Living in the succah

Every year during succos I struggle to decide what the best way to fulfil the mitzvah of living in the succah is in the circumstances, and how we can attempt to change these circumstances in order to enhance the performance of this mitzvah. The issues are both halachic and philosophical.

‘Similar to the way you live at home’

Chazal tell us that during succos, all of the things normally done in one’s home should be done in the succah. This is based on the principle of 'תשבו כעין תדורו', literally “You must dwell (temporarily) in the same way you live (normally).” Thus one must bring his ornate utensils and decorations into the succah, and eating, drinking and various other household activities should be carried out there.[1]

The requirement to decorate ones succah with the ornaments of the house is not easy for a number of reasons. Many of these items are likely to be damaged by the elements if left in the succah, and it is obvious that one is not obligated to take such a risk.[2] The widespread custom to make specially designed succah decorations may be a reasonable substitute, although logically these should be of the quality that one would use in his house.

Another reason for succah decorations is the more general concept of hiddur mitzvah, beautification of the mitzvah. Chazal tell us that mitzvah items should be aesthetically pleasing, and succah is given as one example.[3] However, it is worth noting that there is an inherent difference between these two reasons. While the standard paper-chains, fruit and other shiny decorations do achieve hiddur mitzvah, I would question whether they can be a replacement for the standard household decoration required as part of normal living.

Lack of space

Many are faced with far a bigger problem with the mitzvah of succah. Some simply do not own or have any rights of usage of areas appropriate for building a kosher succah. In this situation the best option may be to spend succos with the extended family, or to stay in a hotel. However, for those who do not normally live in such a fashion doing so specifically on succos seems far from ideal. One doing so is also usually unable to control how the succah is built and decorated, or even what he can do there.

Some do not have the option of staying elsewhere. Assuming that it is possible to rent a space to build a succah, theoretically one is obligated to spend up to a fifth of his money in doing so.[4] Practically it would probably be cheaper to move house once rather than to incur this expense every year, and this realisation may lead those serious about mitzvos to find more creative solutions.

Perhaps a more common situation is when one does have an area for a succah, but the distance between it and the house make the fulfilment of the mitzvah in its entirety extremely tedious or completely impractical. It is clear that one is not obligated to build a separate kitchen for his succah,[5] and having to carry food and utensils for each meal up and down several flights of stairs can hardly be called a normal way of living.

Family life

Even when a man can deal with all the problems mentioned so far, keeping the mitzvah of succah to perfection often places a big burden on his wife. The gemara says that although the mitzvah of succah is time-bound, as we are required to live in the normal way there logically would have been a rationale to obligate women in this mitzvah. The conclusion is that this is not the case, due to an inference from the masculine language the Torah uses for this mitzvah.[6]

The simple way to understand this conclusion is that although the obligation is to temporarily exchange normal life in the home for similar normal life in the succah, this is only on an individual level. When it comes to the family, unless ones wife takes on the mitzvah voluntarily, a man is effectively commanded to separate from her.[7]

This aspect of the mitzvah becomes harder when there are also young children, and one’s succah is far from the house. Either the wife is left alone with the children, the children are forced to stay in the succah, or the whole family live in the succah (if it is practical to make a succah big enough). Yet the husband also has a mitzvah of rejoicing, and of making his wife and children happy.[8]

The purpose of the mitzvah

Unlike most mitzvos, here the Torah explicitly states the purpose:

לְמַעַן יֵדְעוּ דֹרֹתֵיכֶם כִּי בַסֻּכּוֹת הוֹשַׁבְתִּי אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּהוֹצִיאִי אוֹתָם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם אֲנִי ה' אֱלֹהֵיכֶם:

(ויקרא כג, מג)

In order that your generations should know that I housed B’nei Yisrael in succos when I took them out of Egypt. I am Hashem your G-d.

(Vayikra 23:43)

However, we still need to ask what the purpose of remembering this historic event is. The simple explanation is that we are supposed to remember how Hashem took care of us in the desert, and presumably internalise the extension of the principle of Divine Providence to our times.

