Wisdom of the Nations

As we approach Chanuka, the time that we celebrate victory over the Greek Empire and the Hellenism that went with it, it is appropriate to try to make sense of the comments Chazal make about foreign culture and when it is right to learn from it.

The damage caused by ‘Greek wisdom’

The gemara relates that towards the end of the Hasmonean dynasty two brothers fought over the throne, causing a civil war. One controlled Yerushalayim while the other set up a siege on the outside. However, there was co-operation concerning the service of the Beis Hamikdash, and sacrificial animals were lifted over the city walls for this purpose.

This situation continued until an elder used ‘Greek wisdom’ to communicate to the besiegers that the city would not fall as long as the sacrifices continued. The next day a pig was lifted over the walls, it dug its nails in to the wall and all of Eretz Yisrael (figuratively) shook. At that time the rabbis declared a curse on anyone who either raises pigs or teaches Greek wisdom. Those who were close to the monarchy were given special dispensation to use Greek wisdom.[1]

Many questions arise here. Why was the use of Greek wisdom necessary to be able to communicate the message about the service in the Beis Hamikdash? If Greek wisdom is something intrinsically connected to immoral or disloyal behaviour, why was its use permitted beforehand? And why was special dispensation given to some?

Rashi translates ‘Greek wisdom’ as ‘hints’.[2] According to this it seems that the elder did not want to openly advise the prevention of sacrifices, out of fear for how this would be perceived by those who understood their significance.[3] Perhaps there is no inherent problem with Greek wisdom, but Chazal prohibited its use so that people would remember what happened when it was used for bad.

In contrast, the Meiri explains that ‘Greek wisdom’ was forbidden it captures the mind and destroys many of the cornerstones of religion. because Nevertheless, a leniency was given for those close to the monarchy because without this they would not have any influence. Thus they needed to put themselves in potential spiritual danger in order to help protect religion for the masses.[4]

Jewish attitudes to philosophy

These different views of what Greek wisdom is may reflect on how we are supposed to view Greek culture as a whole, and what Chanuka should mean to us. The Maharal writes that the Greek kingdom was naturally opposed to the Torah because of its supremacy over their wisdom. He explains that this superiority stems from the fact that the Torah is from G-d and therefore supernatural. They also fought against the Beis Hamikdash because of its Divine Holiness.[5]

It is apparent in many places that this negative view of the Greeks affected the way the Maharal related to their scholars, holding them in very low regard.[6] He is fundamentally opposed to the way philosophy focuses on what can be understood using human intellect, claiming that the wisdom of the Torah is not just on a higher level but on a different plane.[7]

The Maharal was well aware that this view was by no means unanimous, even within Jewish thought. The Rambam agreed with a huge amount of the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato, including the focus on human intelligence.[8] This earned him much criticism from the Maharal, and at times it even seems as if the Maharal considered some of the Rambam’s views heretical.[9]

The essence of Chanuka

According to Maharal, it is easy to see that Chanuka is a celebration of the triumph of the Torah and its followers over heresy and its followers. It is no surprise that he devotes a whole sefer (Ner Mitzva) to explaining the significance of this.

According to the Rambam one might think that Chanuka is less fundamental. If the Greeks were right about so much, what we are rejoicing over is less obvious. Indeed, Chanuka is not mentioned even once in Moreh Nevuchim, the Rambam’s guide to the principles of Judaism.

However, there is something basic to remember on Chanuka, according to all views. As we mentioned in ‘Divine providence, free will and Coincidence’, Aristotle believed that G-d is not concerned with our lowly existence on the Earth. This was one of the parts of his philosophy that even the Rambam was critical of. On Chanuka, when we celebrate the victory of the few over the many and the miracle of the oil, this point stands out.[10]

It is for this reason that Chazal tell us that the days of Chanuka were instituted for hallel and thanksgiving.[11] In fact, the Rambam puts the laws of hallel for all the festivals within the laws of Chanuka.[12]

Perhaps this is also why the Rambam writes:

מצות נר חנוכה מצוה חביבה היא עד מאד, וצריך אדם להזהר בה כדי להודיע הנס ולהוסיף בשבח האל והודיה לו על הנסים שעשה לנו.

(הלכות מגילה וחנוכה פ"ד הי"ב)

The mitzvah of Ner Chanuka is very dear, and one must be careful with it in order to transmit the (message of the) miracle and to add praise of G-d and thanks to Him for the miracles that He did for us.

(Hilchos Megila v’Chanuka 4:12)

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[1] Sotah 49b, and other places.

[2] Menachos 64b

[3] See ‘He has no physical form’

[4] This is the explanation the Meiri gives in Bava Kama 83a. However,  in Sotah 47a he explains like Rashi.

[5] Ner Mitzva, at the beginning of part 2.

[6] See Tiferes Yisrael chapters 6, 9, 16 and throughout the sefer.

