Wisdom of the Nations

As we approach Chanuka, the time that we celebrate victory over the Greek Empire and the Hellenism that went with it, it is appropriate to try to make sense of the comments Chazal make about foreign culture and when it is right to learn from it.

The damage caused by ‘Greek wisdom’

The gemara relates that towards the end of the Hasmonean dynasty two brothers fought over the throne, causing a civil war. One controlled Yerushalayim while the other set up a siege on the outside. However, there was co-operation concerning the service of the Beis Hamikdash, and sacrificial animals were lifted over the city walls for this purpose.

This situation continued until an elder used ‘Greek wisdom’ to communicate to the besiegers that the city would not fall as long as the sacrifices continued. The next day a pig was lifted over the walls, it dug its nails in to the wall and all of Eretz Yisrael (figuratively) shook. At that time the rabbis declared a curse on anyone who either raises pigs or teaches Greek wisdom. Those who were close to the monarchy were given special dispensation to use Greek wisdom.[1]

Many questions arise here. Why was the use of Greek wisdom necessary to be able to communicate the message about the service in the Beis Hamikdash? If Greek wisdom is something intrinsically connected to immoral or disloyal behaviour, why was its use permitted beforehand? And why was special dispensation given to some?

Rashi translates ‘Greek wisdom’ as ‘hints’.[2] According to this it seems that the elder did not want to openly advise the prevention of sacrifices, out of fear for how this would be perceived by those who understood their significance.[3] Perhaps there is no inherent problem with Greek wisdom, but Chazal prohibited its use so that people would remember what happened when it was used for bad.

In contrast, the Meiri explains that ‘Greek wisdom’ was forbidden it captures the mind and destroys many of the cornerstones of religion. because Nevertheless, a leniency was given for those close to the monarchy because without this they would not have any influence. Thus they needed to put themselves in potential spiritual danger in order to help protect religion for the masses.[4]

Jewish attitudes to philosophy

These different views of what Greek wisdom is may reflect on how we are supposed to view Greek culture as a whole, and what Chanuka should mean to us. The Maharal writes that the Greek kingdom was naturally opposed to the Torah because of its supremacy over their wisdom. He explains that this superiority stems from the fact that the Torah is from G-d and therefore supernatural. They also fought against the Beis Hamikdash because of its Divine Holiness.[5]

It is apparent in many places that this negative view of the Greeks affected the way the Maharal related to their scholars, holding them in very low regard.[6] He is fundamentally opposed to the way philosophy focuses on what can be understood using human intellect, claiming that the wisdom of the Torah is not just on a higher level but on a different plane.[7]

The Maharal was well aware that this view was by no means unanimous, even within Jewish thought. The Rambam agreed with a huge amount of the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato, including the focus on human intelligence.[8] This earned him much criticism from the Maharal, and at times it even seems as if the Maharal considered some of the Rambam’s views heretical.[9]

The essence of Chanuka

According to Maharal, it is easy to see that Chanuka is a celebration of the triumph of the Torah and its followers over heresy and its followers. It is no surprise that he devotes a whole sefer (Ner Mitzva) to explaining the significance of this.

According to the Rambam one might think that Chanuka is less fundamental. If the Greeks were right about so much, what we are rejoicing over is less obvious. Indeed, Chanuka is not mentioned even once in Moreh Nevuchim, the Rambam’s guide to the principles of Judaism.

However, there is something basic to remember on Chanuka, according to all views. As we mentioned in ‘Divine providence, free will and Coincidence’, Aristotle believed that G-d is not concerned with our lowly existence on the Earth. This was one of the parts of his philosophy that even the Rambam was critical of. On Chanuka, when we celebrate the victory of the few over the many and the miracle of the oil, this point stands out.[10]

It is for this reason that Chazal tell us that the days of Chanuka were instituted for hallel and thanksgiving.[11] In fact, the Rambam puts the laws of hallel for all the festivals within the laws of Chanuka.[12]

Perhaps this is also why the Rambam writes:

מצות נר חנוכה מצוה חביבה היא עד מאד, וצריך אדם להזהר בה כדי להודיע הנס ולהוסיף בשבח האל והודיה לו על הנסים שעשה לנו.

