deity, bowing down to it would not technically transgress the prohibition of idolatry.^[7] Others write that the truth is that one is obligated to bare the pain of lashes rather than serve an idol - the gemara merely questions why Chananya, Mishael and Azarya did not flee, trusting that they would manage to endure the test.^[8] However, there is also a view that the Torah could not expect a person to consciously choose unlimited physical affliction, a fate worse than death. In such a situation, it would be permitted to bow to even a bona fide idol.^[9]

According to this last opinion, it would appear that suicide is permitted in situations of severe, unrelenting pain. There is no indication that suicide is a transgression worse than idolatry – if even idolatry is allowed in these circumstances, suicide should be no different. However, one could counter that the leniency regarding idolatry is based on the fact that one bowing down under duress is not really worshipping the idol, as he has no belief in its purported powers.^[10] As such, this form of idol 'worship' is indeed a lesser crime than suicide, which may remain forbidden.^[11]

Either way, according to all views it is explicit that unlimited physical affliction is considered a harsher punishment than death. Our question is whether one suffering to this degree is nevertheless expected to continue serving Hashem, or whether the Torah did not obligate him to such an extent. Clearly, even if suicide is forbidden under all circumstances, it is impossible for us to judge one who does not live up to this.^[12]

Shaul's act

One of the most prominent precedents in Jewish history to learn from here is the case of Shaul Hamelech, in the war against the Philistines. Sefer Shmuel describes how Shaul asked his henchman to kill him, so that the Philistines would not stab and abuse him. When this request was denied, Shaul fell on his sword in an attempt at suicide.^[13] According to the Amalekite convert, Shaul did not die from this and asked him to complete the killing. As the convert saw that Shaul was to die anyway, he carried out Shaul's wish. However, David Hamelech scolded the convert for this act and had him put to death for it.^[14]

This episode raises many questions. Firstly, who was right and who was wrong? Shaul's henchman felt that killing Shaul would be inappropriate even under the circumstances and even though Shaul requested it. Shaul decided to commit suicide. The convert felt that carrying out the request was correct considering that he would die anyway; David strongly disagreed.

Chazal tell us that the Torah's warning of vengeance for those who commit suicide, quoted above, does not apply to Shaul.^[15] Shaul did not lose his portion in the World to Come due to this act. The Ba'alei HaTosfos quote two opinions as to whether Shaul's deed also had approval, but side with the view that it did not.^[16]

Even if Shaul acted appropriately, we cannot necessarily conclude that the same applies to anyone who suffers from severe pain. The 'lenient' view quoted by the Tosfos only talks about a case where "one is afraid that severe afflictions will be imposed on him and that he may not be able to manage the test." The implication is that pain is not enough, unless there is also a fear that enemies will force him to transgress.

Maharshal adds further factors that justified Shaul's act:

1)      He thought that the nation would sacrifice themselves in order to save their king, causing many thousands to fall.

2)      It would not be appropriate for the King of Israel to die in the hands of the uncircumcised and for them to kill him with affliction and shame. This would be a desecration of Hashem and our religion.^[17]

The martyrdom of R' Chanina ben Tradyon

Another potential source event is the story of R' Chanina ben Tradyon. Chazal tell us that the Romans killed R' Chanina in the most brutal fashion – they burned him together with a Sefer Torah, placing sponges soaked in water on his heart so that he should not die quickly, and suffer more. His students witnessed this and suggested that he should open his mouth in order to allow the fire in, to which R' Chanina responded "Better that the One who gave it (my soul) should take it, rather than me harming myself."

Subsequently, the king's executor asked R' Chanina if he would enter the World to Come if he would remove the sponges, to which R' Chanina responded in the affirmative and swore to that effect. The executor immediately strengthened the fire and removed the sponges, causing R' Chanina's soul to depart speedily. The executor then himself jumped into the fire, upon which a Heavenly voice proclaimed "R' Chanina and the executor are invited to life in the World to Come."^[18]

At first glance, we have here an internal contradiction within the words of R' Chanina. He was not willing to haste his own death, but promised the executor reward for doing the same thing. The Heavenly voice confirmed the truth of his second statement,^[19] but the clear implication is that his own refusal to act was also correct.