[7] Ibid. chapters 7-8

[8] For example, at the beginning of part 2 of Moreh Nevuchim the Rambam writes that twenty-five introductory rules are needed to prove the fundamentals of our faith. For the proof of twenty-four of them he merely references to Aristotle and those who followed him. See also part 1 perek 68, where he agrees to the philosophers’ description of G-d’s intellect.

[9] In Tiferes Yisrael chapters 5-7 he strongly argues with the Rambam over a number of issues. He also argues with the Ramban there, but his language in doing so is far more respectful. In the continuation of the sefer he constantly attacks the views of the philosophers (now omitting the fact that the Rambam concurred with them), in chapter 10 describing their preference of studying metaphysics as ‘complete heresy’.

However, it should also be pointed out that in Be’er Hagola, Be’er 4 chapter 1, the Maharal heaps praises on the Rambam. It is not clear to me how to resolve this seeming contradiction.

[10] See Moreh Nevuchim 2:25 where the Rambam writes that the proof that the world was created (and did not always exist) is from the miracles described by the Nevi’im.

[11] Shabbos 21b

[12] Hilchos Megila v’Chanuka, 3:6-14

The right to resist abuse of power

Various current events have led me to try to clarify the Torah’s view of this issue, for myself as well as for others. Although protests against government decisions are common worldwide, discussion usually focuses on practicality rather than on what is right.

To demonstrate the importance of this question, two extreme possibilities should be pointed out. One theoretical option would be to say that no-one should ever take the law into his own hands. We may sometimes hear comments like this, but it is reasonably obvious that they are not meant literally. Those who ‘illegally’ defied the Nazi regime by saving lives are rightly seen as heroes by all.

The other extreme is also clearly wrong. If every minor injustice was immediately fought against violently, it would lead to a world where ‘each man swallows up his fellow’.[1]

Most cases are in between. If we think about the terrorism of Nelson Mandela in his struggle against apartheid, the poll tax riots of 1990 in England, and the various militias that operated in Mandatory Palestine, we may have firm opinions about their legitimacy. But to formulate rules for what is acceptable when is less straightforward.

Examples in Tanach

There are many examples of popular protests in Tanach, although mostly to my knowledge there is little evidence to show whether this behaviour is appropriate or not.

One case that we may be able to learn from is the tragedy of the splitting of the Ten Tribes from the Davidic dynasty. After Rechavam foolishly insists that not only will he not ease the burden imposed on the people by his father Shlomo, but will increase it, there is a mass revolt.[2] Rechavam is severely criticised by the Navi, and the silent implication is that the rebellion is justified.

The logical extrapolation from this is that in countries with cruel dictators, it is acceptable to fight for regime change. However, this does not prove anything regarding protests against governments chosen willingly by the people, especially when the aim is not to overthrow the government but to reverse its decisions.

The limitations of dina d’malchusa

An important source here deals with resistance on a smaller scale. The Mishna tells us that one under threat by bandits or tax collectors may lie by saying that produce is terumah, or that it belongs to the king.[3] The gemara clarifies that the mishna cannot be referring to a regular tax collector, as in this case there could not be any justification for lying. We have a principle that ‘dina demalchusa dina’ (the law of the kingdom is binding).

The gemara offers two possible ways to understand the mishna. The first is that it refers to an unauthorised tax collector.[4] The second is more relevant to our discussion, that the mishna is talking about a collection with no fixed rate. In this case, even though the collection has the ‘legal’ approval of the king, as it is unfair one is entitled to evade it.[5]

The obvious question is how to define what is unfair. Any system would be considered unfair by some, and obviously it is not the right of every individual to decide for himself which laws he feels are moral enough to obligate him. It also would not be helpful to attempt to replicate the legal systems from the time of Chazal, as the difference between them and what is accepted today is huge.[6]

Perhaps surprisingly, there is little discussion of this issue in the early commentaries. The one source I have found starts with a different question. Tosfos ask why it is that a tax collector with no fixed rate does not have the dina d’malchusa, even if the law of the land allows it. They answer that even though the law technically gives freedom to the tax collector to collect as he wishes, common practice is that they collect fairly. Therefore, if he differs from this standard practice he is stealing.

From this we can learn that even when government officials have the technical freedom to impose the law as they choose, if they do so in an unusual way we have the right to resist. It seems reasonable to extrapolate from here to cases where a regime acts unacceptably in the eyes of the vast majority of the world, to the extent that sanctions are imposed upon them (as in apartheid South Africa). This is not always easy to measure, but at least we have a guideline.

The rights of a Jewish king and his limits

The above is true for non-Jewish countries. When it comes to Jewish rule in Eretz Yisrael the Torah imposes stricter regulations.