(הלכות מגילה וחנוכה פ"ד הי"ב)

The mitzvah of Ner Chanuka is very dear, and one must be careful with it in order to transmit the (message of the) miracle and to add praise of G-d and thanks to Him for the miracles that He did for us.

(Hilchos Megila v’Chanuka 4:12)

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[1] Sotah 49b, and other places.

[2] Menachos 64b

[3] See ‘He has no physical form’

[4] This is the explanation the Meiri gives in Bava Kama 83a. However,  in Sotah 47a he explains like Rashi.

[5] Ner Mitzva, at the beginning of part 2.

[6] See Tiferes Yisrael chapters 6, 9, 16 and throughout the sefer.

[7] Ibid. chapters 7-8

[8] For example, at the beginning of part 2 of Moreh Nevuchim the Rambam writes that twenty-five introductory rules are needed to prove the fundamentals of our faith. For the proof of twenty-four of them he merely references to Aristotle and those who followed him. See also part 1 perek 68, where he agrees to the philosophers’ description of G-d’s intellect.

[9] In Tiferes Yisrael chapters 5-7 he strongly argues with the Rambam over a number of issues. He also argues with the Ramban there, but his language in doing so is far more respectful. In the continuation of the sefer he constantly attacks the views of the philosophers (now omitting the fact that the Rambam concurred with them), in chapter 10 describing their preference of studying metaphysics as ‘complete heresy’.

However, it should also be pointed out that in Be’er Hagola, Be’er 4 chapter 1, the Maharal heaps praises on the Rambam. It is not clear to me how to resolve this seeming contradiction.

[10] See Moreh Nevuchim 2:25 where the Rambam writes that the proof that the world was created (and did not always exist) is from the miracles described by the Nevi’im.

[11] Shabbos 21b

[12] Hilchos Megila v’Chanuka, 3:6-14

The right to resist abuse of power

Various current events have led me to try to clarify the Torah’s view of this issue, for myself as well as for others. Although protests against government decisions are common worldwide, discussion usually focuses on practicality rather than on what is right.

To demonstrate the importance of this question, two extreme possibilities should be pointed out. One theoretical option would be to say that no-one should ever take the law into his own hands. We may sometimes hear comments like this, but it is reasonably obvious that they are not meant literally. Those who ‘illegally’ defied the Nazi regime by saving lives are rightly seen as heroes by all.

The other extreme is also clearly wrong. If every minor injustice was immediately fought against violently, it would lead to a world where ‘each man swallows up his fellow’.[1]

Most cases are in between. If we think about the terrorism of Nelson Mandela in his struggle against apartheid, the poll tax riots of 1990 in England, and the various militias that operated in Mandatory Palestine, we may have firm opinions about their legitimacy. But to formulate rules for what is acceptable when is less straightforward.

Examples in Tanach

There are many examples of popular protests in Tanach, although mostly to my knowledge there is little evidence to show whether this behaviour is appropriate or not.

One case that we may be able to learn from is the tragedy of the splitting of the Ten Tribes from the Davidic dynasty. After Rechavam foolishly insists that not only will he not ease the burden imposed on the people by his father Shlomo, but will increase it, there is a mass revolt.[2] Rechavam is severely criticised by the Navi, and the silent implication is that the rebellion is justified.

The logical extrapolation from this is that in countries with cruel dictators, it is acceptable to fight for regime change. However, this does not prove anything regarding protests against governments chosen willingly by the people, especially when the aim is not to overthrow the government but to reverse its decisions.

The limitations of dina d’malchusa

An important source here deals with resistance on a smaller scale. The Mishna tells us that one under threat by bandits or tax collectors may lie by saying that produce is terumah, or that it belongs to the king.[3] The gemara clarifies that the mishna cannot be referring to a regular tax collector, as in this case there could not be any justification for lying. We have a principle that ‘dina demalchusa dina’ (the law of the kingdom is binding).