Rashbam and the Rambam add that the mitzvah of succah also teaches us midos. One who once went through difficult times should remember them even during the good times. This leads a person to thank Hashem, and to learn humility. Therefore we leave the finely crafted houses that Hashem has given us in his kindness, and live in succos like desert dwellers in discomfort.[9]

Despite succos being zman simchaseinu (the time of our rejoicing), the Rambam points out that full simcha cannot be achieved when living in a temporary, flimsy dwelling. For this reason we need Shmini Atzeres to complete the simcha.

Application

With the above in mind, we can suggest some ways to view the problems more positively. We mentioned three major issues (not including those who cannot do the mitzvah at all, which is rare):

1) The difficulty in bringing ornaments into the succah

2) The difficulty of replicating normal living when the succah is far from the kitchen

3) Separation of man and wife

With the first two issues, although I have no great solution, I believe that we don’t need to look at them as problems. With all mitzvos we are only expected to do the best that we can, but with succah the issue is more inherent. The command to replicate normal living in an abnormal environment is somewhat of a contradiction. Part of the idea is to realise the limits of such a dwelling, and these limits also affect our ability to perform mitzvos in the way we would want. We must rejoice despite this, although this rejoicing will also not be complete until Shmini Atzeres.

The same is true when it comes to the possible separation of man and wife, although here I believe that there is an extra point. Normal living should have included women in the mitzvah as well, but to impose a blanket obligation on women like men would not have been practical.

Therefore ideally the husband should do all that he can to facilitate his wife and family joining him in the succah. This makes his own mitzvah of living normally more complete, and also achieves part of his mitzvah to make his family happy on Yom Tov. Although they are not obligated, he should attempt to create a situation where they will want to take part in this mitzvah.[10]

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[1] Succah 28b. More details can be seen there, notably the fact that drinking utensils are also supposed to be kept in the succah (29a).

[2] As one would not leave things at such a risk at home, and a weather-proof succah would constitute a ‘permanent abode’ (see Tosfos Succah 2a). However, if the only concern is for thieves, where possible one should make appropriate security arrangements for his succah like he does for his house.

[3] Shabbos 133b

[4] The same rule applies to all positive mitzvos, see Rema Orach Chaim 656:1.

[5] The gemara in Succah 29a says that food utensils are not kept in the succah.

[6] Succah 28a

[7] Although the Rema suggests that a married man may be exempt from sleeping in the succah (Orach Chaim 639:2), this suggestion that limits the words of the gemara to married men is very difficult (see also Aruch Hashulchan). And even according to this suggestion, there will be separation during waking hours.

[8] Pesachim 109a. Admittedly the method given for doing this, buying colourful clothing for ones wife and confectionery for the children, is not limited by the mitzvah of succah, and if this or similar can keep the family happy without need for the husband’s presence then there is no problem.

[9] Rashbam on the pasuk above, Moreh Nevuchim 3:43

[10] Perhaps a support for this idea can be brought from the gemara in Arachin . At least at one stage, the gemara says that the kohanim on duty who cannot be together with their wives (for reasons not connected to the succah), are exempt from the mitzvah of succah. See Rashi and Rabeinu Chananel there.

The 'laws' of tznius

Introduction

In recent times, many sefarim have been published about tznius, concentrating almost entirely on the way women are supposed to dress. This phenomenon did not exist in the past. The Rambam, Shulchan Aruch and their contemporaries did not devote sections of their compilations to this topic.[1]

One reason some have given for this new development is a decline in standards. Women used to know intuitively which clothes were appropriate, and it was not necessary to spell out every detail. The new publications are written with a considerable degree of sadness over their necessity.[2]

I do not dispute this explanation, although I believe that the issue is deeper. The Rambam did not leave out the prohibition of murder, despite the fact that it is intuitive.[3] As he writes in his introduction, his compilation was intended to be all-encompassing.

I am aware of only one place where Chazal describe a specific instruction to women over dress. The gemara infers from the uncovering of the head of the sotah that generally speaking, Jewish women are commanded not to go out with their heads uncovered.[4]

This does not mean that heads is the only part of the body that needs to be covered. In other places in the gemara it is clear that certain styles of dress are inappropriate, but we must pay attention to the way that these ideas are written.