R' Yehoshua Boaz writes that although causing someone to die quicker is forbidden, if something such as a knocking sound or salt on the tongue is preventing death, it is permitted to remove it. He explains that this is not considered killing, but merely 'removal of prevention.'^[20]

However, it is not always easy to distinguish between a direct act of murder and ‘removal of prevention.’^[21] Some poskim allow disconnecting one whose hope of living has been lost from the life support machine;^[22] some add that the doctors are even obligated to do so.^[23] Others write that a life support machine is not merely a 'prevention’ of death, as it provides the basic requirements for life. The corollary is that disconnecting it is considered murder.^[24] There is also a view that 'removal of prevention’ is only permitted in a case where the ’prevention’ should never have been placed, as in the case of R’ Chanina ben Tradyon.^[25]

Conclusion

To conclude, it should be obvious that the practical application of all of this requires much thought and analysis of each particular situation. Decisions of this level should be left to those who have a deep knowledge both of halacha and the world around them – it will usually also be necessary for several rabbis to convene before coming to a final ruling.

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[1] See for example this article.

[2] Bereishis 9:6

[3] Bava Kama 91b

[4] L'or Hahalacha (Rav Zevin), "Mishpat Shylock according to halacha"

[5] Minchas Chinuch, Mitzva 237:1; Chavos Binyamin (Rav Shaul Yisraeli) 3:109

[6] Kesuvos 33b

[7] Tosfos ibid. in the name of Rabeinu Tam

[8] See Ramban ibid.

[9] Shita Mekuetzes ibid. citing the Kuntresim

[10] In Sanhedrin 61b, the amoraim dispute the law of one who serves idols out of fear. The halacha is in accordance with the view of Rava, that he is exempt from punishment.

[11] One could also suggest another reason to differentiate between one being forced to bow down to an idol and one who suffers from pain 'from Heaven' – as in the latter case no-one is trying to make the person transgress, his act is one of choice and not one of coercion.

[12] As according to the last explanation above, it is possible that even Chananya, Mishael and Azarya would not have managed. See also Shu"t Chasam Sofer, Even Ha'ezer 1:69; Sho'el U'meishiv, volume 1 3:217; Maharsham 6, Yoreh Deah 49.

[13] Shmuel 1, 31:5

[14] Shmuel 2, 1:1-16. Although the Mechilta (Masechta d'Amalek, parsha 2) implies that David would not have had him killed were it not for the fact that he was an Amalekite, from a simple reading of the pesukim it is clear that this was not the only reason. It was at least in part because he killed 'the anointed of Hashem.'

[15] Bereishis Rabbah, parsha 34.

[16] Da'as Zekeinim miBa'alei HaTosfos, Bereishis 9:5. See also Radak, Shmuel 1 ibid., who writes that Shaul did not sin.

[17] Yam Shel Shlomo, Bava Kama 8:59. See also Radak ibid., who writes that it was better for him to kill himself rather than the uncircumcised abusing him.

[18] Avoda Zara 18a

[19] It is unclear what justification there was for the executor to needlessly commit suicide. Perhaps this was not in fact correct, but he was nevertheless rewarded for his good action.

[20] Shiltei HaGiborim, Rif Mo'ed Katan 16b (according to Sefer Chasidim. See there further, that some are more lenient). This is also the ruling of the Rama in Yoreh Deah 339:1. It would appear that although murder and suicide are forbidden even in the event of great pain, these prohibitions only cover direct taking of life. When there is already something killing a person, 'removing prevention' is not murder. Usually even under these circumstances, one is obligated to do all that he can to save a person in danger, as the Torah commands us not to 'stand by over the blood of your friend' (Vayikra 19:16). However, this command is subjective, and severe pain is also a form of 'blood' that the sufferer should be saved from. In such situations, one must carefully weigh up which 'blood' is the more severe and save the ill person from it. Obviously, for one not experiencing the pain this decision is far from straightforward.