The Rambam codifies all the powers of a king in detail.[7] To generalise, he can collect taxes and forcibly purchase goods and services from anyone, but he cannot confiscate private property without fair payment. He has the right to quash any rebellion against his rule by punishing the perpetrators by death or other physical means, but even in such cases he cannot expropriate the possessions of others.[8]

The Ran explains at length that the responsibility for everyday justice and enforcement of the laws of the Torah is the job of the Sanhedrin. The king’s responsibility is to ensure that the country functions orderly, as well as making temporary alterations to suit the needs of the time.[9]

Today in most countries the government controls more than what the king once did. They are responsible for common law and its enforcement, as well as management of the economy and temporary measures. The function of the judiciary is (broadly speaking) limited to interpretation of the law and ascertaining when it has been breached.

This situation is acceptable in non-Jewish countries, as the Noachide laws obligate only that some justice system is applied.[10] As Jews in Eretz Yisrael we must follow all the laws of the Torah, including recognition of the separation of power between the king (or recognized government[11]) and the Sanhedrin.[12] When the government or its agents in the secular courts exercise power that is not rightfully theirs, and decide something contrary to Torah law, this should be protested.

For example, if the government or court decides that a settlement must be destroyed for ‘legal’ reasons contrary to halacha, this is not binding. If they decide to do so not because of the law, but as a practical step aimed genuinely for the good of the country, this may be within their rights.[13]

The manner of protest

When a person is clearly wronged, the gemara tells us that he has the right to enforce the law for himself and prevent others from causing him damage.[14] A straightforward reading seems to indicate that when necessary, it is even permitted to use violence. However, in various places the Rambam prohibits this and the final halacha is unclear.[15]

Practically, even if we can rely on the straightforward reading of the gemara there usually is no justification for violence when it comes to wrongdoings of the government. Such resistance has virtually no chance of achieving its aim, and hence there is no reason to allow it.[16]

Another important point is that there is definitely no excuse for inflicting damage in order to threaten and pressurise the government into changing its ways (terrorism). The leniency found in the gemara is only when the prevention of wrongdoing is direct.[17]

The one time when we definitely must resort to violence if necessary is if human life is in direct danger. If our enemies are trying to kill us by any method, we must make innocent lives our first priority, however politically incorrect it may be. The criticism that some have received for stating this obvious rule is reprehensible.

May Hashem give our leaders the courage and wisdom to act justly, so that we should never need to implement any of the above.

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[1] Avos 3:2

[2] Melachim 1, perek 12

[3] Nedarim 27b-28a

[4] The rishonim explain that the king used to sell the right to collect tax to individuals (an early form of privatisation). Thus it was not uncommon for people to start collecting without formal approval, assuming that the king would agree retrospectively.

[5] The rishonim explain that if tax is taken randomly, or the ‘law’ applies to some and not others, this is robbery and not din.

[6] For example, according to Chazal the amount of tax a person pays is not dependent on his income, but on the benefit he gets from the use of the money. See Bava Basra 7b that determining factors are family size, amount of property (one who has more of either pays more as he has more to protect), and proximity to the city wall (one who is closer pays more, as he is protected from a higher likelihood of damage).

[7] Hilchos Melachim 3:8-4:10.

[8] Ibid. 3:8. The Rambam  may have learned this from the case of the field of Navos, possessed by the wicked king Achav after he had Navos put to death. See Melachim 1, perek 21. See also Hilchos Gezeila 5:13 that in cases where the accepted law allows the king to take property of his servants this is binding.

[9] Drashos HaRan, Drush 11

[10] See Rambam Melachim 9:14 who says that their mitzvah to appoint judges is only in order to enforce the other six Noachide laws. Even according to the Ramban who argues (in Bereishis 34:13) that they must keep the same legal system as us, there is certainly no requirement for them to separate the powers of the king and judiciary in the same way.

[11] One could make an argument that only a king appointed according to halacha has any power at all, but see Amud Hayemini siman  who explains why this is not the case.

[12] Although we do not have a Sanhedrin at the moment, we do have the laws of the Torah which must be kept to. The function of the Sanhedrin is primarily to interpret these laws. They also have power to make new institutions, but when there is no Sanhedrin this power is only in the hands of all (or virtually all) of the Rabbis if they agree to use it. See Nezikin- the part of the Torah that we can change and How does halacha work?

[13] This is a complicated issue. Theoretically, even if we believe that the government are mistaken we must recognise that the government are entrusted to make decisions of this nature. However, if their view of what is ‘good for the country’ is based on a value system different to that of the Torah, this is probably not valid. This is certainly true when the motivation is merely to relieve international pressure, felt only by the heads of the government themselves.

[14] Bava Kama 27b-28a

[15] See Mishne l’Melech, Hilchos Avadim 5:3 who provides a source for the rulings of the Rambam. See also Nesivos Hamishpat 4:1.

[16] See Ohr Sameach, Mamrim 4:7 who makes a similar argument concerning attempted prevention of aveiros.

[17] See R’ Shaul Yisraeli’s article in Techumin 25, on the topic of עביד איניש דינא לנפשיה.