The gemara offers two possible ways to understand the mishna. The first is that it refers to an unauthorised tax collector.[4] The second is more relevant to our discussion, that the mishna is talking about a collection with no fixed rate. In this case, even though the collection has the ‘legal’ approval of the king, as it is unfair one is entitled to evade it.[5]

The obvious question is how to define what is unfair. Any system would be considered unfair by some, and obviously it is not the right of every individual to decide for himself which laws he feels are moral enough to obligate him. It also would not be helpful to attempt to replicate the legal systems from the time of Chazal, as the difference between them and what is accepted today is huge.[6]

Perhaps surprisingly, there is little discussion of this issue in the early commentaries. The one source I have found starts with a different question. Tosfos ask why it is that a tax collector with no fixed rate does not have the dina d’malchusa, even if the law of the land allows it. They answer that even though the law technically gives freedom to the tax collector to collect as he wishes, common practice is that they collect fairly. Therefore, if he differs from this standard practice he is stealing.

From this we can learn that even when government officials have the technical freedom to impose the law as they choose, if they do so in an unusual way we have the right to resist. It seems reasonable to extrapolate from here to cases where a regime acts unacceptably in the eyes of the vast majority of the world, to the extent that sanctions are imposed upon them (as in apartheid South Africa). This is not always easy to measure, but at least we have a guideline.

The rights of a Jewish king and his limits

The above is true for non-Jewish countries. When it comes to Jewish rule in Eretz Yisrael the Torah imposes stricter regulations.

The Rambam codifies all the powers of a king in detail.[7] To generalise, he can collect taxes and forcibly purchase goods and services from anyone, but he cannot confiscate private property without fair payment. He has the right to quash any rebellion against his rule by punishing the perpetrators by death or other physical means, but even in such cases he cannot expropriate the possessions of others.[8]

The Ran explains at length that the responsibility for everyday justice and enforcement of the laws of the Torah is the job of the Sanhedrin. The king’s responsibility is to ensure that the country functions orderly, as well as making temporary alterations to suit the needs of the time.[9]

Today in most countries the government controls more than what the king once did. They are responsible for common law and its enforcement, as well as management of the economy and temporary measures. The function of the judiciary is (broadly speaking) limited to interpretation of the law and ascertaining when it has been breached.

This situation is acceptable in non-Jewish countries, as the Noachide laws obligate only that some justice system is applied.[10] As Jews in Eretz Yisrael we must follow all the laws of the Torah, including recognition of the separation of power between the king (or recognized government[11]) and the Sanhedrin.[12] When the government or its agents in the secular courts exercise power that is not rightfully theirs, and decide something contrary to Torah law, this should be protested.

For example, if the government or court decides that a settlement must be destroyed for ‘legal’ reasons contrary to halacha, this is not binding. If they decide to do so not because of the law, but as a practical step aimed genuinely for the good of the country, this may be within their rights.[13]

The manner of protest

When a person is clearly wronged, the gemara tells us that he has the right to enforce the law for himself and prevent others from causing him damage.[14] A straightforward reading seems to indicate that when necessary, it is even permitted to use violence. However, in various places the Rambam prohibits this and the final halacha is unclear.[15]

Practically, even if we can rely on the straightforward reading of the gemara there usually is no justification for violence when it comes to wrongdoings of the government. Such resistance has virtually no chance of achieving its aim, and hence there is no reason to allow it.[16]

Another important point is that there is definitely no excuse for inflicting damage in order to threaten and pressurise the government into changing its ways (terrorism). The leniency found in the gemara is only when the prevention of wrongdoing is direct.[17]

The one time when we definitely must resort to violence if necessary is if human life is in direct danger. If our enemies are trying to kill us by any method, we must make innocent lives our first priority, however politically incorrect it may be. The criticism that some have received for stating this obvious rule is reprehensible.

May Hashem give our leaders the courage and wisdom to act justly, so that we should never need to implement any of the above.

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[1] Avos 3:2

[2] Melachim 1, perek 12

[3] Nedarim 27b-28a

[4] The rishonim explain that the king used to sell the right to collect tax to individuals (an early form of privatisation). Thus it was not uncommon for people to start collecting without formal approval, assuming that the king would agree retrospectively.

[5] The rishonim explain that if tax is taken randomly, or the ‘law’ applies to some and not others, this is robbery and not din.

