I was at first
reluctant to write about this topic. However, after a number of requests (all
from men), I realised that these issues remain in the forefront of many
people’s minds, and require clarification.
In many shuls,
few discussions are as heated and sensitive as those related to what women may
or may not do. But as regular readers of this blog will know, I have no problem
writing about controversial matters.
The cause of my
hesitance is the point that I will now attempt to prove. I claim that the
majority of the answers to questions asked in this field are not only
non-halachic; they are not even directly based on Torah principles. I do not
mean that there are not halachic questions here, just that they usually are not
the real issue. I will try to illustrate this with some examples.
K’vod
Hatzibur
The gemara tells
us that women may not read from the Torah in public because of k’vod tzibur,
respect for the congregation.[1]
The relevant halachic question here is what happens if the congregation are indifferent
about this respect due to them? Is this comparable to a parent who forgoes the
honour that his children must give him, where the halacha is that the children
are no longer obligated?[2]
This question is
dependent on the nature of the principle of k’vod tzibur. To clarify this, we
need to look at the other halachos based on the same principle. There are four
others in the gemara:
1) One who is
dressed inappropriately may not read from the Torah, lead tefila or ascend the duchan
(platform) to recite birkas cohanim.[3]
2) The one
responsible for putting the sefer Torah away must not also uncover the table it
is read from at the same time. The congregation wait for the sefer to leave,
and they should not be made to wait longer.[4]
3) The sefer
Torah must not be rolled in front of the congregation (so that they should not
have to wait).[5]
4) Chumashim
(scrolls with only one of the five books of the Torah written on them) may not
be used for public Torah reading.[6]
Whether or not
such halachos are dependent on the feeling of a particular congregation was
first discussed in relation to a fifth halacha. The gemara tells us that a
youngster should not be appointed as a shliach tzibur (even though he is over
thirteen years old),[7]
and the Rambam explains that is is also because of k’vod hatzibur.[8]
The Beis Yosef
assumes that according to the Rambam, the congregation have the right to forgo
their honour and to allow a youngster to lead tefila. The Bach disputes this,
one of his claims being that it seems implausible that all the above halachos
should be different for each congregation.[9]
He explains that k’vod hatzibur refers not to the personal honour due to the
congregation, rather to the honour appropriate for one who acts as their
representative in front of G-d.[10]
The majority of
later poskim rule in accordance with the Bach, that the congregation cannot
forgo their honour.[11]
Personally I find the view of the Beis Yosef much easier to understand,[12]
but the truth is that this is not the main issue here. If a rav approved the
appointment of a youngster to be his shul’s regular shliach tzibur, I doubt it
would cause much controversy. And sadly, in many places the congregation
regularly have to wait while the sefer is rolled, even when they have not
consented to this.
Female
‘rabbis’
The title
‘rabbi’ nowadays has little significance, even for men. The original semicha
was passed down from rav to talmid in an unbroken chain from Moshe Rabbeinu, and
was necessary in order to judge capital cases and some some monetary cases in
court.[13]
This chain was broken long ago, and the authentic semicha no longer exists.[14]
The Rivash
(1326-1408, Spain and Algeria) explains the function of what was known as
semicha in Western Europe. The gemara tells us that after a misunderstanding
based on an ambiguous halachic ruling, Chazal required one to get permission
from his rav before issuing rulings.[15]
This permission is only relevant for someone who has already has the necessary
scholarship in order to rule, and it is sufficient for one to get permission
from just one of his rabbanim.[16]
The original
semicha was irrelevant for women, as women cannot halachically act as judges.[17]
Whether or not women can receive the modern form of semicha is hard to prove
from the gemara, but there are early sources that indicate that women can give
halachic rulings.[18]
This expalins the existence of yoatzot halacha (female halachic
advisers) in the field of family purity, and the lack of strong opposition to
it.
The
controversial issue here, whether women can have positions in the clergy, is
not necessarily dependent on either type of semicha. Many communal ‘rabbis’
nowadays do not issue halachic rulings, nor are they capable of doing so.
Pastoral leaders do an important job, but the title ‘rabbi’ assigned to them is
a modern usage of the word.