‘Das Yehudis’

The gemara tells us that if a woman reveals the upper part of her arms in public, she is considered a ‘violator of das yehudis’ (the code of Jewish women) and her husband may divorce her without paying her kesuvah.[5] This is the source many bring to obligate a woman to cover her upper arms. Practically, I do not disagree with this conclusion. However, I believe that it is a mistake to relate to halachos like these in the same way we relate to the measurements Chazal give us for mitzvos like sukkah and lulav.

Rashi explains that ‘das yehudis’ refers to restrictions that are customary, despite not being written (in the Torah). Rabbeinu Yehonasan adds that these practices of Jewish women are out of tznius b’alma (‘mere’ modesty). Clearly then we are dealing with something subjective, dependent on the norms of the community. But how can a failure to adhere to a ‘custom’ be grounds for divorce?

The answer lies within the very definition of tznius. The Rambam writes that a talmid chacham wears neither clothes of kings that everyone looks at, nor the clothes of paupers that shame those who wear them.[6] The idea is clear, that dress is just one part of the modest conduct we are supposed to engage in. The same principle applies both to men and women, except that due to a difference in human nature certain types of clothing worn by women may draw attention where similar clothing on men would not.

This explains why ‘custom’ is so critical in this area. If someone walked on the streets of a modern city in clothes from the days of the Roman Empire, this would not be modest conduct no matter how much of his or her body was covered. The same would apply if clothing commonly worn in mid-Africa was worn in Europe.

If a married woman acts or dresses in a fashion that is considered unbecoming by her peers, this can cause the breakdown of her marriage.[7] This would not be the case if she violated a custom in another area, for example by eating kitniyos on Pesach in an Asheknazi community. In fact, even real transgressions are not grounds for divorce if they are unrelated to the family.[8]

With this in mind, we must ask if there is any basis for obligating an unmarried woman to a dress code. Certainly unmarried women are also supposed to act modestly like with other midos, and this includes dressing in a way that does not draw attention. The question is whether there is any formal obligation or prohibition involved.

Lifnei Iver

The answer to this question is dependent on a prohibition addressed to men. A man must not look extensively at a woman who is forbidden to him, or even at her clothes.[9] It follows that if a woman dresses in a way designed to draw such attention, she violates the prohibition of causing others to sin. However, to get a clearer idea of what is included in this we must define the commandment not to put ‘obstacles in front of the blind’ in more general terms.

Chazal learn from this commandment that one must not offer wine to a nazir, or meat detached from a live animal to a non-Jew.[10] It is clear that the prohibition applies even when there is no desire to cause a transgression, as the gemara includes in it the sale of things that will be used for idolatry or forbidden work during shmita.[11] No dispensation is given for the fact that the intention is merely to do business.

However, elsewhere the gemara tells us an important rule. Whenever there is a reasonable possibility that no prohibition will be violated, it is permitted to sell something that could be used in a forbidden way. For this reason one may sell farming tools during shmita if they are not always readily available to buy, relying on the possibility that the buyer plans to use them after shmita.[12]

It would seem that the same principle applies when it comes to dress. Whenever there is a reasonable chance that dress will not cause men to look extensively, the prohibition of lifnei iver does not apply.

Obviously it is impossible to know exactly which clothing falls into this category, but one thing is clear to me. The boundaries cannot be fixed by any codebook, and depend on the time, place and a large number of other factors. The main thing is to follow the guidelines of the Rambam, acting and dressing in a way that does not draw attention.

Erva

One other major issue still needs to be explained. The gemara tells us that a tefach (fist-area) of the body of a woman is considered an erva (lit. nakedness or lewdness). The gemara explains that here we are not discussing the prohibition of looking at women, as this prohibition applies even to a little finger. Rather the issue of erva applies to one’s wife, at the time one is reciting Shema (or other divrei torah). Due to the sanctity of what one is doing, at this time he must not be able to see a tefach of his wife’s body (in an area that is normally covered).[13]

The gemara goes on to say that the calf (שוק) is also considered an erva for this purpose. The rishonim explain that although this part of the body of a man is not considered private, it is an erva for a woman.[14] The acharonim debate whether this is a blanket rule irrespective of minhag, or whether this too is dependent on the prevalent custom.[15]

The generally accepted rule that women must cover their legs up to the knee is derived from this gemara. This is based on a mistranslation of the Hebrew word שוק as being the thigh. The truth is that it is quite clear elsewhere that the term refers to the calf, with the word ירך used for the thigh.[16] However, despite the fact that this minhag may have started from a mistake, deviating from it in a place where it has become accepted constitutes a violation of das yehudis as explained above.