[6] For example, according to Chazal the amount of tax a person pays is not dependent on his income, but on the benefit he gets from the use of the money. See Bava Basra 7b that determining factors are family size, amount of property (one who has more of either pays more as he has more to protect), and proximity to the city wall (one who is closer pays more, as he is protected from a higher likelihood of damage).

[7] Hilchos Melachim 3:8-4:10.

[8] Ibid. 3:8. The Rambam  may have learned this from the case of the field of Navos, possessed by the wicked king Achav after he had Navos put to death. See Melachim 1, perek 21. See also Hilchos Gezeila 5:13 that in cases where the accepted law allows the king to take property of his servants this is binding.

[9] Drashos HaRan, Drush 11

[10] See Rambam Melachim 9:14 who says that their mitzvah to appoint judges is only in order to enforce the other six Noachide laws. Even according to the Ramban who argues (in Bereishis 34:13) that they must keep the same legal system as us, there is certainly no requirement for them to separate the powers of the king and judiciary in the same way.

[11] One could make an argument that only a king appointed according to halacha has any power at all, but see Amud Hayemini siman  who explains why this is not the case.

[12] Although we do not have a Sanhedrin at the moment, we do have the laws of the Torah which must be kept to. The function of the Sanhedrin is primarily to interpret these laws. They also have power to make new institutions, but when there is no Sanhedrin this power is only in the hands of all (or virtually all) of the Rabbis if they agree to use it. See Nezikin- the part of the Torah that we can change and How does halacha work?

[13] This is a complicated issue. Theoretically, even if we believe that the government are mistaken we must recognise that the government are entrusted to make decisions of this nature. However, if their view of what is ‘good for the country’ is based on a value system different to that of the Torah, this is probably not valid. This is certainly true when the motivation is merely to relieve international pressure, felt only by the heads of the government themselves.

[14] Bava Kama 27b-28a

[15] See Mishne l’Melech, Hilchos Avadim 5:3 who provides a source for the rulings of the Rambam. See also Nesivos Hamishpat 4:1.

[16] See Ohr Sameach, Mamrim 4:7 who makes a similar argument concerning attempted prevention of aveiros.

[17] See R’ Shaul Yisraeli’s article in Techumin 25, on the topic of עביד איניש דינא לנפשיה.

Shabbos and Shevus

The concept of shevus 

It is only natural that a blog for all Torah topics should have a post about something that plays such an integral part of our spiritual lives. But on the other hand, it would be virtually impossible to write an overview of the concept or laws of Shabbos limited to the length I allow for my articles.[1] Consequently, I have chosen a small but critical sub-topic, with many ramifications. 

As has become normal, I will start with the words of the Rambam (this time in Yad Hachazaka):[2]

נאמר בתורה )שמות כ"ג( "תשבות"- אפילו מדברים שאינן מלאכה חייב לשבות מהן. ודברים הרבה הן שאסרו חכמים משום שבות, מהן דברים אסורים מפני שהן דומים למלאכות ומהן דברים אסורים גזרה שמא יבוא מהן איסור סקילה. 

(שבת כא, א)

“The Torah says (in Shemos ch. 23) "You shall desist," implying that one is obligated to desist even from things that are not melacha. The Sages forbade many things because of shevus (desisting), some because they are similar to melachos, and some are forbidden due to an edict, lest a prohibition subject to the punishment of stoning be violated."[3] 

The commentaries discuss whether the Rambam really means to give a Biblical status to the rabbinic prohibitions related to melacha.[4] The truth is that this question seems trivial, as elsewhere the Rambam writes that all rabbinic enactments fall under the Biblical obligation to follow the Sanhedrin.[5] In my mind it is more critical to clarify in what way Shabbos is different from other laws, as rabbinic prohibitions are certainly not limited to the laws of Shabbos.

In fact the additional obligation to ‘desist’ on Shabbos is explained at length by the Ramban in his commentary on Chumash.[6] He argues strongly that this concept is Biblical, and tells us that we must rest on Shabbos even from things like business, moving things from place to place and measuring. Although these things are not melacha, one who continues doing them all day has not obeyed the command to rest on Shabbos.[7]

The Rambam broadly agrees with the Ramban about this obligation, although there seems to be a difference in the way he defines it. According to the Rambam the activities one must desist from are those similar to melachos or which may result in melacha being done. The Ramban does not mention such a requirement, and says that the Torah wants us to rest on Shabbos irrespective of the technical definition of melacha.