[21] See Taz, Yoreh Deah ibid. 2

[22] Rav Chaim David Halevi, Techumin volume 2; Tzitz Eliezer 13:89; Mishne Halachos 7:287.

[23] Rav Chaim David Halevi ibid.

[24] Rav Goren, Toras Harefuah page 54. See also Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg (sheyichye), Emek Halacha, Asya 1.

[25] Rav Eliya Katz, Techumin 3.

How are Jews Unique?

Every week in Havdala we proclaim that Hashem separates between holy and mundane, light and darkness, 'Israel and the nations' and between Shabbos and weekdays. The clear implication is that we as Jews are or are supposed to be distinct from others, akin to holiness and light as opposed to mundane and dark. What does this mean philosophically, and what are the practical applications?

In the Torah

There are a number of places in the Torah itself where this principle appears. The promise that "all the families/nations of the Earth will be blessed through you" is repeated to Avraham, Yitzchak and Ya'akov no fewer than five times.[1] Prior to Matan Torah, Hashem tells us through Moshe Rabbeinu that we will be a segula (treasure) out of all the nations.[2] Moshe reminds us of this several times subsequently,[3] adding that we will be 'superior' to all the other nations.[4]

In one of these places, a cryptic explanation is given as to why Hashem chose us for this purpose – "out of Hashem's love of you and His honouring the oath that He swore to your fathers".[5] These two reasons do not seem to stand alone. If Hashem chose us because He loves us, we obviously still need an explanation as to why He loves us. Honouring the promise made to our fathers would appear to be a technicality, making our status as a 'treasure' far from inherent.

While I don't have any overly convincing resolution of these verses, I believe that the general idea the Torah is telling us here is that there is something integral about us that Hashem loves.[6] It is indeed true that the particular trait or traits have not been specified here, leaving much room for speculation.

Accepting and Keeping the Torah

Chazal tell us that before Hashem gave us the Torah, He offered it to all the other nations. Although they rejected it and we accepted it, this alone is not enough for us to deserve special treatment. The other nations can retort that had Hashem forced them by hanging a mountain over them like a barrel, as he did to us, they too would have accepted the Torah.

The answer to this claim is that the nations of the world did not even keep the seven mitzvos that are incumbent upon them.[7] Thus the claim that they too would have accepted the Torah if forced may be true; the difference is that they certainly would not have kept it. This is why Hashem chose us by 'forcing' us to accept the Torah.[8]

With this in mind, we can begin to understand the historical popularity of the Christian claim that the covenant with the Jewish people terminated once we stopped keeping the Torah and the Beis HaMikdash was destroyed. If keeping the Torah was the whole basis of our superiority, what justification can there be for our special status without keeping the Torah?

The claim is not entirely false. Chazal tell us that when we carry out the will of Hashem, no other nation has power of us. When we don't, Hashem delivers us into the control of a lowly nation and even in to the control of their animals.[9] Our preferential treatment is truly only in merit of keeping the Torah, explaining why many of the interpersonal mitzvos only apply between religious Jews.[10]

However, it is also clear throughout the Tanakh that G-d's covenant with us is everlasting.[11] It must be that mass transgression of the Torah is not equivalent to the entire Jewish people forsaking G-d. It would appear that as long as our nation preserves the Torah to the extent that a community of religious Jews exists, we retain our status as His chosen people. As we are also assured that "the Torah will never be forgotten from Israel,"[12] we will also never lose the right to our special privileges. The realising of this right, however, will only be at times when we keep the Torah.

Are we inherently different?

For all the above to be true, there is no need to claim any intrinsic racial superiority. Anyone could have chosen to question the idolatry practiced at the time of Avraham Avinu and come to the discovery of Hashem; Avraham merited being chosen as he was the only one who actually did it. Our forefathers instilled in us the values which lasted until we accepted the Torah and beyond, enabling us to be more suited to teaching G-d's ways to the world.

For this reason, any non-Jew also has the ability to make the same decision and become part of the Jewish people.[13] And as mentioned above, a Jew who forsakes the Torah is at least temporarily divorcing himself from his chosen status.