Hair

In summary, all of the various issues involved in modest dress are subjective, which explains why no attempt to codify these ‘laws’ was made until recent times. However, as I wrote at the beginning, there is one exception. A direct command was given to women to cover their hair, explaining why the vast majority of poskim maintain that this command is not dependent on minhag.[17]

Here, as we are dealing with a formal commandment it is relevant to discuss precise measurements. R’ Moshe Feinstein claims that it is ok to leave up to a tefach of hair uncovered. In short, he argues that all we can learn from the uncovering of the hair of the sotah is that uncovering the hair in similar fashion is forbidden. As presumably a large amount of the hair of the sotah was uncovered, only a similar amount of uncovering is forbidden normally. However, since hair is also an erva, women must not uncover more than a tefach.[18]

This ruling of R’ Moshe is novel to say the least. One would have expected Chazal to spell out such a measurement in regards to the hair if it existed. On the other hand, it is also clear that only the hairs on the head need be covered and not the hairs around the ear. It is not clear where the cut-off point is, or more precisely where the head ends and the face starts.

With questions like this, until we can find a clear proof we again turn to minhag. As Chazal say, “Whenever an halacha is doubtful, follow the common practice.”[19] Obviously though, the practice of those who are not attempting to keep this halacha in its entirety can be discounted.

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[1] Although the Shulchan Aruch has a section about the laws of tznius, this deals not with dress but with marital relations.

[2] R’ Falk in his introduction to ‘Oz vehadar levusha’.

[3] The Rambam himself writes in his introduction to Pirkei Avos that even if this and similar prohibitions would not have been written in the Torah, it would have been correct for us to forbid them.

[4] Kesuvos 72a

[5] Ibid. 72b in explanation of the Mishna. I have translated the term זרוע as ‘upper part of the arm’ (from the elbow) based on the Mishna in Aholos 1:8, although I have refrained from discussing this at length as my conclusion makes it irrelevant.

[6] Hilchos Deios 5:9

[7] In the times of Chazal this did not apply to similar behaviour by men, as women generally preferred having an ungainly husband over no husband (see Kesuvos 75a). Grounds for forcing the husband to divorce included certain physical illnesses as well as those involved in particularly unpleasant jobs (Kesuvos 77a, Yevamos 65b).

[8] See Rosh (Kesuvos 7:9) who says that if she eats non-kosher privately and does not also mislead her husband into eating, she does not lose her kesuvah.

[9] See Avoda Zara 20a-b. Practically this prohibition applies to any adult woman except ones wife, as all others are either married to someone else or in a state of niddah (menstrual impurity). I have translated the root להסתכל as looking extensively, based on the gemara that deals with a case of the beracha made upon seeing beautiful people (or animals). It is clear from many places that men are not required to avoid all sight of women (see for example Bava Basra 57b), but it is also clear from the gemara in Avoda Zara that the prohibition applies even when there is no lustful intent.

[10] Avoda Zara 6b

[11] Ibid., Shevi’is 5:8

[12] Avoda Zara 15b. However, when it comes to non-Jews it seems that this leniency only applies when in the majority of cases no violation will be caused. See Nedarim 62b.

[13] Berachos 24a

[14] Rashba in the name of the Ra’avad.

[15] See Divrei Chamudos 116 (on the Rosh), Mishna Berura 75:2

[16] See for example Mishna Aholos 1:8. This is pointed out at length by the Chazon Ish, Orach Chaim 16:8

[17] Although here too das yehudis requires women to cover their hair even in situations when the Biblical obligation does not apply, see Kesuvos 72a.

[18] Igros Moshe, Even Haezer 1:58

[19] Yerushalmi Peah 7:5