Extensions

The Rambam also agrees that there is an obligation to rest on Shabbos from non-melacha related activities, from a different source. He writes: 

יש דברים שהן אסורין בשבת אף על פי שאינם דומין למלאכה, ואינם מביאין לידי מלאכה. ומפני מה נאסרו? משום שנאמר (ישעיה נ"ח) "אם תשיב משבת רגלך עשות חפציך ביום קדשי" ונאמר "וכבדתו מעשות דרכיך ממצוא חפצך ודבר דבר." לפיכך אסור לאדם להלך בחפציו בשבת, ואפילו לדבר בהן, כגון שידבר עם שותפו מה ימכור למחר או מה יקנה או היאך יבנה בית זה ובאי זה סחורה ילך למקום פלוני. כל זה וכיוצא בו אסור, שנאמר "ודבר דבר"- דבור אסור, הרהור מותר.

(שבת כד, א)

“Some activities are forbidden on Shabbos even though they are neither similar to melacha nor do they lead to doing melacha. For what reason were they forbidden? Because it says (in Yeshaya 58) “If you rest your feet on Shabbos, from carrying out your affairs on My holy day ….. and you respect it (Shabbos) by refraining from making your journeys, pursuing your affairs and speaking about them.” Therefore it is forbidden for a person to pursue his (business) affairs or even to speak about them. For example, he may not speak with his partner about what he will sell or buy tomorrow, how he will build a house, or for which merchandise he will travel to a particular place. All this and similar to it is prohibited, as it says “And speaking about them”- speech is forbidden, although thought (about these matters) is permitted.”[8]

It is clear from this that although the original concept of shevus only includes melacha-related activities, in the times of the nevi’im this was expanded. Presumably those who made this institution felt that Shabbos could be enhanced by this, and that it would go further to achieving the same purpose that shevus was supposed to achieve.

Later on, this was later extended further. The Rambam writes that the rabbinic prohibition of moving muktzeh items on Shabbos is a natural extension of the above institution of the nevi’im. Another reason was to ensure that even those who don’t work during the week will have a Shabbos different to weekdays.[9]

Modern applications

The questions asked about the laws of Shabbos today tend to be very different even from those asked fifty years ago. The constantly changing technology that we use during the week forces poskim to think carefully about the fundamental principles of the melachos, as there is often no precedent or established minhag.

Sometimes there is almost total consensus that a particular activity is prohibited on Shabbos, but very little agreement about the reason. Two examples that stand out in my mind are the use of bicycles and of electricity. Both of these were disputed originally, and in both cases the poskim seem to bend over backwards to explain themselves.[10]

One of the reasons given to forbid these things is the issue of uvdin d’chol, literally ‘weekday activities’. This is in fact the general term used for the categories of activities decreed forbidden on Shabbos during the period of the nevi’im and later extensions), as described by the Rambam above.

I believe that this consideration is a crucial one, and possibly the real motivation the poskim had in their determination to stop the use of bicycles and electricity on Shabbos.[11] Without this determination, Shabbos today would certainly have looked very different. But more importantly, the distinction between Shabbos and weekday would become increasingly blurred and would eventually disappear entirely.[12]

It is also important to know where to draw the line. Imposing too many restrictions may lead to Shabbos becoming a burden, which can eventually cause rebellion and the opposite of what these restrictions were supposed to achieve.[13] Even if this doesn’t happen, sometimes the attempt to forbid something may simply be disregarded by the community.[14]

When a new technological development arrives, it can lead to long discussions as to whether its use on Shabbos constitutes a melacha or not. If it does not, we must not forget to think about the issue of shvus/uvdin d’chol, and what the repercussions of allowing or not allowing its use will be for future generations. This task is not straightforward, and requires much foresight. It also requires communication between poskim, as making this kind of decision without unity will inevitably lead to failure.[15]

This task is especially complicated when it comes to tools designed specifically to avoid halachic problems. Sometimes these appliances resemble their regular equivalents identically, with small operational differences inside them. Even if this negates the technical melacha (and this is often far from straightforward), the decision to make use of this must not be taken lightly.[16]

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[1] My judgement is that the best contribution I can make here is in pieces short enough to be read in a few minutes, but long enough to get across meaningful ideas in a comprehensive way.

