This is perhaps a topic that
warrants more than a blog post to discuss, but I believe I can at least
summarise the important sources here. With regards the relationship between
Torah and morals, theoretically there are many possibilities. Here is a non-exhaustive
list of some of the more sensible options, not all necessarily mutually
exclusive:
1) Man is completely incapable of
deciding what is moral by his own intellect. Hashem gave us the Torah in order
to dictate to us what is moral, and only by studying it can we know.
2) Man can have some sense of
what is morally correct, and some parts of the Torah could have been worked out
by human logic. Other areas relating to higher spheres are beyond human
intellect, and here the Torah tells us what to do without the possibility of us
understanding why.
3) All of the Torah makes sense
to human logic, and we can understand the reasons for all the mitzvos. However,
without the Torah we could not have figured it all out alone.
4) The Torah is not supposed to
teach us morals. We must keep it because Hashem told us to, but through Torah
alone one will not necessarily be a moral person.
Reasons for Mitzvos
One major part of this topic is
the nature of the reasons for mitzvos in general, if there are reasons at all.
In the words of Chazal there are countless implications that there are reasons
for mitzvos, although two sources seem to indicate the opposite and need to be
resolved.
The Midrash asks why Hashem should care whether
we slaughter animals from the front or the back of the neck, and concludes that
in fact mitzvos were only given in order to ‘purify’ people.[1]
In a similar vein, the Mishna tells us that we silence one who proclaims
(during davening) that Hashem’s mercy extends to a nesting bird, in reference
to the mitzvah of sending away the mother before taking the chicks or eggs. One
of the reasons the gemara gives for this is that is incorrect to describe the
traits of Hashem as mercy when
in fact they are just decrees.[2]
The Rambam explains that the
details of mitzvos need not have reasons, and this is the meaning of the
Midrash about shechita.[3] However,
there are logical reasons for every mitzvah as a whole, and with only a few
exceptions he lists these reasons. The mitzvah of sending away the mother bird
is in fact motivated by mercy, and although the Mishna says otherwise he
follows a different view in Chazal.[4]
Ramban explains slightly
differently, that although mitzvos have a purpose for us, Hashem has no
personal need for them. He does not gain anything by us doing shechita the way
we do it, but we learn the attribute of mercy. Furthermore, there is no
inherent need to be kind to animals, as they are only here to serve us. But
being cruel to animals will have a negative effect on a person’s character, and
for this reason it is forbidden.[5]
The Chinuch also follows the
general principle of the Rambam and Ramban, giving logical reasons for all of
the mitzvos while admitting in his introduction that he may make mistakes.
In contrast, the Kuzari writes that
there are logical mitzvos, but the reasons for ‘G-dly mitzvos’ are repelled by
human intellect. Even logical mitzvos have many elements to them that are
understood only by Hashem. We accept them like the instructions of a doctor,
without understanding their benefit.[6]
Maharal goes even further. He
rejects the explanations of the Rambam and the Ramban at length, and argues
that mitzvos have no purpose connected to nature. Most of them have no reason
known to us, and are decrees from Hashem to purify our souls. As the soul is
divine, only Hashem understands what is good for it. We do get benefit from
doing the mitzvos, but this is not their purpose.[7]
Many will instinctively take one
side of this debate, but philosophically it is hard to prove one way or
another. However, in this case the Rambam points out a clear proof from a
simple reading of these pesukim in the Torah:
רְאֵה לִמַּדְתִּי אֶתְכֶם חֻקִּים וּמִשְׁפָּטִים כַּאֲשֶׁר
צִוַּנִי ה' אֱ-לֹהָי לַעֲשׂוֹת כֵּן בְּקֶרֶב הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אַתֶּם בָּאִים
שָׁמָּה לְרִשְׁתָּהּ:
וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם וַעֲשִׂיתֶם כִּי הִוא חָכְמַתְכֶם וּבִינַתְכֶם לְעֵינֵי הָעַמִּים
אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁמְעוּן אֵת כָּל הַחֻקִּים הָאֵלֶּה וְאָמְרוּ רַק עַם חָכָם וְנָבוֹן
הַגּוֹי הַגָּדוֹל הַזֶּה: כִּי
מִי גוֹי גָּדוֹל אֲשֶׁר לוֹ אֱ-לֹהִים קְרֹבִים אֵלָיו כּה' אֱ-לֹהֵינוּ בְּכָל
קָרְאֵנוּ אֵלָיו: וּמִי גּוֹי גָּדוֹל אֲשֶׁר
לוֹ חֻקִּים וּמִשְׁפָּטִים צַדִּיקִם כְּכֹל הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי
נֹתֵן לִפְנֵיכֶם הַיּוֹם:
(דברים ד, ה-ח)
See that I have taught you
statutes and laws, as Hashem my G-d commanded me in order to act accordingly in
the land that you are coming into to possess it. You shall guard and keep (the
Torah), as it is your wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the nations that
will hear all these statutes. They will say “This great nation is undoubtedly a
wise and understanding people.” For which great nation has G-d close to it,
like Hashem our G-d is whenever we call him?