Other
‘appointments’
The real
halachic issue here is broader. Chazal learn from the masculine language that
the Torah uses regarding the appointment of a king, that we may not appoint a
queen.[19]
The Rambam extends this, saying that all ‘appointments’ must be male.[20]
However his source is unclear, and there may be room to rely on dissenting
views.[21]
Even according
to the Rambam, there is considerable debate over which ‘appointments’ are
referred to. R’ Moshe Feinstein explains that an employee who merely performs
the tasks that his employer wants him to do (even if he has freedom to decide
what this is) is not in this category.[22]
R’ Shaul Yisraeli writes that only an appointment which cannot be rescinded is
forbidden.[23]
Whichever view
we follow here, the question is not limited to rabbinical positions. The fact
that elsewhere there is not much controversy indicates that this too is not the
real issue.[24]
The real
issue
To me it is
clear that the big debate here is over something more fundamental. For
thousands of years men were generally the ones responsible for earning a
living, leading and performing most tasks outside of the home. Women took care
of the children and other domestic needs from inside. There is no denying that
over the last hundred years this has started to change, and the question is whether
or to what extent we wish to continue this process.
There is clearly
no definitive halachic answer to this question. Although usually the husband is
the one obligated to support his wife in return for performance of household
tasks, the wife has the right to reject this arrangement and support herself.[25]
Even in
non-halachic terms, it is virtually impossible to prove what the ideal is from
Torah sources.[26] Although
Torah values such as raising and educating families certainly should influence
our outlook, at the end of the day the question is what the best method to
achieve these goals is.
How we answer
this question is very important, but in my view the answer is based more on
practicality than on what we can derive from the Torah. As the purpose of this
blog is to teach Torah, I will not write my view here.
[3] Megila 24a-b
[4] Sotah 39b, according to Rashi there.
[5] Yoma 70a
[6] Gitin 60a
[7] Chulin 24b. The term used to describe the youngster is ‘one whose
beard is not fully grown’, and here we will not discuss the precise meaning of
this. It also should be noted that the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 53:6) rules
that this only applies to a permanent shliach tzibur, considerably limiting the
practical application of this halacha.
[8] Hilchos Tefila 8:11
[9] Orach Chaim 53
[10] As I do not really understand the view of the Bach, I will not
attempt to explain why according to him it is inappropriate for a woman to read
from the Torah (or for a youngster to be shliach tzibur).
[11] See Eliyahu Rabba (ibid. 10), Mishna Berura (23), Aruch Hashulchan
(10) and Kaf Hachayim (37). R’ Ovadya Yosef (Yabia Omer 4, Orach Chaim siman
10, paragraph 6) also rules stringently on this question.
[12] I subsequently found support for this position in the Mordechai,
Halachos Ketanos siman 968.
[13] Details can be found in the gemara in the first perek of Sanhedrin,
and in the Rambam in the fourth perek of Hilchos Sanhedrin.
[15] Sanhedrin 5b
[17] The gemara in Shevuos 30a derives that women are not kosher
witnesses from the language of the \pasuk ועמדו שני האנשים (Devarim 19:17), referring to witnesses. There is a rule that
all those who cannot give testimony also cannot be dayanim (Mishna, Niddah 49b).
Although Tosfos suggest a possibility that women are an exception to this rule
(Bava Kama 15a), the overwhelming consensus is that this is not the case (see
Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 7:4).
All of
this has little practical relevance nowadays, as litigants can consent even to
invalid judges (see Sanhedrin 24a). As things stand, when the Sanhedrin is
re-established women will not be able to serve, but theoretically the Sanhedrin
could disagree with these rules (provided it is based on an honest interpretation
of the Torah, not on external influences).
Regarding
testimony, practically it is unusual for any of the witnesses in beis din to be
kosher technically (people who know relevant information almost always have a
reason to be impartial). The practice of all batei din is to hear testimony
from everyone, but not to automatically accept it as the truth (this would be
harder with two kosher witnesses).
[18] The Chinuch (mitzvah 152) mentions the possibility of ‘a wise woman
who is fit for the issuing of rulings’. See also Pischei Teshuva, Choshen
Mishpat 7:5. A contradictory source can be found in the midrash, Bamidbar Rabba
10:5.
[20] Hilchos Melachim 1:5
[21] R’ Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:44) shows that
several rishonim do not accept the position of the Rambam here, and rules that
in case of great need we can rely on their view.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Amud Hayemini, siman 12 perek 5.
[24] Sometimes one reason for the controversy is an objection to the incorporation
of any idea associated with the Reform or similar movements. My belief is that
this also is not a halachic issue, but a tactical one which varies from place
to place. There is more to write here, but in order to do this justice I will
leave it for another time.
[26] One might want to derive principles from some of the halachos that
we have discussed above, but as the reasons for them are not explicit this will
most likely be mere conjecture.