[2] There is a source for this in the Sifra (Acharei Mos Parsha 5), but the Rambam presents it in a clearer way.

[3] Hilchos Shabbos 21:1

[4] See Magid Mishne and Lechem Mishne

[5] Sefer Hamitzvos, Shoresh 2. See also “How does halacha work?”.

[6] Vayikra 23:24

[7] Chazal decreed that many of these actions are forbidden to do even once on Shabbos, but this is a rabbinic prohibition.

[8] Shabbos 24:1

[9] Ibid. 24:12

[10] See for example Tzitz Eliezer 1:21 and Yechave Da’as 2:52 about bicycles, and Minchas Shlomo 1:11 and Tzitz Eliezer 1:20 about electricity. Obviously when a real melacha (like lighting a fire) is achieved by means of electricity, there was never any question.

[11] Although activities in the category of uvdin d’chol are usually permitted where there is even a relatively small need, I believe that it is fair to differentiate between different cases of uvdin d’chol. It makes sense to be stricter with activities that may take up a large part of the day, and significantly dilute our Shabbos experience.

[12] Already now, most electric lights work without anything getting hot. Even the writing on a computer screen may halachically not be a melacha, as nothing is tangibly changed (black is created by the absence of light and not by colouring any material).

[13] This may be one of the reasons for many leniencies the poskim have to allow people to walk freely in the street on Shabbos, irrespective of various motion sensors. At some point it may simply not be possible to leave the house on Shabbos without triggering various electric circuits, and it is not practical to tell people that they must stay at home all day.

[14] An example of this is the ruling of R’ Moshe Feinstein forbidding the use of time-switches for electricity on Shabbos (Igros Moshe Orach Chaim 4:60). His main claim is that this degrades Shabbos, which in his time was probably very understandable. Even he allowed the use of time-switches for lights, as anyway in many places the practice was (rightly or wrongly) to have them turned on and off by non-Jews on Shabbos.

[15] This point goes beyond practicality. When there is no precedent outlawing a particular action, even if it is clear that Chazal would have done so if it was relevant, the only mechanism we have to forbid it is making a new edict. This is only possible if it is agreed to by the overwhelming majority of poskim, as well as being accepted by the community. See “How does halacha work?”

[16] Many of these contraptions are developed for the use of those in great need, such as the elderly or the sick. It may be appropriate to stipulate that the device is only permitted for certain people, although this is not always practical. Sometimes it might be better simply to utilise existing leniencies for those in need, waiving rabbinic prohibitions or even biblical ones when there is danger to life.

Divine Providence, Free Will and Coincidence

Growing up through various stages of a religious Jewish education, something fairly ingrained in me was that there is no such thing as coincidence. I do remember one teacher mentioning that there are views that G-d does not intervene with unimportant matters, but this was certainly not considered mainstream.

It is perhaps shocking that despite spending most of the last 15 years learning Torah, it is only within the last two or three that I have investigated this seriously, but better late than never. The first thing that needs to be decided here is the method used to tackle philosophical questions, which texts are binding and how much is left to one’s own intellect.

The difference between halacha and philosophy

In “How does halacha work?” I explained the model of the Sanhedrin and the later equivalent of the Talmud.  In the first footnote I mentioned that whether the same rules apply to philosophical issues requires further discussion, and this is the place. The natural question to start with is whether the Sanhedrin have the same power when it comes to philosophy, essentially can they dictate what we are supposed to think.