(Devarim 4:5-8)
How will the nations of the world
understand the greatness of the Torah and its laws if most of them are not
understandable to man?[8] In
all of the lengthy argument of the Maharal he does not explain these pesukim or
similar proofs brought by the Rambam. Although I am sure if he was here today
he would have some answer, we can only judge based on what we have in front of
us.
We can conclude that the Torah
teaches us morals, and that most of the mitzvos can be understood simply in
moral terms. If a certain halachic detail seems to contradict our view of
morality, we must re-examine either our view of morality, the understanding of
this halachic detail, or both.[9]
Is there something more?
We still need
to ask whether the Torah includes all of morality, or if there is something more.
To answer this question we first
need to explain the term morality. For the purposes of this article, I will
define as ‘moral’ any good act, speech or thought. Of course this definition
doesn’t really help that much, as we still need to define what is considered
‘good’. But this is already the start of the answer.
Goodness can be determined only
by accepting someone else’s definition or by following one’s own gut feelings. As
I am not prepared to blindly accept the definition of any human, the first
category will include only what Hashem has set out in the Torah and inferences
from it.
If the Torah does not contradict,
I may be able to include my own gut feelings as part of morality.[10]
However, just like I will not accept someone else’s gut feelings, it would be
unreasonable to expect someone else to accept mine. I may personally feel
disgusted by another person’s conduct, but if I cannot point to any Torah
transgression, all I can do is to appeal to his own intellectual honesty and
hope that he will understand what is obvious to me.
In summary, the answer to our
original question lies somewhere between possibilities 2 and 3 above. The Torah
as a whole and the reasons for mitzvos can be understood by human logic,
although most of us will have difficulty finding reasons for a minority of the mitzvos.
There may be morals not found in the Torah, but these cannot be proved.
[1] Bereishis
Rabba, Lech Lecha 44:1
[2] Berachos 33b
[3] Moreh
Nevuchim 3:26. He gives the example of korbanos, where there certainly is a
reason for the mitzvah as a whole (see He
has no physical form). However, there may be no reason for the number of
animals we are instructed to bring, as some number had to be given.
[4] Ibid.
3:48 (there he also explains that the idea of shechita is to kill in the most
painless way possible). See also Hilchos Tefila 9:7 where the Rambam does write
that we silence one who praises Hashem’s mercy on the mother bird for the
reason above, in a seeming contradiction. In my view the best resolution of
this contradiction is to differentiate between halacha, where the Rambam is
bound by the Mishna and Gemara, and philosophy where he is not. See Divine
Providence, Free Will and Coincidence.
[5]
Commentary to Devarim 22:6. The Ramban does concede that understanding the
reason for some mitzvos like para aduma (the red heifer) is beyond the
intellectual capabilities of most people, and the Rambam seems to agree with
this in Moreh Nevuchim 3:47. There the Rambam attempts to find reasons for the
different purification processes in the Torah, but has to admit that many of
the reasons are not known to him.
[6]
Ma’amar 3, paragraph 7. See also paragraph 11 where he lists Mila, Shabbos and
the prohibitions of incest, cross-breeding, shmita and sorcery as ‘G-dly
mitzvos’. This is at clear odds with the Rambam, who gives reasons for all of
these mitzvos.
[7] Tiferes
Yisrael ch. 6-8. At the end he does write that Moshe Rabbeinu and other
chachamim know the reasons of mitzvos according to their wisdom, an apparent
contradiction.
[8] See
Rabenu Bachya on these pesukim who says that the nations will see the wisdom of
the understandable mitzvos and conclude that even the mitzvos without a clear
reason must be beneficial. However, this definitely presumes that most of the
mitzvos can be understood by most people.
[9] As I
have written before (in the name of the Rambam), a common cause of this
perceived contradiction is the unrealistic expectations that a physical world
should be perfect and that mitzvos should have favourable results all of the
time. The undesirable results of mitzvos (e.g. the suffering of a mamzer for no
fault of his own) must be weighed against their overall benefit (in this case
the deterrent from adultery and incest).
[10]
Gut feelings should not be discounted, as we have already seen that the
Torah values the fact that the justness of its laws will be recognised by the
peoples of the world. Even if the Torah’s omission could be used to refute the
validity of one’s feelings, this refutation could only be confirmed by someone
who knows the entire Torah with all the inferences from it.