However, there are those who have taken this a step further. R' Yehuda HaLevi famously writes that the 'Divine aspect' was given to Adam HaRishon and passed down to just one son each generation, until Ya'akov Avinu who had 12 sons all suited to this Divine aspect. From then on this quality was preserved for all the descendants.[14] Although even those born without it can convert, this will not endow them with quite the same nature that those born Jewish have. Thus a convert can never be a prophet.[15]

This last point about converts was subject to much criticism, not least because the gemara says that the prophet Ovadya was an Edomite convert.[16] I am more bothered by the seeming lack of evidence for the entire extreme idea of R' Yehuda HaLevi, versions of which have subsequently been adopted by Maharal[17] and many other mystical writers. It also would seem to diminish the achievements of Avraham Avinu, as according to this he was the one born with a greater ability than anyone else in his generation.[18] However, I believe that accusations of racism in the classic sense are unfounded. The 'Divine aspect' theory does not say that Jewish genes are superior; merely that Hashem bestows upon us an ability that others do not have.

Those with a more rationalist approach never accepted this concept of the Kuzari. The Rambam writes that whether or not we believe a person who claims to be a prophet is based entirely on his message and evidence, irrespective of their origins and nationality.[19] Although I have not seen anyone who explicitly disputes the main 'Divine aspect' idea as a whole, it seems safe to say that all those who wrote comprehensive philosophical works and did not mention any such concept, do not believe in it.

On the other hand, it is well known that the Rambam writes that one of the thirteen fundamental principles of our faith is the existence of the Messianic era, including the restoration of the Davidic dynasty.[20] If our being chosen is entirely based on the keeping of the Torah, it seems strange that the realisation of this is a fundamental belief. What exactly will force us to return to the level of observance required of us to merit being redeemed?[21]

This question may have been what led R' Yehuda HaLevi to develop the 'Divine aspect' theory. For those of us who are not satisfied by this explanation, the issue remains similar to most questions we have about the End of Days – a mystery.[22]

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[1] Bereishis 12:3, 18:18, 22:18, 26:4, 28:14

[2] Shemos 19:5

[3] Devarim 7:6, 14:2, 26:18

[4] Ibid. 26:19

[5] Ibid. 7:8

[6] See Kli Yakar and R' Hirsch, who both explain along these lines. They imply that the stress is more on the word 'you' and less on the 'love.'

[7] All this in Avoda Zara 2b.

[8] See Tosfos Chachmei Anglia ibid.. Exactly what was accepted willingly and what was 'forced' is not my topic of discussion here.

[9] Kesuvos 66b.

[10] This is explicit in Yevamos 22b regarding the prohibition of cursing and discussed extensively in relation to other mitzvos such as returning lost property. Practically speaking we tend not to differentiate so as not to create animosity (some also claim that the distinction does not apply to those who were not given a religious upbringing), but the fundamental principle remains true.

[11] See for example Vayikra 26:44, Bamidbar 24:14-19, Devarim 30:1-10, Amos 9:13-15, Zecharia 14.

[12] See Devarim 31:21 and Shabbos 138b. This promise is presumably part of the reward given to Avraham Avinu.

[13] Although there are a few halachos that differentiate between born Jews and converts (the prime examples being that converts cannot marry Cohanim or be appointed to positions of authority), these are due to special high standards that require the absence of certain past associations.

[14] Kuzari 1:47

[15] Ibid. 1:115

[16] Sanhedrin 39b. Non-Jewish prophets such as Bilam also seem to be problematic.

[17] See for example Tiferes Yisrael chapter 5.

[18] It is also a worrying step towards determinism.

[19] Igeres Teiman

[20] Commentary to the Mishna, Introduction to Perek Cheilek.

[21] Although the Tana'im dispute whether repentance is a necessary prerequisite to the Redemption in Sanhedrin 97b-98a, and the conclusion is that it is not necessary, this itself requires explanation. If this is merely a reward for the actions of previous generations, why is this a fundamental principle of faith?

[22] At least in my mind.