The Torah seemingly tells us clearly which matters are within the remit of the Sanhedrin:

כִּי יִפָּלֵא מִמְּךָ דָבָר לַמִּשְׁפָּט בֵּין דָּם לְדָם בֵּין דִּין לְדִין וּבֵין נֶגַע לָנֶגַע דִּבְרֵי רִיבֹת בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ וְקַמְתָּ וְעָלִיתָ אֶל הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְקֹוָק אֱלֹקֶיךָ בּוֹ:

(דברים יז, ח)

“When a matter of justice will be hidden from you, whether between types of blood, din or negaim, matters of dispute in your gateways, you must arise and ascend to the place that Hashem your G-d will choose.”[1]

The Talmud Bavli explains that the question between types of blood refers to the blood of a niddah, as certain types of menstrual blood are in fact pure halachically. ‘Din’ refers to capital, monetary and corporal judgements, and negaim are the different types of tzara’as afflictions, some of which are pure and some impure. The seemingly superfluous phrase ‘matters of dispute’ adds also various cases of consecration, and the processes of the sotah, egla arufa (the calf whose neck must be broken when a murder has taken place and the culprit is unknown) and purification of the metzora.[2]

Clearly these examples are not exhaustive, but are meant to illustrate the different categories over which the Sanhedrin has jurisdiction. How to define these categories precisely is not so obvious, but there certainly is no mention of philosophical issues here.

In contrast, the Yerushalmi includes also aggadic matters, based on the word דבר at the beginning of the pasuk.[3] Based on this, some indeed understand that our question as to whether Sanhedrin dictates to us philosophical issues is itself subject to a dispute between the Bavli and the Yerushalmi.[4] If this is the case, the generally accepted rule is that the halacha follows the Bavli.[5]

It is possible to suggest that in fact there is no dispute here. Often seeming differences between the Bavli and Yerushalmi can be due to different styles. The Bavli tends to be clear and precise, whereas the Yerushalmi is more cryptic and poetic.

Bearing this in mind, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Yerushalmi also agrees that the absolute authority of Sanhedrin is limited to halacha. However, sometimes halacha itself can depend on philosophy. One who has heretical beliefs is not granted many of the special privileges halacha gives to the Chosen People.[6] But not every mistaken belief is heretical.[7] The Yerushalmi clarifies that the Sanhedrin has authority to fix which beliefs are heretical, but if heresy is not in question they do not dictate to us how to think.

Returning to our original discussion, I have yet to see any view about the way G-d oversees the world classed as heresy (as long as there is general acceptance that G-d does indeed oversee the world and has not forsaken it[8]). It follows then that the only authority that is binding here is that of G-d himself in Tanach. But the Tanach is far from clear-cut on this issue, and the same is true of Chazal. It therefore makes sense to start by quoting some of the Rishonim who did discuss this extensively.[9]

Rambam

The Rambam lists five ancient views that existed in the world about hashgacha (Divine Providence):[10]

1) There is none (the worthless belief of Apikores).

2) G-d cares only about the higher spheres of the universe, from the moon upwards (Aristotle).

3) Nothing in the entire universe is coincidental, all is decreed by G-d and there is no free will (the view of one group of Muslims).

4) There is free will, but all of G-d’s actions are with an intelligent purpose including what happens to animals, plants and the non-living. This also includes people being born with defects (the view of another group of Muslims).

5) All actions of man and animal are based on free will. All G-d’s actions are with justice, i.e. there is fair reward and punishment for everything. However this concept of reward and punishment applies only to man and not to animals[11] (the view of the Torah[12]).

The Rambam goes on to explain that his understanding of the Torah view is that G-d’s care for the world is dependent on seichel (intelligence or wisdom). The nevi’im have the highest level of protection, and others follow on a sliding scale. There is such thing as coincidence, but this is fair as those more deserving are less exposed to it. True, animals were born without individual Divine Providence, but this is no more difficult than the fact that they were born without intelligence.[13]

Who argues?

The view of the Rambam is endorsed by Ralbag[14] and R’ Yosef Elbo.[15] The Ran also says something similar, that G-d only changes nature in case of great need. It follows from this that some suffer despite their innocence.[16]

I have found no strong evidence that any of the early commentaries disagree with the Rambam in a major way. It seems that the first to do so was the Ohr HaChaim (1696-1743), who says that a person will never die by exposure to the elements or animals if he does not deserve it. However, even he agrees that human beings could kill one undeserving of death, as they have the ability to decide between good and bad.[17]

Not long after this, the Ba’al Shem Tov (c. 1700-1760) and the Chasidim stated that everything that happens is due to Divine Providence (although seemingly paradoxically they also accept the concept of free will). As already mentioned, the fact that they expressed a novel opinion is not to be held against them. However, the portrayal of this view as the mainstream is wrong and misleading.

Fallout

I believe that with an issue like this that can affect much of our decision making, everyone should figure out for themselves where they stand. Personally, as I have not seen any indication in Tanach or even in Chazal that Providence is all-encompassing, my assumption is that it isn’t. Crucially though, whatever a person thinks he must take responsibility for the consequences, both philosophical and practical.

One who takes the Chasidic approach must know how to explain how free will is not compromised.[18] He must also figure out how to understand suffering of the innocent, unless he is prepared to take the bold step of denying it entirely. Rationalists like me also have questions to answer, albeit in areas less directly connected.[19]

Practically, the way of the Rishonim is generally more conducive to taking responsibility for our actions. The assumption that in most cases G-d will not intervene, and our actions will achieve their natural results, is usually something very positive. Although the Ba’al Shem Tov certainly did not intend us to be passive and rely on Hashem alone, those following his path need to be aware of this possible danger.[20]

One reason many give for preferring the way of the Chasidim is the encouragement they can give to those who are suffering. They claim that it helps these people to understand that there is a reason for the pain they are experiencing.[21] Clearly this depends on the person, but in my view ultimately the opposite is true. Too often we have lost Jewish souls who simply could not comprehend what they or others had done to deserve the punishment they thought had been imposed upon them.[22]

In the short term it may also be hard for people to accept that they have been left by G-d to the mercy of the free will of others, and even to random occurrences. But once the importance of both free will and a naturally-functioning world are understood, it should become clear that even these events are in a broad sense part of G-d’s master plan.

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[1] Devarim 17:8

[2] Sanhedrin 87a

[3] Sanhedrin 11:3

[4] See Igros Har’iya, Igeres 103

[5] As it was written later, and those who compiled it knew the views expressed by the Yerushalmi and decided whether to accept them or not. There is some discussion about the position of the Rambam on this issue, but the truth is that he states clearly in his introduction to Mishne Torah (quoted in “How does halacha work?”) that only the Talmud Bavli is absolutely authoritative.

[6] See for example Menachos 42b that if he writes tefilin they are invalid.

[7] See for example Ra’avad, Hilchos Teshuva 3:7 who argues this about the view that G-d has a physical form. Even though the Rambam strongly disagrees there, he also agrees that some mistaken views are not heretical. See Moreh Nevuchim 1:71 concerning the view that the world was not created.

[8] Such a view is criticized strongly by prophecies of Yechezkel, 8:12 and 9:9

[9] I have only quoted those who are clear in their views. Some others merely hint to the issue, and the view of the Ramban is hard to determine due to apparent contradictions.

[10] Moreh Nevuchim 3:17-18

[11] The Rambam mentions that one of the Geonim accepted the Muslim view that there is reward for animals, see the commentary of R’ Kapach for a discussion of who he may be referring to.

[12] Elsewhere (3:10) the Rambam explains that the existence of defects is inherent to physical beings, and other than this fact there is no reason why people are born with them. As the only alternative would have been not to create the physical world at all, even the creation of these people is a good thing.

[13] There is much more to be discussed here, but my purpose in this post is just to provide a starting point for independent thought.

[14] Milchamos Hashem, Ma’amar 4 chapter 7

[15] Sefer Haikarim 4:10

[16] Drush 3

[17] Bereishis 37:21

[18] Here it is not enough to claim lack of mental capacity and leave the understanding up to G-d, as if so one should also not assume that Providence is all-encompassing with certainty.

[19] I have a difficulty explaining the role of the simpleton who is entirely devoted to Hashem but understands little about Him. There also seem to be contradictions in Moreh Nevuchim about this.

[20] I described an example of this danger in 'Building the Beis Hamikdash'.

[21] I once even heard that a certain Rosh Yeshiva felt this way so strongly that he removed all sefarim with references to coincidence from the shelves of the yeshiva.

[22] The claim that it could be for sins in a previous life is rarely convincing or encouraging.